VOLUME 104 • NUMBER 2 • APRIL 1999

The American Historical Review

AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION



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The ***American Historical Review*** appears in February, April, June, October, and December of each year. It is published by the American Historical Association, 400 A Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 (202-544-2422) and is printed and mailed by Cadmus Journal Services, 2901 Byrdhill Road, Richmond, Virginia 23228. The editorial offices are located at 914 Atwater, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 47405 (812) 855-7609.

Our editorial e-mail address is ahr@indiana.edu.

The *AHR* is sent to members of the American Historical Association and to institutions holding subscriptions. Membership dues: Contributing Member, $150 annually; for incomes over $70,000, $123; over $55,000, $103; over $45,000, $92; over $35,000, $77; over $20,000, $66; under $20,000, $36; for students, $31; for teachers of K-12 (AHA/OHT/SHE/NHEN), $66; for K-12 with the *Review*, $92; for joint members or spouse/partners, $36; for associate members (nonhistorians), $46; a life membership is $2,600. The proportion of dues allocated to the *AHR* is $17.00. Subscription rates effective for volume 104: Class I, *American Historical Review* only, United States $90.00, foreign $102.00. Further information on membership, subscriptions, and the ordering of back issues is contained on the two pages—1(a) and 2(a)—immediately preceding the advertisements.

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Postmaster: Please send notification (Form 3579) regarding undelivered journals to: American Historical Association, 400 A ST SE, Washington, DC 20003. Publication identification number: *American Historical Review* (ISSN 0002-8762).

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In This Issue

This issue contains three articles, an *AHR Forum*, and a review essay. The articles examine the financial foundations of the West African slave trade, the role of gratitude in Cuban-American relations since the war of 1898, and the gendered character of resistance in communist Poland. The *Forum* explores changing perspectives on early modern British history by viewing it in an Atlantic context. It contains four essays and a comment. The review essay analyzes studies of the Cold War produced after the opening up of archives in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In addition, the issue includes a full complement of book reviews and film reviews.

Articles

Paul E. Lovejoy and **David Richardson** examine the financial context of the eighteenth-century West African slave trade in the Bight of Biafra, or the Niger Delta. They focus on the ability of British merchants to advance credit to local Biafran traders and, in alliance with them, to devise institutional and other mechanisms to protect their credit arrangements. Lovejoy and Richardson argue that the personal ties British merchants tried to cultivate with Biafran traders proved inadequate as a basis for credit relations. As a result, the merchants developed other instruments, including the appropriation and adaptation of local credit-based institutions such as human pawnship. Equally important, Lovejoy and Richardson develop their argument by drawing on insights from the new institutional economics and thus demonstrate the value of institutionally based approaches to economics for the study and teaching of history. Their article also sheds light on the development of cross-cultural trade as a part of the evolution of the Atlantic economy in the early modern period.

Louis A. Pérez, Jr., analyzes the principal narrative formulations by which the United States fixed the representations of the war with Spain in 1898. He contends that, early on, the notion of a war of lofty purpose selflessly waged and won entirely by the United States emerged as the dominant narrative of the conflict. It served as a set of assumptions from which historical knowledge and public policy were derived, with far-reaching implications. Pérez argues that it rearranged the relationship of Cubans to their own independence no less than it redefined the

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Cuban relationship to the United States. Cubans were henceforth proclaimed beneficiaries of the generosity of the United States, to whom they owed their deliverance and for which they were expected to be properly grateful. The North American representation of 1898, he insists, must be considered as the dominant discursive modality by which the United States parlayed its version of 1898 into the larger logic of domination. Most critically, the proposition that influence over Cuba was properly derived and justly exercised as a function of services rendered became central to the resilience of U.S. hegemony over Cuba between 1899 and 1959. At the same, Pérez explains, the matter of 1898 also reached deeply into Cuban national sensibilities and implicated the very sources of nationhood. The challenge to U.S. hegemony, Cubans understood, was obliged first to revisit 1898 and contest the dominant representations by which Cubans were denied agency in their own independence. Pérez concludes that it was no coincidence that the new Cuban leadership reopened the debate on 1898 simultaneously with the triumph of the revolution in 1959. His essay convincingly demonstrates the importance of examining the cultural and psychological sources of national relationships, the uses and abuses of historical narratives, and the interaction of domestic and foreign affairs.

Padraic Kenney proposes a new way to look at the state and opposition in communist regimes. He contends that in Poland, where resistance to communism was more vigorous than in any other communist state, the historiography has focused on dramatic clashes. Prime among these are the December 1970 conflict that ended in the massacre of shipyard workers and the events of August 1980 that culminated in the creation of the Solidarity independent trade union. Kenney argues, though, that the opposing sides in these clashes, both overwhelmingly male, actually shared many common assumptions about work, politics, and the division between public and private spheres. He contends that these shared assumptions were a reason for the opposition's limited success in changing the communist system. However, hidden behind the more famous conflicts, he finds a source of resistance much more threatening to the regime: women workers. Kenney chronicles protests led by women textile workers in Łódź in 1971, 1947, and 1981 to demonstrate that women's articulation of the needs of consumers, household managers, and mothers stymied communists, who ineffectually sought to appropriate that same imagery. By forcing the state to adopt an unsupportable rhetoric of consumer and family welfare, he maintains, these women workers struck a crippling blow to Polish communism and thus contributed to the fall of the regime in 1989. Ranging across the communist era and topics such as ideology, economic policy, popular protest, and memory, Kenney makes a persuasive case for placing gender analysis at the center of the study of state socialism.

AHR Forum

David Armitage begins the *Forum* on "The New British History in Atlantic Perspective" by arguing that nationalist teleologies and incomplete master-narratives have rendered the historiographies of "colonial" America and "early

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modern" Britain for the most part mutually incomprehensible. He points to earlier models by J. R. Seeley in the 1880s and J. G. A. Pocock a century later as inspirations for histories of the Anglophone Atlantic world that would be comparative, integrative, and, most important, intelligible to historians of both Britain and Ireland and those of America, Canada, and the Caribbean. Armitage explains that the efflorescence of historical writing that goes by the name of the "New" British history has not so far extended its range of concerns beyond the Three Kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland in the early modern period. And he maintains that only historians of Ireland have taken any interest in Atlantic history. Armitage concludes that a rapprochement between historiographical models might usefully test the limits and divisions of the various histories they encompass, and can therefore provide both a set of problems for research and a more expansive paradigm for teachers of British and American history.

Jane Ohlmeyer examines where Irish history stands in the historiographical debates generated by the "New British History." She explains that, although the very phrase "British history" could be interpreted as excluding Ireland, in reality Britain ruled Ireland as a colony for much of the early modern period. After 1603, she notes, the British kings viewed Ireland as an integral part of their personal dynastic heritage, and the peoples of Ireland, particularly the Catholics, doggedly professed their loyalty to the crown. Ohlmeyer analyzes how allegiances had an impact on identity formation. She suggests that a "three kingdoms" model offers historians an opportunity to examine the cultural, linguistic, dynastic, economic, religious, and geographic ties that bound—as well as divided—the Stuart monarchies. Ohlmeyer also addresses the distinctive role that Ireland, which served as a laboratory of empire, played in the Atlantic world in the seventeenth century. She ends by questioning the nature of Irish exceptionalism during an era when Ireland formed an integral component of both a wider multiple monarchy and a burgeoning Atlantic empire.

Ned C. Landsman shifts the focus to Scotland and the issue of Scottish involvement with the Americas in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He notes that most studies of nationality in early American settlement rely on ethnicity as an organizing principle and use it to consider the acceptance or avoidance of assimilation. However, at the center of his approach is the experience of a national group within a multi-national state in the extended empire of early modern Britain. He maintains that, while Scots have long been known as a nation of emigrants, and their extensive participation in the Atlantic world is now well established, their activity in that realm was in fact quite particular. It extended only to certain areas at specific points in time. Landsman argues that the Scottish manner of participating was rooted in Scotland's experience as a nation long dependent on a multitude of involvements abroad and shaped by the almost simultaneous processes of British union and imperial expansion. Most important, he contends that Scottish participation in American colonization did not follow the familiar model of emigration and settlement. On the contrary, Scottish immigrants rarely attached themselves to permanent emigrant communities but instead regularly traversed the boundaries of

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settlements and provinces. As a result, Scots became a source of cultural and economic expansion and integration in colonial British America.

Eliga H. Gould uses the final essay of the *Forum* to argue that the American Revolution both highlighted and intensified the composite, multi-polar character of political authority throughout the British Empire. Despite the current scholarly emphasis on the integration of the early modern British Atlantic, Gould contends that the revolution was crucial in shaping later conceptions of the empire as a political community bound together by a combination of force, commerce, and sentiment yet lacking the uniform structures characteristic of a unitary state. Noting the contemporary debate over the "break-up" of Britain, he concludes by suggesting that historians examine the implications of this legacy not just for the nineteenth-century empire but also for relations between the component parts of the modern United Kingdom.

J. G. A. Pocock completes the *Forum* with a commentary on the four essays and the larger subject of the New British History. Indeed, he offers an account of "British History" as an intellectual, political, and historical necessity. He maintains that the history of many nations to which it relates must be understood in archipelogic, Atlantic, and oceanic terms, including both the ways in which it has been "European" and those in which it has been American and Pacific. Pocock insists on the need to resist both a hegemonic and an ill-thought-out "Europeanism." He delineates two crises of "empire" in which the meaning of the term itself was changed: the archipelogic crisis of the mid-seventeenth century and the Atlantic and American crisis of the late eighteenth. In both, nations and the relations between them were seen as coming into being and changing. Pocock concludes his comment by contending that the *Forum* focuses on a complex and deeply contested history, whose center is not the history of any one nation and thus therefore constantly shifts.


Review Essay

Melvyn P. Leffler assesses the new literature on the Cold War. He questions whether it leaves us with as clear and unambiguous a view of the Soviet-American conflict as some scholars suggest. Ideology has become the new mantra for interpreting the Cold War, but Leffler shows that ideology is used by different authors to mean different things. As a result, he argues that ideology must be studied in a nuanced way and linked to other causal factors to be properly understood as a factor in the Cold War. Binary categories of analysis pitting ideological considerations against geopolitical factors need to be put aside. Notions of culture, ideology, and national identity, Leffler contends, should be linked to an examination of political process and political institutions as well as to an analysis of material and strategic interests. And this must be done for all key participants in the Cold War. The opening of documents within the former Communist world, he adds, should not divert attention from the role played by the United States. The

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American role remains a critical part of the complex interplay of nations, alliances, interest groups, and revolutionary movements; that role, moreover, needs to be properly situated within a turbulent international system that was conjuring up its own threats and opportunities. Leffler concludes that too much of the recent literature obfuscates the conditions of depression, war, and genocide that established the context for the unfolding of post–World War II international relations.

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Redrawn by Keith Scurr, School of Geography, University of Hull, after a map in Kannan K. Nair, *Politics and Society in South Eastern Nigeria, 1841–1906: A Study of Power, Diplomacy and Commerce in Old Calabar* (London, 1972).

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Trust, Pawnship, and Atlantic History: The Institutional Foundations of the Old Calabar Slave Trade

PAUL E. LOVEJOY and DAVID RICHARDSON

"Pawns Will Live when Slaves is Apt to Dye."

Richard Rogers, Bristol shipmaster, 1788.[1]

WHEN ADAM SMITH WROTE IN 1776 that the "greater part of the exportation and coasting trade of America is carried on by the capital of merchants who reside in Britain," he was commenting on Britain's dominance of the North Atlantic world at that time.[2] The causes of that dominance and its connections with British industrialization have been the subject of much debate. For some, both industrialization and commercial supremacy stemmed from socioeconomic forces within Britain itself, among which early productivity advances in agriculture, success in creating a system of public finances, and a socioeconomic environment conducive to technological innovation have been seen as important. Others, by contrast, have argued that it was the fruits of empire that allowed Britain to emerge as the first industrial nation. Specifically, the slave plantation complex of the Americas is frequently seen to have been a major engine of capital accumulation in Britain, with Liverpool's late eighteenth-century dominance of the Atlantic slave trade and its subsequent control of the cotton import trade symbolizing the apparently intimate relationship between slavery and the rise of industrial capitalism in Britain.

Whatever contribution the Atlantic system made to capitalist development in Britain, the ability of British merchants to mobilize finance capital for commercial purposes was a major factor in turning the North Atlantic into "an English inland sea."[3] Following Adam Smith's lead, various historians have studied the mecha-

Earlier versions of this article were presented at the London School of Economics, Stanford University, University of Birmingham, University of Warwick, Northwestern University, University of Manchester, the African Studies Association (UK) Annual Meeting, Bristol, 1996, and the Canadian Economic History Conference, Niagara-on-the-Lake, 1997. We wish to thank the participants of these seminars and conferences for their comments and suggestions. We would like to thank Robin Law, Ruth Paley, Stephen Behrendt, and LaRay Denzer for various references and Ugo Nwokeji and Caroline Sorensen-Gilmour for their comments and assistance. Support for our research has come from the University of Hull and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

[1] Public Record Office (hereafter, PRO), Chancery Masters' Exhibits, C 107/12, July 20, 1788, Richard Rogers to James Rogers.

[2] Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* [1776] (London, 1900), 282.

[3] Russell R. Menard, "Transport Costs and Long-Range Trade, 1300–1800: Was There a European 'Transport Revolution' in the Early Modern Era?" in James D. Tracy, ed., *The Political Economy of Merchant Empires: State Power and World Trade 1350–1750* (Cambridge, 1997), 252.

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nisms and patterns of capital flows between Britain and the Americas.[4] In some cases, these studies have highlighted important institutional and other innovations for securing and protecting debts, including guarantee payment systems for post-dated bills of exchange.[5] Much less attention, however, has been paid to the role of capital in the procurement and export of slaves from Africa, which was seen by Malachy Postlethwayt as the "Great Pillar and Support" of the American plantation trade in the 1740s.[6] Nearly one out of every two enslaved Africans shipped across the Atlantic was transported in British vessels between 1660 and 1807, and in the quarter-century before British abolition, the British share of the trade accounted for more than half the slaves transported to the Americas.[7] Hence the slave trade in Africa depended heavily on the capital of British merchants, principally in the form of advances of trade goods to African dealers in slaves.

The levels of credit advanced to African merchants have yet to be quantified, and indeed quantification may be impossible. But the amounts advanced almost certainly grew in tandem with the magnitude of the trade and the opening of new slaving frontiers, both inland and along the coast.[8] Whatever the absolute levels of credit were, moreover, it is likely that advances by Europeans were as important in facilitating the seizure and movement to market of slaves in Africa as they were in allowing slave purchases and the clearance and cultivation of land in the Americas. In this respect, the credit situation in Africa mirrored that which underpinned American colonial expansion and the development of a transatlantic economy.[9] Without credit to African merchants, the scale of the transatlantic traffic would have been much lower than it actually was.

Compared to British America, where credit was a matter for negotiation between agents of British or European heritage who often shared family or other ties, credit relations in Africa almost always involved parties who lacked common ancestry and whose cultural traditions could not have been more different. Nonetheless, the evidence of rising slave shipments suggests that British merchants and African dealers in slaves were able to agree on forms of accommodation that reduced the risks of advancing credit for the British and allowed African dealers to compete with other groups in the Atlantic world for British commercial capital. But the mechanisms by which this accommodation was reached remain far from clear. The aim of this article is to explore some of those mechanisms in order to shed light on

[4] Jacob Price, "Credit in the Slave Trade and Plantation Economies," in Barbara L. Solow, ed., *Slavery and the Rise of the Atlantic System* (Cambridge, 1991), 313–17.

[5] Richard B. Sheridan, "The Commercial and Financial Organisation of the British Slave Trade, 1750–1807," *Economic History Review* 11 (1958–59): 249–63.

[6] Malachy Postlethwayt, *The African Trade, the Great Pillar and Support of the British Plantation Trade in America* (London, 1745).

[7] David Eltis, David Richardson, Stephen D. Behrendt, and Herbert S. Klein, eds., *The Atlantic Slave Trade 1527–1867: A Database* (Cambridge, 1999).

[8] For specific examples of credit in the slave trade in Africa, see Ray A. Kea, *Settlements, Trade and Politics in the Seventeenth-Century Gold Coast* (Baltimore, Md., 1982), 240; Philip D. Curtin, *Economic Change in Pre-Colonial Africa: Senegambia in the Era of the Slave Trade* (Madison, Wis., 1975), 303–04; and Marion Johnson, "The Ounce in Eighteenth-Century West African Trade," *Journal of African History* 7 (1966): 197–214. Joseph C. Miller suggests that European credit was at "the core of the complex forces that fuelled the transport and distribution sectors of western central Africa's eighteenth century political economy"; see *Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade, 1730–1830* (Madison, 1988), 187.

[9] See Price, "Credit in the Slave Trade," 335–36.

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how western Africa became integrated into the Atlantic economy and how in general British merchant-investors interacted overseas with local agents to work out mutually advantageous conditions for trade.

British merchants achieved their dominance of the slave trade by shipping slaves from various parts of Atlantic Africa.[10] Since trading and credit relations varied by region and by port of slave supply, Britain attained its position by adjusting to local political conditions, which were shaped to a considerable degree by the commercial and political elites who served as slave suppliers. We will focus on conditions at one African port dominated by British merchants, the port of Old Calabar, in the Bight of Biafra.[11] British merchants were easily the largest source of credit for slave transactions at Old Calabar before 1807, and how they handled credit arrangements with local merchants offers insights into the commercial strategies pursued by British merchant-investors elsewhere in Africa and throughout the Atlantic world.

We shall argue that British commercial relations with Old Calabar in the hundred years after the middle of the eighteenth century were in large measure a story of evolving institutional adjustments to changing economic and political parameters of trade. In seeking to tell this story, we follow others, notably Douglass C. North, Oliver E. Williamson, and Avner Greif, who have used insights from "new institutional economics" to explore in other contexts the relationship between institutional change and levels of economic activity.[12] Our analysis of credit at Old Calabar highlights a number of features of the personal and commercial relations of British and local merchants at the port, but, we argue, the adaptation by British and Old Calabar merchants of the local institution of debt bondage, or "pawnship," proved crucial as a way of securing credit until Britain abolished its slave trade in 1807. As abolitionist Thomas Clarkson learned in the course of his investigation

[10] For a survey of the ports of western Africa involved in the export slave trade, see David Eltis, Paul E. Lovejoy, and David Richardson, "Ports of the Slave Trade: An Atlantic-Wide Perspective," in Robin Law, ed., *The Ports of the Slave Trade (Bights of Benin and Biafra)* (Stirling, forthcoming).

[11] There is often confusion over "Calabar," "New Calabar," and "Old Calabar" and by extension to the ethnic designation "Calabari" and "Calabali" for enslaved Africans in the Americas who came from the interior of the Bight of Biafra. The confusion arises from the fact that Elem Kalabari in the Niger delta was often called "New Calabar" to distinguish it from Old Calabar, located on a tributary of the Cross River, the Calabar River, which has no connection with Elem Kalabari. For Old Calabar, see A. J. H. Latham, *Old Calabar, 1600–1891: The Impact of the International Economy upon a Traditional Society* (Oxford, 1973); Kannan K. Nair, *Politics and Society in South Eastern Nigeria, 1841–1906* (London, 1972); Monday Efiongh Noah, *Old Calabar: The City States and the Europeans 1800–1885* (Uyo, Nigeria, 1980); and Monday B. Abasiattai, ed., *A History of the Cross River Region of Nigeria* (Enugu, 1990), especially chapters by Latham, "The Pre-Colonial Economy: The Lower Cross Region" (70–89), and Noah, "Social and Economic Developments: The Lower Cross Region, 1600–1900" (90–108). Also see David Northrup, *Trade without Rulers: Pre-Colonial Economic Development in South-Eastern Nigeria* (Oxford, 1978).

[12] Douglass C. North, "Institutions, Transaction Costs, and the Rise of Merchant Empires," in Tracy, *Political Economy of Empires*, 22–41; Lance E. Davis and North, *Institutional Change and American Economic Growth* (Cambridge, 1971); Oliver E. Williamson, *The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting* (New York, 1985); Williamson, "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," *American Economic Review* 73 (1983): 519–40; Avner Greif, "Institutions and International Trade: Lessons from the Commercial Revolution," *American Economic Review* 82 (1992): 128–33; Greif, "On the Political Foundations of the Late Medieval Commercial Revolution: Genoa during the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries," *Journal of Economic History* 54 (1994): 271–97; Greif, "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," *Journal of Political Economy* 102 (1994): 912–50; and Greif, Paul Milgrom, and Barry Weingast, "Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild," *Journal of Political Economy* 102 (1994): 745–76.

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into the slave trade in 1788, African merchants received goods on credit from the slave ships "for the purpose of slaving those ships, on whose account they travel. These are in a particular predicament, being obliged to leave a pledge or security for their return. This pledge consists of their own relations, who are detained till they come back."[13] The use of human pawns to secure goods advanced against the delivery of slaves represented, we believe, an extension of local credit arrangements to British ship captains enabling them to enforce repayment of debts in compliance with customary law.[14] Moreover, as pawns were subject to possible transport and sale in the Americas should they be unredeemed, ship captains were sometimes faced with making judgments about whether or not to sail with pawns instead of waiting for slaves to be delivered. The comment of Bristol slave trader Richard Rogers that is cited at the beginning of this article suggests that pawns were more likely to survive the Middle Passage than slaves brought from the interior, thereby tempting ship captains to sail with pawns rather than wait for delivery of slaves, despite the underlying premise prohibiting the shipment of pawns from the port. Hence Rogers's comment that "Pawns Will Live when Slaves is Apt to Dye" reveals a complex structure of credit and a mechanism for enforcement of the contracts implicit in slave transactions at Old Calabar, with those being held as pawns providing apparently good security for credit because of their connections with local traders. This institutional adjustment brought some alleviation of the risks to British traders of advancing credit at Old Calabar while allowing local merchants to compete for access to commercial credit. Pawnship, therefore, underpinned the expansion of slaving at Old Calabar before 1807. Once Britain abolished its slave trade and then sought to develop other forms of trade with the port, different mechanisms had to be found to secure credit relations.

To consider the impact of British credit on commercial institutions at Old Calabar, it is first necessary to examine the historical context of the slave trade there in the eighteenth century. We will then describe the extent to which a relatively few merchants in Bristol and Liverpool, on the one side, and Old Calabar, on the other, dominated the trade in slaves. This oligarchical structure, we argue, promoted personal interaction and resulted in longstanding relationships based on business, education, and friendship, but by itself was insufficient to provide the security necessary to allow British merchants to "trust" goods on credit to their counterparts at Old Calabar. We then consider how local institutions, notably the male secret society, Ekpe, and human pawnship (in Efik, the word is *ubion*),[15] were modified as debt-enforcing agencies at the port, allowing British merchants to advance goods on

[13] Thomas Clarkson, *An Essay on the Slavery and Commerce of the Human Species, Particularly the African* [1785], 2d edn. (London, 1788), 27–28. The second edition of the *Essay* included Clarkson's observations arising from his research in Liverpool and Bristol in 1788, as well as letters and other materials sent to him. Both Northrup and Noah have mistakenly assumed that Clarkson actually visited Old Calabar, but he never did; see Northrup, *Trade without Rulers*, 66; Noah, "Social and Political Developments," 95. According to Clarkson's own testimony before the parliamentary inquiry in 1789, "he had never been to Africa, but had made a Tour last Year through England, in the View of collecting Information on the Subject of the Trade to Africa; and in this Tour had passed Two Months at Liverpool, and Two at Bristol"; see Sheila Lambert, ed., *House of Commons Sessional Papers of the Eighteenth Century*, 145 vols. (Wilmington, Del., 1975), 69: 73.

[14] For a general discussion of human pawning in Africa, see Toyin Falola and Paul E. Lovejoy, eds., *Pawnship in Africa: Debt Bondage in Historical Perspective* (Boulder, Colo., 1994).

[15] Hugh Goldie, *Dictionary of the Efik Language* (Farnborough, 1964), 300.

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TABLE
African Slave Exports from the Bight of Biafra, 1701–1810

Period	*Number of Slaves*	*Proportion of Total Trade (Percent)*
1701-1710	10,867	3.4
1711-1720	21,956	5.5
1721-1730	38,295	7.1
1731-1740	34,069	6.6
1741-1750	99,870	18.5
1751-1760	97,968	15.7
1761-1770	152,076	18.2
1771-1780	119,005	16.3
1781-1790	175,428	20.4
1791-1800	151,365	19.6
1801-1810	100,567	14.7

SOURCE: David Eltis, David Richardson, Stephen D. Behrendt, and Herbert S. Klein, eds., *The Atlantic Slave Trade 1527–1867: A Database* (Cambridge, 1999).

credit with greater confidence than would otherwise have been the case. Finally, we explore the implications of the Old Calabar case for our understanding of British commercial and financial relations with the Atlantic world from the mid-eighteenth century.

UNTIL THE 1740s, THE BIGHT OF BIAFRA was a minor source of slaves for the transatlantic trade as a whole. Biafran slaves only constituted about 6 percent of the slave trade as a whole early in the eighteenth century, but the Bight of Biafra became a leading source of slaves, especially for the British trade, by the end of the century, when it accounted for 20 percent of the trade.[16] Annual shipments of slaves probably amounted to less than 3,000 in most years during the first three decades of the eighteenth century but then rose rapidly, increasing over fourfold from the 1730s to the 1760s, or from about 34,100 in 1731–1740 to about 152,100 in 1761–1770 (see Table). The trade peaked in the 1780s, when an estimated 175,400 slaves left the Bight, but then began slowly to decline up to and beyond British abolition in 1807 before experiencing a final resurgence between 1820 and 1840. Shipments of slaves from the Bight almost totally collapsed after 1840. About 900,000 slaves were shipped to the Americas during the height of the British trade from the 1740s through 1807. This represented about 60 percent of the total number of slaves, estimated at perhaps 1.5 million, who embarked on ships in the Bight of Biafra during the whole period of the slave trade.

Although British merchants took an increasing share of the slave trade on many parts of the African coast in the eighteenth century, the expansion of British trade was most heavily concentrated in the Bight of Biafra. Of the slaves known to have

[16] For information on slave shipments from the Bight of Biafra before 1700 and after 1810, see David Eltis, "The Volume and African Origins of the British Slave Trade before 1714," *Cahiers d'études africaines* 35, nos. 2–3 (1995): 138–39, 616–27; and Eltis, *Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave* (Oxford, 1987), 250–52. The slaves taken from the Bight in 1810–1840 were shipped by non-British carriers.

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left the Bight of Biafra from 1701 to 1810, some 85.8 percent left on British ships. French ships came a distant second, transporting less than 10 percent of exported slaves.[17] While some slaves were obtained from the region called "Calabar" in the early seventeenth century, most of these usually came from Elem Kalabari, not from the Cross River.[18] By the second half of the seventeenth century, English ships began to call at Old Calabar, but the trade remained relatively small until Bristol ships became active in the slave trade early in the following century. Much of the trade in the first three decades of the eighteenth century appears to have been in Bristol hands. Thereafter, sustained expansion in exports from the Bight of Biafra was almost entirely attributable to Liverpool shipping, although Bristol continued to be important until the early 1790s.[19] Based on a sample of 640,806 slaves, it has been calculated that Liverpool ships took 60.9 percent of all slaves leaving the Bight of Biafra, while Bristol ships accounted for another 20.2 percent. Of slaves leaving Old Calabar from 1701 to 1810, 49.4 percent (86,810 slaves in a sample of 175,684) went on Liverpool ships, a smaller percentage than for the region as a whole, while 25.1 percent (44,112 slaves) went on Bristol ships, and another 6.6 percent (11,560 slaves) went on London ships. French ships accounted for 13.8 percent (24,238 slaves), mostly from 1780 to 1793. Other countries accounted for the remaining 5.1 percent (8,964).

It is evident from shipping data that merchants residing in Liverpool and Bristol provided the bulk of credit advances that fostered the large expansion in slave shipments from Old Calabar between 1740 and the 1780s. It is also evident, however, that merchants at Old Calabar were not the only ones in the Bight of Biafra to gain by such advances, as merchants from the same two British ports dominated other ports in the region, notably Bonny.[20] Given this dominance, British abolition of slaving in 1807, though perhaps anticipated by well-connected merchants at the coast, still brought some disruption to commercial relations and credit movements at ports in the region. Unfortunately, evidence relating to the commercial relations between the British and local merchants at other ports in the Bight of Biafra is, at present, much weaker than for Old Calabar. Therefore, we concentrate on the management of credit at Old Calabar in the period 1750–1807 and, to a lesser extent, during the transition to palm oil trading following British abolition. The growth of palm oil exports attracted British merchants again, as A. J. H. Latham, Kannan Nair, and more recently Martin Lynn have shown, but in advancing goods to local traders they now had to find ways of protecting credit that differed from those used in the era of the slave trade.[21] Further developments in the

[17] See Eltis, *et al.*, *Atlantic Slave Trade*.

[18] For the early slave trade in the Bight of Biafra, see A. F. C. Ryder, "The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade," in Obaro Ikime, ed., *Groundwork of Nigerian History* (Ibadan, 1980), 238–41; Edwin Ardener, "Documentary and Linguistic Evidence for the Rise of the Trading Polities between Rio del Rey and Cameroons, 1500–1650," in I. M. Lewis, ed., *History and Social Anthropology* (London, 1968), 81–126; and G. I. Jones, *The Trading States of the Oil Rivers: A Study of Political Development in Eastern Nigeria* (London, 1963), 33–42.

[19] Eltis, Lovejoy, and Richardson, "Ports of the Slave Trade."

[20] For Bonny, see K. O. Dike, *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830–1885* (Oxford, 1959); and Susan Hargreaves, "The Political Economy of Nineteenth Century Bonny: A Study of Power, Authority, Legitimacy and Ideology in a Delta Trading Community from 1790–1914" (PhD dissertation, University of Birmingham, 1987).

[21] Latham, *Old Calabar*, 55–90; Nair, *Politics and Society*, 28–113; and Martin Lynn, *Commerce and*

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nineteenth century resulted in a series of institutional adjustments and economic crises that ultimately led to British colonial occupation.

AT OLD CALABAR, as Latham has shown, credit, and the mechanisms for guaranteeing that credit arrangements were honored, depended on "trust," as credit between European firms and African suppliers was known in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[22] Goods were advanced to "trusted" merchants in the river towns of the Niger Delta and Cross River estuary. These goods in turn were sent to interior markets controlled by slave traders from Aro Chukwu, whose dispersed settlements in the interior gained control of the slave trade in much of Igbo and Ibibio country in the course of the eighteenth century. Aro merchants in effect "bulked" slaves at their monthly fairs at Bende and Uburu for re-export to the coast, almost always through Bonny, Elem Kalabari, or Old Calabar, depending on the line of credit.[23] For Old Calabar, slaves were often sent to Itu on the Cross River, from where they were transferred downriver. Unlike Bonny and Elem Kalabari, however, merchants at Old Calabar traded directly with Ibibio country and with Cameroons.[24] Whether through commercial arrangements with the Aro network or with other merchants, the delivery of slaves liquidated debts that stretched into the interior. Liverpool and Bristol merchants had no direct access to Aro traders and other inland sources of slaves, but they could, and indeed actively sought to, establish good relations with coastal merchants, protecting their investments through institutional arrangements that could be enforced in these towns and apparently through similar means into the interior. It is probably not a coincidence that the great expansion in slave exports from the Bight of Biafra occurred at the same time as the consolidation of the Aro commercial "diaspora."

At any time in the second half of the eighteenth century, a limited number of Liverpool and Bristol firms dominated particular ports in the Bight of Biafra. Probably no more than fifteen or so commercial houses were operating at any one time, with usually twice as many from Liverpool as Bristol. At Old Calabar, partnerships headed by William Whaley and Edward Forbes of Liverpool and James Laroche of Bristol controlled much of the early trade in the 1740s and 1750s. William Davenport, who has left some of the most detailed accounts for the eighteenth-century trade, was a major Liverpool trader from 1757 to 1784 and perhaps the largest single British trader at Old Calabar in the period 1768–1774.[25]

Economic Change in West Africa: The Palm Oil Trade in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 1997). See also A. G. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa* (London, 1973), 112–66.

[22] A. J. H. Latham, "Currency, Credit and Capitalism on the Cross River in the Pre-Colonial Era," *Journal of African History* 12 (1971): 600–05; and Latham, *Old Calabar*, 26–28.

[23] For the Aro, see J. O. Ijoma and O. N. Njoku, "Highpoints of Igbo Civilization: The Arochukwu Period," in A. E. Afigbo, ed., *Groundwork of Igbo History* (Lagos, 1991), 313–30; Felicia Ekejiuba, "Highpoints of Igbo Civilisation—The Arochukwu Period: A Sociologist's View," in Afigbo, 333–40; K. O. Dike and Ekejiuba, *The Aro of South-Eastern Nigeria, 1650–1980* (Ibadan, 1990); A. O. Nwauwa, "The Dating of the Aro Chiefdom: A Synthesis of Correlated Genealogies," *History in Africa* 17 (1990): 227–45; G. Ugo Nwokeji, "The Biafran Frontier: Trade, Slaves, and Aro Society, c. 1750–1905" (PhD dissertation, University of Toronto, 1999); Northrup, *Trade without Rulers*, 113–45.

[24] Latham, *Old Calabar*, 46; Ardener, "Documentary and Linguistic Evidence," 106–11.

[25] Information on these merchants and their connections is to be found in Eltis, *et al.*, *Atlantic Slave*

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Davenport had been apprenticed to Whaley in the 1740s, and the Whaley-Davenport connection with Old Calabar was to continue into the 1770s and beyond through other Liverpool merchants. By 1785–1795, Liverpool merchants John, James, and William Gregson and Thomas and William Earle and Bristol merchant James Rogers were the leading traders to the port. Members of the Earle family had earlier been partners with Davenport, and the Earles continued to trade into the early nineteenth century. Moreover, another continuity in the concentration of commercial knowledge of trade at the port is evident in the close association of Sir James Laroche, member of Parliament and nephew of the Bristol merchant of the 1750s, with James Rogers, at least before Rogers went bankrupt in 1793.

Although the evidence is more patchy, the pattern of local merchant participation in the slave trade at Old Calabar appears to have mirrored that at British ports. A few Old Calabar merchant families, descended from the original Ibibio-speaking settlers but adopting a new ethnic name, Efik, dominated the African side of the trade. For most of the seventeenth century, when the scale of the slave trade was not very large, the principal settlement was at Creek Town (Obio Oko), but other wards or "towns" were founded, the most important of which were Old Town (Obutong), Duke Town (Atakpa or New Town), and Henshaw Town. By the end of the seventeenth century, Old Town, where the Robin family was dominant, appears to have emerged as the leading commercial ward, and it remained so until the middle of the eighteenth century. Old Town was located on the Calabar River downstream from Creek Town and was therefore in a better location to serve slave ships. Another trader active in the 1690s, Ephraim Duke, may have been the founder of the Duke family, which was initially resident at Creek Town but which established its ward, New Town or Duke Town, a few kilometers downstream from Old Town, apparently in 1748, and became a serious rival to Old Town as the slave trade expanded.[26]

By the last third of the century, there were at least thirty local traders at Old Calabar who were active in the slave trade; they are mentioned in a diary kept by Antera Duke (Ntiero Edem Efiom), fragments of which have survived for 1785–1788.[27] As many as half of these merchants were supplying slaves to British ships in

Trade; David Richardson, "Profits in the Liverpool Slave Trade: The Accounts of William Davenport, 1757–1784," in Roger Anstey and P. E. H. Hair, eds., *Liverpool, the African Slave Trade, and Abolition* (Liverpool, 1976), 61–62; Richardson, ed., *Bristol, Africa and the Eighteenth-Century Slave Trade to America*, Vol. 3: *The Years of Decline 1746–1769* (Bristol, 1991); Stephen D. Behrendt, "The British Slave Trade, 1785–1807: Volume, Profitability, and Mortality" (PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1993), 303; PRO, Chancery Masters' Exhibits, C 107/59, accounts of Sir James Laroche with James Rogers; PRO, Treasury Papers, T 64/286, Lists of Ships and Their Owners in the African Trade 1789–95. Also see A. J. H. Latham, "A Trading Alliance: Sir John Tobin and Duke Ephraim," *History Today* 24, no. 12 (1974): 862–67; J. V. Clinton, "King Eyo Honesty II of Creek Town," *Nigeria Magazine* 69 (1961): 182–83.

[26] For the background to the various wards at Old Calabar, see Noah, *Old Calabar*, 2–18, 48–66; Noah, "Social and Political Developments," 90–108; Ekei Essien Oku, *The Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar (1785–1925)* (Calabar, 1989); and Ukorebi U. Asuquo, "The Diary of Antera Duke of Old Calabar (1785–1788)," *Calabar Historical Journal* 5 (1978): 32–42.

[27] "The Diary of Antera Duke," in Cyril Daryll Forde, ed., *Efik Traders of Old Calabar* (London, 1956), hereafter, Antera Duke, "Diary." For the identity of Antera Duke (Ntiero Edem Efiom), see Asuquo, "Diary of Antera Duke," 35–38.

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the late 1760s, and each was associated with one of the Old Calabar wards.[28] Prominent among them were Eyo Nsa of Creek Town, Tommy Henshaw of Henshaw Town, and Egbo Young, Antera Duke, and Edem Ekpo and his son, Edem Efiam (both known as Duke Ephraim) of Duke Town.[29] Moreover, several of those active in 1785–1788 remained involved in slaving beyond 1800.[30] When Edem Ekpo died in 1786, his son not only took his commercial name, Duke Ephraim, but also continued the business. Indeed, the continuity in names is one indication that merchants were succeeded by their descendants.[31]

It appears, then, that a few trading houses controlled slave exports from Old Calabar between 1750 and 1807, just as a relatively small number of Bristol and Liverpool merchants and their agents or ship captains tended to dominate European trade with the port.[32] In this respect, at least, slave trading activities and credit relations at Old Calabar may have become embedded in social relations. More specifically, they may have come to resemble a situation described by Mark Granovetter in which agents had recurrent dealings with each other and might be assumed to rely on their past record of dealings to determine whether "a particular other may be expected to deal honestly."[33] It is important, therefore, to try to assess the degree to which trust permeated commercial relations at Old Calabar after 1740.

IT WAS OBSERVED IN 1789 that the "Black Traders of Bonny and Calabar" were "very expert at reckoning and talking the different Languages of their own Country and those of the Europeans."[34] British dominance of trade at these ports helped ensure, however, that English, often in pidgin form, became the language of commerce. There are signs that the leading traders at Old Calabar appear to have been both literate and relatively fluent in English or pidgin versions of it as early as the 1750s. In 1761, William Earle of Liverpool responded to a letter of complaint that he had received from Duke Abashy; Abashy's letter has, unfortunately, not survived, but those of some other Old Calabar merchants have.[35] For example, a letter dated June 16, 1769, from Ephraim Robin John to Thomas Jones of Bristol was later

[28] For the names of traders supplying slaves in 1769–1770, see Account Book of the *Dobson*, in Hasell Papers, Dalemain House, Cumbria. We are grateful to Mr. Robert Hasell-McCosh for permission to use material from his family's papers.

[29] P. E. H. Hair, "Antera Duke of Old Calabar—A Little More about an African Entrepreneur," *History in Africa* 17 (1990): 360.

[30] In 1805, Henry Nicholls reported that Egbo Young, Duke Ephraim (the younger), Eyo Honesty, and Antera Duke were active traders; see Robin Hallett, ed., *Records of the African Association, 1788–1831* (London, 1964), 197, 199.

[31] Latham, *Old Calabar*, 33–37; Nair, *Politics and Society*, 4–14.

[32] Similar patterns of British merchant participation in slaving voyages to other places in the Bight of Biafra are also evident; see Behrendt, "British Slave Trade," 301–03; Eltis, Lovejoy, and Richardson, "Ports of the Slave Trade."

[33] Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," *American Journal of Sociology* 91 (1985): 491.

[34] Evidence of William James, in Lambert, *Sessional Papers*, 69: 49. Also see John Adams, *Remarks on the Country extending from Cape Palmas to the River Congo* (London, 1823), 144. Adams, who was at Old Calabar in the 1790s, observed that "many of the natives write English."

[35] William Earle noted that he had only received one of several letters that Duke Abashy had written; see February 10, 1761, William Earle to Duke Abashy, Merseyside Maritime Museum

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submitted as evidence in an affidavit in a British court in 1773. Other letters were also presented to the court.[36] Hence it is perhaps not surprising that in 1773, Robin John Otto Ephraim asked Ambrose Lace of Liverpool to "Send me some Writing papers and 1 Bureaus to Buy."[37] Perhaps like Antera Duke, he used some of the paper requested to keep a diary; there are suggestions that other diaries were being kept *circa* 1800, at least.[38] Furthermore, we know that trading accounts were registered on board slave ships and that Old Calabar merchants kept their own accounts and "comey books" to record which ships had paid tax.[39] Thus in 1792, Captain Thomas Codd lodged provisions and gunpowder from his ship the *African Queen* with Duke Ephraim, Egbo Young, and Antera Duke and reported to the Bristol merchant James Rogers that he had "taken their receipts" for the same.[40] British–Old Calabar commercial relations in the late eighteenth century were, therefore, underpinned by a shared language, and, as Codd's experience indicates, Old Calabar traders became accustomed to at least some of the commercial conventions of European merchants.

Although many Old Calabar traders learned English without leaving Africa, some merchants and their offspring went to Britain to be educated.[41] In 1767, Ambrose Lace brought "young Ep[rai]m" (Robin John Otto Ephraim) to Liverpool for schooling. The youth was the son of Robin John Ephraim, alias King George, of Old Town.[42] In Lace's view, the father "has been Guilty of so many bad Actions, no man can say anything in his favour." The boy spent two years at Lace's expense at school in the city before returning to the coast, carrying Lace's hopes that "when his Fathers gone . . . the son will be a good man."[43] In 1804, Archibald Dalzel informed the African Association that "there are many negroes who speak English; and that there is rarely a period that there are not at Liverpool, Callabar negroes sent there expressly to learn English."[44] As seems to have been the case with young Robin John Otto Ephraim in the late 1760s, these students often lodged in the homes of the Liverpool slave traders, perhaps forming attachments to their families. In this respect, overseas travel by the Old Calabar elite helped cement ties with British

Archives, Liverpool, Earle Papers, Letter Book of William Earle 1760–1. We are grateful to the Merseyside Maritime Museum for permission to cite material from these papers.

[36] Ephraim Robin John to Thomas Jones, June 16, 1769, in affidavit of Thomas Jones, Bristol, October 21, 1773, PRO, King's Bench, KB 1/19 Mich 1773.

[37] "Grandy King George" [Robin John Ephraim] to Ambrose Lace, January 13, 1773; Robin John Otto Ephraim to Ambrose Lace, July 19, 1773; in Gomer Williams, *History of the Liverpool Privateers and Letters of Marque, with an Account of the Liverpool Slave Trade* (London, 1897), 542–48.

[38] Asuquo, "Diary of Antera Duke," 34.

[39] Antera Duke, "Diary," 29, 33, 41, 46, 54, 56, 60. The diary also suggests that letters were being exchanged between Old Calabar merchants; see 52.

[40] PRO, C 107/6, March 11, 1792, Thomas Codd to James Rogers & Co.

[41] According to Adams, *Remarks on the Country*, 144, literacy in English was "an art first acquired by some of the traders' sons, who had visited England."

[42] Evidence of John Ashley Hall, in Lambert, *Sessional Papers*, 72: 537. The connection between King George's son and Lace was made by those questioning Hall; Hall himself denied first-hand knowledge of the connection.

[43] Ambrose Lace claimed to have spent £60 on young Robin John Otto Ephraim; see Lace to Thomas Jones, November 11, 1773, in Williams, *History of the Liverpool Privateers*, 541–42.

[44] Hallett, *Records of the African Association*, 195. On the basis of Archibald Dalzel's report, Nicholls spent two weeks in Liverpool talking with students before he left for Old Calabar in 1805.

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slave traders.[45] At the same time, some of the merchants in Bristol and Liverpool visited Old Calabar as commanders of slave ships before establishing their own firms at home and thus had opportunities to develop ties with their Efik counterparts. Ambrose Lace of Liverpool and Thomas Jones of Bristol, for example, commanded ships trading to Old Calabar before establishing their own firms in the 1770s.[46] Sometimes, moreover, ship captains may have become attached to specific families in Old Calabar. In October 1785, for instance, Antera Duke referred in his diary to the house of Captain Potter's "mother" and "father." When Potter welcomed Antera Duke to his "father's" house, he killed a goat in accordance with local custom.[47]

Business relations at Old Calabar seem, therefore, to have become, in Granovetter's phrase, "mixed up with social ones."[48] In the 1780s, captains regularly attended dinner parties given by Old Calabar merchants, including parties on Christmas and New Year's Day. Captains reciprocated by hosting Old Calabar merchants on board their ships.[49] They also went on fishing trips together.[50] Discussion of business matters doubtless helped enliven conversations on such occasions. In this sense, these gatherings of masters and traders perhaps helped produce the conspiracies against the public interest that Adam Smith feared,[51] except in this case the victims were those who had been enslaved. While slaving transactions clearly took place at Old Calabar between agents of radically different cultural backgrounds—British and Biafran—some accommodation of these differences seems to have taken place through education, social interaction, and even fictive kinship. Indeed, efforts to personalize relationships contrast sharply with the endemic violence that accompanied and underpinned the slave trade.

Both British and Old Calabar traders used terms and expressions of endearment and familiarity in seeking to build confidence or to repair damage caused by disputes. As William Earle of Liverpool wrote to Duke Abashy in 1761, "You know very well I Love all Calabar." He also claimed that "I do not Want to wrong Nor I never did wrong any man one Copper," a reference to the local copper currency at

[45] Literacy remained common into the early nineteenth century, at least among the male offspring of the leading merchants. In 1819, G. A. Robertson claimed that "the greater part of the male-natives" at Old Calabar "can read and write English"; see Robertson, *Notes on Africa; Particularly those Parts which are Situated between Cape Verd and the River Congo* (London, 1819), 313. Similarly, in the early 1820s, Adams observed that the traders of Old Calabar "have had the sagacity to retain up to the present period" knowledge of English: "They have established schools and schoolmasters, for the purpose of instructing in this art the youths belonging to families of consequence"; see *Remarks on the Country*, 144.

[46] Eltis, *et al.*, *Atlantic Slave Trade*. In 1772–1773, Jones was involved in the repatriation of Little Ephraim Robin John and Ancona Robin Robin John, sons of Robin John Ephraim of Old Town; see Ruth Paley, "After Somerset: Mansfield, Slavery and the Law in England 1772–1830," in Norma Landau and Donna Andrews, eds., *Crime, Law and Society* (Cambridge, forthcoming).

[47] Antera Duke, "Diary," 39, 64; compare Asuquo, "Diary of Antera Duke," 40, who offers a different interpretation, identifying the "Potter of Antera Duke" as King Ekpo Iya Obo, "otherwise called 'Ekpo Ete' " of Eniong.

[48] Granovetter, "Economic Action," 495–96. Also see Sara S. Berry, "Stable Prices, Unstable Values: Some Thoughts on Monetization and the Meaning of Transactions in West African Economies," in Jane I. Guyer, ed., *Money Matters: Instability, Values and Social Payments in the Modern History of West African Communities* (Portsmouth, N.H., 1994), 309–10.

[49] Antera Duke, "Diary," 41–42, 52, 63.

[50] Antera Duke, "Diary," 37.

[51] Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, 282.

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Old Calabar. The personal dimension of this correspondence should be noted: Earle even passed on the greetings of his wife, who "Sends you her Love."[52] Similarly, in a letter dated July 19, 1773, Robin John Otto Ephraim asked Ambrose Lace to "Remember me to your Wife," almost certainly because he had known her in Liverpool when he was there a few years earlier.[53] Marital relations were certainly far different in Old Calabar than in Liverpool or Bristol, but this did not prevent traders on both sides from using knowledge of each other's families to try to cement relations. The language of sociability obviously permeated correspondence between British and Old Calabar merchants.

Many of the problems that created tension between British and Old Calabar merchants arose from the way in which slave ships conducted their business. Merchants in Liverpool, Bristol, and London delegated the responsibility for their affairs to ship captains, who might well jeopardize long-term relations in the pursuit of short-term gain. One source of tension was uncertainty over the definition of slaves, and the resulting problems that arose through arbitrary seizure and illegal shipment to the Americas of allegedly free persons. Such occurrences provoked "panyarring," that is, retaliatory seizure of goods or people, and perhaps most unusual, the poisoning of ship captains by Old Calabar traders in 1773.[54] Friendship and personal relationships aside, violence often accompanied slave trading and could be sudden and severe.

William Earle's correspondence with Duke Abashy of Old Town in 1761, noted above, began in fact because one of Earle's shipmasters had seized Abashy's son. In early 1763, perhaps in retaliation, traders from Old Town seized the master of the *Dalrymple* of Liverpool, temporarily held him captive, and confiscated some of his goods.[55] It is significant that Earle was part owner of the vessel, and, the personal nature of Earle's letters notwithstanding, the dispute over Duke Abashy's son had to be resolved. This was not, moreover, an isolated incident. In 1789, Duke Ephraim informed James Rogers and Sir James Laroche that two of his canoemen had been seized illegally. Ephraim complained that while he had been a "very good friend" to the ship *Jupiter*, owned by Rogers and Laroche, its master had sailed away with the canoemen, both of whom were "free men." In response, the outraged Duke threatened to "make Bristol Ship pay for them two" unless they were returned by "Any other Ship or himself [Rogers]."[56] Whether the two men were returned or Duke Ephraim carried out his threat is unknown, but the fact that those seized worked for Old Calabar's leading merchant at the time is significant. Even when

[52] William Earle to Duke Abashy, February 10, 1761, in Letter Book of William Earle 1760–1.


[53] Robin John Otto Ephraim to Ambrose Lace, July 19, 1773, in Williams, *History of the Liverpool Privateers*, 547. Also see Hall's testimony in Lambert, *Sessional Papers*, 72: 537.

[54] According to John Ashley Hall, two ship captains from Liverpool were imprisoned and poisoned in 1773; see Lambert, *Sessional Papers*, 72: 538–39. This incident, combined with the sharp fall in British trade with Africa following the outbreak of war, may have prompted King Henshaw, Duke Ephraim, and Eyo Honesty to write in 1780 to the merchants of Liverpool to assure them that "no whiteman shall be stop onshor any more long as we be Callabar and we make Great Law about whitemen not hurt and Suppose one family Stop any whiteman We Will Brock that family because all country Stand by that Law this time." The letter was published in the Liverpool *General Advertiser*, February 21, 1788. We wish to thank Stephen Behrendt for drawing our attention to this letter.

[55] Letter of James Berry, April 3, 1763, in Williams, *History of the Liverpool Privateers*, 533–35.

[56] PRO, C 107/12, October 16, 1789, Duke Ephraim to Rogers & LRoach [Laroche].

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Rebuilding trust? William Earle writes to Duke Abashy, 1761. Photograph courtesy of National Museums & Galleries on Merseyside, Liverpool.

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British merchants dealt regularly with Duke Ephraim, as Rogers and Laroche evidently did, the behavior of one of their ship captains could still undermine trust.

Perhaps the single most important event to undermine trust in British–Old Calabar relations was the "massacre of 1767," when British ship captains assisted in the entrapment and subsequent slaughter of some 300 Old Town residents and the shipment overseas into slavery of many more, including two sons of the head of Old Town, Robin John Ephraim.[57] The roots of the massacre lie in the ongoing struggle between Old Town and Duke Town for mastery of the trade and the right to charge "comey" and other fees on slave ships. The struggle may have intensified because the Seven Years' War in Europe disrupted levels of British trade with Old Calabar. The move to resolve the conflict by force began when the ship captains invited the Old Town merchants to the ships on the pretense of mediating the dispute between the wards. Critical in the deception of the Old Town merchants was their belief in "the sincerity of the proposition of the captains to bring about a reconciliation."[58] Illustrating Granovetter's argument that personal relations can be used to deceive as well as build trust, the massacre of 1767, even if it benefited the merchants of Duke Town, can ultimately have done little to promote "expectations of trust" in British–Old Calabar relations.[59]

In pursuing commerce in late eighteenth-century Old Calabar, British traders were plainly eager to cultivate good relations with the heads of local trading houses. Despite being implicated in the 1767 massacre, Lace benefited from rescuing Robin John Otto Ephraim and taking him to Liverpool, although Lace himself never returned to Old Calabar. In 1773, Robin John informed his benefactor that he supplied slaves to a ship commanded by Captain Doyle "because he told me you have part of his ship."[60] Other masters of ships expected to gain from personal relations with Efik merchants as well, but, while there are signs that "social content" may have infiltrated economic relationships in the region, this did not produce the "abstention from opportunism" that one might expect to arise from strong personal or social relations.[61] On the contrary, even when trust was apparently established, there was no guarantee that some deception by one of the parties might not undermine the order that underlay transactions. The ambiguity of social relations may have made it, as Sara Berry has suggested, "imperative for people to invest time and money in maintaining them,"[62] but the social relations that developed among the parties involved in slaving activities at Old Calabar did not prevent malfeasance. In such circumstances, other mechanisms were required to support

[57] For evidence on the massacre, see PRO, KB 1/19 Mich. 1773, affidavit of William Floyd of Bristol, October 5, 1773, and affidavits of Thomas Jones of Bristol, September 18, October 21, and November 15, 1773; Minutes of Evidence of John Ashley Hall, March 1–2, 1790, and of Ambrose Lace, March 12, 1790 in Lambert, *Sessional Papers*, 72: 515–60, 633–36. Thomas Jones of Bristol was involved in the repatriation of at least two of the Old Town residents. Also see the material reproduced in Williams, *History of the Liverpool Privateers*, 536–38; and the more recent discussions in Latham, *Old Calabar*, 49; Noah, *Old Calabar*, 17–19; Nair, *Politics and Society*, 24–25; and Paley, "After Somerset."

[58] Hall's testimony in Lambert, *Sessional Papers*, 72: 516.

[59] Granovetter, "Economic Action," 491.

[60] In the same letter, Robin John Otto Ephraim asked Lace whether or not the two boys he had sent Lace's son Joshua as companions had arrived in Liverpool. See Robin John Otto Ephraim to Ambrose Lace, July 19, 1773, in Williams, *History of the Liverpool Privateers*, 547.

[61] Granovetter, "Economic Action," 490.

[62] S. Berry, "Stable Prices, Unstable Values," 309.

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and protect commercial exchange and, above all, to promote the growth of credit that bound British and Biafran traders together.

IT HAS BEEN CLAIMED THAT, within Old Calabar, the institution that provided enforcement mechanisms for debt recovery was the Ekpe society.[63] Latham identifies the rise of Ekpe with the external slave trade, at which time "the Efik began both to receive and give credit, adopting a new institution, Ekpe, to cover the inevitable problem of bad debts. It was an elementary capitalist institution, of entirely African origin. Yet the credit which the Efik gave was dependent upon the credit which they received from the Europeans."[64] It appears that the foundation of Old Town in the second half of the seventeenth century was associated with the introduction of Ekpe into Old Calabar, and may have represented an attempt to manipulate the secret society to advance the commercial interests of the settlers at Old Town.[65]

Associated with the leopard, Ekpe has been well described in the anthropological literature as a masquerade and an exclusively male secret society that was divided into a series of grades under a chief priest/official, the Eyamba. Each grade, the number of which appears to have increased during the past three hundred years, required payment of dues to be a member, the highest grade costing the most.[66] Members of the most senior grade shared the income from dues of all grades among themselves. Wealthy individuals could purchase more than one share or finance the memberships of junior kin, thereby capturing a higher proportion of the income from dues.

According to Monday Efiongh Noah, those who introduced Ekpe tried to transform the society into an "effective governmental institution" that enabled the different wards to interact and thereby resolve disputes.[67] He concedes, however,

[63] On May 4, 1786, Antera Duke, "Diary," 45, recorded that Ekpe was used to collect a debt from Aqua Bakassey for goods advanced on credit; a payment of one slave was received.

[64] Latham, *Old Calabar*, 29–30. It should be noted that Latham suggests that Ekpe was only introduced in the middle of the eighteenth century, but in fact William Snelgrave had already documented its existence in 1713, and it is likely to have been introduced at least several decades earlier. See Snelgrave, *A New Account of Some Parts of Guinea and the Slave-Trade* (London, 1734), 7–12. Snelgrave referred to a boy, whom a prominent Old Calabar resident was about to sacrifice to "his God Egbo." An earlier incident witnessed by Snelgrave in 1704 was similar, implying that Ekpe was established by then.

[65] E. J. Alagoa, "Peoples of the Cross River Valley and the Eastern Niger Delta," in Ikime, *Nigerian History*, 61, citing Ado N'Idu, "Ekpe: Cross River Cult," *West Africa Review* (1959): 749.

[66] For early nineteenth-century commentaries on Ekpe, see "Letters of Henry Nicholls 1804–1805," in Hallett, *Records of the African Association*, 191–210; *Holman's Voyage to Old Calabar* [1828], Donald C. Simmons, ed. (Calabar, 1959); James Holman, *A Voyage round the World*, 4 vols. (London, 1834), 1: 356–410; J. B. King, "Details of Explorations of the Old Calabar River, in 1841 and 1842 by Captain Becroft and Mr. J. B. King," *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society* 14 (1844): 260–83. For more modern interpretations, see Noah, *Old Calabar*, 27–32, 48, 71–72; Alagoa, "Peoples of the Cross River Valley," 61–66. Also see Donald C. Simmons, "An Ethnographic Sketch of the Efik People," in Forde, *Efik Traders*, 1–26; G. I. Jones, "The Political Organization of Old Calabar," in Forde, *Efik Traders*, 116–60; C. N. de Cardi, "A Short Description of the Natives of the Niger Coast Protectorate, with Some Account of their Customs, Religion, Trade, etc.," in Mary Kingsley, *West African Studies* (London, 1899); Percy Amaury Talbot, *In the Shadow of the Bush* (London, 1912); Talbot, *Life in Southern Nigeria: The Magic, Beliefs and Customs of the Ibibio Tribe* (London, 1923); Talbot, *The Peoples of Southern Nigeria: A Sketch of Their History, Ethnology and Languages*, 4 vols. (London, 1926).

[67] Noah, *Old Calabar*, 30.

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that the effectiveness of Ekpe was only achieved with difficulty, especially since the society was initially associated with one ward, Old Town. Indeed, the foundation of Duke Town, also referred to as New Town, by settlers from Creek Town, apparently around 1748, appears to have been an attempt to counteract the influence of Old Town and its control of Ekpe. Inter-ward conflict, much of it doubtless related to struggles for control of Ekpe itself as well as access to the taxes and fees of slave ships, continued into the 1750s and 1760s, the decades of the great expansion in the trade. The most obvious manifestation of this tension was the 1767 massacre, after which Old Town, and presumably its domination of Ekpe, was undermined. Thereafter, Duke Town came to control Ekpe and to manipulate it for its own political and commercial ends, even securing the appointment of the younger Duke Ephraim to the office of Eyamba.[68]

By the 1790s, virtually all males at Old Calabar were being forced to purchase membership in Ekpe, if they did not join willingly. Those individuals who were not members of the society but were in the streets when ekpe was being "run" were punished, usually by whipping. In "running ekpe" through the different wards, the "grand council" turned the Ekpe society into a type of protection racket, akin in its operation to organizations like the Mafia, and with its religious functions seemingly subordinated to commercial and political ends. In the nineteenth century, political conditions allowed the society to function in the way that Noah describes and to become a more effective debt-policing agency. As residents of Henshaw Town noted in a brief history sent to George Offer and Company of Liverpool in 1877, the different wards lived separately, "each under its own laws except in the line of Egbo [Ekpe]."[69]

Despite political intrigue and commercial rivalry, Ekpe allowed the principal merchants "to put in force any law that may exist and to punish offenders."[70] Whether for debt enforcement or other things, the society's council had the power to "blow" ekpe, that is, impose summary justice on offenders, which could involve seizure and sale into slavery or execution of the accused and his family.[71] Often, Ekpe held families collectively responsible for the actions of its members. The ability to impose sanctions and otherwise enforce its decrees was assisted through the reduction to writing of the *nsibidi* sign language, which consisted of a series of over five hundred signs. Although it is not clear when *nsibidi* were first used, the spread of Ekpe, together with its rituals and symbols, required mechanisms for announcing decrees that resulted in the evolution of the system. *Nsibidi* were drawn on calabash gourds and walls, and signs were placed on roadways. By the end of the nineteenth century, at least, Ekpe members sometimes kept accounts and held court proceedings in *nsibidi*.[72]

Political and legal leadership was thereby concentrated in the hands of members

[68] Simmons, *Holman's Voyage to Old Calabar*, 12, 18.

[69] Brief Statement of the History of Henshaw's Town, Old Calabar River, West Coast of Africa for the information of George Offer and Co., London, December 30, 1877, PRO, Foreign Office Papers, FO 84/1527, as cited in Noah, *Old Calabar*, 30.

[70] Ibid.

[71] For a description of the sanctions that could be imposed, see Jones, "Political Organization," 142; and Holman, *Voyage round the World*, 393.

[72] Alagoa, "Peoples of the Cross River Valley," 62–63; also see E. Dayrell, "Some Nsibidi Signs," *Man* 10 (1909): 113–14.

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of a cartel who maintained control of trade and society through secret knowledge, including literacy in English and use of an indigenous script. Moreover, Ekpe spread into areas where Old Calabar merchants traded, together with the use of *nsibidi*. The Aro maintained their own secret Ekpe association, and Ekpe also spread to the Ibibio region along the Cross River and to neighboring Cameroons.[73] This interlocking grid of secret associations served to regulate the behavior of members and to control the trade routes that supplied slaves for the transatlantic market.

It is important to emphasize, however, that while Ekpe was involved in condemning debtors to enslavement and in policing other aspects of the slave trade, it did not do so in direct support of British interests, at least before 1807. On the contrary, Ekpe often acted against British interests by attempting to control ship departures and, as we shall see later, by trying to protect pawns on board ships. For example, on September 16, 1787, Antera Duke reported that "Grand Ekpe" had imposed sanctions on several ships to protect individuals from being wrongly seized.[74] Moreover, as revealed in Antera Duke's diary, Ekpe was not only an important agency in safeguarding Ekpe members and their dependents from enslavement but also in settling and collecting "comey" or duties on trade as well.

Clearly, therefore, Ekpe was used to collect debts and to protect members who were in debt, but its debt-related functions essentially applied to insiders. There are claims, based on nineteenth-century evidence, that British traders became members of Ekpe and could thus exploit its powers. As far as our evidence reveals, however, they did not, and perhaps were not allowed to, join Ekpe before British abolition in 1807.[75] James Holman, who was at Old Calabar in 1828, reported that masters of British ships were being admitted to Ekpe in the 1820s,[76] but, in our view, European membership was an innovation associated with the expansion of the palm oil trade, not with slaving, and arose from changes in both political and commercial conditions after British abolition. British membership in Ekpe became therefore the preferred method of securing credit traders to Old Calabar only when other methods developed earlier in the context of the slave trade were no longer effective.

IN THE ABSENCE OF A LOCAL POLITICAL OR LEGAL AGENCY capable or willing to act on their behalf before 1807, British traders sought security for credit, as Thomas

[73] Alagoa, "Peoples of the Cross River Valley," 61–62; Northrup, *Trade without Rulers*, 110, 156; Nwokeji, "Biafran Frontier," 93–94; U. N. Abalogu, "Ekpe Society in Arochukwu and Bende," *Nigeria Magazine* 126–27 (1978): 78–97. For the secret society at Bonny, see Hargreaves, "Political Economy of Nineteenth Century Bonny," 111.

[74] Antera Duke, "Diary," 59–60. "Grand Ekpe" appears to have involved sanctions imposed by or on the most senior officers of the society who comprised the council. It was designed from "ekpe," which might be "blown" by any member or ward of the society against an offending party. Members or wards might be pressured into removing the "blow" by senior officers or the council.

[75] On the basis of evidence from 1828, Latham, *Old Calabar*, 38, concludes that "several European traders joined the [Ekpe] society during the nineteenth century *if not earlier*" (emphasis added). Eyo Okon Akak may have misinterpreted the diary of Antera Duke to reach a similar conclusion; see Akak, *Efiks of Old Calabar*, 4 vols. (Calabar, 1981–83), 3: 292.

[76] According to Simmons, *Holman's Voyage to Old Calabar*, 12, "They sometimes admit Englishmen into this assembly [Ekpe]: Captain Burrell of the Ship Hayward of Liverpool held the rank of Yampai, which is one of considerable importance, and he found it exceedingly to his advantage, as it enabled him to recover all debts due to him by the natives."

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Clarkson recognized, by exploiting another local institution, namely human pawnship. Taking humans as collateral or "hostages" for loans of trade goods may be seen as an appropriation by the British of African value systems, in which people are more highly valued than territory: using debt to expand the number of one's dependents was a widely accepted means of accumulating wealth and power. But in conceding pawns to British traders, African dealers in slaves also gained, since the trade goods received in exchange, albeit on credit, increased their capacity to spread debt and thereby to create dependents. Thus, in underpinning credit arrangements in slave transactions at Old Calabar, human pawnship helped promote expansion of pawnship and slavery within Old Calabar itself and, indeed, in the interior.

Although we cannot establish the antiquity of the practice of pawning individuals as collateral for debts at Old Calabar or in its interior, pawning almost certainly existed before the middle of the eighteenth century, as E. J. Alagoa and A. M. Okorobia have suggested.[77] The earliest direct evidence of pawning in the export trade dates from the early 1760s; in 1763, for example, the master of a Liverpool brig reported getting "pledges" from the "Kings Town [Old Town], Dukes and Tom Henshaws [towns]."[78] There are other glimpses of pawnship in the 1760s,[79] and, by the 1770s, pawning was common in the slave trade. Thus John Ashley Hall, a London captain who traded at Old Calabar in 1772–1773, accepted pawns as collateral, which he reported to a Parliamentary Select Committee in 1790, as "the way the trade is carried on" in the Calabar and Del Rey rivers, that is in the estuary of the Cross River.[80] And there are references to pawning in Antera Duke's diary from the 1780s, and significantly, he used the term "pawn" ("pown," "paun," or "prown"), which he distinguished from "slave."[81]

"Commercial" pawning involving British ships was in principle governed by a more precise time schedule than its domestic equivalent, which by all accounts might continue indefinitely and even across generations, unless other arrangements were made. Often, such arrangements, involving women, resulted in marriage contracts that terminated the debt. Sometimes in domestic pawning, pawns became slaves, although the justification for such actions is seldom clear.[82] The possibility that commercial hostages might become slaves was, therefore, not the only situation in which the status between slave and pawn became blurred. Nonetheless, the commitment in the export trade to the delivery of slaves by a specified date in order to redeem pawns represented a significant modification of the institution of

[77] E. J. Alagoa and A. M. Okorobia, "Pawnship in Nembe, Niger Delta," in Falola and Lovejoy, *Pawnship in Africa*, 74. Also see Felix K. Ekechi, "Pawnship in Igbo Society," in Falola and Lovejoy, 83–104.

[78] Letter of James Berry of Liverpool, April 3, 1763, in Williams, *History of the Liverpool Privateers*, 533.

[79] Evidence of James Morley, in Lambert, *Sessional Papers*, 73: 149–54. Morley told the parliamentary inquiry that his ship, the *Amelia*, was at Old Calabar in 1763 or 1764, but from other evidence provided by Morley, it appears that the voyage in question was made in 1761–1762; see also Richardson, *Years of Decline*, 139.

[80] Evidence of John Ashley Hall, in Lambert, *Sessional Papers*, 72: 227. The Calabar River, on which the various wards of Old Calabar are located, is a tributary of the Cross River, while Rio del Rey flows into the estuary where the Cross River joins the Bight of Biafra.

[81] Antera Duke, "Diary," 86, 95, 109, 110, for the original pidgin.

[82] Falola and Lovejoy, "Introduction," in *Pawnship in Africa*, 4.

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domestic pawnship and may be seen as an important innovation, provided that the mechanisms and the will existed to enforce the contracts implicit in trade bargains based on credit. A number of important issues arise from these contracts, of which three are perhaps crucial in terms of the credit relationship involved. First, how was the number of "pledges" or pawns deposited as security for goods determined? Second, what protection, if any, existed for pawns and the interests of those that pledged them? And third, and perhaps most important of all, what evidence is there that British traders enforced contracts by sailing away with pawns when there was defaulting on debts?

The number of pawns deposited by slave suppliers with shipmasters appears to have been subject to individual negotiation, the outcome of which depended, among other things, on general trading conditions at the time of negotiations and the relative skills and probably the status of the parties involved. Including relatives of traders among pawns was clearly seen by masters of ships as improving the likelihood of contracts being fulfilled, although, given asymmetries in information of masters and traders regarding the relationship of pawns to traders, some deception by the latter in negotiating such matters was possible. Calabar merchants would not always allow their kin to be held as pawns, as a Liverpool brig discovered in 1763, when Robin John Town refused "a son for pledge."[83] Some pawns, nevertheless, were related to Old Calabar merchants. In 1762, for example, it appears that Archibong Robin John was a pawn on the *Amelia* of Bristol,[84] while in 1787 King Ambo was required to "give one of his sons to [Captain] Tatam" of Liverpool in place of a pawn who had absconded.[85]

Other things being equal, British shippers tried to obtain a high ratio of pawns to slaves. In April 1788, Richard Rogers reported trying to achieve a ratio of two pawns for every three slaves to be delivered to his ship, the *Pearl*; he was not alone in expecting such a ratio.[86] While ship captains naturally tried to increase their leverage over local dealers, Old Calabar merchants equally preferred a low ratio. Indeed, if possible, they preferred to trade without providing any pawns, since the incarceration of pawns on board ship represented a loss of labor and the costs of maintaining them apparently fell on the debtor. Such costs provided powerful incentives to redeem pawns on schedule or even earlier.[87] Moreover, pawning arrangements shifted much of the risk associated with advancing credit against future slave deliveries from the British to the Old Calabar merchants, because, in the event of default, unredeemed pawns could be shipped to America for sale. Pawnship gave masters of ships important insurance against default by Old Calabar

[83] James Berry, April 3, 1763, in Williams, *History of the Liverpool Privateers*, 533.

[84] Evidence of James Morley, in Lambert, *Sessional Papers*, 73: 154. For another example, see the account of James Berry, April 3, 1763, when four sons of Robin John Ephraim (Grandy King George) of Old Town were among the pawns being held by James Berry; see Berry's letter, April 3, 1763, in Williams, *History of the Liverpool Privateers*, 534.

[85] Antera Duke, "Diary," 59.

[86] For instance, James Arnold, in evidence to Parliament in 1790, reported that the master of the Bristol ship *Ruby*, which traded at Bimbia in Cameroons in 1787–1788, had released eleven slaves and some ivory to three local merchants in order to allow them to redeem pawns from another ship, the master of which was threatening to sail away with pawns. Arnold reported that the eleven slaves secured the release of "Six or Seven" of the merchants' pawns; Lambert, *Sessional Papers*, 72: 52.

[87] Antera Duke, "Diary," 35.

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slave suppliers. Credit arrangements at Old Calabar were therefore consistent with "economizing on transactions costs," but they also placed at risk the kin of local traders.[88] As John Ashley Hall observed in 1790, relatives were "always particularly anxious" about their fate and "seemed much distressed whenever they took up an idea that the ship would sail away with the pawns."[89]

The fate of pawns was, then, more than simply a question of protecting friends, relatives, and dependents; it went to the heart of debt enforcement. Much depended on the personal bond or trust between the ship captain and local merchants and, for those Liverpool and Bristol firms trading regularly to the region, between the ship captains and their employers. Since, however, ship captains were not always reliable, Old Calabar merchants had to find ways of safeguarding their pawns. Sailors were sometimes seized or "panyarred" to force the return of pawns.[90] But the principal method by which Old Calabar merchants sought to protect their pawns was through Ekpe. Antera Duke describes occasions when "grand ekpe" was collectively "blown" against ships close to completing their loading of slaves and perhaps contemplating taking away pawns.[91] Sometimes, ekpe was "blown" to force an Old Calabar merchant to replace a recalcitrant pawn, perhaps in an attempt to deter other ships from leaving with pawns. In this respect, at least, Ekpe functioned as a "merchant guild" of Old Calabar's leading traders and the principal body for coordinating local action to monitor the treatment of pawns and to safeguard the interests of the merchants who used them as collateral.

Because of the potential damage to future commercial dealings that might arise, ship captains were often reluctant to deport pawns and even transferred pawns from one ship to another in exchange for slaves to avoid carrying them away. In 1788, when Richard Rogers had sixty pawns on board the *Pearl*, for example, he noted that "most of the Pawns [had been] redeem'd from other ships."[92] A captain close to having a full shipload of slaves had to consider the trade-offs between sailing with the pawns or waiting further for pawns to be redeemed with slave deliveries, with the risk of losing to disease slaves already purchased. Whether transfers of pawns between ships needed permission from Old Calabar merchants is unclear, although, in local practice, as far as known, such alterations in arrangements required the approval of close kin.

When deadlines passed and their patience ran out, however, ship captains were known to foreclose on debts and to sail away with pawns. In 1773, Robin John Ephraim complained that one ship had gone with his pawns, including four of his sons.[93] Fifteen years later, in 1788, the *Gascoigne* of Liverpool left the river with 540 slaves and pawns. Captain Cumberbach, it was said, was "oblig'd to carry off . . . 120

[88] Williamson, *Economic Institutions of Capitalism*, 17.

[89] Evidence of John Ashley Hall, in Lambert, *Sessional Papers*, 72: 227.

[90] Grandy King George [Robin John Ephraim] to Ambrose Lace, January 13, 1773, in Williams, *History of the Liverpool Privateers*, 543.

[91] Antera Duke, "Diary," 59. Also see Nair, *Politics and Society*, 15. In 1787, one ship threatened to sail before slaves could be delivered against trade goods that had been advanced to Henshaw and one Willy Tom. According to Antera Duke, "Diary," 59, the Ekpe decree expressly forbade "any Captain to send any Calabar pawn, which was given for my slave goods, away in his tender."

[92] PRO, C 107/12, April 1788, Richard Rogers to James Rogers.

[93] Letter to Thomas Jones, Old Calabar, November 11, 1773, in Williams, *History of the Liverpool Privateers*, 543–45.

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Pledges," and even then the debts which the ship "left behind is 100 more."[94] As Richard Rogers observed, when he could "Gett my Debts in Such Cytuation" as he desired, he would give the dealers just two days to clear any outstanding debts, and "Should they not pay in that time," he would then "Borrow their pawns to sell in the West Indies."[95] The idea that one might "borrow" pawns is in itself intriguing since it implies that, even after being shipped from the coast, pawns might still be redeemed, at least in theory. Be this as it may, these examples confirm contemporary suggestions that British merchants normally regarded pawns as enslavable by sale in the Americas "if their friends refuse, or are not able to redeem them."[96]

When pawns were taken as collateral against future delivery of slaves, ship captains tended to assume that Old Calabar merchants recognized that they were engaging in a self-enforcing contract. This point seems to have been fully acknowledged in a deposition signed by King George (Robin John Ephraim), Jno. Robin John, Otto Ephraim (Robin John Otto Ephraim), and Orrock Robin John and witnessed by John Richards and James Hargraves at Old Town on August 22, 1776:

> This is to certify whom it doth or may concern that the within is a True List of Debts owing by the Natives of Old Town to Captain Lace of Liverpoole, and that the Boy named Assogua was not stoped by Captain Lace as has been Reported, but was put on board by Orrock Robin John unto whom he belonged, and that Captain Lace carried him of [*sic*] for the within debts, because we made no application for him nor did we even offer to Redeem him whilst the ship staid in the River, as Witness our hands.[97]

The fact that pawns, including kin, could be and were carried away was, in the final analysis, perhaps the most powerful single incentive for Old Calabar merchants to fulfill their contracts. Given the political situation at Old Calabar at the time, resorting to human pawnship was thus probably the most effective means available to British merchants of protecting the credit that underlay slave transactions at the port in the late eighteenth century.

As a region, the Bight of Biafra was on the margin of the emergent Atlantic economy in the early eighteenth century. During the hundred years or so after 1740, however, it became a major supplier of slaves to the Americas and, in the early nineteenth century, a primary source of palm oil, a vital ingredient in some branches of British industry. Based fundamentally on slave exports, the Bight's integration into the Atlantic economy was in many aspects typical of other regions in western Africa that supplied coerced labor for American plantations and mines. Perhaps more than any other region, its links with British merchants and, more specifically, access to British capital enabled the Bight of Biafra to move from the margins of the Atlantic economy to a much more prominent position. Moreover,

[94] PRO, C 107/12, April 1788, Richard Rogers to James Rogers.
[95] PRO, C 107/12, July 20, 1788, Richard Rogers to James Rogers.
[96] Evidence of James Fraser, in Lambert, *Sessional Papers*, 71: 15.
[97] Cited in Williams, *History of the Liverpool Privateers*, 541. Significantly, only Robin John Otto Ephraim, who, as noted earlier, was educated in Liverpool, signed with his own name; the others used crosses, which indicates that not all merchants were literate.

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whereas the purchase of slaves in some parts of Atlantic Africa was associated with the establishment of European factories or forts at the coast, in the Bight of Biafra trade was conducted from ships exclusively with indigenous merchants throughout the history of the Atlantic slave trade. In this respect, slave trading in the Bight of Biafra was similar to the cross-cultural trades that arose from encounters between groups from different cultural traditions in other parts of the world.[98]

We have recently been reminded by Avner Offer that in business activities "a common identity can substitute for face-to-face relations."[99] Personal and family bonds can help cement "trust" between traders, as, for instance, in the case of merchants in Britain and North America from the seventeenth century onward.[100] Similar bonds were also important in shaping patterns of capital investment in Britain itself during the first century of industrialization. To quote Offer again, "business credit is essentially a form of delayed reciprocity," and early industrial investment in Britain "relied primarily on funds raised locally from family, friends, and business contacts, who based their trust on family knowledge."[101] The embeddedness of trust in social relations is, therefore, an important theme in the historical literature and one that has been given renewed emphasis by the application of modern microeconomic theory to history.

The history of British trade with Old Calabar provides an important cautionary tale to those who would see trust based on social relations as shaping Britain's relationship with the Atlantic world after 1740. Attempts were made by both British and Old Calabar merchants to form ties that might be seen to engender "trust," but, we have argued, these proved insufficient to allow Old Calabar slave traders to attract British credit without other, essentially institutional, forms of security for capital being created. The case of Old Calabar reminds us, therefore, that flexibility and adaptability characterized British merchant capitalism on frontiers of trade where the conditions that Granovetter and others see as prerequisites for building trust were largely absent or at best poorly embedded. Although Adam Smith noted the difficulties that Europeans faced in colonizing Africa, whose "barbarous nations" were "by no means so weak and defenseless as the miserable and helpless Americans,"[102] it was left to others such as Thomas Clarkson to discern that, in such circumstances and in the absence of British political control, institutional arrangements for protecting credit would have to serve as a substitute for trust.

In the case of Old Calabar, it was the local institution of debt pawnship that was appropriated and adapted by both British and Old Calabar traders for this purpose before 1807. Interestingly, while pawns were sometimes taken to the Americas and

[98] For discussions of cross-cultural trade, see Philip D. Curtin, *Cross-Cultural Trade in World History* (Cambridge, 1984); Abner Cohen, "Cultural Strategies in the Organization of Trading Diasporas," in Claude Meillassoux, ed., *The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa* (London, 1971), 266–81; Janet Tai Landa, *Trust, Ethnicity and Identity: Beyond the New Institutional Economics of Ethnic Trading Networks, Contract Law and Gift-Exchange* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1994). Also see Paul E. Lovejoy, *Caravans of Kola: The Hausa Kola Trade 1700–1900* (Zaria, 1980); and Lovejoy, *Salt of the Desert Sun: A History of Salt Production and Trade in the Central Sudan* (Cambridge, 1986).

[99] Avner Offer, "Between the Gift and the Market: The Economy of Regard," *Economic History Review* 50 (1997): 450–76 (quotation, 468).

[100] Bernard Bailyn, *The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, Mass., 1955).

[101] Offer, "Between the Gift and the Market," 468.

[102] Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, 496.

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sold as slaves, the institution of human pawnship itself remained confined to Africa and did not become an alternative mechanism for supplying labor for the Americas. Pawnship was tied to credit, not labor, and remained effective only when pawns were in close proximity to kin and patrons. Equally, however, pawnship could serve as a useful device for protecting credit advances only where those taking human hostages were not prohibited by their own laws from taking them away from Africa. After 1807, when Britain outlawed slaving and at the same time sought to expand other trades at Old Calabar, new institutional arrangements, centering on the Ekpe society, evolved to safeguard credit. The story of British trade with Old Calabar provides insights into how the British came to dominate the "odious commerce" in enslaved Africans. More generally, however, it also reveals how, in alliance with local merchants, British merchant-investors were sometimes able to devise, in Douglass North's words, "an adaptively efficient set of institutions"[103] that, from the mid-eighteenth century, enabled them to shape the history of some parts of the Atlantic world without either formal colonization or the support of transplanted Britons overseas.

[103] North, "Institutions, Transaction Costs, and the Rise of Merchant Empires," 26.

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Incurring a Debt of Gratitude: 1898 and the Moral Sources of United States Hegemony in Cuba

LOUIS A. PÉREZ, JR.

> I expect nothing from the Americans. We should entrust everything to our own efforts. It is better to rise or fall without help than to contract debts of gratitude with such a powerful neighbor.
>
> General Antonio Maceo (1896)

"I READ ABOUT THE . . . PEOPLE of Cuba who wanted independence and a republic," poet Carl Sandburg years later recalled, referring to his decision in 1898 to volunteer for military service in the Sixth Infantry Regiment of Illinois. "I read about Gómez, García, the Maceos, with their scrabbling little armies fighting against Weyler. They became heroes to me. I tried to figure a way to get down there and join one of those armies." Sandburg continued: "I was going along with millions of other Americans who were about ready for a war to throw the Spanish government out of Cuba and let the people of Cuba have their republic. If a war did come and men were called to fight it, I knew what I would do."[1]

Sandburg gave poignant expression to what subsequently developed into the enduring North American representation of the war of 1898. For more than three years, the American public had followed accounts of the expanding insurrection in Cuba closely if not impartially, for popular sympathy for the Cuban cause had always been stronger than support for Spanish rule. The war in Cuba acquired immediacy in February 1898 with the tragedy of the U.S.S. *Maine*, whereupon the United States had additional cause for ill-will toward Spain. The loss of American lives in the Spanish colony conferred on the United States something of a direct stake in the resolution of the conflict, adding motive and momentum to U.S. involvement.

The U.S. war against Spain was a popular war, a war declared amid great excitement and enthusiasm, proclaimed just and justifiable, waged to put an end to conditions that spoke directly to the conscience of the nation, simultaneously a calling and crusade in pursuit of liberty and liberation for an oppressed people. The Cuban struggle was perceived as a righteous cause, a conflict that, early on, entered mainstream familiarity through such accessible discursive dichotomies as right versus wrong, liberty versus tyranny, underdog versus overlord. Cubans were

The author wishes to acknowledge with appreciation helpful suggestions received from Lars Schoultz and Rebecca J. Scott.

[1] Carl Sandburg, *Always the Young Strangers* (New York, 1953), 376–77, 403–04.

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depicted as a heroic people, of firm resolve and bold spirit, but seemingly over-matched and out-fought, confronting insurmountable obstacles in the face of insuperable odds, theirs a cause that appeared in 1898 at risk of faltering and falling short of its lofty goals.

The proposition of a popular mobilization on behalf of *Cuba Libre* was registered then and remembered later as the principal rationale of war with Spain. Popular narratives in 1898 celebrated the call to arms as a project of beneficent sentiment, explicitly a mission of rescue and redemption. *Harper's Weekly* described the "popular movement in this country" and the "wild frenzy of desire" to free Cuba, and added: "The horrible tales . . . have fired the imaginations of our people, and have made them ready to incur the miseries and horrors of war in behalf of a struggling people." Carl Schurz wrote with heartfelt sincerity of "a war of liberation, of humanity, undertaken without any selfish motive, . . . a war of disinterested benevolence."[2]

The popular music of the time is rich with representations of the war as a project of liberation. Sheet music titles alone are suggestive: "Cuba Shall Be Free," "Set Cuba Free," "Fighting for Cuba," "Columbia, Make Cuba Free," "Cuba Must Be Free," and "For the Boys Who Have Gone to Set Cuba Free" are among the scores of songs written to celebrate the cause.[3] The pages of newspapers and magazines across the country filled with solemn outpourings in the form of poems and odes eulogizing *Cuba Libre*.[4] The letters, diaries, and journals of the men who rushed to volunteer for military service similarly provide powerful testimony of the extent to which the cause of a free Cuba moved a people to action.[5]

Political leaders were especially fond of proclaiming the generosity of the American purpose, and indeed these pronouncements served further to confirm the moral rationale for war. The United States was inspired by the need to "discharge . . . its responsibilities to civilization," Secretary of War Russell Alger insisted. "The American people naturally sympathize with all who struggle for liberty and independence," Senator Joseph B. Foraker reflected, "but especially with those who are of this hemisphere and our immediate neighbors. The struggle of the Cubans has been so heroic, and against such odds and wrongs, that it has excited the greatest interest and admiration." Action had to be taken, Foraker insisted, "to end the war, stop starvation, and give the Cubans their independence." Senator John Spooner was eloquent in his appeal to conscience. "We intervene to put an end to savagery," Spooner proclaimed during the Senate debate over the war resolution, and concluded: "We intervene . . . to aid a people who have suffered every form of

[2] "The War Spirit of the People," *Harper's Weekly* 43 (April 16, 1898): 363; Carl Schurz, "Thoughts on American Imperialism," *The Century Magazine* 56 (September 1898): 783.

[3] The most complete collection of war music is found in Sidney A. Witherbee, ed., *Spanish-American War Songs: A Complete Collection of Newspaper Verse during the Recent War with Spain* (Detroit, Mich., 1898), 400.

[4] See James Henry Brownlee, ed., *War-Time Echoes: Patriotic Poems, Heroic and Pathetic, Humorous and Dialectic, of the Spanish-American War* (Akron, Ohio, 1898).

[5] Harry H. Ross to Editor, *The Freeman*, September 30, 1898, in Willard B. Gatewood, Jr., *"Smoked Yankees" and the Struggle for Empire: Letters from Negro Soldiers, 1898–1902* (Urbana, Ill., 1971), 197; Joseph H. McDermott to Magdalene McDermott, June 25, 1898, Joseph H. McDermott Letters, Manuscript Department, New York Historical Society, New York, N.Y.; Oswald Garrison Villard, *Fighting Years: Memoirs of a Liberal Editor* (New York, 1939), 134.

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tyranny and who have made a desperate struggle to be free." Senator Henry Cabot Lodge was moving in his description of how the "brave fight for liberty and against Spain presently aroused the sympathy of the American people," and Senator George Hoar was spellbinding in his Senate speech:

> It will lead to the most honorable single war in all history . . . It is a war in which there does not enter the slightest thought or desire of foreign conquest, or of national gain, or advantage . . . It is entered into for the single and sole purpose that three or four hundred thousand human beings within ninety miles of our shores have been subjected to the policy intended, or at any rate having the effect, deliberately to starve them to death.[6]

The national purpose in 1898 assumed fully the form of a moral cause, a summons to deliver an oppressed New World people from the clutches of an Old World tyranny that could not but ennoble all who responded. Certainly the purport of the Joint Resolution of Congress in April 1898—"the people of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to be free and independent"—which included, too, the self-denying Teller Amendment to the war resolution by which the United States disclaimed "any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island," served further to fix the intent of liberation as the dominant representation of U.S. resolve, something to which commentators then and thereafter could point confidently as proof of purpose.

Popular discourse and political pronouncements seemed to validate themselves and pass directly into the collective memory, and they thereupon proceeded to inform the assumptions by which the narratives of the war were recorded and remembered and public policy derived. The notion of a war on behalf of Cuban independence to be waged and won by an explicitly selfless and self-denying United States emerged early as the principal explanatory structure. It is not clear, in fact, how—or even if—popular sentiment, that is "public opinion," shaped public policy in 1898. What is certain, however, is that the conventional wisdom about 1898, from participant observers and commentators at the time and historians later, accorded public sentiment a privileged place in the narrative of the war. Indeed, "public opinion" has been the single most enduring explanatory construct of the vast historical literature on 1898.[7]

After the war, North Americans understood themselves to have mobilized on behalf of Cuban independence, to have succeeded where the Cubans had failed, from which to infer easily enough a war waged and won for the purpose proclaimed. The narrative assumed fully the proportions of a national truth, incontrovertible precisely because alternative explanations were unimaginable. "Cuba was not able to expel Spain," Senator Albert Beveridge proclaimed in 1901, and thereby gave representative rendering to the American explanation of 1898. "The United States ejected Spanish government from that island. In doing this, the United States

[6] Russell A. Alger, *The Spanish-American War* (New York, 1901), 4; Joseph B. Foraker, "Our War with Spain: Its Justice and Necessity," *The Forum* 25 (June 1898): 388, 390; *Congressional Record*, 55th Cong., 2d sess., 1898, 31: 293; Henry Cabot Lodge, *The War with Spain* (New York, 1899), 14; Frederick H. Gillett, *George Frisbie Hoar* (Boston, 1934), 203.

[7] See Marcus M. Wilkerson, *Public Opinion and the Spanish-American War* (Baton Rouge, La., 1932); Thomas A. Bailey, *The Man in the Street: The Impact of American Public Opinion on Foreign Policy* (New York, 1948); and Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, 2d edn. (New York, 1960).

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expended many scores of millions of dollars. Our soldiers gladly gave their lives." Champ Clark wrote about the United States "having freed Cuba," and Congressman J. Hampton Moore alluded to the drawing "upon our blood and treasure to liberate the Cubans," adding, "Cuba was given her liberty through the intervention of the United States."[8]

The United States early assumed full credit for the victory over Spain, with none shared with the Cubans. Cubans were excluded from the surrender negotiations, denied participation in the armistice arrangements, and ignored during the peace negotiations. The moral, sometimes stated explicitly, other times left to inference, but always central to the emerging U.S. narrative on 1898, was unambiguous. Spain had been defeated and expelled, the North Americans affirmed, through the resolve and resources of the United States, as a result of the effort and exertion of Americans, through their sacrifices, at the expense of their lives and the expenditure of their treasure.

The United States took on and in the process took over the Cuban cause. The appropriation began almost immediately, in the very name by which the conflict became known. Silences betrayed assumptions. The representation of a "Spanish-American" war suggested in more than symbolic terms a conflict without a history, limited to only two parties.

The proposition of war waged and won by the United States purported nothing less than to redefine Cubans' relationship to their own independence. The denial of agency to Cubans served immediately to silence the Cuban voice in the discussions concerning postwar settlements. Cubans could hardly demand to be present at the peace table if they had been absent on the battlefield. The North American representation also changed the Cuban relationship to the United States. Cubans were henceforth proclaimed beneficiaries of the generosity of the United States, to whom they owed their deliverance and for which they were expected to be properly grateful.

THE SALIENCE OF GRATITUDE AS A DISCURSIVE MOTIF of the North American representation of 1898 gave definitive form to the normative context in which the United States subsequently arranged the terms of its relations with Cuba. The account served to insinuate gratitude as a source of binding reciprocity, simultaneously a source of moral entitlement and means of social control by which to transact assumptions of domination. The narrative of 1898 served as a subject of multiple subtexts, central to which was the representation of an American war waged and won against Spain for Cuban independence. The proposition imposed a moral hierarchy as the principal explanatory framework of the war, with the Cubans (beneficiaries) having incurred a debt to the Americans (benefactors), by which Cubans were subsequently duty-bound to the United States.

The importance of gratitude in the construction and maintenance of binding social exchanges has long been recognized by philosophers and social scientists

[8] Albert J. Beveridge, "Cuba and Congress," *North American Review* 157 (April 1901): 541; Champ Clark, *My Quarter Century of American Politics*, 2 vols. (New York, 1920), 2: 401; J. Hampton Moore, *With Speaker Cannon through the Tropics* (Philadelphia, 1907), 300, 405.

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alike. Immanuel Kant wrote at length on gratitude as a "moral duty," insisting that "[g]ratitude consists in *honoring* a person because of a kindness he has done us. The feeling connected with this recognition is respect for the benefactor (who puts one under obligations)." Kant explained gratitude as an obligatory display attesting to "indebtedness . . . for a past kindness," necessitated "by moral law, i.e., duty." Conversely, ingratitude was characterized as "one of the most detestable vices" and "the essence of vileness and wickedness."[9] Sociologist Edward Westermarck insisted that "to requite a benefit, or to be grateful to him who bestows it, is probably everywhere . . . regarded as a duty," while Benedetto Croce rendered gratitude as a "duty devolving upon an individual to repay with benefit the benefit received from another individual." Philosopher Fred Berger similarly argued that gratitude was "intertwined with an aspect of our moral relations," principally "as a response to the benevolence of others," and added: "[E]xpressions of gratitude are demonstrations of a complex of beliefs, feelings, and attitudes. By showing gratitude for the benevolence of others, we express our beliefs that they acted with our interests in mind and that we benefitted; we show that we are glad for the benefit and the others' concern—we appreciate what was done." The ties are indissoluble, Berger suggests, noting that "some form of reciprocation is requisite."[10]

The power of gratitude as a means of social control was suggested in clinical studies completed by Jack Brehm and Ann Himelick Cole, who concluded that "a favor tends to put pressure on the favored person to return the favor. The pressure to return the favor is a threat to the freedom of the favored person in his relations with the favorer." Indeed, Kant was entirely clear on the larger implications of indebtedness: "If I accept favours, I contract debts which I can never repay, for I can never get on equal terms with him who has conferred the favours upon me; he has stolen a march upon me . . . I shall always owe him a debt of gratitude, and who will accept such a debt? For to be indebted is to be subject to an unending constraint. I must for ever be courteous and flattering towards my benefactor." Philosopher Claudia Card reflected on the ethics of gratitude with particular attention to parties who were "distinctly unequal in power," and observed, "Historically, the powerful and the privileged have imposed *their* guardianship upon the powerless and have felt the latter should be grateful for their 'care.'" Sociologist Georg Simmel similarly understood that power "actually consists, not in the return of a gift, but in the consciousness that it cannot be returned, that there is something which places the receiver into a certain permanent position with respect to the giver, and makes him dimly envisage the inner infinity of a relation that can neither be exhausted nor realized by any finite return gift or other activity . . . The reason is that his gift, because it was first, has a voluntary character which no return gift can

[9] Immanuel Kant, *The Doctrine of Virtue*, Mary J. Gregor, trans. (New York, 1964), 123, 128; Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, Lewis White Beck, ed., Louis Infield, trans. (New York, 1963), 218 (emphasis is original). For a historical survey of the place of gratitude in philosophical treatises, see Charles Stewart-Robertson, "The Rhythms of Gratitude: Historical Developments and Philosophical Concerns," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 58 (June 1990): 189–205.

[10] Edward Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, 2 vols. (London, 1917), 2: 155; Benedetto Croce, *The Conduct of Life*, Arthur Livingston, trans. (New York, 1924), 85; Fred R. Berger, "Gratitude," *Ethics* 85 (July 1975): 300–02.

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ever have. For, to return the benefit we are obliged ethically; we operate under a coercion which, though neither social nor legal but moral, is still coercion."[11]

The proposition of gratitude as an analytical construct has obtained useful if limited application in the study of unequal power relations, nowhere perhaps with greater effect than in the literature on New World slavery. Certain informal types of paternalistic behaviors, most notably the display of kindness and compassion, have been recognized as strategies within complex systems of social control calculated to induce desired behaviors in slaves. Slaveowners could appreciate the capacity of paternalism to implicate slaves in binding reciprocities, whereby slaveowners attempted to parlay a display of compassion into obedience and a demonstration of kindness into loyalty. David Barry Gaspar recognized the resonance of such types of reciprocal ties in the slave system of Antigua. Gaspar addressed specifically the ways in which "that elusive but perhaps universal phenomenon of paternalism helped mold desirable slave behavior," noting: "Paternalistic slaveowners endeavored to convince their slaves that, in return for humane treatment, they owed gratitude, which was most suitably expressed in loyalty and submission." In a compelling account of daily life on the James Henry Hammond plantation in South Carolina, Drew Gilpin Faust detailed the variety of strategies of domination, including "positive inducement [that] evolved into an elaborate system designed to win the slaves' allegiances." Concluded Faust: "Hammond had supplemented his use of rewards with rituals and symbols designed to persuade the slaves to accept their master's definition of their own inferiority and dependence and simultaneously to acknowledge the merciful beneficence of his absolute rule . . . [G]radually he sought to establish a system of domination in which he could extract willing obedience from compliant slaves, a system in which he could regard himself as benevolent father rather than cruel autocrat." Eugene Genovese commented extensively on "the doctrine of reciprocal duties," inherent in which were "dangerously deceptive ideas of 'gratitude,' 'loyalty,' and 'family'" that transformed "every act of impudence and insubordination—every act of unsanctioned self-assertion—into an act of treason and disloyalty, for by repudiating the principle of submission it struck at the heart of the master's moral self-justification." Observed Genovese:

> But just what is gratitude? Why did slaveholders dwell on it so? . . . In society much turns on the giving and receiving of equivalences, but where equivalence is out of the question, gratitude enters as a substitute. People are expected to be grateful not so much for the object received as for the experience of the giver himself. Between equals gratitude becomes a mediating force, which binds men into an organic relationship. But paternalism rested

[11] Jack W. Brehm and Ann Himelick Cole, "Effect of a Favor Which Reduces Freedom," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 3 (1966): 421; Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, 118–19; Claudia Card, "Gratitude and Obligation," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 25 (April 1988): 115, 124 (emphasis is original); Georg Simmel, *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, Kurt H. Wolf, ed. (New York, 1950), 387, 392. Philosopher Terrance McConnell alluded to a "contractual relationship" that binds the benefactor to the beneficiary. See McConnell, *Gratitude* (Philadelphia, 1993), 19–26. These themes are further elaborated on by Alvin W. Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement," *American Sociological Review* 25 (April 1960): 161–78; Martin S. Greenberg and Solomon P. Shapiro, "Indebtedness: An Adverse Aspect of Asking for and Receiving Help," *Sociometry* 34 (1971): 290–301; Abraham Tesser, Robert Gatewood, and Michael Driver, "Some Determinants of Gratitude," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 9 (1968): 233–36.

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precisely on inequality. The masters desperately needed the gratitude of their slaves in order to define themselves as moral human beings.[12]

Such relationships have still larger implications and must be seen as central to systems of colonial domination. Colonializers historically have sought validation in the self-proclaimed role as transmitters of progress and civilization, to which "natives" were proclaimed beneficiary and for which they were expected to display proper appreciation, most appropriately through submission to their colonial benefactors. Octave Mannoni wrote at length about Europeans in Madagascar and the "bonds of dependence" forged by gratitude, which "cannot be demanded, even though in a way it is obligatory." Frantz Fanon addressed the larger ideological implications in French claims of medical progress in Algeria—"This is what we have done for the people of this country; this country owes us everything; were it not for us, there would be no country"—and deciphered the larger meaning of the French claim: "The fact that the colonization, having been built on military conquest and the police system, sought a justification for its existence and the legitimization of its persistence in its works." Of course, the spurning of the blessings of civilization introduced by the colonizer, Albert Memmi understood, served to expose a "notorious ingratitude," with far-reaching implications: "[T]he colonizer's acts of charity are wasted, the improvements the colonizer has made are not appreciated . . . [A] portrait of wretchedness has been indelibly engraved."[13]

THE POWER OF THE NORTH AMERICAN REPRESENTATION OF 1898 resided precisely in its capacity to implicate Cubans in binding reciprocities derived from the moral calculus of the intervention. Americans arrived in Cuba on a self-proclaimed mission of redemption, self-consciously in the role of liberators, to release the downtrodden Cubans from Spanish colonial oppression. Spain had indeed been defeated and expelled, thus they inferred easily enough that the mission of liberation had been achieved. Intention of purpose shaped the perception of outcome. The United States had accomplished what it set out to do, thereby fixing the enduring representation of 1898. In the process, Cubans were transformed from active to passive, from subjects to objects, from agents of their own liberation to recipients of North American largess.

Cubans had a different view. They defended their claim to independence as an achievement rightfully obtained through their own efforts. They recalled more than three years of relentless war, not just 1898, during which they had inflicted countless thousands of casualties on Spanish soldiers and effectively driven Spanish units into beleaguered defensive concentrations in the cities, there to suffer further the debilitating effects of illness and hunger, circumstances that in no small fashion

[12] David Barry Gaspar, *Bondmen and Rebels: A Study of Master-Slave Relations in Antigua* (Baltimore, Md., 1985), 130; Drew Gilpin Faust, *James Henry Hammond and the Old South: A Design for Mastery* (Baton Rouge, La., 1982), 89, 101; Eugene D. Genovese, *Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made* (New York, 1974), 91, 145–46.

[13] Octave Mannoni, *Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization*, Pamela Powesland, trans. (New York, 1964), 44–47; Frantz Fanon, *A Study in Dying Colonialism*, Haakon Chevalier, trans. (New York, 1965), 122; Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, Howard Greenfield, trans. (Boston, 1967), 82.

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contributed to the ease with which Spain was defeated in 1898. Cubans had already brought the Spanish army to the brink of defeat and more than adequately contributed to the vastly weakened condition in which Spain labored to mobilize for war with the United States. The role played by the Cuban army in joint operations with the United States, moreover, at Daiquirí and Siboney, in the engagements at Las Guásimas, El Caney, and San Juan, during the siege of Santiago de Cuba, as well as the success of Cubans in preventing reinforcements and relief supplies from reaching the besieged Spanish army in Santiago de Cuba, contributed decisively to the final military defeat of Spain.[14]

Cubans acknowledged with appreciation U.S. assistance, but they were also impatient to bid the North Americans farewell and get on with the project of independence for which they had struggled so long. "We thank the United States for the assistance it has given us," General José Mayía Rodríguez said in October 1898, "but the time has now arrived when Cubans should be placed in the highest offices and should be prepared to take over the island on the departure of the Spanish." General Máximo Gómez brooded in late 1898 and confided to an aide, alluding to the conditions of Cuban gratitude:

> What is going to be done about independence? The Americans, it seems, are not thinking about it . . . Even if finally they give it to us, it will be as a gift, while we have gained it. And more than gained it with continuous efforts during more than half a century. The Americans have had an easy campaign because we have exhausted Spanish soldiers and resources. I am obligated to be grateful to the Americans, but only when they fulfill their promises, and if they fulfill them with decency and without aggravation to the Cubans.[15]

The continued U.S. presence on the island after the cessation of hostilities aroused Cuban suspicions. Impatience at times assumed menacing tones. "We have made a revolution against Spain specifically for our independence, and nothing else," General Pedro Betancourt warned, "we will not put down our arms until Cuba is, absolutely, independent . . . We are capable and sufficient in numbers to take care of ourselves and our own affairs." General Pedro Pérez was blunt. "If our independence is not secured now," Pérez threatened menacingly in August 1898, "I am willing to continue the fight for another thirty years, if necessary. The Cuban army has not fought for annexation or American control of our affairs. Our fight has been for independence, and the army will not be satisfied with anything else."[16]

However, the United States had interests of its own in Cuba, many with antecedents that reached early into the nineteenth century and not all compatible with the proposition of Cuban independence. Expansionist aspirations were very much in the ascendancy, and the prospect of seizing Spanish possessions in the

[14] Among the best accounts of the Cuban campaign are "La cooperación militar de los cubanos," *Macco* 1 (October 20, 1898): 15–28; Enrique Collazo, *Los americanos en Cuba* (Havana, 1905); Cosme de la Torriente, *Calixto García cooperó con las fuerzas armadas de los EE. UU. en 1898, cumpliendo órdenes del gobierno cubano* (Havana, 1952); Aníbal Escalante Beatón, *Calixto García: Su campaña en el 95* (Havana, 1978), 465–672; Herminio Portell Vilá, *Historia de la guerra de Cuba y los Estados Unidos contra España* (Havana, 1949).

[15] *New York Journal* (October 27, 1898): 14; Orestes Ferrara y Marino, *Mis relaciones con Máximo Gómez*, 2d edn. (Havana, 1942), 220–21.

[16] *Patria* (October 1, 1898): 2; *New York Herald* (August 10, 1898): 5. See also the editorial "Nuestra impaciencia," *Patria* (October 5, 1898): 1.

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Pacific and Caribbean had given flight to the imperialist imagination. Vital commercial and strategic interests were implicated in the outcome of the Cuban insurrection, interests that were in fact at the heart of the U.S. decision to intervene. The representation of the war as an act of disinterested benevolence, from which the enduring moral vitality of the U.S. purpose in 1898 was derived, was not incompatible with the proposition of war in defense of national interests. On the contrary, the efficacy of the former as a means to the latter became evident early. For almost a century, the United States had contemplated the prospects of Cuban independence with a mixture of alarm and apprehension, fearful that a free Cuba would pose a source of regional instability and international tension, or worse: that an independent Cuba would pass under the influence of a hostile country capable of menacing U.S. interests in the region. The issue of Cuban independence may well have contributed to the decision for war in 1898, but as an eventuality to resist, restrict, or otherwise regulate.

The proposition of independence as an achievement properly obtained by Cuban efforts thus challenged the terms by which the Americans had assigned meaning to their mission and value to their victory. The Cuban claim was inadmissible precisely because, drawn to its logical conclusion, it negated the American rationale to rule. Cubans were rebuked for their pretensions but mostly for their ingratitude, attributed to unappreciative malcontents seeking to evade their obligations to the United States. When the newspapers *Las dos repúblicas* and *La verdad* in Puerto Príncipe demanded independence in July 1899, the local U.S. military commander could hardly contain his ire. "The two newspapers . . . are against American intervention," bristled Colonel L. H. Carpenter. "They go as far in this direction as to appear oblivious that they owe anything to the Americans." Correspondent Francis Nichols reached a similar conclusion. "Many of them sincerely believe that the war would have ended just as quickly without the slightest aid from the Americans," scoffed Nichols. "It has always seemed to me that this national conceit is at the root of the national ingratitude . . . Cubans are, as a rule, one of the most ungrateful peoples on earth . . . [E]veryone who knows the Cuban people knows that down in the bottom of their hearts there is no real gratitude, only a hope that Americans will soon receive enough thanks to leave them forever."[17]

Cuban demands for independence were specious or suspect, North Americans charged, whereupon they drew another inference. Independence sentiment was the doing of persons engaged in mischief or influenced by wicked men, or people who knew no better. The Americans turned the Cuban demand for independence on its head, suggesting that Cuban aspirations confirmed their incapacity for self-government. Gratitude became a measure of civility and civilization, a standard by which to assess fitness for self-government, the absence of which cast larger doubts about Cuban capacity for independence. Major James Bell said what many were thinking: "What they want is to see us do the work and themselves reap the fruits." "In plain terms," the *New York Evening Post* declared as early as July 1898, "it has

[17] L. H. Carpenter to Adjutant General, Division of Cuba, July 10, 1899, War Department, *Annual Reports of the War Department, 1899*, House of Representatives, 56th Cong., 1st sess., serial 3901 (Washington, D.C., 1899), 316–17; Francis H. Nichols, "Cuban Character," *The Outlook* 62 (June 29, 1899): 710–11.

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been discovered that . . . the Cubans themselves were not worth one gill of the good American blood spilled for their benefit . . . They are obviously a wretched mongrel lot, . . . ungrateful to the last degree for the condescension of the United States in coming to their relief." Captain H. L. Street expressed a view common among U.S. army officers. "I think they are the most ungrateful set I have ever come across," Street complained, "and no one was a stronger pro-Cuban than I was before the war was begun." General Otis O. Howard, former director of the Freedmen's Bureau, invoked a familiar frame of reference. He attributed the deepening "prejudice against the Cubans" principally to "a feeling that these patriots have not properly appreciated the sacrifices of life and health that have been made to give them a free country"—circumstances similar to the "dislike of black men in 1863 in our own country because so many of them did not seem to understand, or be grateful for, what had been done for them."[18]

General Howard's allusion to race relations in the United States was not without implications in Cuba. The realization that the armed ranks of *Cuba Libre* included large numbers of Cubans of color immediately had a sobering effect on American enthusiasm for independence. Color was indeed one of the first things race-conscious Americans noticed. "The valiant Cuban!" one officer scoffed. "He strikes you first by his color. It ranges from chocolate yellow through all the shades to deepest black with kinky hair." Lieutenant A. P. Berry discredited independence sentiment by suggesting that the population demanding "a government republican democratic in form and entirely independent of the United States . . . is made up of the turbulent class of the ignorant and the negroes." A *New York Times* correspondent wrote with concern about "an irresponsible government of half-breeds. The negroes, too, who, in varying degrees of mixture, constitute nearly one-half of the population are another uncertain element . . . We cannot afford to have another Haiti." It was left to Governor General Leonard Wood to make the definitive pronouncement on the character of proponents of independence: "The only people who are howling for [self-government] are those whose antecedents and actions demonstrate the impossibility of self-government at present."[19]

The representations of 1898, with the attending emphasis on American generosity and Cuban ingratitude, acquired commonplace familiarity as the dominant renderings by which knowledge of the war passed into popular texts and the historical literature. The *Havana Post*, an American-owned newspaper published in Cuba, denounced Cuban pretensions to self-government as "the most remarkable exhibition of affrontiveness and ingratitude that the leaders of a race saved from destruction and annihilation have ever shown towards its rescuer."[20] "It is forgotten

[18] *New York Times* (July 23, 1898): 1; *New York Evening Post* (July 21, 1898): 2; *Washington Evening Star* (May 2, 1899): 3; Otis Oliver Howard, "The Conduct of the Cubans in the Late War," *Forum* 26 (October 1898): 155.

[19] John H. Parker, *History of the Gatling Gun Detachment, Fifth Army Corps, at Santiago, with a Few Unvarnished Truths Concerning That Expedition* (Kansas City, 1898), 76–77; Lieutenant A. P. Berry to Adjutant General, Department of Matanzas and Santa Clara, August 26, 1899, File 995/24, Records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, Record Group 350, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter, BIA/RG 350); *New York Times* (August 1, 1898): 6; Leonard Wood to William McKinley, February 6, 1900, Special Correspondence, Elihu Root Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

[20] *Havana Post* (December 8, 1900): 2.

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Editorial cartoon from *Punch*, London, *circa* 1898–1899. Caption reads: "FLOR DE CUBA! / UNCLE SAM (to Cuban)—'See here! if I'd known what a durn'd worthless, ill-conditioned skunk you are, I wouldn't ha' lifted a hand for you; but now I'm here, guess I'm goin' to stay, and lick you into shape!' "

that the United States finally sent her troops and men to war to battle in Cuba's cause," the *Havana Post* protested on another occasion, "at an expense of hundreds of millions of dollars and thousands of lives of young men who took up arms through no other motive than for sympathy with suffering Cuba." Continued the *Post*:

but for the timely intervention of the United States many of these very ones who now condemn and criticize that people and government most severely might have been made to stand before the cruel dead line and receive bullets in their backs from Spanish Mausers. All this seems to have been wiped from the pages of the histories read by some of these agitators

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and political intriguers, and Cuba is placed in the false position of being an ingrate and turning upon the very hand that saved her from destruction.[21]

The larger moral was unambiguous. "It is an old and time-worn saying that ingratitude is the basest of crimes," David Copeland wrote in the *Washington Post* in 1900:

From the days of Moses to the present hour no instance in history can compare with the action of so-called Cuban leaders. After our country, out of pure sympathy, has spent millions upon millions of treasure and sacrificed many of her noble sons upon the altar of humanity to rescue the Gem of the Antilles from Spanish greed and oppression, we are now called upon to give up all and retire from the field of action so that a hungry horde may reap what we have sown. And must we give the government over to men who have never received one lesson in the intricate school of civil affairs? . . . The amazing impudence . . . to demand immediate independence is unparalleled in all history . . . We are dealing with base men, devoid of magnanimity, and we must give them to understand that we have fathomed their true nature.[22]

"The Cubans have not generally been accredited with being a very grateful and generous people," lamented the *San Antonio Express*, "nor with having shown very high appreciation of the efforts of the American people in their behalf":

When matters had finally reached such a point that nothing short of armed intervention would save the Cubans from the prospective extermination at the hands of the Spaniards the . . . American armies landed on the soil of the Faithful Isle to aid in driving the Spaniards off and to give liberty and peace to the inhabitants . . . From the day the American troops landed in Cuba until the Stars and Stripes floated over every part of the island it was a Spanish-American war for the deliverance of Cuba. The Cubans really took no further part in the struggle . . . The Cubans had done little more than help to consume the American rations, yet they were immediately ambitious to assume the reins of government and bid the Yankees good-bye. They have been more or less restless every since, chafing under the restraint it was necessary to impose to save the Cubans from themselves. It cost the United States many millions of dollars and many precious lives to do what she has done . . . , but the Cubans care nothing for that.[23]

The *St. Louis Globe-Democrat* used the occasion of the third anniversary of the founding of the Cuban republic to affirm the conventional wisdom that "it was the Americans who emancipated the Cubans": "The insurrection which began in 1895 was on the point of collapse when the United States intervened in 1898 . . . Every sane Cuban of to-day understands this. It was the United States, and not [Máximo] Gomez and his followers, who expelled Spain and gave freedom to the Cubans."[24]

Cuban independence as the objective and outcome of a war won by the United States soon emerged as the dominant U.S. historiographical rendering of 1898. Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg celebrated the liberation of Cuba as "one of the loftiest purposed acts in the history of civilization . . . [The Teller Amendment] compliments the altruism of a nation which . . . is prepared to serve human-kind in its own way and on its own initiative with a purity of dedication unmatched in any

[21] *Havana Post* (July 13, 1900): 2.
[22] *Washington Post* (August 27, 1900): 9.
[23] *San Antonio Express* (November 30, 1900): 6.
[24] *St. Louis Globe-Democrat* (June 4, 1905): 4.

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Editorial cartoon from the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat, circa* 1898–1899.

other government on earth." Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele Commager pointed to the Joint Resolution as "authorizing the use of the armed forces of the nation to liberate Cuba," and at another point stated directly that the "war was fought for the liberation of Cuba." Alice Craemer celebrated "a war for the liberation of Cuba, a moral, altruistic war," while Louis Hacker wrote of "the holy war of 1898."[25] The historical literature is rich with accounts of a war in which Cubans seem not to have participated. "The Cuban troops," William Wood and Ralph Henry Gabriel asserted outright in a view generally representative of North American historical writing, "played no decisive part in determining the outcome of the war."[26] Barbara Tuchman proclaimed flatly that with "the surrender of Santiago . . . Spanish rule came to an end, defeated, not by the Cuban insurgents, but by the United States."[27] Having completed its mission in Cuba, Mabel Casner and Ralph

[25] Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg, *The Trail of a Tradition* (New York, 1926), 321; Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele Commager, *The Growth of the American Republic*, 2 vols. (New York, 1950), 2: 331; Morison and Commager, *The Growth of the American Republic*, 5th edn., 2 vols. (New York, 1962), 2: 419; Alice R. Craemer, "Peace—1898," *Current History* 10 (January 1946): 32; Louis M. Hacker, "The Holy War of 1898," *American Mercury* 21 (November 1930): 316–26.

[26] William Wood and Ralph Henry Gabriel, *In Defense of Liberty* (New Haven, Conn., 1928), 190.

[27] Barbara Tuchman, *The Proud Tower* (New York, 1966), 156.

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Editorial cartoon from the *Los Angeles Times*, *circa* 1898–1899. Caption reads, "Ha! ha! 'It didn't hurt a bit,' Spain says."

Henry Gabriel pronounced, "according to its promise, the United States withdrew the American soldiers and made Cuba independent."[28]

[28] Mabel B. Casner and Ralph Henry Gabriel, *The Rise of American Democracy* (New York, 1938), 531.

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THE LOGIC OF THE NARRATIVE OF 1898 soon expanded to include the proposition that the expulsion of Spain conferred on the United States special responsibilities. The line between the rationale for war and reason to rule was straight and direct. That the Cuban republic had come into existence as a result of U.S. efforts, North Americans insisted, necessarily meant that the United States had incurred a moral obligation to guarantee the well-being of the nation it claimed to have created. "The self-government which we are called upon to establish is self-government guided by equity and common sense," the *New York Times* pronounced in July 1898. "The sacrifices of treasure and life that we have made clearly entitle us to fix the conditions under which the observance of these principles shall be secure, and to retain whatever power is requisite to enforce these conditions."[29] Whitelaw Reid, the publisher of the *New York Tribune*, who often served as the editorial voice of the McKinley administration, made an eloquent case for U.S. authority over Cuba, rich with allusions to moral obligations and ethical responsibilities. "Are we not . . . bound in honor and morals to see to it that the government which replaces Spanish rule is better?" Reid asked rhetorically, "Are we not morally culpable and disgraced before the civilized world if we leave it as bad, or worse? Can any consideration of mere policy, of our own interests, or our own ease and comfort, free us from that solemn responsibility which we have voluntarily assumed, and for which we have lavishly spilt American and Spanish blood?" And he answered:

> If the last state of that island should be worse than the first, the fault and the crime must be solely that of the United States. We were not actually forced to involve ourselves; we might have passed by on the other side. When, instead, we insisted on interfering, we made ourselves responsible for improving the situation . . . no matter what Congress "disclaimed."[30]

Senator Orville Platt was categorical. "We became responsible to the people of Cuba, to ourselves, and the world at large," he insisted, "that a good government should be established and maintained in place of the bad one to which we put an end." "Our work was only half done when Cuba was liberated from its oppressor." Secretary of War Elihu Root drew a direct connection between representation of the war and authority over Cuba. "The United States," he wrote in 1901, "has . . . a moral obligation arising from her destruction of Spanish sovereignty in Cuba, and the obligations of the Treaty of Paris, for the establishment of a stable and adequate government in Cuba." Root insisted that, "after all the expenditure of blood and treasure by the people of the United States for the freedom of Cuba," and by virtue of "expelling Spain from Cuba, [we] have become the guarantors of Cuban independence and the guarantors of a stable and orderly government protecting life and property in that Island."[31]

The U.S. narrative on 1898 provided the moral rationale by which to mediate the

[29] *New York Times* (July 19, 1898): 6.

[30] Whitelaw Reid, "The Territory with Which We Are Threatened," *The Century Magazine* 56 (September 1898): 789.

[31] Orville H. Platt, "Our Relation to the People of Cuba and Porto Rico," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 18 (July 1901): 147; Platt, "The Solution of the Cuban Problem," *The World's Work* 2 (May 1901): 730; Elihu Root to Leonard Wood, February 14, 1901, Correspondence between General Leonard Wood and Secretary of War, 1899–1902, BIA/RG 350.

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terms of Cuban independence and from which to reconfigure the meaning of independence around American interests. The defeat of Spain enabled the United States to subsume Cuban independence into the larger logic of U.S. national interests. American officials fashioned a particular version of independence, one nominally consistent with the Joint Resolution but also compatible with U.S. needs. Cuba would be free and independent of all countries—except the United States. The defense of national interests did indeed commit the United States to Cuban independence against the world, but it also obliged the United States to mediate the terms by which Cubans would exercise the attributes of sovereignty. Cubans could not be permitted to compromise or otherwise jeopardize the independence obtained at such great cost by North Americans. The United States had secured Cuban liberty and independence, Root asserted, and added: "It forbade her ever to use the freedom we had earned for her by so great a sacrifice of blood and treasure, to give the island to any other power." "[T]he peace of Cuba is necessary to the peace of the United States," Root insisted at another point, "the health of Cuba is necessary to the health of the United States, the independence of Cuba is necessary to the safety of the United States."[32]

North American authorities were prepared to concede self-rule to Cubans but not without reservations and not without restrictions. The Platt Amendment to the military appropriations bill of 1901 met U.S. needs. By its terms, the Cuban republic was denied precisely those attributes of sovereignty deemed most likely to jeopardize U.S. interests. Cuba was denied the authority to assume or contract a public debt beyond its normal ability to repay, denied, too, the authority to enter into "any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers . . . or in any manner authorize or permit any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or, for military or naval purposes or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any portion of said island." Cuba was obliged to cede to the United States—"to enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba"—national territory "necessary for coaling or naval stations." The United States also exacted the right to intervene for the "preservation of Cuban independence [and] the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty."[33] The Platt Amendment was presented to the Cuban constituent assembly, which was enjoined to append it to the Constitution of 1901 as the non-negotiable condition to the termination of the U.S. military occupation.

News of the Platt Amendment precipitated protests across the island. Cubans took to the streets in organized demonstrations, marches, and rallies. Municipalities, civic associations, and veterans' organizations passed resolutions and organized petition drives against the proposed appendix to the constitution. The Cuban protests evoked a sense of betrayal and breach of faith, of deception and duplicity. What of the Joint Resolution pledge to independence? Cubans asked. "Such an

[32] Elihu Root, *The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States*, Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott, eds. (Cambridge, Mass., 1916), 99, 219. "It would be a most lame and impotent conclusion," Root explained to Wood, "if, after all the expenditure of blood and treasure by the people of the United States for the freedom of Cuba . . . we should, through the constitution of the new government, by inadvertence or otherwise, be placed in a worse condition in regard to our vital interests than we were while Spain was in possession." See Root to Wood, February 14, 1901.

[33] *Congressional Record*, 56th Cong., 2d sess., 1901, 34, pt. 3: 2954.

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order," former provisional president Salvador Cisneros Betancourt protested, "if carried out, would inflict a grievous wrong on the people of Cuba, would rob them of that independence for which they have sacrificed so much blood and treasure, and would be in direct violation of the letter and purpose of the solemn pledge of the people of the United States to the world as consigned in the Joint Resolution." General Juan Rius Rivera, a member of the constituent assembly, was indignant: "And I ask, if we concede to all or part of this, what remains of the independence and sovereignty that the American Congress recognized and committed itself to when the island was pacified in accordance to the Joint Resolution?" The Regla municipal council exhorted Secretary Root "to comply with the terms of the Joint Resolution." Republican Party president Rafael García Cañizares protested the Platt Amendment and asked for "its complete revocation and fulfillment of the American commitment to absolute independence for Cuba," while Federal Party president Pelayo García called for the "complete fulfillment of the Joint Resolution which embodies the constant aspiration of the Cuban people, that for which they have sacrificed so many lives and wasted so much property." *El cubano libre* was incredulous: "Is it possible that the American people will permit their government to despoil us of what we have obtained?" Not a few shared the sentiments expressed in a letter published in *Diario de la marina*, signed as "A Veteran of Independence":

> Rather than living under the "humanitarian" Saxon race we prefer death, because death is preferable to humiliating slavery. We, the veterans of the independence struggle, who took to the fields of the revolution in order to defend the sacrosanct cause of Cuban liberty, should force the complete fulfillment of the program of the Revolution. Independence or death! That is, the absolute independence of the Cuban people, or death and destruction of everything that rests on the face of this rich and today disadvantaged Pearl of the Antilles.[34]

Cuban protests were dismissed as further evidence of the general thanklessness with which Cubans repaid U.S. generosity. The United States had interests to defend, American authorities countered, to which Cubans could not be indifferent. The very independence of Cuba from Spain was due to U.S. beneficence, at great cost of blood and treasure; the United States would simply not permit Cubans to evade their obligations. The continued display of ingratitude, U.S. authorities warned, raised grave doubts about the Cuban capacity for self-government, with far-reaching consequences. "These people are base ingrates," former Consul Walter B. Barker wrote from Cienfuegos. "I pity this people for . . . they are incapacitated for self-government." With "minds of no greater scope than children," Barker asked rhetorically, "how could they be expected to conduct success-

[34] Salvador Cisneros Betancourt, *Appeal to the American People on Behalf of Cuba* (New York, 1901), 13; "Opinión del delegado Sr. Juan Rius Rivera," February 19, 1901, in Cuba, Senado, *Memoria de los trabajos realizados durante las cuatro legislaturas y sesión extraordinaria del primer período congresional, 1902–1904: Mención histórica; Documentación relacionada con los acontecimientos que dieron, como resultado definitivo, la independencia y el establecimiento en república de Cuba, 1892–1902* (Havana, 1918), 396–97; Council of Veterans to Leonard Wood, March 9, 1909, File 3051, Letters Received, Records of the Military Government of Cuba, Record Group 140, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter, MGOC/RG 140); Municipal Council, Regla to War Department, March 7, 1901, File 568–28, BIA/RG 350; Rafael García Cañizares to Leonard Wood, March 9, 1901, File 3051, Letters Received, MGOC/RG 140; Pelayo García to William McKinley, March 4, 1901, File 568–64, BIA/RG 350; *El cubano libre* (March 12, 1901): 2; *Diario de la marina* (July 21, 1901): 2.

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fully a Government of their own?"[35] *Washington Evening Star* correspondent Thomas Noyes could not conceal his disappointment. "Absolutely nothing is to be expected on the line of gratitude from these people," Noyes cabled from Havana in March 1901. "Many, in fact, are bitter in their remarks concerning the United States."[36] Governor General Wood fumed that the "political element are an ungrateful lot and they appreciate only one thing, which is, the strong hand of authority and if necessary *we must show it*."[37]

However, North Americans were reluctant to obtain compliance through coercion, although the availability of force as ultimate recourse was a contingency understood by all. Negotiations—such as they were—were conducted between two countries of vastly unequal power, with one occupied militarily by the other. U.S. policymakers sought to secure Cuban acquiescence through moral suasion, a way to act out the formulations by which North America had represented the motives and meaning of 1898 and on which rested the moral claim of domination. It was thus possible to shame Cubans into submission. "[T]he fact that so many of their leaders seem devoid of all gratitude to the United States for the many millions of dollars we have spent in their behalf," Congressman Henry F. Gibson remarked on the floor of the House, "makes me suspicious of what Cuba's fate may be when wholly committed to their hands." Gibson denounced the Cubans. "We found her people dying of starvation in prison pens," he retold the familiar story, "or slaughtered by a merciless foreign soldiery; and we have driven out these soldiers, opened the prison doors and made every Cuban free, and fed them generously from our own table." Gibson continued: "In a word . . . we found Cuba a hell, and we are fast converting it into a paradise . . . And shall we have no right to guard this island and see to it that disorder shall not take the place of order, and see to it that the island, by unwise treaties, be not given over to our enemies[?] . . . This is all that the [Platt] amendment proposes to do." Congressman Townsend Scudder agreed. "[W]e are in a position to make demands upon the island much more severe than any we will make, and still the Cubans would have no cause to complain." "We also should have the privilege of establishing naval stations . . . All these things Cuba ought to be more than willing to grant, but it seems that the convention delegates have very little gratitude . . . [I]n view of the cost of Cuba's freedom to this country in treasure and in blood, gratitude should impel her to lean upon America as her best friend and protector." Concluded Scudder, "[I]t is not pleasant to have to urge upon one whom you have greatly benefitted the duty of manifesting a reasonable gratitude for such benefits, but it would be well were Cuba to show a bit more appreciation of what this Government has done for her . . . They have a sacred duty to perform toward us, just as we have toward them. A bit of gratitude and friendly feeling on the part of the people whom we brought out of bondage would be a pleasant thing to contemplate just now."[38] Senator Orville Platt could hardly contain his indignation. Platt denounced Cuban "false pride," expressing dismay that there was "no

[35] Walter B. Barker to Senator John T. Morgan, April 2, 1901, Philip Jessup Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

[36] *Washington Evening Star* (March 21, 1901): 11.

[37] Leonard Wood to Elihu Root, February 27, 1901, File 331–71, BIA/RG 350.

[38] *Congressional Record*, 34, pt. 4, March 1, 1901, 3375; *Congressional Record*, 34, pt. 4, March 1, 1901, appendix, 357–58.

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recognition of the United States, no expression of gratitude or friendliness." The constitutional convention represented the "most radical element of the Cuban electorate," Platt argued, "irresponsible as children, jealous of outside influences, dazzled with the prospects of at last being their own masters."[39] Secretary Root warned of dire consequences attending the Cuban refusal to meet their obligations. "If the American people get the impression that Cuba is ungrateful and unreasonable," Root threatened in an allusion to the Joint Resolution, "they will not be quite so altruistic and sentimental the next time they have to deal with Cuban affairs as they were in April, 1898." Two months later, Root was categorical. "[T]here is only one possible way for them to bring about the termination of the military government," Root warned, "and . . . that is to do the whole duty they were elected for . . . If they continue to exhibit ingratitude and entire lack of appreciation of the expenditure of blood and treasure of the United States to secure their freedom from Spain, the public sentiment of this country will be more unfavorable to them."[40]

The Cuban constituent assembly acquiesced and in June 1901 voted to adopt the Platt Amendment by one vote. The need to register gratitude played a decisive role. The weekly *La tribuna* justified the adoption of the Platt Amendment as a "duty of our people to assist the nation which helped to rescue us."[41] "The brusque and precipitous manner in which the Platt resolution was imposed," future president Tomás Estrada Palma complained, "has injured my dignity as a Cuban and has caused me profound resentment." However, he added, in view of the fact that the United States was "a decisive factor in the achievement of our independence and in the creation of the Republic," an accommodation of U.S. interests was necessary as a way to "give full expression to our gratitude."[42]

The U.S. military occupation came to an end on May 20, 1902, amid ceremonies of what was celebrated as Cuban independence. North Americans congratulated themselves, then and thereafter, for a pledge nobly made and honorably kept. President Theodore Roosevelt was positively exultant on the evening of May 20. Speaking at Carnegie Hall in New York before the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, Roosevelt celebrated "the spirit of character and decency and the spirit of National righteousness" that culminated in "starting a free republic on its course" and "setting a new nation free," adding: "I think that the citizens of this republic have a right to feel proud that we have kept our pledges to the letter."[43]

Historians followed suit. With the end of the military occupation, R. D. W. Connor wrote in 1916, "Cuba was at last free and independent." Randolph Greenfield Adams pointed with pride to "one of the most creditable pages in

[39] Platt, "Solution of the Cuban Problem," 731; Louis A. Coolidge, *An Old-Fashioned Senator: Orville H. Platt of Connecticut* (New York, 1910), 337.

[40] Elihu Root to Leonard Wood, January 9, 1901, Root Papers: Root to Wood, March 2, 1901, File 331–71, BIA/RG 350.

[41] *La tribuna* (March 26, 1901): 1.

[42] Tomás Estrada Palma to Gonzalo de Quesada, March 14, 1901, in Gonzalo de Quesada, *Archivo de Gonzalo de Quesada*, Gonzalo de Quesada y Miranda, ed., 2 vols. (Havana, 1948–51), 1: 151–52.

[43] *New York Times* (May 21, 1902): 2. Fifteen years later, Theodore Roosevelt could unflinchingly continue to sustain the proposition of Cuban independence. "We made the promise to give Cuba independence," he proclaimed in his *Autobiography*, "and we kept that promise." See Roosevelt, *Autobiography* (1913; rpt. edn., New York, 1946), 504.

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American foreign policy when the United States kept its promise to make Cuba a free and independent nation," and James Ford Rhodes flatly asserted that the "pledge contained in the Teller amendment was faithfully kept." John Holladay Latané and David W. Wainhouse were unabashedly celebratory: "Never has a pledge made by a nation under such circumstances been more faithfully carried out."[44]

Those who understood what had actually transpired knew better. Until its abrogation in 1934, the Platt Amendment served to deprive the republic of the essential properties of sovereignty while preserving the appearance of independence, permitting self-government but precluding self-determination. "There is, of course, little or no independence left in Cuba under the Platt Amendment," Leonard Wood acknowledged privately to Roosevelt in 1901. The next step was obvious: "The only consistent thing to do now is to seek annexation."[45] Certainly Cubans understood what had happened. Independence had been compromised and sovereignty curtailed. "The Republic will surely come," a disconsolate General Gómez wrote to a friend in May 1901, "but not with the absolute independence we had dreamed about." And on the matter of gratitude, the newspaper *Patria* was unequivocal:

> If there is no independence and sovereignty, why should Cubans have to show themselves to be grateful to the United States? For having deceived them? For having replaced Spain as master? . . . What service has [the United States] rendered to Cubans that warrants appreciation? Is it not as clear as daylight that they intervened for their own benefit? And in this instance, should it not be the United States which should be grateful to poor and trusting Cuba for having provided the circumstances for its self-aggrandizement?[46]

The North American representation of 1898 served to sustain the U.S. claim of authority over the new republic and supplied the leverage with which to obtain Cuban acquiescence to the primacy of U.S. interests. It emerged as the principal source of validation of North American influence over virtually all spheres of the Cuban national system and indeed must be considered as the dominant discursive modality by which the United States achieved domination.

Nor did the Cuban debt of gratitude end with independence from Spain. On the contrary, it appeared to have increased. During three years of military occupation, the United States had borne the cost of extensive postwar reconstruction projects, including public works, public health programs, and educational reforms: something more for which Cubans were expected to be grateful. "[W]hat did we do?" Senator George Hoar asked rhetorically on May 20, 1902. "We not only lifted from Cuba the dark and heavy weight of Spanish misrule, but we threw around that island our great, strong arm, and while in the path of peace and the methods of orderly administration the people of that island were enabled to form their own govern-

[44] R. D. W. Connor, *The Story of the United States* (Raleigh, N.C., 1916), 366; Randolph Greenfield Adams, *A History of the Foreign Policy of the United States* (New York, 1933), 277; James Ford Rhodes, *The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations, 1897–1909* (New York, 1922), 177; John Holladay Latané and David W. Wainhouse, *A History of American Foreign Policy*, 2d edn. (New York, 1940), 511.

[45] Leonard Wood to Theodore Roosevelt, October 28, 1901, Leonard Wood Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

[46] Máximo Gómez to Sotero Figueroa, May 8, 1901, in Máximo Gómez, *Papeles dominicanos de Máximo Gómez*, Emilio Rodríguez, ed. (Ciudad Trujillo, 1954), 396–97; *Patria* (March 19, 1901): 2.

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ment, and to-day Cuba stands out among the nations of this earth." Senator Charles Fairbanks agreed, and on the day following the end of the occupation exulted:

> In the history of this country and of civilized government there has never been an event of such splendid significance as that which was witnessed in that island yesterday. A solemn national pledge has been redeemed. A Republic has been erected under the authority of the United States, and the possession of the island has been surrendered to that Republic under happy auspices ... Where there was monarchical power and tyranny four years ago a Republic has arisen and starts peacefully upon her career with the congratulations of the nations of the earth. The freedom of Cuba is accomplished—accomplished through the valor of American arms and the wisdom of American statesmanship.[47]

The national consensus on occupation was striking and unabashedly celebratory. North Americans congratulated themselves for a mission accomplished and a purpose achieved. Editorial comments echoed official thinking and shaped popular perceptions. "Vast improvements have been effected," proclaimed the *Havana Post* in 1900, "and we have given the people the first good government they have ever known." Continued the *Post*: "We found its cities beds of pestilence. We have stamped out yellow fever and made Havana as healthy a city as exists at that latitude. We took its starving *reconcentrados* [war-time internees] who have survived the war and other poverty-stricken people and fed them and clothed them. We organized a public school system, and have everywhere established law and order."[48] "[I]n three years," exulted the *New York Times* at the end of the occupation, "we have put the Cubans in a better position for successful self-government than they could have been put by their own unaided efforts." The *Times* enjoined Cubans to appreciate the "new and better day" provided by the United States:

> The sanitary work that we have done for them has alone compensated them a thousand fold for any sufferings of spirit they may have undergone through the postponement of their independence. We have established schools at which 75,000 of the children of the island are attending—certainly that is an achievement far beyond the expectations of the Cubans themselves. We have left them an orderly financial system ... It is useless to speculate upon the ills that might have befallen them had we adopted the disgraceful and heartless course of leaving them to work out their own destiny unaided. The very real and living results of our care for them are pleasanter to contemplate.[49]

Cuba was launched into nationhood under optimum circumstances, North Americans insisted. "To-day we inaugurate in Cuba the experiment of building upon the ashes of extinct monarchical institutions the fabric of free representative government," the *Washington Post* proclaimed on May 20, 1902. "No republic in the history of man was ever born under more auspicious circumstances ... We desire only peace, order, prosperity, and strength for the new republic, which owes its existence to us, and which can do nothing so graceful as to make us proud of it." The *Chicago Tribune* agreed, noting that Cubans "have had the advantage of three years' tutelage under American administrators." Successful government would be

[47] *Congressional Record*, 57th Cong., 1st sess., 35, pt. 6: 5686, 5719.
[48] *Havana Post* (June 26, 1900): 2.
[49] *New York Times* (May 22, 1902): 8.

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Editorial cartoon from the *Chicago Tribune*, *circa* 1898–1899. Caption reads, "Knocking at the door."

ample rewards to the Americans, the *Tribune* concluded, "to whom [Cubans] owe their independence."[50]

Through the first half of the twentieth century, North American authorities invoked Cuba's "debt" as the principal discursive device to gain acquiescence to U.S. interests. Cuban preferential tariff concessions to American imports, for example, were deemed a small price to pay for the great sacrifices made by the United States on behalf of Cuban independence. "For all our loss of life, and the tremendous expense which our Government has incurred in expelling Spain from the island," General James H. Wilson, the military governor of Matanzas province,

[50] *Washington Post* (May 20, 1902): 6; *Chicago Tribune* (May 20, 1902): 4.

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insisted, "it would be no more than fair that the Cubans should enter into an agreement with us by which they should give free entrance to our natural and manufactured products . . . and at the same time establish tariffs identical with our own against all European countries."[51] When the newly installed Estrada Palma government contemplated a new trade agreement with England in 1902, U.S. minister Herbert Squiers bristled with indignation. "I cannot believe that the Cuban Government seriously considers England as a market," he cabled to Washington, and speculated that they were only after better terms from the United States. "The Cuban Government is prepared to make the best possible bargain, regardless of what they may owe the United States," he continued.[52] Squiers reported learning from Fermín Goicochea, a member of the board of directors of the Planters Association, that Cuban sugar growers supported expanded trade relations with Europe. "Mr. Goicochea belongs to a class of Cubans who are willing to sell their souls for the benefit of their pockets," Squiers complained; "they have no love or respect for our flag or any other . . . They are devoid of gratitude, devoid of any feeling other [than] mercenary."[53] In the end, U.S. pressure was not without effect, for the proposed trade agreement was defeated in the Cuban senate. "Unhappy will it be for us," Senator Antonio Sánchez Bustamante explained in opposition to the proposed agreement, "if public opinion in the United States shall come to believe that this people, which has received only favors from the noble and heroic republic of North America, looks upon the United States only with jealousy and suspicion."[54]

THE MEANING OF 1898 ASSUMED MANY FORMS, designed in the north always to convey the larger obligations derived from the "Spanish-American War." In the decades that followed, the United Spanish War Veterans Association convened annually in Cuba to celebrate 1898. In what must be viewed as a ritualized enactment of U.S. representations, North American veterans marched annually in a parade in Havana to commemorate the U.S. liberation of the island.

Cubans obliged, and also engaged in the annual rite of acknowledging the national debt of gratitude. Commented the *Diario de la marina* in 1925,

> Cuba knows how to appreciate the sacrifices made by these heroes . . . We are sure that those veterans who after twenty-five years have come to visit us, each in his heart feels that his offering was not made in vain, and that Cuba has shown its worthiness by developing, in a comparatively short period of time, into one of the most modern republics in the Western Hemisphere . . . We must confess, however that on more than one occasion we have probably disappointed our neighbors of the North by committing errors that resulted from lack of experience in self-government . . . We hope that we can show and demonstrate in

[51] James H. Wilson to Joseph Benson Foraker, May 12, 1899, General Correspondence, James H. Wilson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

[52] Herbert Squiers to John Hay, October 9, 1902, Despatches of U.S. Ministers to Cuba, 1902–1906, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter, DS/RG 59.)

[53] Herbert Squiers to John Hay, October 23, 1902, DS/RG 59.

[54] *Havana Daily Telegraph* (May 23, 1905): 1.

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other ways to our visitors that their efforts to aid us have not been in vain . . . We hope that the American people will forgive us, even if they do not entirely forget our errors.[55]

In 1928, Cándida Cruz Miranda of the Ministry of Public Health addressed visiting members of the Florida delegation of the United Spanish War Veterans as "our saviors," adding, "[H]ad it not been for the great American republic which sent these brave soldiers down here to help us obtain our liberty, we would have never been free and probably all Cubans in the woods would have perished . . . We must be grateful to the United States."[56]


Gratitude obtained other expressions, none perhaps more public than the commemorations associated with monuments and memorial statues. The island filled with markers and statues memorializing the liberation of Cuba by the United States. In 1901, the U.S. military government placed a monument on San Juan Hill to commemorate the victory of the Rough Riders. Three years later, the "First Landing Monument" was erected at Daiquirí. In 1906, a battle monument at El Caney, with a roster tablet, commemorated the role of Captain Allyn Capron's Artillery Battery E in the U.S. victory. In 1908, a bronze plaque was dedicated in Siboney to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the U.S. landing. The site of a great Ceiba tree in Santiago de Cuba, whose expansive branches provided the shade under which representatives of Spain and the United States negotiated the terms of the surrender of Santiago de Cuba, was made into a small public park. An open bronze book was placed at the base of the "Peace Tree" recording the names of American servicemen who lost their lives in land and sea operations. In 1924, a monument to Theodore Roosevelt was dedicated in the new "Roosevelt Park" in Santiago de Cuba, in recognition, U.S. Consul Francis Stewart reported, of the "valiant service in the capture of Santiago from the Spanish forces in July 1898" and "symbolizing the creation of the Cuban nation by the people of the United States."[57] In the same year, a memorial to the Eighth Massachusetts Regiment was dedicated in Matanzas. In 1925, the Veterans Association 71st Regiment New York Volunteers dedicated an eight-foot bronze figure of a U.S. soldier in honor of the volunteers who lost their lives in the Santiago campaign. In March 1925, President Alfredo Zayas dedicated a monument to the *Maine* in Havana on which was inscribed simply:

> To the Victims of the *Maine*,
> The People of Cuba

"The kindly sentiments of gratitude shown by the people of Cuba in erecting this exceptionally beautiful monument," said General John Pershing, himself a veteran of the war and heading the U.S. delegation on the occasion of the dedication ceremonies, "will be warmly appreciated by the American people as a new evidence of friendship and good will." Pershing extolled the "very intimate relationship" between Cuba and the United States, adding, "By our association with her on the

[55] *Diario de la marina* (October 5, 1925): 2.
[56] *Havana Post* (October 13, 1928): 2.
[57] Francis R. Stewart to Secretary of State, December 16, 1924, 837.413T26/7, DS/RG 59.

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The Peace Tree, Santiago de Cuba, the site of formal ceremonies on July 17, 1898, during which Spanish General José Toral signed the surrender of Santiago de Cuba to U.S. General William R. Shafter. Photograph by Deborah M. Weissman.

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battlefield we helped secure the independence she now enjoys."[58] The *Maine* monument, the *Havana Post* proclaimed, represented "one more link to the cordial and friendly relations existing between Cuba and the United States and in granite and marble perpetuates the gratitude of the Cuban people for America's generous aid in her struggle for freedom."[59] Every year thereafter, through the late 1940s, the *Maine* monument served as the site of February 15 commemorative ceremonies, in which soldiers and sailors from both countries joined together to march in a parade.

The representation of "Spanish-American War" had far-reaching and long-lasting implications. Claims advanced first in 1898 as political propositions and subsequently transformed into historical truths developed into the conventional wisdom from which policy assumptions seemed as self-evident as they were self-explanatory. More than half a century of U.S.–Cuba relations were driven by North American policy paradigms first fashioned in 1898, always with a clear if unstated moral, a reminder of what had been done for Cubans as a way to insinuate what was expected of them. The line of reasoning was straight and unbroken. "Cuba . . . owes to us her birth," Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed on one occasion.[60] Twenty-five years later, U.S. Ambassador to Cuba Harry Guggenheim made the same point, reiterating that "American intervention gave to Cuba its independence," and the obligatory inference: "We then felt a moral responsibility for the new State which we had brought into being."[61]

Something special linked Cuba to the United States, North Americans proclaimed repeatedly. "We gave her liberty," Roosevelt pronounced in 1903. "We are knit to her by memories of the blood and courage of our soldiers who fought for her in war; by the memories of the wisdom and integrity of our administrators who served her in peace and who started her so well on the difficult path of self-government."[62] The year 1898 was the moment in which the U.S. relationship to Cuba was fixed, and in a particular way: as benefactor, as protector—as progenitor of sorts, what U.S. Ambassador Earl E. T. Smith later characterized as a "special relationship" and historian Lynn-Darrell Bender described as a "sentimental relationship." Preparations for the *Maine* day celebrations in 1948 prompted the State Department Office of Inter-American Affairs to declare that the "people

[58] Pershing's speech was forwarded to the Department of State in John Pershing to Secretary of State, n.d., John Pershing Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. "The Cuban people," President Zayas responded to Pershing's comments, "like all beings inspired by loyal and noble sentiments, must be eternally grateful to the United States." See *La lucha* (March 9, 1945): 4. The most complete account of the construction and dedication of the *Maine* monument is found in the bilingual edition of Emeterio S. Santovenia, *Libro conmemorativo de la inauguración del Maine en La Habana* (Havana, 1928).


[59] *Havana Post* (March 9, 1925): 9. "Grateful Cubans erected this monument," Melville Bell Grosvenor observed in *National Geographic Magazine* twenty years later. See Grosvenor, "Cuba—American Sugar Bowl," *National Geographic Magazine* 91 (January 1947): 2. In February 1998, on the occasion of the centennial of the explosion of the *Maine*, the *New York Times* described the memorial as an expression of Cuban "gratitude for the United States role in the struggle for independence." See *New York Times* (February 14, 1998): A4.

[60] Theodore Roosevelt, "Special Message," June 13, 1902, United States Congress, Joint Committee on Printing, *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, 15 vols. (New York, n.d.), 15: 6683.

[61] Harry F. Guggenheim, *The United States and Cuba* (New York, 1934), 45–46, 243.

[62] Theodore Roosevelt, "Special Session Message," November 10, 1903, *Compilation of Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, 15: 6742–43.

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Rear view of the original 1925 *Maine* monument, constructed in what was then called the *Maine* Plaza in Havana. Postcard.

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of the United States and Cuba . . . share a bond, unique among the other republics of Latin America, of having striven side by side for the liberation of the island."[63]

North Americans expected gratitude to bind Cuba to the United States forever, as Cuba would be under eternal obligation to the United States for its very national existence. Senator Platt foresaw Cuba "bound to us by location, helplessness and . . . by the sentiment of gratitude." *The Nation* confidently predicted eventual annexation, "coming in the natural way, as the result of gratitude, friendly intercourse, and trade."[64] Destinies were proclaimed joined in 1898, indissolubly and in perpetuity, a relationship consecrated by the U.S. sacrifices. "Thirty-five years ago," Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles explained in 1934, "the United States helped the Cuban people win their independence as a free people. American blood was shed upon the soil of Cuba . . . to obtain Cuban liberty." Fifteen years later, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the war with Spain, President Harry Truman pointed to the Joint Resolution as "the foundation upon which our relations with the Cuban Republic are based," a commitment that "expressed our determination that once the Cuban people were liberated, they, and they alone, should govern the Island of Cuba." Added Truman: "[F]ew nations of differing languages and cultures have drawn so closely together during the last 50 years, freely and without duress, as have Cuba and the United States." On the same occasion, the *Washington Post* was unabashedly celebratory: "It was just 50 years ago . . . that Cuba with American help attained her independence . . . and respect, and the two countries have perhaps a closer bond than most because of the circumstances of Cuba's deliverance."[65]

Such pronouncements were simultaneously consequence and confirmation of narratives first formulated in 1898 and indeed must be placed at the heart of North American understanding of the reciprocities by which Cuba was bound to the United States. Cuban conduct was measured in relationship to 1898, deemed appropriate and adequate—or not—as a function of obligations owed to the United States. Thus Cuban participation in World War I was represented as repayment of 1898. "The United States came to the aid of Cuba in her great struggle for liberty in 1898," pronounced U.S. Ambassador Noble Judah in 1929. "Twenty years later Cuba repaid her debt when the United States entered the World War."[66]

The narrative also served as the script by which to rebuke Cubans for policies opposed by the United States. When the Cuban Ministry of Education repealed mandatory English-language instruction in 1915, the Memphis *Commercial Appeal* remembered 1898: "The American people are the best friends the Cubans have

[63] Earl E. T. Smith, *The Fourth Floor* (New York, 1962), 23; Lynn-Darrell Bender, *Cuba vs. United States: The Politics of Hostility*, 2d edn. (Hato Rey, P.R., 1981), 2; Office of Inter-American Affairs, "Maine Day Congressional Delegation," February 12, 1948, 837.415/2–1248, DS/RG 59.

[64] Orville H. Platt, "Cuba's Claim upon the United States," *North American Review* 165 (August 1902): 146; *The Nation* 71 (August 2, 1900): 85.

[65] Sumner Welles, *Relations between the United States and Cuba* (Washington, D.C., 1934), 2; Harry S. Truman, "Address before a Joint Session of the Congress in Observance of the 50th Anniversary of Cuban Independence," April 19, 1948, in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948* (Washington, D.C., 1964), 225; *Washington Post* (April 27, 1948): 12.

[66] "Ambassador Judah's Address at Maine Memorial Exercises," February 15, 1929, 837.413/M28–34, DS/RG 59; Noble Brandon Judah, "Diary of My Stay in Cuba," February 15, 1929, Noble Brandon Judah Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

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today . . . It was the people of the United States who gave the Cubans their freedom. It was because of American influence that the Spanish yoke was cast aside. Cuba has not been a grateful nation." The *Havana Post* agreed: "It need not be a matter of pride with Americans, for English needs no defense. But it may seem to some rather ungracious . . . for the Cubans to cut the language of their deliverers from the public school curriculum."[67]

Representations of 1898 were employed to counter Cuban criticism of U.S. policy in Latin America, which served also to discourage Cuban solidarity with Latin America. When *El heraldo de Cuba* criticized U.S. policy in Mexico in 1916, the *Havana Post* retorted:

> One would think that after the Americans set Cuba free and guaranteed her sovereignty . . . that there would never be heard anything but kindly phrases for the great and good friend of the North, but such is not the case, for it is a startling fact that practically . . . all [newspapers] are in active sympathy with Mexico in the present controversy between that country and the United States . . . Has Mexico spent millions for Cuban independence for which she has never rendered a bill as the United States? Did Mexico, when the Cuban *reconcentrados* were starving by the thousands, send millions worth of foodstuffs here and in every town and village distribute free American army rations to the needy ones as the United States did? . . . Has Mexico guaranteed to the world that the sovereignty of Cuba shall never be impaired, as the United States has? No? Then why this sympathy with Mexico when the United States has borne patiently hundreds and hundreds of insults, has seen its citizens robbed and murdered in Mexico time after time, and finally has even had its own territories invaded by armed Mexicans?[68]

The *Post* similarly attacked the conservative and formerly pro-Spanish *Diario de la marina*, which also criticized U.S. policy in Mexico: "Such ingratitude! If there is a paper in Cuba that should be grateful to Americans it is the *Diario de la Marina* . . . So bitter had been the *Diario* against everything Cuban that once the Spanish regime was withdrawn from Cuba the natives wanted to rid themselves once and forever from the newspaper that had occupied itself through its existence in sneering at everything Cuban . . . The protection of the American government, however, saved the *Diario* . . . [and] so does the *Diario* show its gratitude."[69] When *La noche* criticized the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, the *Havana Post* excoriated Cubans for their misplaced sympathies. "What is the purpose of *La Noche* in making such allegations against the American government?" Did it wish to arouse "against the United States the hatred of all Latin Americans, especially of the Cubans," against the nation that in 1898 had "sent Americans to bleed in Cuba's cause"?[70]

The North American narrative of 1898 entered fully into the realms of popular imagination as the ordinary and commonplace terms by which the Cuban relationship to the United States was defined. It provided the imagery through which vast numbers of Americans acquired familiarity with Cuba. Popular writers in particular were given to describing Cuba in relationship to 1898. The Cuban "has neither the

[67] *Commercial Appeal* (September 27, 1915): 6; *Havana Post* (September 28, 1915): 2.
[68] *Havana Post* (June 28, 1916): 4.
[69] *Havana Post* (May 17, 1914): 4.
[70] *Havana Post* (September 18, 1920): 4.

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force nor the executive ability to carry out his designs," Forbes Lindsay concluded in 1911. "For a full century he has conspired to throw off the galling yoke of Spain, and he would never have done it but for the intervention of the United States." Henry Phillips characterized the Cuban as "the problem stepchild of the United States" and added: "While Cuba owes her very existence as a nation to the United States, her gratitude and friendliness have been of a most doubtful character . . . No other nation, perhaps, have we aided so constructively, and been rewarded with so much distrust and lack of confidence." Travel writer Marian George suggested that, prior to 1898, Cuba "had no government; there were no schools outside of a few of the largest towns, the country was full of beggars, the towns were unclean, and . . . there were swarms of hungry, homeless, destitute people everywhere. There were no proper hospitals or charities, no money in the public treasuries." Henry Wack offered a similar judgment in 1931: "But for the liberation of our Cuban neighbors by the U.S. . . . Havana would still be the dump it was in the last century." Hyatt Verrill wrote of the "competent, enthusiastic, trained, honest and zealous men" of the U.S. military occupation under whom "an almost inconceivable amount of reconstruction, sanitation, reformation and improvement was carried out," adding: "[E]verything possible was done to place Cuba and Havana in perfect condition before turning the island over to the Cubans." Continued Verrill, "Since then its history has been largely made up of mismanagement, graft, political intrigues, sporadic revolts, plots, mad financial speculations, unwonted prosperity and riches, and periods of depression . . . [W]orst of all is the ingratitude of the people whom we helped to freedom, for whom we did everything possible to assure their future. It was a thankless task."[71]

At a critical point in their national formation, Cubans seemed to have been dislodged from their own history. North American representations of 1898, at the time and continuing thereafter, served to weaken Cuban claims to sovereignty and self-determination. Cubans were denied the moral authority to advance the primacy of national interests as an attribute of national sovereignty, obliged instead to accommodate U.S. interests as the principal rationale of independence.

These developments had far-reaching implications. Three decades of Cuban liberation struggles in the nineteenth century seemed to have dissolved into a futile project, producing a crisis at the very point of national origins and troubling ambiguities on the sources of national identity. The subordination of Cuban interests to U.S. needs produced national frustration and in the process contributed to the development of nationalist impulses driven principally by anti-American sentiment.

The question of 1898 insinuated itself deeply into Cuban national sensibilities, which meant, too, that it loomed large in public forums and political debates. In the emerging nationalist discourse, the year 1898 was remembered as an usurpation, a point of preemption, when Cubans were displaced as actors and transformed into the audience. The proposition of 1898 as a wrong to redress emerged early as one

[71] Forbes Lindsay, *Cuba and Her People of To-Day* (Boston, 1911), 87; Henry Albert Phillips, *White Elephants in the Caribbean* (New York, 1936), 129; Marian M. George, *A Little Journey of Cuba and Porto Rico* (Chicago, 1923), 79–80; Henry W. Wack, "Cuba and West Indies Winter Charm," *Arts & Decoration* 34 (February 1931): 53; Hyatt Verrill, *Cuba of Today* (New York, 1931), 157–58.

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of the central themes of the Cuban counter-narrative. Harvard-educated essayist Jorge Mañach, always a judicious observer of the Cuban condition, reflected in 1933 on the larger meanings and lasting consequences of 1898:

> The Cuban effort for political self-determination resulted thus in semi-subjection, tarnishing the joy and pride of liberation . . . [D]espite the most generous intention on the part of the United States, Cuban illusions were still to be humiliated further . . . When finally the Cubans were granted permission to write their constitution, the sovereignty of the new state was compromised by the Platt Amendment, which imposed on Cuba a permanent treaty, by which the United States was conceded the right of intervening in Cuba in certain specified emergencies. Cuba was irremediably a protectorate . . . The paternal and perspicacious prudence of the American Congress resulted in crushing the Cuban sentiment of self-determination.[72]

The past developed into contested terrain, the recovery of which was necessary to advance the Cuban claim to national sovereignty. When Cubans contemplated what had become of the independence project for which a generation of men and women had struggled and sacrificed, the year 1898 developed into something of a preoccupation, a brooding sense that history seemed to have gone awry then, and everyone was implicated. "Independence was the result of a century of enormous [Cuban] sacrifices," writer Eduardo Abril Amores wrote in 1922, "but we do not conceive of independence as thus achieved and properly earned . . . We have neither faith and confidence in ourselves. We attribute independence, conquered by the edge of our machetes, to the government of the United States."[73] The angst over 1898 often found expression in popular fiction. In the novel *La danza de los millones* (1923), Rafael A. Cisneros speaks through his protagonist: "In Cuba the Americans helped us to become free, which is the same as if they had loaned us one hundred *pesos* when we were hungry, and in return we will be paying them back for the rest of our lives. Don't you see, they seized Guantánamo Bay and their troops have not yet left Santiago. And the sugar mills? Ah! They are virtually all American, as are the mines, commerce, the banks, and all the money. And they say that they don't want the land!" Pedro José Cohucelo's protagonist in *Apostado de amor* (1925) attacks the United States "as a usurper of a victory that was ours, . . . [and] first through the military intervention of the Island and then through the odious Platt Amendment, proclaimed that it was not Cuba which, through the efforts of its sons and blood spilled by its martyrs and heroes, had obtained the independence and sovereignty sought for half a century." In Ofelia Rodríguez Acosta's novel *Sonata interrumpida* (1943), the narrator comments that "we owe everything to the Americans . . . We owe them our independence and . . . we will always owe them . . . our famous sovereignty," to which the protagonist responds: "Owe them! What do we owe them? The Platt Amendment to our Constitution, without which its forced acceptance there would never have been a transfer of power to the Cubans in 1902? Mortgaged forever by our eternal gratitude."[74]

Cuban voices found other forms of self-affirmation, all sharing a common

[72] Jorge Mañach, "Revolution in Cuba," *Foreign Affairs* 12 (October 1933): 50–51. See also Mañach, *Pasado vigente* (Havana, 1939), 18.

[73] Eduardo Abril Amores, *Bajo la garra* (Santiago de Cuba, 1922), 155.

[74] Rafael A. Cisneros, *La danza de los millones* (Hamburg, 1923), 316; Pedro José Cohucelo,

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determination to reinstate themselves into the past and confer agency upon their presence. Some of this began by contesting the privileged sites of the American monuments on the island. In 1928, authorities in Santiago de Cuba added a second bronze book under the "Peace Tree," this one recording the names of Cuban soldiers who perished in the Santiago campaign. "The fact that . . . no Cuban heroes were recorded," acknowledged the U.S. consul in Santiago de Cuba, Edward I. Nathan, "has long been irritating to the Cuban officials and people."[75] The addition of the second book, asserted the *Diario de Cuba*, "will proclaim that Cuba did not receive its independence as a gift. It will no longer be said that Cubans did not fight in San Juan."[76] A year later, a statue dedicated "To the Glory of the Victorious Liberator" (*A la Gloria del Mambí Victorioso*) was erected within sight of the bronze statue commemorating the U.S. volunteers. In 1942, as a result of a resolution passed by the Second National Congress of History, a bronze plaque was dedicated in San Juan Park with the inscription in Spanish and English: "In 1898 the victory was won through the decisive support given to the U.S. army by the Cuban Army of Liberation under the command of Lieutenant General Calixto García. Therefore this war must not be called the Spanish-American War but the Spanish-Cuban-American War." Two years later, the Cuban national congress enacted legislation officially changing the name from the "Spanish-American War" to the "Spanish-Cuban-American War."[77]

The meaning of 1898 developed into a politically charged issue. In early 1949, in response to growing political pressure, the administration of President Carlos Prío Socarrás announced it would not participate in the annual *Maine* commemoration ceremonies. Prío subsequently suspended all future official ceremonies commemorating the *Maine*. U.S. historian Duvon Corbitt, a long-time resident of Havana, sought to explain the circumstances to Secretary of State Dean Acheson: "During the fifteen years of residence in Cuba, I saw Cuban soldiers file by the [*Maine*] monument on the Malecon, but not always joyfully. And in recent years certain groups have used the occasion to stir up anti-American sentiment. This has been increasingly true of the 'revisionists' who are publicizing the thesis that the Cubans had already won the war with Spain and the United States entered only in time to share in the victory."[78] Corbitt's allusion to "revisionists" referred to shifting historiographical currents in Cuba. A new historical self-consciousness was in the making, one in which the Cuban presence in the narrative of liberation acquired relevance to the formation of the nation. The Cuban quest for national sovereignty was obliged to challenge North American versions of 1898, from which so many of

Apostado de amor (Havana, 1925), 300; Ofelia Rodríguez Acosta, *Sonata interrumpida* (Mexico City, 1943), 117.

[75] Edward I. Nathan to Secretary of State, May 11, 1928, 837.413/31, DS/RG 59.

[76] *Diario de Cuba* (May 10, 1928): 1. "The pages of the [bronze] book," Colonel José González Valdés, the local provincial commander, explained to the U.S. consul, "will be inscribed with the names of the Cuban soldiers who fell side by side with the American officers and soldiers at the glorious engagement on San Juan Hill, thus saving their names from oblivion in an identical form with that which the United States has adopted for the memory of their heroes in said battle. We wish history to perpetuate equally the names of the North Americans and Cubans who died there." See González Valdés to Francisco R. Stewart, March 18, 1927, 837.413/6, DS/RG 59.

[77] See Congreso Nacional de Historia, *Un lustro de revaloración histórica* (Havana, 1947), 43–56.


[78] Duvon C. Corbitt to Dean Acheson, March 8, 1949, 837.415/3–849, DS/RG 59.

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Statue dedicated in 1929 at San Juan Park to the memory of the officers and men of the Cuban Army of Liberation who perished in the battle of San Juan Hill, "To the Glory of the Victorious Liberator." Photograph by Deborah M. Weissman.


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Bronze plaque laid at San Juan Park, pursuant to the resolution of the Second National Congress of History (1942), affirming that the new name of the war was the "Spanish-Cuban-American War." Photograph by Deborah M. Weissman.

the assumptions of U.S. hegemony stemmed. "The first duty of every Cuban who truly wishes to free Cuba of today's ills," insisted historian Herminio Portell Vilá in 1949, "is to believe in the epic history of Cuba and in the heroes, martyrs, and

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Bronze plaque at the base of a statue in San Juan Park memorializing the officers and men of the Cuban Army of Liberation who died in the battle of San Juan Hill. Photograph by Deborah M. Weissman.

patriots who forged that history and who belong with dignity to the international lineage of the great liberators of nations."[79]

Cuban historiography challenged U.S. formulations head-on. The proposition of Cuba "owing" its independence to the United States was refuted explicitly by Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring in *Cuba no debe su independencia a los Estados Unidos*

[79] Portell Vilá, *Historia de la guerra de Cuba y los Estados Unidos contra España*, ii.

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(1950). Roig rejected the notion that Cubans "owed" the North anything, insisting instead that Spain was on the verge of defeat prior to the U.S. intervention. His small monograph gave definitive form to the principal tenets of revisionist historiography: "Cuba does not owe its independence to the United States of North America, but to the efforts of its own people, through their firm and indomitable will to end the injustices, abuses, discrimination, and exploitation suffered under the despotic colonial regime."[80] The inference was clear. If Cuba had achieved its own independence, Cubans were thereby at liberty to exercise self-determination, without outside encumbrance or hindrance, free to advance the primacy of national interests as the central function of national sovereignty.

By mid-century, U.S. policy officials had developed some appreciation of Cuban disquiet. In 1948, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the *Maine*, U.S. Ambassador R. Henry Norweb sought to bring Cuban sensibilities to the attention of his superiors in Washington. "[T]here are many in this country," Norweb reported, "who feel that the important part played by Cubans in bringing about their liberation from Spanish rule has not been adequately recognized, particularly in the United States . . . We should bear in mind that there are many Cubans . . . who are sensitive about what they feel has been our failure to give proper recognition to Cuba's contribution over Spain." Among the "number of sources of friction" identified three years later in a State Department secret memorandum was that "Cubans resent any tendency on our part to minimize their own contribution in gaining their independence. They still criticize us for having reserved and used the right to intervene in their domestic affairs under the Platt Amendment despite the fact that it was repealed in 1934."[81]

A consensus had developed that something had gone awry in 1898. Memory lingered in places of unsuspected profundity. Restless spirits of a past wrong haunted the national debate on the Cuban relationship with the United States and often appeared in unexpected forms under unforeseen circumstances. The release of the Warner Brothers film *Santiago* (1956) provoked indignation across the island over the depiction of the Cuban struggle for independence. "It is grievous that the Americans intervened in our war of independence at the final moments and imposed upon us the Platt Amendment," bristled columnist Agustín Tamargo in the popular weekly magazine *Bohemia*:

> The American insults to our sovereignty did not begin with this Warner Brothers film. They go back much further. In the American public school textbooks, for example, that Cuba was

[80] Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring, *Cuba no debe su independencia a los Estados Unidos* (Havana, 1950), 153. Roig de Leuchsenring was a prodigious scholar, and virtually the full weight of his scholarship was dedicated to advancing the principal tenets of revisionist historiography. His other works include *Cuba y los Estados Unidos, 1805–1898* (Havana, 1949); *Los Estados Unidos contra Cuba Libre* (Havana, n.d.); *La guerra hispano-cubanoamericana fué ganada por el lugarteniente general del Ejército Libertador* (Havana, 1952); *Por su propio esfuerzo conquistó el pueblo cubano su independencia* (Havana, 1957); *1895 y 1898: Dos guerras cubanas; Ensayo de revaloración* (Havana, 1945). Much of the revisionist arguments entered the historical literature in the United States by way of Philip S. Foner, *The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, 1895–1902*, 2 vols. (New York, 1972). For a general discussion of revisionist historiography, see Duvon C. Corbitt, "Cuban Revisionist Interpretations of Cuba's Struggle for Independence," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 32 (August 1963): 395–404.

[81] R. Henry Norweb to Secretary of State, March 18, 1948, 837.415/3–1848, DS/RG 59; Department of State, "Policy Statement: Cuba," January 11, 1951, 611.37/1–1151, DS/RG 59.

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engaged in a struggle for its liberty one hundred years before the explosion of the battleship "Maine" in our harbor is not at all acknowledged. On the contrary, it is said that we obtained independence solely as a result of the *yanqui* intervention, as a result of the declaration of war against Spain. That war, which has always been the war of independence of Cuba, is called the "Spanish-American War." Its veterans are veterans of the "Spanish-American War." Nowhere does the name of Cuba appear, as if it were fought in some barren rocky hillside, where one day the soldiers of the *yanqui* democracy clashed accidentally with the soldiers of the Spanish monarchy. It is one more way to deprive a people of the most worthy possession that a people can have, and that is its presence in History.[82]

Memories were difficult to reconcile. Americans expected gratitude; Cubans harbored grievances. North Americans remembered 1898 as something done for Cubans; Cubans remembered 1898 as something done to them. For Cubans, the Joint Resolution of 1898 appeared as a cruel hoax. Worse still, many Cubans could not escape the sense that they had themselves served as unwitting accomplices to their own undoing. The alliance with the United States was more than a disappointment; it was a deception. This was a profoundly disillusioning denouement to decades of heroic mobilizations. There was something very wrong about the way things ended.

At issue were matters related to the very nature of nationhood, with implications for self-determination and sovereignty, and hence the defense of national interests. These issues were accorded a place of prominence in the 1958 "Manifesto-Program" of the 26 July Movement led by Fidel Castro. The writers of the "Manifesto-Program" recalled the "high cost paid for liberty" with the lives of martyrs and acts of heroism, yet at the "symbolic moment in which the war ended, Cuba was excluded from the accord in which its political status was settled."

The deed established an unfortunate precedent. The final outcome appeared determined by the intervention of the United States rather than the bloody sacrifices of the Cubans. The island thus appeared liberated from the political yoke of Spain thanks only to the "powerful neighbor." The antecedents and consequences of that episode can perhaps be explained within the logic of the facts, but the result was that from that moment forward the former colony was burdened by a situation equivalent to a protectorate, and by an ironic and costly "debt of gratitude" that would over time serve to cloak countless injustices and arbitrary acts.[83]

The triumph of the Cuban revolution in January 1959 provided the occasion on which the contest over representations of 1898 moved to center stage between Cuba and the United States. What had happened sixty years earlier now mattered in new ways and with far-reaching consequences. The narrative of 1898 served to frame the relationship between historical circumstances and actual conditions. Again and again, all through early 1959, the events of 1898 were remembered and recounted as an injustice done to the *patria*, perceived as the point at which the United States had usurped the Cuban claim to nationhood.

[82] Agustín Tamargo, "Quien injuria a Martí y a Maceo no puede ser amigo de Cuba," *Bohemia* 48 (August 26, 1956): 49–50.

[83] "Manifesto-Program del Movimiento 26 de Julio," *Humanismo* 7 (November–December 1958): 14.

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The invocation of the past was not simply an incantation of woeful lament. On the contrary, remembrance of 1898 signified a way to rectify history and reclaim the past. Connections were drawn early and often. Representation of 1898 served anew as a source of moral subsidy, except this time it was employed in the Cuban counter-narrative, a way to confer on the project of revolution a claim of continuity out of which to affirm the historicity of the revolutionary experience. "The Republic was not free in [1898]," Castro recalled on January 3, "and the dream of the liberators [*mambises*] was frustrated at the last minute." Castro asserted "that those men who had fought for thirty years and not seen their dreams realized" would have rejoiced in 1959 at the achievement of the "revolution that they had dreamed of, the *patria* that they had imagined."[84] A month later, he proclaimed outright that "the *mambises* initiated the war for independence that we have completed on January 1, 1959."[85] Raúl Castro made the point as well: "Now, with the Revolution, with this civil war that ended on January 1, we have done nothing less than to finish the War of Independence that began nearly one hundred years ago by our *mambises*."[86] Writer Armando J. Flórez Ibarra drew the connections succinctly: "Analyzing the historical reach of the triumphant revolutionary movement, it appears to us as if the revolutionary armies of 1895 . . . have reached power, finally, free of all mediating influences. We are witness to the vindication of the triumph that the United States, through its armed intervention in 1898, cheated us of . . . We have finally liberated ourselves from the complex of a protectorate."[87]

Fidel Castro carried Cuban grievances about 1898 to the United Nations. "The Spanish power had worn itself out in Cuba," he explained to the General Assembly in September 1959. "Spain had neither the men nor the economic resources left with which to continue the fight in Cuba. Spain had been routed . . . The Cubans who had fought for our independence, the Cubans who at that very moment were giving their blood and their lives believed in all good faith in the Joint Resolution of the United States Congress . . . But that illusion was ended by a cruel deception."[88] This was a theme to which Castro would return repeatedly. "That foreign intervention was the source of many of our difficulties," he insisted:

> Yes, a brutal sanitation was introduced: they killed the mosquitos, drained many swamps, did a series of things, some were definite improvements. But, what else did they do? They deprived the nation of the prerogatives to govern itself, they deprived the nation of its sovereignty, they treated it like a little child to whom they said: "We give you permission to do just this, and if you do more we will punish you." The Platt Amendment was imposed [and] we either behaved ourselves—behaved ourselves in the manner convenient to the foreign country—or we would lose our sovereignty.[89]

The triumph of the revolution signaled the ascendancy of the nationalist discourse. So much turned on 1898. It reached deeply into a place of unsettled

[84] *Revolución* (January 5, 1959): 4.
[85] *Revolución* (February 25, 1959): 4.
[86] *Revolución* (April 8, 1959): 8.
[87] Armando J. Flórez Ibarra, "La hora del deber americano," *Revolución* (February 2, 1959): 2.
[88] "Speech by Fidel Castro to the General Assembly of the United Nations," September 26, 1959, in Robert F. Smith, ed., *What Happened in Cuba? A Documentary History* (New York, 1963), 286.
[89] Fidel Castro, *Pensamiento de Fidel Castro: Selección temática*, 2 vols. (Havana, 1959), 1: 5.

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memories, of dormant sensibilities, and served as a powerful source of moral indignation, and hence a catalyst for political mobilization. The new Cuban leadership characterized the North American representation of 1898 as outright deception. "They forced us to live in an illicit concubinage with a lie," Castro thundered in March 1959. "It is preferable to bring down that world than to live within a lie."[90]

Cuban evocations appeared slightly incomprehensible to most Americans, many of whom seemed to have no idea what the Cubans were referring to. In Washington, bafflement was as commonplace as it was highly placed. "What do you suppose, sir, is eating [Fidel Castro]?" President Dwight D. Eisenhower was asked at a press conference in October 1959. The president was at a loss:

> I have no idea of discussing possible motivation of a man, what he is really doing, and certainly I am not qualified to go into such abstruse and difficult subjects as that. I do feel this: here is a country that you would believe, on the basis of our history, would be one of our real friends. The whole history—first our intervention in 1898, our making and helping set up Cuban independence . . . and the very close relationships that have existed most of the time with them—would seem to make it a puzzling matter to figure out just exactly why the Cubans and the Cuban Government would be so unhappy . . . I don't know exactly what the difficulty is.[91]

Even as relations were deteriorating, U.S. political leaders continued to view 1898 as a source of cordial relations. "I sincerely hope that the day is not far off," Senator Styles Bridges mused in 1960, "when the traditional friendship forged between our two countries 62 years ago in our joint war for the liberation of Cuba can be firmly and permanently reestablished."[92]

North American hostility toward Cuba after 1959 was, in fact, related to 1898. That Cubans, for whom Americans had sacrificed life and treasure to free, would turn against the United States was once again incomprehensible and attributed to persons who knew no better, or were engaged in mischief, in this case most likely communists.[93]

North Americans also invoked 1898, repeatedly, in an attempt to discredit the new Cuban government. Newspaper editorials that were entered into the *Congressional Record* in early 1960 struck a remarkably common note. "Castro has rejected friendship with the country that liberated Cuba in 1898," lamented the Charleston *News and Courier*, and the Bangor *Daily News* asked: "What is Castro doing to us, the country that liberated Cuba in 1898?" The Roanoke *World-News* recalled 1898 as a "war for Cuba's freedom," and added: "True to the principle that it did not

[90] *Revolución* (March 17, 1959): 2.

[91] *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959* (Washington, D.C., 1960–61), 271.

[92] Styles Bridges, "Red Poison with Our Sugar," n.d. [*ca.* 1960], unpublished speech, Robert C. Hill Papers, Library Special Collections, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire.

[93] "He seems to be incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline," Vice-President Richard Nixon described Fidel Castro after their meeting in April 1959. See "Summary of Conversation," April 24, 1959, in United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Cuba, 1958–1960* (Washington, D.C., 1991), 476.

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covet territory, the United States gave full freedom to the Cuban people within 2 years—as soon as they could be prepared for it."[94]

The war of 1898 was also very much on the minds of members of Congress, for whom political developments in Cuba assumed fully the proportions of a betrayal. Representative William S. Bloomfield gave a pained account of 1898, recalling how the *Maine* "touched off the Spanish-American War":

> Americans and Cubans fought side by side in this war. Neither the Cubans nor the Americans were fighting for personal glory, for new territories, for plunder or new possessions. We were fighting for freedom. We Americans were not fighting for our own freedom. We had already achieved this goal. We were fighting for the right of the Cubans to shake off the oppressive yoke of colonialism, to decide their own destinies, to chart their own course in domestic and world affairs.[95]

With the "long background of historic relations with Cuba," Congressman Mendel Rivers asked, "will . . . we forget our obligations toward the Cuban people whom we helped to liberate?" Rivers denounced "the bearded pipsqueak of the Antilles" who "seized American property in a country that was conceived by America, delivered by America, nurtured by America, educated by America and made a self-governing nation by America." He warned: "When ingratitude on the part of a nation reaches the point that it has in Cuba, it is time for American wrath to display itself in no uncertain terms."[96] Indeed, 1898 was precisely the reference that suggested itself to Senator Barry Goldwater. "We won a great victory and we liberated a people," Goldwater proclaimed. "And it cost us dearly. It cost us thousands of lives and millions of dollars. It cost us sickness and suffering and sorrow." Goldwater urged action of "the type the world should expect from a nation whose blood and heartaches bought freedom for Cuba in the first place."[97] Years later, historian Richard E. Welch, Jr., examined the sources of the Cuba–U.S. conflict after 1959 and concluded that among the most important factors of the dispute was the "assumption that Cuba owed its independence to the United States, and was properly dependent on the latter for its diplomatic security and economic prosperity." Thus any Cuban leader "who sought to destroy Cuba's historic ties with the United States could not be acting from motives of concern for the Cuban people but must be a power-hungry dictator with regional ambitions."[98]

Old representations of 1898 crumbled in the months that followed the triumph of the revolution. On May 1, 1961, only days after the Cuban victory at the Bay of Pigs, a mass rally assembled around the *Maine* monument in Havana to witness approvingly a wrecking crew smash the American eagle from atop the forty-foot pedestal. A new inscription was added to the remaining twin columns of the monument: "To the victims of the Maine, who were sacrificed to imperialist greed

[94] *Congressional Record*, 86th Cong., 2d sess., 1960, 106, pt. 1: 1200; *Congressional Record*, appendix, 106, 1960, A2043 and 1329.


[95] *Congressional Record*, 86th Cong., 2d sess., 1960, 106, pt. 4: 5227.

[96] *Congressional Record*, 86th Cong., 2d sess., 1960, 106, pt. 2: 14385; *Congressional Record*, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, 197, pt. 1: 108.

[97] Barry Goldwater, "Tragic Situation in Cuba," *Vital Speeches* 27 (May 1, 1961): 422–23.

[98] Richard E. Welch, Jr., *Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959–1961* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1985), 186.

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The new inscription on the *Maine* monument in Havana added in May 1961. Photograph by Fidel Requeijo.

in its fervor to seize control of the island of Cuba." In the years that followed, the monuments, plaques, and statues in San Juan Park commemorating the U.S. presence were all but forgotten, left unattended to corrode and deteriorate, often the site of graffiti and vandalism.

ONE HUNDRED YEARS AFTER THE END OF THE WAR, the matter of representation of 1898 continues to engage Cuban and North American historical imaginations in very different ways. Paths had crossed in 1898 and both nations were shaped decisively by the encounter, but memories of the experience stood in stark contrast to one another. In the United States, the war continued to be remembered mostly as the "Spanish-American War," and what was remembered most in 1998 was the *Maine*. All through the centennial of the sinking, magazines and newspapers featured articles recalling the *Maine*. In February 1998, the U.S. Post Office issued a 32-cent "Remember the *Maine*" commemorative stamp. The event was also used to promote tourism in Key West. Travelers were urged to visit the final resting place of many of the *Maine* sailors who perished in 1898. The Navy Department

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refurbished the grave sites, and a *Maine* Centennial Commission prepared a traveling exhibit.[99]

In Cuba, the centennial year served as the occasion to remember the past as a subtext of the present, where the wrong began and why it mattered. "It is impossible to ignore the fact that Cuba's current difficulties can generally be traced to the United States," proclaimed writer Roberto Fernández Retamar. "On a humanitarian pretext, it invaded Cuba in 1898 and blocked its independence, . . . which was not truly achieved until 1 January 1959." Historian Eusebio Leal struck a similar note: "Upon reflection . . . what we think today about those transcendental historical events allows us to affirm, with our heads held high, that the Cuban nation obtained its right to exist as a result of the immense sacrifice of those who knew how to suffer, to struggle, and to die for the nation. [Independence] was obtained neither as a gift nor by the grace of others."[100]

Through the first half of the twentieth century, the United States exercised wide-ranging authority over Cuba. Certainly one facet of this relationship stemmed from the obvious inequality of power and the imposition of that power on the smaller country. The internal logic of the Cuba–U.S. relationship, however, and especially the assumptions by which the propriety of the relationship was validated, was driven by factors far more complex than unequal power relations. Central to the resilience of U.S. hegemony was the proposition that influence over Cuba was properly derived and exercised as a function of a service rendered, the basis on which the United States could rightfully exact Cuban submission. Representations of 1898 were central to this belief system, on both sides. In the United States, it not only made for the efficacy of domination of the Other but also for the edification of self. The North American claim of authority over Cuba had obtained enduring moral subsidy from the narrative of 1898, to which Cuban acquiescence was expected. The requisite gratitude was demanded for—and the domination derived from—the debt incurred in 1898.

Ambivalences in Cuba were real and substantial. The North American representation of 1898 entered the arena of political discourse, as indeed inevitably it had to, for the matter reached into Cuban national sensibilities and implicated the very sources of nationhood. Given the scope of authority claimed from the narrative of 1898, it is certainly arguable that the larger issues of 1898 could not have been resolved by any means other than political. The challenge to U.S. hegemony, Cubans understood, was obliged to revisit 1898 and contest the dominant representations by which Cubans were denied agency. The right of self-determination could be exercised only as an act of self-knowledge. The affirmation of an

[99] Virtually all published observances of 1898 in the United States centered on the *Maine*, and almost all remembered the *Maine* with very similar titles. See Thomas B. Allen, "Remember the *Maine*?" *National Geographic* 193 (February 1998): 92–111; Hugh Thomas, "Remember the *Maine*?" *New York Review of Books* 45 (April 23, 1998): 10–12; Larry Rohter, "Remember the *Maine*? Cubans See an American Plot Continuing to This Day," *New York Times* (February 14, 1998): A4; Tom Miller, "Remember the *Maine*," *Smithsonian* 28 (February 1998): 46–57. Tourism was promoted in Mary Maynard Drake, "'Remember the *Maine*,' One Hundred Years Later," Raleigh *News & Observer* (February 15, 1998): 1H, 9H.

[100] Roberto Fernández Retamar, "Cuba Defended: Countering Another Black Legend," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 86 (Winter 1997): 102; Eusebio Leal, "Meditación ante el 98," *Debates americanos* 4 (July–December 1997): 94.

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instrumental past was perhaps one of the decisive if often unrecognized outcomes of the Cuban revolution of 1959. It was not coincidence that, simultaneously with the triumph of the revolution, the new Cuban leadership reopened the debate on 1898. Once out from under the "debt" of obligation to the United States, Cubans were free to claim their independence. The revolution of 1959 canceled the debt.

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The Gender of Resistance in Communist Poland

PADRAIC KENNEY

TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER THE JUNE 1956 UPRISING IN POZNAŃ, Solidarity labor leaders in that city unveiled a monument to those who died in that struggle; two massive crosses, lashed together, were emblazoned with five dates of popular struggle against communism: 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, and 1980. At least until recently, every Pole knew the meaning of this litany of dates and could connect them to the seemingly inevitable fall of communism. Indeed, the history of the Polish People's Republic is framed largely by the drama of Polish resistance. Towering over the nation both literally and figuratively, that series of monumental dates has forced postwar Polish history into a rather tight teleology. The events of those years seem to accelerate and build on one another until they culminate in the victory of a presumably informed and organized society in 1988–1989. Poland was the site of the most sustained and articulate resistance to state communism anywhere in the world. No case is better documented or more evidently central to the fall of communism. These events of resistance are the most compelling—and hopeful—moments in the otherwise gray era of communist rule, in Poland or elsewhere.

The events of the last decade have challenged many assumptions about the communist experience in Europe. While some questions—about the nature of "revolution" and "transition," or about desires for democracy and the free market—are already the focus of new academic subfields, the central question of opposition to communism remains largely unexamined. Who participated, and why? What effect did opposition have on the communist regimes? How should historians evaluate the experience of opposition? Surely it is impossible to understand either communism or its fall if we do not know what opposition in fact was. The Poznań monument is emblematic of the difficulty of studying Polish resistance to communism. As monolithic as opposition may seem fifteen or twenty-five years later, it was not experienced the same way by all Poles, even all Polish workers. In fact, divisions in Polish society were no less than those that

For comments on earlier versions of this article and for theoretical insights, I am especially grateful to Michael Bernhard, Martha Hanna, Janina Holc, Elżbieta Kaczyńska, Temma Kaplan, Jacek Kochanowicz, Warren Morishige, Izabela Ziółkowska-Kenney, and the anonymous readers for the *American Historical Review*. A brief report on some of these findings appeared as "Discourses of Communism and Opposition in Poland," *Dialogues on Discourse: The Newsletter of the Discursive Approaches Research Group* 5 (Fall 1995): 4–5. A 1996 fellowship from the 20th Century Humanities Initiative at the University of Colorado allowed me to complete research and writing. For research assistance, I would like to thank Louisa Vinton and the staff at Radio Free Europe in Munich; Grażyna Slanda, Slavic Librarian at the Harvard University Libraries; and Ewa Karpińska, Henryk Marczak, Elżbieta Oleksy, Andrzej Paczkowski, and Gregorz Sołtysiak.

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separated opposition from the communist regime. In a largely homoethnic society, the greatest such division was that of gender. During the August 1980 strike at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk, the following graffito appeared on the shipyard fence: "Women, don't interfere with US—we are fighting for Poland."[1]

There is thus much more to these moments of resistance than has met the eye until now. This slogan points to fundamental weaknesses in the historiography of workers' unrest in the Polish People's Republic. That research has generally portrayed workers as more or less a single group, whose identity is strongly tied to the workplace.[2] Thus one recent study of the Solidarity era can claim that "gender, class, and age were not good predictors of participation in oppositional activities in the late 1970s."[3] As a result, when we see workers attending Mass, occupying their factories, or participating in a hunger march, we have been able so far only to interpret this as the manipulation of resource or simply a reflection of Polish idiosyncrasies. What has been missing is a recognition that workers and their understandings of opposition are shaped by their experience outside the workplace and the church, particularly by their roles as family members. Inspired in part by a search for feminism in Eastern Europe, several scholars have recently turned to the role of women in Solidarity. These important contributions, however, do not go beyond putting women into the story.[4] The point is, however, that women were not simply "also" there. For the men in Gdańsk, they were *not* there, and should not have been. At a minimum, it seems clear that women, and the image of woman, have played contradictory roles in Polish culture; one could even start simply by considering their absence. Further, we need to consider how women and men experienced communism and ask whether the denial of free organizations and censorship were the most painful repressions or whether the experience of communism at home or in the streets and stores was equally impelling. The next step is to consider whether the tensions—between women as figures in Polish culture and men fighting for a nation—revealed in the 1980 graffito warrant a reinterpretation of opposition itself.

In this article, I reexamine the so-called "struggles for Poland" as struggles shaped by gender. The resistance moments in Poland are the logical place to explore how ideas of the masculine and feminine shaped the communist system. All the major periods of unrest in postwar Poland began not just among men but also in quintessentially masculine industries and factories. The Cegielski railway works

[1] "Kobiety, nie przeszkadzajcie NAM, walczymy o Polskę." Quoted in Magdalena Środa, "Feministki, kobiety, wiedźmy," *Polityka* 31 ("Kultura" supplement 7) (July 31, 1993): 1.

[2] Key studies of Polish labor conflict are Roman Laba, *The Roots of Solidarity: A Political Sociology of Poland's Working-Class Democratization* (Princeton, N.J., 1991); Alain Touraine, *et al.*, *Solidarity: The Analysis of a Social Movement; Poland 1980–81*, David Denby, trans. (Cambridge, 1983); Michael D. Kennedy, *Professionals, Power, and Solidarity in Poland: A Critical Sociology of a Soviet-Type Society* (Cambridge, 1991). Of these, only Kennedy identifies significant differences within Polish society, looking at the alliance between professionals and workers.

[3] Jan Kubik, *The Power of Symbols against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland* (University Park, Pa., 1994), 5. See also J. M. Montias, "Observations on Strikes, Riots and Other Disturbances," in *Blue-Collar Workers in Eastern Europe*, Jan F. Triska and Charles Gati, eds. (London, 1981), 180.

[4] Kristi S. Long, *We All Fought for Freedom: Women in Poland's Solidarity Movement* (Boulder, Colo., 1996); Shana Penn, "The National Secret," *Journal of Women's History* 5 (Winter 1994): 54–69; Anna Reading, *Polish Women, Solidarity and Feminism* (London, 1992); Renata Siemieńska, "Women and Social Movements in Poland," *Women and Politics* 6 (Winter 1986): 5–35.

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in Poznań, birthplace of the June 1956 uprising that ended the Stalinist era; the shipyards of Gdańsk, Gdynia, and Szczecin, key sites of unrest in 1970–1971 as well as in the Solidarity era; the tractor factory at Ursus and the Walter arms factory in Radom, main centers of protest in June 1976; the auto plant in Lublin where the strikes of the summer of 1980 (and thus the Solidarity movement) began; the mines and steel mills (Jastrzębie, Nowa Huta, and Stalowa Wola) that initiated communism's fall in 1988, these are not just factories with predominantly male work forces (certainly, there are women workers in each, a direct result of communist rule) but also factories represented as masculine. The images of opposition—men and boys throwing rocks at police, or being gunned down, or kneeling in prayer, women passing sandwiches to strikers over factory walls or sitting numbly on courthouse benches as their husbands are sent to prison—come from these places. This fact has led most observers to conclude that women only rarely, or sporadically, voiced opposition to communism.[5]

In contrast to identities of nation and class, gender identity (as distinct from women's experience) has been virtually ignored in the history of European communist states. I have in mind the socio-political organization of sexual differences and especially the way understandings of gender—both masculine and feminine—have shaped how Poles, and in particular Polish workers, have interpreted and resisted communism, and how the state has responded to that resistance.[6] I begin by asking whether women workers did not resist or if their involvement has been neglected in favor of the more dramatic and violent protests of their male colleagues. If the latter—and I will show that such is the case—then what difference did their protests make? How, moreover, should the question of gender and opposition force us to reconsider the communist state? More so than in other modern states, ideology was important to the communist regime and shaped its intervention in social relations. Even as elite survival took precedence over Marxist revolution by the 1970s, ideology furnished the fabric of state-society relations, while at the same time rendering the state surprisingly vulnerable to its subjects.[7] While acknowledging the importance of economic disintegration to the decline of the communist state, I will argue that communism's reaction to women's opposition, and its inability to address women's demands, greatly contributed to the state's problems in the 1970s and 1980s.

Western scholarship on gendered activism and the relationship between gender and the state has often focused on the border between public and private spheres. For communist societies, in which there is at best minimal space for public interaction or public opinion outside the state, it makes more sense to reformulate this distinction as one between the political and the social realms. The "social realm" in recent scholarship denotes the world of the household and the family as it was delineated in the nineteenth century. In twentieth-century capitalism, the

[5] The year 1968, in which students and writers protested communist cultural and education policies, is the only date on the Poznań monument that refers to opposition not involving workers.

[6] Joan Wallach Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History* (New York, 1988), 2–3.

[7] Václav Havel's observations on the centrality of even a hollow, discredited ideology in what he calls the "post-totalitarian" state is still the best analysis of this phenomenon. See Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," in Havel, *et al.*, *The Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the State in Central-Eastern Europe*, John Keane, ed. (Armonk, N.Y., 1985), 23–96.

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division has been recast symbolically as between productive (breadwinning) and non-productive spheres.[8] Obviously, the borders and content of the social were different in the communist state. Here, I will use the concept to encompass household management (especially the purchase of food) and motherhood; as with the nineteenth-century version, the political realm is (ideally) masculine and the social, feminine.

While revolutionary communist regimes generally seek to intervene in all aspects of life and to remake the social (through laws on household relations, the revision of customs, and the like), postrevolutionary regimes withdraw from this activism, leaving the private or social sphere alone—and in women's hands.[9] In doing so, they insist on a distinction between the political and the social in a kind of contract: society is to refrain from contesting the political realm, and, in return, the state promises to provide fully for society's needs. As David Ost has written on the "social contract" in Poland, "benefits came to workers precisely to the extent that they stayed out of the political realm."[10] After Stalinism (which came to an end in 1956), the state's involvement in the social sphere was largely limited to rhetoric and subsidies. When the state was unable to fulfill its promises, society could challenge the state by reintroducing issues of social consumption into politics. Only with the rise of Solidarity in 1980 did society successfully contest what the regime considered to be the political realm.

Hana Havelková has suggested that women under communism were uniquely able to cross the (artificial) barrier between the two realms: as the public (political) sphere, dominated by surreal ideological pronouncements and false information, became more abstract, the private (social, or household-management) sphere became the locus of substitute economic activity and of information exchange. Only women were "competent" in both realms.[11] As both consumers and community "activists," in a regime that admitted neither, Polish women workers could link economics and politics in dangerous ways, bringing the social back into the political; their intervention into the political would destabilize the state. However, the standard narrative of political opposition has understated the role women played in forcing these boundaries. Polish women did not, of course, think of themselves only as women; gender identity was not necessarily even a primary identity. As will be seen in the cases discussed below, women defined themselves also as workers, as consumers, and as Poles. Yet each of these identities acquired a certain power as a result of the conjunction with gender: a *woman* worker was more threatening than a "worker." Moreover, gender identity gave women access to particularly powerful

[8] See Mary Ryan, "Gender and Public Access: Women's Politics in Nineteenth-Century America," in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, Craig Calhoun, ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 259–88, esp. 259–62, and sources cited there; Denise Riley, *"Am I That Name?" Feminism and the Category of "Women" in History* (Minneapolis, 1988); Nancy Fraser, *Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory* (Cambridge, 1989), 124–25.

[9] Joanna Goven, "The Gendered Foundation of Hungarian Socialism: State, Society and the Anti-Politics of Anti-Feminism" (PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1993), chap. 3.

[10] David Ost, "Polish Labor before and after Solidarity," *International Labor and Working-Class History* 50 (Fall 1996): 36.

[11] Hana Havelková, "A Few Prefeminist Thoughts," in *Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, Nanette Funk and Magda Mueller, eds. (New York, 1993), 68–69.

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symbols, the most important of which was motherhood: a *mother*-worker was the most dangerous of all.

Research in this direction may have implications for the study of women's (or men's) protest elsewhere. However, because of the role of the state and of a transformative ideology, there can be no parallel until the Solidarity movement to the study of women's social movements in other developing societies (even those with powerful states) or industrial democracies. In this article, I focus explicitly on the nature of the communist experience and on the weaknesses of the communist regime. My intention is to explore the consequences of gender identity and of gendered protest for the survival, and fall, of communism.

IF RESISTANCE WAS GENDERED IN COMMUNIST POLAND, SO, TOO, was the state. The ideology of the communist state is a gendered ideology, based partly on a particular understanding of sexual difference. Communism has also foundered on the question of gender and politics as the result of two insuperable paradoxes. Both are directly related to the core communist ideas of revolution and progress. The first paradox is that of equality. The founders of the Soviet Union and their descendants elsewhere promised social, political, and economic equality for women (and some other disadvantaged groups). Quickly, however, they found this promise the easiest to shed in the face of the daunting challenge of rapid modernization. The rapid erosion after revolution of early communist ideals of sexual equality has been the most researched aspect of women's history in communist societies.[12]

But it is not simply the problem of governing that turns communists against women's emancipation. In the end, communism is an ideology most attuned to the ideas and symbols usually advanced by men, whether in support or in opposition. Eric Weitz has explored this aspect of the German Communist Party (KPD) in the Weimar era, finding that the KPD constructed a "gendered party culture that elevated male productive labor and male physical prowess to the revolutionary ideal."[13] The communist regime claims its origins—or creates a myth of origin—in heroic, individual, male struggle: the fearless agitator leaping factory fences, the political leader parachuting into enemy territory, the self-taught worker explaining current events to his less literate workmates. The communist appropriation of military terminology to economic and political struggle, of course, is a particularly well-known example. The central image of society in the revolutionary communist state is surely that of the hero worker. In Poland and East Germany, as well as in

[12] See, for example, Elizabeth A. Wood, *The Baba and the Comrade: Gender and Politics in Revolutionary Russia* (Bloomington, Ind., 1997); Christina Kelley Gilmartin, *Engendering the Chinese Revolution: Radical Women, Communist Politics, and Mass Movements in the 1920s* (Berkeley, Calif., 1995); Judith Stacey, *Patriarchy and Socialist Revolution in China* (Berkeley, 1983); Andjelka Milić, "Women and Nationalism in the Former Yugoslavia," in Funk and Mueller, *Gender Politics and Post-Communism*, esp. 111–12; Muriel Nazzari, "The 'Woman Question' in Cuba: An Analysis of Material Constraints on Its Solution," in *Rethinking the Political: Gender, Resistance, and the State*, Barbara Laslett, Johanna Brenner, and Yesim Arat, eds. (Chicago, 1995), 414–31. This is also the central theme of the collection edited by Sonia Kruks, Rayna Rapp, and Marilyn B. Young, *Promissory Notes: Women in the Transition to Socialism* (New York, 1989).

[13] Eric D. Weitz, *Creating German Communism, 1890–1990: From Popular Protests to Socialist State* (Princeton, N.J., 1997), 189.

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the Soviet Union, the first such heroes were coal miners, whose virility was celebrated.[14] Like most labor organizers, communists have traditionally been most active in large, heavy-industry factories—factories like those in which communist-era opposition erupted in Poland. Communism, too, offers a vision of a violently remade world, a cathartic upsetting of the order that keeps workers subordinate to their employers.

In contrast, communists have had more difficulty articulating their vision of the feminine. In Weitz's KPD, "the understandings of women's roles were notably diffuse, even contradictory. Most often, the KPD rendered women as the oppressed but largely passive objects of capitalist exploitation." The conflict between revolutionary and passive images was further complicated by maternal themes as well.[15] As Thomas Schrand has aptly observed, women were to become "honorary men" in the Bolshevik vision. Women's reluctance to embrace this category helped push the Bolsheviks back toward models adapted from tradition. "Feminine" could even mean the opposite of communist; communist propaganda has frequently portrayed members of the ruling class or of the opposition as weakened—made effeminate—by their addiction to luxury and leisure.[16]

Resolution of the dilemma of equality only led communist regimes into a paradox of consumption: a conflict between the ideology of progress (best captured in Nikita Khrushchev's promise to "bury" the West or Edward Gierek's dream of a "second Poland" emerging like a butterfly from the chrysalis of socialism-under-construction) and the means of getting there. Burdened with the legacy of Stalinist revolutionary industrialization (and, often, owing their successful careers to its gigantomania), postwar communist leaders tried to maintain this masculine version of progress while adding a second, the promise to families and consumers of a higher standard of living. They discovered that one could not have both; meanwhile, their societies came to measure success by the latter standard.[17] In this, the position of women as consumers was crucial but poorly understood both by regime representatives and by men in opposition. The Polish regime's efforts to square this circle through evocation of traditional family images only deepened the gap between the state and working women.

It is often unrecognized (in part, because historical study of communist regimes

[14] For Poland, the ghostwritten memoirs of early labor heroes provide a wealth of material. See, for example, Włodzimierz Gmitrzykowski, *Za przykładem Matrosowa*, Biblioteka Przodownika Pracy [hereafter, BPP] no. 6 (Warsaw, 1949); Jan Kaniewski, *Było to na Pa-Fa-Wagu*, BPP no. 15 (Warsaw, 1949); Michał Krajewski and Bogdan Ostromęcki, *Ludzie z rusztowań*, BPP no. 20 (Warsaw, 1950). Women's memoirs evoke quite different images of skill, authority, and heroism. See, for example, Wanda Gościmińska, *Mój wielki dzień*, BPP no. 16 (Warsaw, 1949); Halina Lipińska, *Mój awans* (Warsaw, 1950). I discuss these memoirs and others in Padraic Kenney, *Rebuilding Poland: Workers and Communists, 1945–1950* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1997), chap. 5. For East Germany, see François Bafoil, "Adolf Hennecke, un Stakhanoviste allemande ou les fundaments de la RDA," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 30, no. 1 (1990): 5–25. On the Soviet Union, Lewis H. Siegelbaum, *Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity in the USSR, 1935–1941* (New York, 1988). Anne Gorsuch discusses the "male image" of the Russian civil war in " 'A Woman Is Not a Man': The Culture of Gender and Generation in Soviet Russia, 1921–1928," *Slavic Review* 55 (Fall 1996): 638, 644–46.

[15] Weitz, *Creating German Communism*, 189, 205–20.

[16] Thomas G. Schrand, "Socialism in One Gender: Masculinist Values in the Stalinist Revolution," paper presented at the 29th convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, November 1997, 2–4; Weitz, *Creating German Communism*, 191.

[17] Katherine Verdery, *What Was Socialism and What Comes Next?* (Princeton, N.J., 1996), 26–29; Slavenka Drakulić, *How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed*, rev. edn. (New York, 1993).

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has naturally started from the beginning) how radically different "ordinary" or "stagnant" communism is from the revolutionary variety. The need for stability came to the Soviet Union after World War II and to Eastern Europe after 1956. Stability meant evocation of tradition—nation and family in particular—and attention to the problems of daily life, including consumption.[18] Scholars have described the postrevolutionary communist state as "patriarchal,"[19] "paternalist" or "socialist paternalist,"[20] or "neo-paternalist,"[21] the latter term denoting the replacement of traditional forms of paternalist authority by a similar authority embodied in the state. All these terms depict the state acting as the head of a family, providing protection and stability in return for obedience—even though communist paternalism usually promised more than it could deliver.[22] Katherine Verdery describes a "persistent gendering of the power structure and the societal division of labor," and shows how the rhetoric of nation reinforced this division.[23]

Thus women in communist states are at once promoted into the public sphere (awarded equality in many professions, for example) and also kept firmly in domestic, auxiliary roles—always with an identity "as defined by others, not woman as someone with the autonomy to define herself."[24] The communist system of "transmission belts"—in which various mass organizations such as unions and youth organizations served to convey party directives to segments of the population—politicized society yet also served to cut some social identities off from politics. That is, activity in their own social organizations substituted for the participation of women, youth, and minorities (for example) in national political leadership.[25] Even as the force of ideology receded in communist societies, to be replaced by a

[18] See Vera S. Dunham, *In Stalin's Time: Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction*, 2d edn. (Durham, N.C., 1990); Greta Bucher, "The Impact of World War II on Moscow Women: Gender Consciousness and Relationships in the Immediate Postwar Period, 1945–1953" (PhD dissertation, Ohio State University, 1995), esp. chap. 2; Marianne Liljeström, "The Soviet Gender System: The Ideological Construction of Femininity and Masculinity in the 1970s," in *Gender Restructuring in Russian Studies*, Liljeström, *et al.*, eds. (Tampere, Finland, 1993), 163–74. On Poland, Jacek Kuroń and Jacek Żakowski, *PRL dla początkujących* (Wrocław, 1997), chap. 2.

[19] Martha Lampland, "Biographies of Liberation: Testimonials to Labor in Socialist Hungary," in Kruks, *et al.*, *Promissory Notes*, 306–22.

[20] Verdery, *What Was Socialism*, 63; Ferenc Fehér, "Paternalism as a Mode of Legitimation in Soviet-Type Societies," in T. H. Rigby and Ferenc Fehér, eds., *Political Legitimation in Communist States* (New York, 1982), 64–81.

[21] Ken Jowitt, "Challenging the 'Correct' Line: Reviewing Katherine Verdery's *What Was Socialism and What Comes Next?*" *East European Politics and Societies* 12 (Winter 1998): 94–95.

[22] See Lewis Siegelbaum, "'Dear Comrade, You Ask What We Need': Socialist Paternalism and Soviet Rural 'Notables' in the Mid-1930s," *Slavic Review* 57 (Spring 1998): 107–32. Oddly, it is not clear from any of these authors that such a "family head" is necessarily male; this, however, becomes clear with attention to state (or party) imagery, as in Weitz's work, cited above. On the other hand, the "father" state need not act in a "masculine" way. Indeed, communist leaders have usually been strangely genderless individuals of purported asceticism (in the Polish case, one thinks of Władysław Gomułka and Wojciech Jaruzelski). See also Drakulić, *How We Survived Communism*, 22–23.

[23] Verdery, *What Was Socialism*, 67.

[24] Kennedy, *Professionals, Power, and Solidarity*, 366. See also Martha Lampland, *The Object of Labor: Commodification in Socialist Hungary* (Chicago, 1995), 182–86; Lynne Attwood, *The New Soviet Man and Woman: Sex-Role Socialization in the USSR* (Bloomington, Ind., 1990).

[25] On women in Polish public life, see Renata Siemieńska, *Płeć zawód polityka: Kobiety w życiu publicznym w Polsce* (Warsaw, 1990). The Polish women's organization was the Liga Kobiet (League of Women). See Jean Robinson, "Women, the State, and the Need for Civil Society: The *Liga Kobiet* in Poland," in Dorothy McBride Stetson and Amy Mazur, eds., *Comparative State Feminism* (Thousand Oaks, Calif., 1995), 203–20.

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legitimacy based on economic success and national traditions, it remained a force in the area of gender and the boundary of the political realm, because women who had the freedom to attend to family and household management symbolized prosperity while reinforcing the image of the Polish nation that leaders wished to claim as their own. As Polish feminist Joanna Bator writes, "the main points of reference for those living in the [Polish People's Republic] were 'nation' and 'family.' The responsibility for the latter fell upon women. Matters of 'nation' belonged rather to the men."[26]

The communists both inherited and helped create a factory world that was similarly masculine. In the early Soviet factory, men's mastery of skills and of communist theory and practice gave them superiority over women, who were thus marginalized in both the factory and politics.[27] Male workers in Poland's "masculine" industries could think of women (and mothers in particular) as likely to be safely home, outside the factory, as in this verse from a song composed during the May 1988 strike at the Gdańsk shipyard:

> Wives and mothers came to the gate
> To encourage us and give us strength.
> "Don't worry, we are with you!
> When we win, it will be easier to live."[28]

Paradoxically, mothers and wives might also be those who weakened strikers' resolve; in the shipyard strike that August, strikers taunted those who gave up and left the strike: "Home to Mommy!"[29] In both scenarios, men are on the literal and figurative inside of the political (or public) struggle, while women remain outside, even though they might be vocal about some economic issues. The men invoke links between the workplace and the nation; as the shipyard graffito claimed, they are "fighting for Poland," a thing much greater than the livelihood of any one family.[30] That fight—like the communists' battle described earlier—would be, like all wars, best waged by men.

This division of labor was apparent among the intellectual opposition as well. Writing in 1987 to *Wiadomości*, a conservative nationalist underground journal, a woman who signed herself "Auntie Aniela" exposed the limitations of the opposition's focus on the political realm as defined by the communists and contrasted this with the knowledge she possessed as a person inhabiting both spheres:

[26] Joanna Bator, "Brzydkie słowo 'feminizm,'" *Gazeta wyborcza* (June 27–28, 1998): 27.

[27] Diane P. Koenker, "Men against Women on the Shop Floor in Early Soviet Russia: Gender and Class in the Socialist Workplace," *AHR* 100 (December 1995): 1438–64.

[28] Zbigniew Stefański, "Gdy nadszedł maj," in Tomasz Tabako, *Strajk 88* (Warsaw, 1992), 101. See also Małgorzata Szejnert and Tomasz Zalewski, *Szczecin: Grudzień—sierpień—grudzień* (London, 1986), 69, for a remarkable description of women fighting with the police in order to bring food to striking husbands and sons at the Szczecin shipyard in January 1971.

[29] Tabako, *Strajk 88*, 211. See also Szejnert and Zalewski, *Szczecin*, 133.

[30] The choice of the nation as a focus of political struggle was potentially problematic, as this was a discourse readily adopted by the communist leadership as well. See Kubik, *Power of Symbols*; and Michael Checinski, *Poland: Communism, Nationalism, Anti-Semitism*, Tadeusz Szafar, trans. (New York, 1982).

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Dear editors, you write about very interesting things: the machinations [*matactwa*] of the left, the wisdom of the right, the craftiness of perestroika, and also about what should be the duty of every Pole [Polak]. Fortunately, you aren't talking to me, because I am a Polish woman [Polka]. So there's no need [for me] to read [Wiełsaw] Chrzanowski [a leading conservative thinker], and with a clear conscience I can run around and do my shopping. Which is, by the way, the daily responsibility of every Polka. But in order to (despite everything) help the cause, I have decided to speak out.

Aniela chides the editors for their lack of knowledge about the market:

The statement "there's nothing in the stores" tells us nothing about reality. Everyone has been saying that for over forty years—and it means something different every year . . . The crisis began very recently, in the spring, and is deepening unusually fast. This should be noticed, and it is easiest to notice being a woman, and not right or left. Kisses for all. Auntie Aniela.[31]

Aniela implies that, even though there is rarely a conscious mention of gender, the everyday language of the political opposition is nevertheless highly gendered. Men talk about one thing, and women see another—Aniela argues that women see the truth. She suggests that the men of the political opposition habitually used a language foreign to her everyday experience, and that her everyday experience was key to seeing the disintegration of the communist system.

The leadership of the opposition that emerged in Poland after 1976 found women workers as difficult to lead as the regime did. Before 1976, the intellectual opposition had little to do with workers; after this (with the founding of the Workers' Defense Committee, KOR), it moved ever closer to the opposition based in the communists' flagship enterprises. Within such opposition circles, it was a commonplace to subsume other differences and struggles to the battle for national freedom—as the strikers in Gdańsk asked women to do.[32] Thus, as they constructed a story of resistance, underground editors and essayists did not (and perhaps could not) capture or represent the voice of the workers in all its variety, and in particular they elided the gender differences or similarities between various types of opposition and the state. Many of the key underground journals in the 1980s (though not, evidently, *Wiadomości*) were edited by women; they were no more likely to raise issues of gender than were male editors, placing the general goals of national sovereignty and human rights above issues of gender.[33] This sense that

[31] Mischievously, Aniela indicates the depth of the current crisis by noting the shortage of sanitary pads and cotton: "Am I improper to raise this topic? Probably so . . . Thank God, there is the independent [underground] press! And that one can write in it not only about the idea of Independence! (because in the Catholic press one can almost—almost—write about the idea of Independence, but one does not mention sanitary pads.)" *Wiadomości* 252, September 27, 1987. Joanna Goven argues that a conservative ideology of the family becomes central to anticommunist opposition, even as the state adopts a similar position. Goven, "Gendered Foundation of Hungarian Socialism," 13. See also Lee Feigon, "Gender and the Chinese Student Movement," in *Popular Protest and Political Culture in Modern China*, Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom and Elizabeth J. Perry, eds., 2d edn. (Boulder, Colo., 1994), 125–35.

[32] See Long, *We All Fought for Freedom*, chaps. 3–4.

[33] See Penn, "National Secret." Jacek Kuroń, *Gwiezdny czas: Tom II wspomnień* (London, 1991), 222, calls these women "the little girls" who kept Solidarity alive during martial law. For a more subtle interpretation, see the comments of Bogdan Borusewicz and of Władysław Frasyniuk (who calls them "the nameless heroines") in Maciej Łopiński, Marcin Moskit, and Mariusz Wilk, *Konspira: Rzecz o podziemnej "Solidarności"* (Warsaw, 1989; 1st edn., Paris, 1984), 185–86.

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there were certain things one could not risk protests over was precisely a view of two realms, political and social; only the former was properly inhabited by opposition work.

The shared culture of masculinity and political logic between communist state and opposition suggests an explanation for the lack of success, in the short term at least, of most worker opposition to communism. An opposition using the same discourse might necessarily find it difficult to overturn, rather than simply reform, the regime; the communist state could too easily coopt such opposition, and often did. It should be clear that the communists did not create this discourse on their own, nor was this a discourse to which society had to adapt. Workers could—and did—adapt the discourse of industry and nation to subvert the communists; this is a large part of the story of Solidarity. However, since in effect workers and party grounded their discourse in the same location, conflict was rendered more difficult—and, what is more important, more easily diffused. But what about an opposition that used an entirely different set of assumptions and demands: could such opposition prove more threatening to the state?

IN LATE 1970, THE POLISH COMMUNISTS, led by Władysław Gomułka, faced their most severe test in fourteen years. The so-called "little stabilization" of the early 1960s—a gradual increase in consumer comforts, in response to the upheaval of 1956—had begun to wear thin. Like its counterparts throughout Eastern Europe, the Gomułka regime steered an erratic course between reform and protection of the Stalinist economic system.[34] Beginning in early 1969, the party proposed a complex and contradictory reform package, including a wage reform that was tantamount to a two-year wage freeze prior to promised incentive-based raises (evoking the brutal pace of the Stalinist years), a reduction of investments in certain industries (which promised only to worsen the country's long-term economic health), and, finally, a comprehensive but sudden price reform in December 1970. Prices rose on dozens of basic household items, particularly food (which accounted for half the total increases measured as household expenditures nationwide; meat and fats alone accounted for half the increase). The price increases were planned to net almost 6 percent of the national wage fund, but workers' budgets suffered disproportionately.[35] The Christmas season in Polish culture is the most important food-shopping period of the year, a time of preparation for ceremonial meals and entertainment of guests. There could not have been a worse moment to raise prices; this seemed a direct attack not only on household budgets but on Polish religious and family traditions as well. Angered by the government's refusal to discuss the

[34] See, for example, Jeffrey Kopstein, *The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945–1989* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1997), esp. chap. 2.

[35] Bogdan Mieczkowski, *Personal and Social Consumption in Eastern Europe: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany* (New York, 1975), 169–70; T. Podgorski, "Poland's New Economic Policy and the Workers," Polish Background Report, *Radio Free Europe Research*, April 7, 1970; Michael Costello, "Poland on the Eve of the Eighth Plenum," Polish Background Report, *Radio Free Europe Research*, February 1, 1971; Michael Gamarnikow, "Economic Background of the Workers' Revolt in Poland," Polish Background Report, *Radio Free Europe Research*, February 1, 1971; Andrzej Jezierski and Barbara Petz, *Historia gospodarcza Polski Ludowej 1944–1975* (Warsaw, 1980), 265–70.

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price hikes or respond to their other demands, workers in the shipyards and ports along the Baltic coast struck, staged marches and demonstrations, and even burned down party headquarters in several cities.

Even though the shipyards were a vital symbol of economic power, and symbolic of the national prosperity achieved in the "little stabilization," the regime found it did not have to give in to workers' demands in December 1970. Instead, it rediscovered a common language with the workers. At first, such rhetoric was futile—such as Vice Premier Stanisław Kociołek's appeal (the day before an angry crowd burned Gdańsk party headquarters) to those "who had rebuilt Gdańsk out of ruins [in 1945] not to tear it down on their own heads."[36] But when troops fired on workers exiting a commuter train in Gdynia on the morning of December 17, killing seventeen (another twenty-four died in clashes with police elsewhere on the coast), the nature of conflict changed. Polish United Workers' Party First Secretary Gomułka resigned on December 19; he was succeeded by Edward Gierek, of impeccable proletarian credentials after eighteen years working in French coal mines. Even better, Gierek had gained a national reputation in the 1960s for his management of the Katowice region. He was the "generous father";[37] it was well known that what one could not buy in one's own province could be obtained in Katowice stores.[38] Gierek drew on this background in his famous meetings with workers in Szczecin and Gdańsk in late January 1971. "I am a worker just like you," he told strikers in Szczecin.[39] When he ended his dramatic appeal to patriotism and trust in the dedication of the renewed party with the plea "Will you help us?" the men of the shipyards shouted back: "We will help."[40]

However fragile, common ground between the two sides was found. Alojzy Szablewski, a strike leader in 1970 (as well as 1980 and 1988), recalls the "wonderful atmosphere" in which people worked in 1971; the sense of Gierek's comradeship overcame the memory of slain colleagues and of the lines his wife Adela stood in for sugar and meat.[41] As one participant in the Szczecin confrontation told his fellow workers, after recounting how workers were shot on the street: "In my opinion, Comrade Gierek has promised us nothing; he has said that the economic situation was too difficult. It is well known that Polish workers know how to work—here as well as abroad . . . So . . . we must give Comrade Gierek a chance. Of course, . . . we also trusted Gomułka. Only nothing came of it—nothing was accomplished. But in my opinion, Comrade Edward is the right kind of man. Let's give him at least a year or two and we'll see the results."[42] Gierek had asked the men to put aside the mundane concerns of food prices for a higher goal: to build ships for the economic revival of Poland. Lech Wałęsa regretted his answer in his memoirs: "After Gierek's speech someone should have stood up and said:

[36] Quoted in Laba, *Roots of Solidarity*, 29.

[37] Kuroń and Żakowski, *PRL dla początkujących*, 138.

[38] Maria Hirszowicz, *Coercion and Control in Communist Society: The Visible Hand in a Command Economy* (New York, 1985), 121–24.

[39] "Polish Workers and Party Leaders—A Confrontation," *New Left Review* 72 (March–April 1972): 38. This is a partial transcript of the meeting between Gierek (and other party leaders) and Szczecin strikers on January 25, 1971.

[40] Kubik, *Power of Symbols*, 32–33; Laba, *Roots of Solidarity*, 80–81.

[41] Tabako, *Strajk 88*, 27, 24.

[42] "Polish Workers and Party Leaders," 40.

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'Comrade, okay, you ask "will we help" but whom are we supposed to help?' But no one did this. [We] all sang 'Poland is not yet lost.'[43] . . . How could one not believe? We believed. At any rate, we were full of enthusiasm. We were in a fighting mood."[44] Stirred by national pride, these new "working-class leaders" could overlook the fact that the price hikes remained in effect.

Just two weeks later, on February 10, 1971, the huge Marchlewski cotton mill in Łódź went on strike to protest the same price hikes, upon receiving paychecks that showed a wage cut. Over the next few days, the strike spread to other textile mills and related factories.[45] As of February 13, the government clearly intended to hold the line, yet the workers of Łódź succeeded in forcing a reversal of that position. These were not the hero workers of the shipyards but underpaid, generally ignored workers of industries traditionally staffed by women. For the first time ever, a communist government publicly retreated under social pressure. Nevertheless, this strike, though an important moment of confrontation in communist Polish history, which "to a serious degree influenced the economic policy of the 1970s," has received almost no scholarly attention.[46] Why did the regime give in to the demands of the women of Łódź's much less violent protest after weathering the violence of December? The answer lies in the different language of protest that the regime faced.

On the fourth day of the strike, February 13, with nearly the entire city on strike or threatening to strike (a high of 90,000 on strike was reached two days later[47]), the party's Political Bureau sent a delegation led by Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz to Łódź to explain the situation. He was to offer a limited pay raise, promise more attention to the problems of Łódź and light industry in general, and explain that no more was to be had.[48] Some 3,000 workers gathered to hear him on February 14 in the Grand Theater.[49] Accounts of the meeting offer various versions of the women's determination. Celestyna Augustyniak, a worker at the Marchlewski mill, recalled they greeted Jaroszewicz with a patriotic song that began, "Thanks to you, Lord Magnates / For our servitude and our chains."[50] When the premier tried to speak, one woman shouted: "Your wife, Mrs. Jaroszewicz, loads ham on her sandwiches, while my children eat dry bread."[51] When Jaroszewicz attempted to use Gierek's line, "Will you help us?"—reported Radio Free Europe—the women "responded with a thunderous NO!"[52] Walery Namiotkiewicz—formerly Gomułka's personal

[43] The Polish national anthem. The rest of the line is "as long as we live."

[44] Lech Wałęsa, *Droga nadziei* (Kraków, 1989), 70–71.

[45] Andrzej Woźnicki, "Łódzkie strajki," *Solidarność ziemi łódzkiej* 2, no. 7 (February 12, 1981).

[46] Stefania Dzięcielska-Machnikowska and Grzegorz Matuszak, "Łódź między grudniem 1970 roku a lutym 1971 roku," *Rocznik Łódzki* 33 (1985): 227.

[47] Antoni Dudek and Tomasz Marszałkowski, *Walki uliczne w PRL 1956–1989* (Kraków, 1992), 137.

[48] *Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego: Grudzień 1970* (London, 1991), 202–03.

[49] Laba, *Roots of Solidarity*, 81. Some accounts place the confrontation not in the Grand Theater—where Dzięcielska-Machnikowska and Matuszak ("Łódź," 254) say there were 1,200 workers—but in a subsequent informal encounter in the Marchlewski mill late that evening. Woźnicki, "Łódzkie strajki"; *Poland, 1970–71: Capitalism and Class Struggle* (Detroit, Mich., 1977), 98.

[50] Laba, *Roots of Solidarity*, 82. The song, now known under the title "When the People Stand to Battle," was composed in 1836 as a rebuke to the nobility, which fought for its independence yet refused to emancipate the peasantry. It became a hymn of worker uprisings in the late nineteenth century and after.

[51] Laba, *Roots of Solidarity*, 82.

[52] "List z kraju na temat strajku w Łodzi." Radio Free Europe broadcast, April 19, 1971 (Facts and Views, 3417), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Archives, Budapest, III.6, p. 3. *Poland, 1970–71*, 99.

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secretary and a member of the Central Committee—recalled another version that circulated among the party elite that spring: the women gathered at the meeting with Jaroszewicz did not respond when asked for their demands but simply sat and cried.[53] On February 15, the Political Bureau announced that the price hikes had been rescinded.

Even though there had been sporadic strikes in Łódź over the previous two decades, the workers there had little formal organization to fall back on.[54] The trade unions and factory committees were useless, and workers ignored them. The power of the 1971 strike lay in the women strikers' devastating sense of pure injustice. They held fast to certain values and rights—the right to be fed, or at least the right to equal access to food. One complaint at Marchlewski was the cancellation of a special monthly payment for the purchase of milk; demands included lower prices on meat and a 20 percent wage increase. It was precisely the "unstructured" nature of the strike that forced the regime's reversal, as the party had difficulty both talking with the strikers and understanding their motives.[55] The violence on the coast had been easier to understand; in Łódź, the avoidance of violent tragedy was perceived to be one source of the strike's success. When an angry crowd gathered on the street on February 15 (as it happened, at about the same time as the regime was announcing the rollback of price hikes), an observer reported that "order was exemplary; only one shop window was broken by accident, as the result of the crush of people, yet no one touched the goods in the window display."[56] Whether or not it was true, this account expresses a belief in the morality that underlay the women's demands.

[53] I am indebted for this story to Grzegorz Sołtysiak, who shared with me his notes from an interview with Namiotkiewicz. Such a response would imply that Jaroszewicz was abusing the women rather than protecting them and was thus less masculine. Jaroszewicz's version, meanwhile, seems less than likely: he emerges as their avuncular protector: "I went [to Łódź] and found myself among hundreds of terribly upset and exhausted women, at that time working in conditions which made a mockery of the most elementary demands of hygiene and work safety. And they also made so little money! That night, I visited three large, old textile mills . . . I experienced a great deal, and learned a lot during that night shift. I also understood that it was necessary either to raise the pay of women in the textile mills—but this would provoke an avalanche of pay claims—or quickly to recall the price increase of December. We had no reserves for this, but I believed that if we could get rid of pay conflicts we could move forward . . . At a meeting of the Political Bureau I put forward a motion to recall the price increase. There was understanding, agreement, and support." Piotr Jaroszewicz and Bohdan Roliński, *Przerywam milczenie . . . 1939–1989* (Warsaw, 1991), 171. See also Janusz Rolicki, *Edward Gierek: Przerwana dekada; Wywiad rzeka* (Warsaw, 1990), 64. Notes from the Politbiuro meeting of February 15, 1971, made by Stefan Jędrychowski (and supplied to me by Grzegorz Sołtysiak), are in the Archiwum Dokumentacji Historycznej PRL, Kolekcja Stefana Jędrychowskiego, J-I/3, Warsaw.

[54] Kazimierz Zaworski and Zofia Zwolińska, "Łódź Textile Workers Reported on Strike," Polish Background Report, *Radio Free Europe Research*, February 15, 1971.

[55] The term is Barbara Jancar's. She writes that the women did not choose representatives to voice demands but shouted them from the floor, making real communication impossible. "The Łódź strike method," she concludes, "forced the regime to change its mind." Jancar, "Women in the Opposition in Poland and Czechoslovakia in the 1970s," in Sharon L. Wolchik and Alfred G. Meyer, eds., *Women, State, and Party in Eastern Europe* (Durham, N.C., 1985), 175. Jancar notes a similar strike in Żyrardów in 1981. Although it is hardly a necessary attribute of women's protest, non-hierarchical activism by women is particularly baffling for its state opponents. See Barbara Einhorn's description of the East German "Women for Peace": "Socialist Emancipation: The Women's Peace Movement in the German Democratic Republic," in Kruks, *et al.*, *Promissory Notes*, 298–300. Woźnicki, "Łódzkie strajki"; Dzięcielska-Machnikowska and Matuszak, "Łódź," 250–51.

[56] "List z kraju na temat strajku w Łodzi," 4. On the demonstration, see also Dudek and Marszałkowski, *Walki uliczne*, 136–38.

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Women's leadership in this strike was in part symbolic. Certainly both men and women participated in the street demonstration. Some accounts suggest that senior, skilled men in several factories took the lead in creating strike committees.[57] On the other hand, "leadership" could mean various things. A strike "led" by men, in which leaders and spokespeople for the strike committee were men, might also have the unofficial spiritual leadership of an older, trusted woman worker—a mother figure. Such was the case in Gdańsk in 1980, where a strike was begun to protest the firing of crane operator Anna Walentynowicz. An even more telling example is at the Warski shipyard in Szczecin back in 1970–1971. Maria Chmielewska, an office worker, found herself chosen to serve on the official workers' council almost by chance, because she was a good typist; as she put it, she began to "babysit my charges" (*niańczyć tych swoich stażystów*), fighting for health services for the young men performing the most dangerous work in shipbuilding. When the 1970 strike began, Chmielewska was appointed to the strike committee and continued to look after her charges: "An old worker, with a family in Szczecin and better-paid work, has money, and his family brings him soup. The young [worker] has nothing, he is hungry and cold. My task was to take care of them, and if someone had something, to divide it fairly." Ten years later, she was one of those to whom the workers turned for guidance in the strike that led to Solidarity. But as that strike progressed, she was more likely to be busy typing up the strikers' demands, and she does not figure as a formal "leader" of the strike. Women like Chmielewska and Walentynowicz possessed a certain kind of subtle charisma, guiding rather than leading dramatically; though effective, even decisive, they were easily overlooked.[58] It may therefore be beside the point to determine who were the "leaders" of the Łódź strike. Zdzisław B., a male skilled worker at one of the smaller factories involved in the strike, told of his negotiations with the factory director, his organization of the strike, and his attendance at the meeting with Jaroszewicz. He was hard pressed to remember any women, since his factory employed mostly men—but then recalled that the women workers of the one workshop dominated by women had started the strike: telling Zdzisław B. that he was sure to make a secret deal with the director, they shut off their machines to force his hand. What did it mean, then, to "lead" the protest in this factory?[59]

When the critical meeting with the premier took place, it was the voices of the women of the textile mills that people remembered. All of Poland saw Łódź as a "women's city," and these workers knew this well. The strike was punctuated by

[57] Interviews with veterans of the 1971 strike are all in the Slavic Collection, Harvard University Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts (uncatalogued). That senior, skilled men took the lead is disputed by Łódź Solidarity leader Andrzej Słowik; interview with author, Łódź, February 3, 1997. Słowik points out that even by 1980 there were few workers left at the Marchlewski mill from 1971; it was such an antiquated mill that one went there to work "as punishment." The confused memories of the strike are similar to the memories of the shipyard strike of August 1980; see Long, *We All Fought for Freedom*.

[58] Szejnert and Zalewski, *Szczecin*, 29–30, 46, 121, also 80–81. See Temma Kaplan, *Crazy for Democracy: Women in Grassroots Movements* (New York, 1997). None of the works on women in Solidarity (see n. 4) discusses this issue, although each does look at individual women leaders like Anna Walentynowicz.

[59] Zdzisław B., interview with author, Łódź, February 3, 1997. See also his interview of August 7, 1981, Slavic Collection, Harvard University Library (uncatalogued). One might also consider Poland's most famous strike, in Gdańsk in August 1980. Even though Lech Wałęsa is remembered as that strike's leader, it was Alina Pieńkowska who urged him and the other strikers to continue their protest in solidarity with other factories after the shipyard's demands had been addressed on August 15. Long, *We All Fought for Freedom*, 30.

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rumors that unrest was spreading to other textile cities similarly dominated by women.[60] After the debacle of December, this was the women's turn. While one must be hesitant to assign "community" or "family" issues to women, the fact is that the communist authorities had always done just this, and the men had accepted such categories, most recently in their "dialogue" with Secretary Gierek. Yet, given the obvious power of food-basket issues, could not men be consumers as well? After all, they had been the first to advance price-related demands—even if they did abandon them later. But men were unlikely actors in this role. Shopping for food in shortage-plagued Poland required a great expenditure of energy, not only because of long lines in stores but also because supplies were distributed at uncertain times and in unexpected places; one might ordinarily have to visit a half-dozen stores to complete the purchases for one day's meals. It was generally assumed that women had the time, or the "intuition," for this chore. While men might be aware of prices and the strain on family budgets, they would be less likely to recognize the connections between time, money, and government policy than would their wives.[61]

The communists, in contrast, tried to remind men occupying the shipyards of their family obligations—not as providers but as consumers of what their wives would provide. "HAVE YOU CONSIDERED," asked a leaflet thrown from a helicopter circling above Szczecin in December 1970, "why your place at the Sunday dinner table will be empty? . . . Vice-premier Franciszek KAIM guarantees you that if you leave the factory, your safety is assured."[62] In exchange for renunciation of "political" demands, the regime thus promised that it—and the housewives of Szczecin—would take care of the strikers' needs. The men chose to believe the state and its new leader, Gierek; it was not long before their wives reminded them of this: as one shipyard worker admitted, "I believed like crazy. Then every time I had an argument with my wife when we ran out of something, she would say: 'Go, let Gierek give it to you.'"[63]

For workers, consumer-based conflict could also mean class conflict. The women who attacked the household privileges of Premier Jaroszewicz's wife implied an indirect exploitation of one by the other. Similar charges had been made (never openly) against the wife of Władysław Gomułka. A famously devout and ascetic communist, Gomułka was said to be ignorant of his wife's shopping sprees in exclusive stores (Gierek's wife, too, was believed to take regular shopping trips—to Paris) and unaware of the relative ease with which she, unlike ordinary women, could obtain items such as meat.[64] In later years, such anger would also be turned against the wives of miners, whom working women imagined to be leading an easy life off their husbands' large paychecks. Each of these complaints, of course, reveals

[60] "List z kraju na temat strajku w Łodzi," 2.

[61] See Ivan Volgyes and Nancy Volgyes, *The Liberated Female: Life, Work, and Sex in Socialist Hungary* (Boulder, Colo., 1977). Karen Hagemann has described a similar division of protest in Weimar Germany, in which men engaged in "political" protests and women in protests on "everyday" issues; she reports a cross-class consensus upholding this division. Hagemann, "Men's Demonstrations and Women's Protest: Gender in Collective Action in the Urban Working-Class Milieu during the Weimar Republic," *Gender and History* 5 (Spring 1993): 101–19. See also Lynne Viola, *Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance* (New York, 1996), chap. 6.

[62] Tabako, *Strajk 88*, 69. See also Szejnert and Zalewski, *Szczecin*, 127, 133.

[63] Szejnert and Zalewski, *Szczecin*, 74.

[64] On Gomułka's attitude toward consumerism, see Hirszowicz, *Coercion and Control*, 91–93.

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more about the speakers than about actual social relations. They also show how divisions between the political and social were believed to be replicated even within the families of state leaders.

Thus the new Polish consumer, whom Gomułka's little stabilization had helped to create, turned against leaders who came to be seen in part as even greater consumers. The late 1950s saw consumption increase by about one-third, with wages in 1960 about one-quarter higher than in 1956. Although the 1960s in general brought an economic slowdown, in which real wages generally increased by less than 2 percent per year, the pattern of personal consumption changed. Increased consumption in the 1950s was in large part made up of items that had been in short supply during Stalinism, such as shoes or soap; food consumption increased less than wages did. In the 1960s, consumption of meat, fats, and sugar led growth, while more and more households began to acquire refrigerators, televisions, and washing machines.[65] Even though it would be an exaggeration to say that Polish consumers' concerns turned from survival to comfort, Polish mothers were now more aware of how they could provide their children with an acceptable standard of living. In a visit to one striking textile mill in February 1971, Minister of Light Industry Tadeusz Kunicki faced withering ridicule when he attempted to play down price increases by pointing out to strikers that, for example, the price of children's leggings had gone down; one woman retorted, "Excuse me, sir, but am I going to stuff my child's mouth with leggings, and he'll jaw on them like chewing gum?"[66] Statements like this reminded authorities that they had underestimated mother-consumers, and that they understood nothing about mothering except its centrality to national rhetoric.

The strikers of Łódź thus had powerful weapons at their disposal in the linked images of family, community, and nation. Polish traditions of gentility and protectiveness toward women had not disappeared under communism; this was, after all, a regime that emphasized patriotism and traditional nationalist values even more than its predecessor had.[67] As much as one could find common ground with male strikers, the rules of conduct in Polish culture (kissing women's hands, buying flowers on International Women's Day—which was just three weeks away) placed a barrier between male elites and the women workers they were forced both to speak down to and yet revere. The women in the Grand Theater recognized the awkward situation and exploited it.[68] The authorities simply could not repress the women as they had the men. The price increase of December 1970 was the state's

[65] Mieczkowski, *Personal and Social Consumption in Eastern Europe*, 124, 127, 130, 142–44.

[66] Wojciech Lityński, interview, July 5, 1981, in uncatalogued materials, Slavic Department, Harvard University Library. Lityński's commentary suggests some sympathy for the minister: "I thought he would drop dead, but like a worldly guy he controlled himself" (*myślałem że go szlag trafi, ale jako facet obyty opanował się*).

[67] Kubik, *Power of Symbols*, 34.

[68] One can imagine how women could stand up to Jaroszewicz given the pity felt by Maria Chmielewska as she watched him accompanying Gierek to Szczecin in January 1971: "After [Gierek and a group of workers] there ambled this old guy in a trenchcoat with the collar turned up, and that was Jaroszewicz. I recognized him, because that was my third vice-minister when I worked in Warsaw as a typist right after the war. So I'm looking—what do you know, it's Jaroszewicz! They let Gierek through on the stairs, so he could enter first, but Jaroszewicz got pretty crushed when they all crowded in. It really grabbed me that he walked along so modestly, and got so worked over on the stairs, really." Szejnert and Zalewski, *Szczecin*, 70. On kissing hands, see Maria Bogucka, "Gesture, Ritual, and Social Order in Sixteenth- to Eighteenth-Century Poland," in *A Cultural History of Gesture*, Jan Bremmer and Herman Roodenburg, eds. (Ithaca, N.Y., 1992), 195–96.

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admission of failure to guarantee the social sphere in return for peace in the political realm. Gierek's plea to shipyard workers was an attempt to restore this contract and accept the boundary between the political and social; the women of Łódź thrust social demands back into the political realm, fully aware of the power their protest as *women* might have. The complaints about food, for example, immediately returned the strike to a context that had been lost in December: ordinary consumers trying to feed their families. The men of the Baltic coast were not well prepared to deliver this message, but women, who did most of the food shopping and usually controlled household budgets, could. They sharpened this message by comparing their plight to the comfort of the elites, whom they refused to admit as members of their community. They sang a song associating the delegation with the magnates of the feudal era, and then pointedly refused to join the scripted dialogue the men had helped write just three weeks earlier. Instead, they refocused the government's attention on social issues, in ways that contributed to the government's increasing economic problems—which would lead eventually to the birth of Solidarity.[69]

The strikers had memory on their side as well. The party elites who came to negotiate in 1971 surely remembered—or had been briefed—on the events of twenty-four years earlier, when the women of the same Łódź cotton mill—then called the I. K. Poznański mill—began a strike that virtually shut down the city's textile industry for two weeks in September 1947.[70] This strike showed many similarities to the strike of 1971. First, strikers in 1947 demonstrated remarkable unity. Over 50,000 workers in at least twenty factories were on strike at the conflict's height, despite the considerable difficulties of communicating news of the strike without media coverage or a pro-worker union leadership. Moreover, workers in many factories demanded their right to communicate with other factories by forming delegations, which they attempted to send to monitor the situation at the Poznański mill.

Second, the demands workers advanced in 1947 were clearly based on a sense of injustice; like those of 1971, they suggested that the state should refrain from intervening in the community, while also keeping to the social promises the communists made. The spark for the 1947 strike was management's attempt to introduce spinning work on double the number of machines by creating a separate workshop for "enthusiasts" who had agreed to try the new method. This threatened the security of workers' jobs, because the spinners displaced from "their" machines could well end up on newly created night shifts or out of the factory entirely. Even more fundamentally, the new scheme—like the changes in work process introduced in 1970—challenged the ability of textile workers to control their own work and pay. After two years of smaller-scale "enthusiast" campaigns supervised by the communist-allied Union of the Youth Struggle—campaigns that had often earned huge bonuses for winners—this was the leading edge of the drive to involve all workers. The campaign undermined the traditional bases of factory authority, in which skill

[69] Dudek and Marszałkowski, *Walki uliczne*, 144.

[70] The following account is from Padraic Kenney, "Working-Class Community and Resistance in Pre-Stalinist Poland: The Poznański Textile Strike, Łódź, September 1947," *Social History* 18 (January 1993): 31–51.

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and advance were gained by long apprenticeships to more experienced workers. In an industry that was largely unskilled, this was the main way in which workers could control the work process. Now, one could get ahead through political allegiance and norm-beating, eventually forcing norms upward for all workers. The price to be paid for higher wages seemed to the strikers to be just too high. The 1947 strike was thus an attempt to reassert community control and maintain standards of justice and tradition at work.[71]

Just as in 1971, female strikers in 1947 manipulated authorities' perceptions of them as helpless women. A key moment in the earlier conflict came when a communist agitator sent to Poznański became involved in a discussion with a group of striking women and allegedly struck or pushed one. In response, twenty-seven women staged a mass fainting. Within hours, rumors that police had kicked a pregnant woman and that four strikers had been killed swept the city, bringing Łódź textiles to a halt. Rather than engaging in violence, then, these women employed methods seemingly appropriate to their community and thus magnified the purported brutality of their opponents. As with the alleged crying episode of 1971, the fainting had the effect of undermining men's masculinity. In this clash between two gender cultures, the women won—in the short term, at least.

In 1947, as in 1971, strikers were acting as *workers* as well as women, operating with many of the same identities as men but reinterpreting them in powerful ways. Their conduct during the strike, for example, indicates that they thought of the factory as part of their neighborhood, as much as were the shops or the church. Men, when they struck (as in Gdańsk in 1980, for example), were more likely to occupy the factory around the clock, while their families smuggled food in to them.[72] Women, in contrast, would leave the occupied factory at the end of their shift (they surely knew that no one would be making sandwiches for *them*). While this made them more vulnerable to a lockout, it also asserted a particular understanding of the factory in the community that was in some ways more threatening to the authorities who sought to dislodge them.[73] Men and women even dressed differently. In recalling the 1970 strike, men in the shipyards took care to mention how they were dressed: "I must have gone back to the shop to change, because I was at the [demonstration in front of the] Provincial Committee in civilian dress." The work apron was a strong signifier of one's place at the strike, a world clearly delineated from the world outside yet emphasizing the worker-employer nature of the conflict. Women were more likely to change from their work clothes whether occupying the factory or participating in a street demonstration. Thus they appeared as

[71] Another example of community-based strikes occurred in mid-1946, when women in many of the same factories struck to protest a change in paydays from bi-weekly to semi-monthly. While the former method meant payment on the same day (usually Thursday) each time, the new system could result in pay being received on a Saturday, when stores were closed for the weekend. Authorities had underestimated the importance of reliably receiving one's pay in time for weekend shopping, and were forced to revert to the old method. See Kenney, *Rebuilding Poland*, 105.

[72] On the importance of food preparation in strikes, see Long, *We All Fought for Freedom*, 152–55.

[73] Karin Brodkin Sacks, in a study of resistance among women health-care workers in the United States, locates the source of this threat in "familistic values": "women learned in their families that work in the house and work for wages are not qualitatively different, and that the mental organization of both is a most significant source of pride and of adulthood." Sacks, "Gender and Grassroots Leadership," in *Women and the Politics of Empowerment*, Ann Bookman and Sandra Morgen, eds. (Philadelphia, 1988), 85.

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consumers or homemakers as well as workers—and made it incumbent upon the authorities to treat them not as workers but with the respect accorded women.[74]

To party observers, the 1947 strikers were women first, then workers. Internal party documents described the strikers as "pious old biddies" or "hysterical women," and made frequent reference to their religiosity and supposed lack of political consciousness. At the same time, they were fearful of the women. The police complained that, unlike in strikes before the war, it was impossible to identify strike leaders; strikes in many factories seemed to be spontaneous, directionless, and without demands. As a result, arrests were few—even three years into the communist era. Nevertheless, as their protest came at a crucial moment in the rise of Stalinism in Poland—virtually concurrent with the meeting of communist leaders at Szklarska Poręba, at which Joseph Stalin created the Cominform to exert tighter control over the direction of his East European satellites—the Poznański strikers of 1947 could not roll back the regime's incursions onto the factory floor. At least, they could not do so openly, although the strike was to some extent responsible for the bargain struck between workers and the state in the last years of the decade, in which the boundaries between political and social were first outlined. In 1948 and 1949, multi-machine work became a lucrative deal for many workers; wages rose sharply, much faster than inflation. By 1950, most workers in most industries were participants in some form of labor competition. A truce had been achieved: while the work was much harder, the pay still insufficient to feed a family, and the supply of goods never reliable, the regime would not for a long time risk raising prices, cutting wages, or punishing workers for their protests.[75] And when the regime finally did attempt any of these—as it did in 1970—it backed down quickly before the women of Łódź, with promises of well-being that it is difficult to imagine would have been offered to the men.[76]

IF HISTORIANS AND MONUMENT-BUILDERS had forgotten about these powerful strikes, the activists of Solidarity had not. Łódź, it is true, did not play a central role in the founding of Solidarity in 1980. Solidarity leaders saw women primarily as mothers, and they stressed this image in their appeals to women.[77] Moreover, this followed logically from the exchange initiated by Gierek a decade earlier: Solidarity was for men, and household management was for women. As one Gdańsk shipyard worker shrewdly put it, the authorities expected that the result of (manipulated) shortages

[74] Quote in Szejnert and Zalewski, *Szczecin*, 38–39. See also Maria Chmielewska's comment (p. 70), which likely refers to female office workers: "It is very hard for a woman to strike. Men have their clothes closets, and he can go there and just take a shower, put on overalls, but a woman—her hair is dirty, her pants are dirty." Other examples: 197, 223.

[75] On attitudes of the regime toward workers, see Hanna Świda-Ziemba, "Robotnicy 1950," in *Mechanizmy zniewalania społeczeństwa—Refleksje u schyłku formacji* (Warsaw, 1990). This deal is discussed in greater detail in my *Rebuilding Poland*, chap. 5.

[76] Gierek told his audience in Szczecin that his predecessor had constantly thwarted his desires to help Polish consumers. "From time to time we reproached Gomułka for being against buying more coffee, for instance. His only reply was: 'You don't like it? Chocolate and coffee are petty-bourgeois habits.'" "Polish Workers and Party Leaders," 52. His choice of illustration suggested that he expected workers to recognize that one could certainly not strike over luxuries, even if they were well deserved. The problem, he asked men to believe, was not really one of starving families.

[77] Reading, *Polish Women*, 66–67, quoting Anna Walentynowicz.

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in 1980 would be that "the women would take their rolling pins and knock Solidarity out of our heads."[78] Demands of the social realm, in other words, would be made within the family, not on a political level versus the authorities.

However, in the crisis months of summer 1981, the union turned for help to the women of Łódź. Supply bottlenecks and shortages had reached impossible levels; there were reports of meat lines several days long. This placed intolerable—and potentially resolve-weakening—burdens on ordinary people, especially women. As one newspaper put it, "the acquisition of food has become for women [workers] a second shift."[79] Nowhere else was there such a high concentration of working women with families as in Łódź, and the city was particularly hard hit in other ways as well. Recent changes in the rationing system had cut the city's meat supply nearly in half, and the prices of staple items were going up quickly.[80] Meanwhile, hopes for dialogue with the communists dimmed as the Ninth Party Congress revealed the strength of hard-line forces and the weakness of so-called "horizontal groups" seeking to democratize the party. In this atmosphere, Solidarity leaders announced and supported a four-day protest in Łódź, which culminated, on Thursday, July 30, 1981, in a mass "hunger march" of Łódź women through the main streets of the city, echoed by smaller marches in other cities (mostly textile centers) throughout central Poland.

This was, Solidarity felt, not the time for a general strike; the result was a new form of protest that allowed the textile women to make a significant contribution to the movement—and perhaps to regain the prominence Łódź had enjoyed in 1947 and 1971. However, the impact of such a street protest was difficult to calculate beforehand. Łódź Solidarity leader Andrzej Słowik had found it impossible to persuade the angry women of the textile mills, "with fire in their eyes," to engage in some "sensible action."[81] While Solidarity refrained from reaching for political power, it was hardly apolitical. Indeed, the larger sense of "political"—including the battle for free speech and freedom of association, and discussions over worker self-government—embraced all that Solidarity stood for; the realm of the social, while occasionally represented in strike demands, was generally left alone. The hunger march changed that, by raising demands explicitly within the social realm and politicizing them. Solidarity feared that such a protest had the potential to explode into a "Bastille situation" and worked to keep insurrectionary demands out of the protest.[82]

The first three days of the protest were dominated by men, who drove buses and other vehicles in brief parades, echoing similar protests of recent months. The Thursday march, however, was something quite new. At the head of the parade

[78] Tabako, *Strajk 88*, 41. Note, however, demands advanced in Gdańsk and Szczecin in August 1980 regarding maternity leave: Siemieńska, *Płeć zawód polityka*, 232–34.

[79] Leszek Będkowski, "Dlaczego do protestu doszło w Łodzi: Drugi dzień akcji 'Solidarności,'" *Życie Warszawy*, July 29, 1981.

[80] Associated Press report, July 23, 1981, in Radio Free Europe Archives, folder III.6; on the economic situation in general, see Stefania Dzięcielska-Machnikowska and Grzegorz Matuszak, *Czternaście łódzkich miesięcy: Studia socjologiczne sierpień 1980–wrzesień 1981* (Łódź, 1984), 151–55.

[81] Słowik interview. Also see Małgorzata Bartyzel, "Fala łódzkich protestów," *Tygodnik Solidarności* 19 (August 7, 1981): 2, 15.

[82] Słowik interview. See Jadwiga Staniszkis, *Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution*, Jan T. Gross, ed. (Princeton, N.J., 1984).

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marched women pushing strollers or carrying children, and women in wheelchairs; they accompanied a banner reading, "Hungry people of the world, unite!" Crowd estimates ranged from 10,000 to ten times that. The marchers delivered messages of economic and social justice. First, there was the structure of the march itself, led by representatives of the needy and deserving. Second, many banners expressed a belief in the fundamental right to be fed: "Punish those who are guilty of the ration-card mess [*bałagan*]"; "Down with [food] lines"; "36 years of the Party in power; we are hungry, and we will be naked"; "The government governs and works miracles, and the people starve"; "Where is the biological minimum?" Finally, some banners explicitly referred to community and the injustices it faced: "Our children are hungry"; or, in reference to the fact that many women were forced to work the night shift: "Three shifts—one hunger."[83]

The march exceeded expectations both as a symbol and a concrete demonstration against regime policies. This was the first time in the Solidarity era that crowds had gone into the streets;[84] until now, nearly all protests had been within the factory (or, if in the streets, by transportation workers), and thus were circumscribed by the relatively narrow bounds within which the authorities sought to keep the union. As Jacek Kuroń recalls, the marches "created an atmosphere of such tension that the government probably panicked."[85] A common official reaction was to doubt that women could have organized such an action. "Did the spinners of Łódź think up these [slogans]?" asked an article in the Łódź party organ.[86] Another common theme, one that highlighted the symbolic power of the march, was the allegation that it was irresponsible of (presumably male) organizers—again, the regime seemed to be seeking to reestablish a common masculine ground with the opposition—to risk the lives of women and children on the streets. The members of a party circle at the Próchnik factory believed, reported the national party daily, *Trybuna ludu*, that children should not be allowed to take part; one worker at that factory explained: "I'll probably go to the march . . . but I would be afraid to go with children."[87] Such statements revealed the threat that organizing a community—and emphasizing the family roles played by women workers—posed to the regime.

The immediate result was, at least for a time, to raise the temperature of party-society relations. In early August, the party stepped up its hard-line rhetoric, while Solidarity staged a major street protest in the center of Warsaw.[88] In general, the Łódź protest helped reshape the conflict as a struggle for the very survival of society. In this struggle, Solidarity found itself in precisely the same position Edward Gierek's regime had ten years earlier. It needed women's support and hoped to use their concerns to advance its program; on the other hand, it was easier to harness the men. Thus Jacek Kuroń, Solidarity's leading strategist and a tireless negotiator, faced strikers in a printing shop in Olsztyn (a small northeastern city) in

[83] Dziecielska-Machnikowska and Matuszak, *Czternaście łódzkich miesięcy*, 169, 177.
[84] Jerzy Holzer, *"Solidarność" 1980–1981: Geneza i historia* (Paris, 1984), 257.
[85] Kuroń, *Gwiezdny czas*, 207.
[86] Quoted in Dzięcielska-Machnikowska and Matuszak, *Czternaście łódzkich miesięcy*, 177; see also *Trybuna ludu*, July 31, 1981.
[87] *Trybuna ludu*, July 29, 1981.
[88] Holzer, *Solidarność*, 257–60; Kuroń, *Gwiezdny czas*, 207–10.

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August 1981.[89] In the tense period after the hunger march, Solidarity leadership had called for a strike moratorium as a show of strength and good will. Olsztyn was far away from Solidarity strongholds, and workers there felt different pressures:

At last we were able to talk to the work force—all women [*same baby*]. Once again I laid out my arguments. I had almost proven that they are simply being manipulated [by the government] . . . when again some feisty twerp [*bojowy szczawik*—male] from the regional [union] commission jumped in my face, screaming about the dignity of the workers, that the workers want to strike, that I'm playing politics, that I have insulted them, etc. etc. I was up against 100 women. Every one of the men in that work force was on the strike committee. Well, I spoke again and I sensed that [the women] are mine. And again their boys started on about dignity . . . The guys from the industrial [non-Solidarity] union, party members, were also shouting about dignity. And so the women voted to [keep] striking. I tried once again and explained that they have absolutely no force on their side. It's a local matter, so no one in the country will support them. Only the government will benefit, because it can announce that Solidarity doesn't want to print schoolbooks . . . And again I sense that, slowly but surely, I am beginning to convince these women. But their men keep on about dignity. We pushed back and forth three times. Three times I got them to a vote, and three times I lost. Women in such situations listen to their boys, and not to rational arguments [*chłopów, a nie racji*]. I came and will leave, and they [the women] must remain with [the men]. It was hopeless.[90]

For Kuroń, this strike is formless and without direction. He cannot find a common language with these women, and he fears that their resistance to "rational" arguments could jeopardize everything Solidarity had gained. How much easier it was to negotiate with even the most radical male workers.[91] The previous week, Kuroń had journeyed to Silesia to convince miners to accept work on Saturdays for the good of the country.

It was very difficult for me to speak to those exhausted people, to win them over to ideas which were not very convincing even for my friends . . . I stood before a crowd of miners; I explained what our plan was for those free Saturdays, and suddenly a kid jumps out and angrily proposes that I should go down [the mine shaft] and see how hard it is down there and not force them to work. Immediately someone behind me began to second him: "That's true! He's right!" And pandemonium broke loose, because that was the first secretary of the party's factory committee. Since he spoke against me, I had won, because people knew one thing: if the party is against [it], that means the cause is right.[92]

The miners' anticommunism—generally the most radical in the country—won out over their concerns about everyday and work life, just as shipyard workers' national pride had triumphed in January 1971.

[89] On the strike, see Piotr Rachtan, "Strajk o honor," *Tygodnik Solidarności* 23 (September 4, 1981). The strikers' bitterest complaint was that they had been accused on national television of using violence against strikebreakers.

[90] Kuroń, *Gwiezdny czas*, 213.

[91] In the Olsztyn strike, it seems, Kuroń considered the men not to be members of the work force but of union bureaucracy.

[92] Kuroń, *Gwiezdny czas*, 211.

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WHILE SOLIDARITY WON THIS LATE-SUMMER ROUND of protests, the gender gap also shaped the language for Prime Minister General Wojciech Jaruzelski's martial law four and a half months later. The rhetoric of martial law asserted in part that only order could save Poland's economy and implied that the revived party and state was qualified to accomplish this task. In his speech to Parliament in January 1982, General Jaruzelski outlined three goals of martial law: to reestablish strong authority, to broaden socialist democracy, and to reconstruct the economy "so it becomes efficient and productive and meets the needs of working people." Over that winter, the Soviet Union and other bloc allies increased delivery of food to Poland; even though ordinarily this might seem to unmask Poland's lack of self-sufficiency, the regime made much of this material support in the media.[93] In his memoirs, Jaruzelski substitutes a different set of Łódź women—party members—for the Solidarity strikers as a key factor in his decision to impose martial law. During the tense discussions in his office on December 12, hours before martial law was declared, he recalls, "My thoughts constantly returned to the 6th Plenum [of the party, on November 28]. The heavy, unusually depressing atmosphere. Nearest to the presidium sat the delegates from Katowice, Poznań, Łódź, and Piotrków. I particularly remember the women's reactions. Their faces gray, circles under their eyes, they cried without tears. And these are mothers and wives; they are respected in their workplaces and in their communities. In their eyes I read reproach, regret, and a question: 'What will happen, General?'"[94]

But in accepting this (reinterpreted) challenge from the women of Łódź, the communist regime underwent a dangerous transformation, one that contributed greatly to its downfall. It had already broken the contract with society by reneging on its pledges to care for the needs of society. It had not politicized the social realm since the days of Stalinism, when acquisition of certain goods was suspect and motherhood was colored with meanings of duty to communism. Of course, it could hardly revert to these images in the 1980s, long after the Stalinist threat of repression had disappeared. The rhetoric of martial law continued the responsibilities of the social contract but politicized them: the regime implied that it could be judged according to how well it provided for society's needs. Gierek had asked shipyard workers to judge his regime on the basis of how many ships were built, and sought to keep the political and social separate. As Maria Chmielewska recalls Szczecin workers' hopes after 1971: "We thought we had wise leaders; we thought it would be like with father or mother, like in the Lord God's lap. We thought they would guide us, and we would only think about going to work or to buy something, or about entertainment, and those at the top would take care of deeper matters."[95] In 1981, workers would no longer accept the division of the political and social in

[93] Jaruzelski quoted in Jan B. de Weydenthal, "Poland's Parliament Ratifies the State of Emergency," Polish Background Report, *Radio Free Europe Research*, January 29, 1982. See also RFE reports from January 14, 1982, and August 25, 1982, among others. Cam Hudson, "Can the Soviet Union Quench Poland's Thirst for Economic Assistance?" Background Report, *Radio Free Europe Research*, March 16, 1982.

[94] Wojciech Jaruzelski, *Stan wojenny: Dlaczego . . .* (Warsaw, 1992), 4–5; see also 16–17: in contrast to the standard practice of communist leaders when they chose to make "informal" public appearances, Jaruzelski places more emphasis on his visits to stores, where he met consumers, than on his visits to factories.

[95] Szejnert and Zalewski, *Szczecin*, 110.

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this way; martial law, which followed intense government propaganda during 1981 blaming social unrest for the sorry state of the consumer economy, implied that the government would soon attend to consumers' needs. Throughout the martial law period, the media featured stories of ordinary people who desired social peace above all as a way of taking care of their families.[96] Even more than the restoration of order, the state's legitimacy after 1981 rested on its ability to redress the injustices articulated in Łódź—these, suggested Jaruzelski, were more important than the demands of the more prominent opposition of Gdańsk and elsewhere.

To put it another way, the state attempted to combine the rhetoric it shared with the masculine labor (and labor-based) opposition with that of the women's protests, a rhetoric it was ill-equipped to master or to fulfill. The martial law period was marked by governmental confusion and hesitation in the face of promised economic reform. The rhetoric of nation was also central to martial law; this aspect was as colored by gender as in Gierek's time. As Jaruzelski suggested, martial law was for Poland's mothers.

Mother's Day, 1982, amid the most violent clashes between the military regime and the resistance, was the occasion for the Military Council of National Salvation (the main body of martial law) to propose a monument to Polish mothers. Prime Minister Jaruzelski, who was also First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party, took the opportunity of the following International Women's Day, March 8, 1983, to make a pilgrimage (by regularly scheduled train) to Łódź, the women's city.[97] Jaruzelski sought to soften the hard edges of the regime he had initiated and, indirectly, to answer the charges made during the hunger marches two years earlier. After visiting several workshops in textile factories—where he offered holiday wishes and made small talk ("How's your productivity?" he asked one woman worker stiffly)—he announced to workers at the Uniontex mill, the largest in Poland, that Łódź would be the site of the proposed monument, a hospital to be called the "Memorial Hospital Health Center for the Mother-Pole" (Pomnik-Szpital Centrum Zdrowia Matki-Polki). With some 500 beds (later increased to 1,100), it was set to be completed in four years.[98]

The response—as orchestrated by *Trybuna ludu*—was lyrical in its celebration of women as mothers, Poles, and workers. City Vice President Zbigniew Turewicz tenderly described the hospital's location for "all Polish mothers" who might be its future patients: an area surrounded by "rich greenbelts and a small reservoir"; a few kilometers away "stretch beautiful forests, which will additionally, with the right breeze, enrich the air with oxygen."[99] The laborious term "Mother-Pole" evoked images of national suffering: the hospital honored "Polish mothers who during World War II lost their children; mothers from the villages of Zamość province

[96] On the Polish economy during martial law, see George Kolankiewicz and Paul G. Lewis, *Poland: Politics, Economics, and Society* (London, 1988), chap. 4; and George Sanford, *Military Rule in Poland: The Rebuilding of Communist Power, 1981–1983* (New York, 1986), chap. 4. On the rhetoric of martial law, see Grzegorz Ekiert, *The State against Society: Political Crises and Their Aftermath in East Central Europe* (Princeton, N.J., 1996), 297; Michał Głowiński, *Mowa stanu oblężenia* (Warsaw, 1996); and Jancar, "Women in the Opposition," 183; she cites, among others, Václav Havel.

[97] Martial law was still in effect, although it had been suspended a few months previously; it ended formally in July.

[98] *Trybuna ludu*, March 9, 1983; March 17, 1983.

[99] *Trybuna ludu*, March 11, 1983.

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whose children were taken away to the Reich to be Germanized."[100] Helena Ciszewska, a retired Łódź worker, explained her "great emotion" in the laborious prose of the official press:

> I was . . . moved by the fact that the government decided to build this memorial hospital in working Łódź, in the city in which mother-workers have borne and raised wonderful sons who are forever recorded on the pages not only of Poland's history, but of the history of the international workers' movement. This is in part how I understood the words of the general, that the memorial hospital will be an expression of homage to all Polish mothers, and will be a thanks to and recognition of Łódź mothers, and a remembrance of their struggle and educational labor. I will contribute to this goal 500 *złotys* from my pension.[101]

Over the spring and summer, *Trybuna ludu* kept up the drumbeat as the date for the laying of the cornerstone drew near (originally September 1, finally October 21, coinciding with the close of celebrations of the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the communist Polish Army): the hospital was featured on the front page nineteen times, with dozens more articles inside the paper. On Mother's Day, a week after work on the hospital began, the Council of Ministers created a 126-member Citizens' Committee to oversee the hospital project; its members included a vice-premier, the Łódź party leader, the president of Łódź, two generals, three ministers or vice-ministers, and the editor-in-chief of the official press agency (none of these were women). In a published appeal to the nation and to Poles abroad, the committee urged people to follow Ciszewska's example: "The memorial hospital will be built with social funds [that is, contributions from society], supplemented with the state's financial assistance . . . We believe that this activity will meet with the material and moral support of all Poles who have warm hearts."[102] Nearly every week, *Trybuna ludu* informed its readers about soldiers, students, and workers who contributed to the hospital; by October, some 530 million *złotys* (of the estimated 8 billion needed) had been collected in this way. In addition, almost 400 liters of blood were donated.[103] All the familiar weapons of a typical communist-era campaign were deployed, in what was the largest such event during the 1980s. Indeed, such a campaign was a contrast to the shrill warnings and sermons of martial law; the campaign to build the Memorial Hospital for the Mother-Pole marked an attempt to turn back toward the people, to reestablish the familiar routines and enlist allies. In this way, it was emblematic of the effort by Polish communism in the 1980s to achieve the appearance of normalcy at all costs.

The very name of the hospital was an example of the regime's attempt to ally itself with the nation—and its perception that women carried national identity—in ways before which the communists were especially vulnerable. A statue erected in front of the hospital, for example, shows a mother caressing and kissing an infant, in a pose strongly reminiscent of images of the Madonna common in Polish culture.[104] The "pious old biddies" of the textile mills may not really have gone on

[100] Krystyna Niedzielska, *Women in Contemporary Poland: A Sketch to a Portrait* (Warsaw, 1985), quoted in Reading, *Polish Women*, 37; see also 106–11.
[101] *Trybuna ludu*, March 10, 1983.
[102] *Trybuna ludu*, May 27, 1983.
[103] *Trybuna ludu*, October 19, 1983. The total cost was roughly equivalent to 100 million U.S. dollars.
[104] Reading, *Polish Women*, plate 3.

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frequent pilgrimages to the holy shrine to the Madonna at Częstochowa, but the authorities certainly believed so.[105] Church leaders who interacted with these women—such as the bishop of Łódź, who blessed the hunger marchers as they gathered in front of the Łódź cathedral—may not have understood the women's demands much better than did party officials; yet the mere perception that women had such a resource was important both to their mobilization and to the impact of their protest on a regime that wished to appropriate nationalist symbols for itself. Thus the image of the Mother-Pole, and the rhetoric in her honor.

The hospital was also a reminder of the regime's promises to society. The proclamation read at the cornerstone ceremony in October reminded the thousands of listeners—schoolchildren, factory delegations, veterans, party organizations from all over Łódź province, many displaying banners—of the "tradition, which mother-Poles have for centuries inculcated into their daughters and sons, that one gives to Poland all which is best; one sacrifices one's daily labor, and when the need comes, one does not spare even one's blood and life." The hospital and Polish motherhood were symbols both of life and of its sacrifice in the national struggle. That national struggle, in turn, was one for the communist state, concluded the proclamation: "People's Poland is the mother of the whole nation."[106] One could not imagine a neater expression of the regime's attempt to feminize itself after the declaration of martial law; yet, while in this rendition motherhood meant sacrifice, one could not forget that motherhood also meant feeding one's children—and the shelves of Poland's stores had never been more bare.

The hospital was largely completed, though not on time or on budget; the Citizen's Committee disbanded amid allegations of horrific embezzlement.[107] But by then, People's Poland had disappeared. The idea of building a $100 million hospital (hard on the heels of a similar venture, a huge pediatric hospital in Warsaw) as a national and political monument with individual contributions amid a crisis many Poles felt was the worst since the war simply illustrated how confused the Polish communists had become. The regime was not the "mother of the nation"—and certainly could not provide for society in the ways this image suggested—and attempts to play that role were doomed to ridicule and failure. Insofar as Polish workers—and all of society—rejected the regime in 1989 on economic grounds, that rejection was made possible by the government's choice of rhetoric; the women of Łódź, then, had won.

ATTENTION TO THE POLITICS AND LANGUAGE OF GENDER thus opens up new ways to understand communist states, suggesting aspects of state-society relations that even the opposition itself did not fully recognize. The workers of the Gdańsk shipyard who warned women away from the national struggle also sought justice, of course, as they demanded workplace rights and national dignity. What I am suggesting is

[105] On the association of the Marchlewski/Poznański mill with Częstochowa, see Kenney, *Rebuilding Poland*, 121.

[106] *Trybuna ludu*, October 22–23, 1983.

[107] Maria Dmochowska (a doctor and a member of Parliament), interview with author, Łódź, February 3, 1997.

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that this masculine resistance was less able to score lasting success against the communist regime. The moral outrage of Poland's women workers, on the other hand, was based on demands and values that were much more threatening to the regime, and indeed helped to destroy it. Motherhood in particular possessed this power. The rumors of an attack on a pregnant woman in 1947, the angry heckling in 1971, and the marchers with baby strollers in 1981 suggest the ways in which this image was used.

The struggle against communism has often been portrayed as that of the individual against an imposed collective. Certainly the tropes of civil society, democracy, and the free market that 1989 has brought us reinforce this view—and thus minimize the differences between men's and women's experiences. Yet even as individuals may have been searching for ways to break out of imposed roles—mother, worker, proletarian—to fulfill themselves in some new way, they also defended their collective identities, and found ways to subvert or exploit them. The communist state depended not only on its citizens living a lie (as Václav Havel observed) but on them accepting and inhabiting clearly delineated identities. Just as individuals could attack the state by "living the truth," so, too, they could wound it by reshaping identities in threatening ways.

The traditional focus on organized or published opposition has filtered out such opposition as this and overlooked the gendered nature of the better-known opposition. Yet a state that repressed the right to organize in usual ways left open the possibility of new, unexpected forms of activism, which women, playing on the roles assigned to them, were able to pursue. Women's resistance, in which concerns from the nominally private sphere were thrust forward as points of conflict with the state, showed indirectly just how large the private sphere was in the eyes of the communist state. The simple fact that such concerns were raised and went on to destabilize the state suggests that these were issues (motherhood, family budgets) the state preferred not to deal with unless forced to. It is difficult in this light, incidentally, to take seriously the use of the term totalitarian to describe a state so willing to avoid such issues. The study of gender, and of its representation both in community dynamics and in the language of politics, thus yields fundamentally new understandings of the success, and the ultimate failure, of communism in Poland.

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AHR Forum:

The New British History in Atlantic Perspective

Changing historiographical methods and subjects lay at the heart of this AHR Forum. *It continues a debate over the boundaries of British history that itself stretches back into the nineteenth century. The essays by David Armitage, Jane Ohlmeyer, Ned C. Landsman, and Eliga H. Gould range broadly over space and subject. However, they unite in contending that an Atlantic perspective is fundamental to any understanding of British history in the early modern era and, by implication, subsequent periods as well. As such, they are a significant contribution to the growing debate about the idea of history without borders that has erupted in many fields of history. J. G. A. Pocock, whose own work helped initiate recent debates about the scope and subjects of British history, adds a comment that not only critiques the essays but offers his own strong endorsement of Atlantic approaches to British history. Together the essays and commentary offer specialists and historians of other times and places a sense of current debates about early modern British history. At the same time, they provide a compelling example of how recent emphases on globalism in general and the Atlantic world as site of historical analysis in particular have had a significant impact on ongoing historiographical discussions.*

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AHR Forum

Greater Britain: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis?

DAVID ARMITAGE

THE FIRST "BRITISH" EMPIRE imposed England's rule over a diverse collection of territories, some geographically contiguous, others joined to the metropolis by navigable seas. The various peoples who inhabited those territories were not all treated alike by English colonists, who extended their power by military aggression. At first, a commission to evangelize pagan populations had legitimated English expansion; subsequently, a cultural mission to civilize the barbarian maintained the momentum of conquest; later still, an ideology of domination and a historical mythology together encouraged further English migration and the resettlement of native peoples on the conquered lands. Although the English did export their governing institutions, the exigencies of colonial rule demanded that control of the outlying territories be left in the hands of absentee proprietors or entrusted to a creolized governing elite. That elite in time grew to demand its independence, and appropriated legislative institutions to affirm its autonomy. The English nonetheless remained the cultural arbiters and commercial masters of what remained formally an Anglo-British empire, over which they steadfastly asserted their sovereignty. They had acquired this empire haphazardly and with little determining forethought. Within two centuries of its inception, it had disintegrated, apparently for good. Failure to enforce institutional uniformity, incomplete assimilation of subject peoples, the cultural estrangement of the English settlers from metropolitan norms, and monarchical indifference all conspired to bring about its collapse.

Even though such a narrative of colonial expansion, cultural divergence, and imperial implosion might seem to fit that of the British Atlantic empire of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it in fact describes the "British" empire that reached its apogee in the reign of Edward I (1272–1307), not the one reconstituted under George III (1760–1820). Its dependencies were not the colonies of British North America, the western Atlantic, and the Caribbean but rather Ireland, Wales, and Scotland, the constituent kingdoms and principalities of the northwest European archipelago.[1] Yet the very fact that the structure of this medieval narrative so

I am especially grateful to the National Humanities Center for its support during the original composition of this article. My thanks, too, to Joyce Chaplin, Jack P. Greene, Elizabeth Mancke, John Sainsbury, Anders Stephanson, and the *AHR*'s anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier versions. Finally, I am indebted to Richard L. Bushman for his generosity and willingness to share the experience of teaching the history of Greater Britain.

[1] R. R. Davies, "The Failure of the First British Empire? England's Relations with Ireland, Scotland and Wales 1066–1500," in Nigel Saul, ed., *England in Europe, 1066–1453* (London, 1994), 121–32;

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closely parallels another in early modern British and colonial American history indicates the close connections between European state formation and extra-European empire building in the pre-modern period.[2] Conventional historical accounts of the consolidation of European nation-states and the expansion of those states beyond Europe have tended to obscure the continuity between the two processes, both as they were projected outward from metropolitan centers and as they were experienced by provinces, colonies, and dependencies.[3] Early modern empire building was an extension of state formation, although the one did not necessarily follow smoothly from the other. As the American Revolution showed, an empire could split apart when the demands of the state came into conflict with the aspirations of a wider British nation. Empire therefore revealed the limits of any equation between nation and state.[4]

The disjuncture between national and extra-national histories has been particularly abrupt within the history of Britain. None of the major modes of English historiography in the nineteenth century and most of the twentieth had any place for the imperial enterprise. An insular history of English exceptionalism maintained a willful amnesia about England's outlying dependencies, whether British, Irish, continental European, or ultramarine.[5] The historiography of English religion grounded such exceptionalism in an Erastian tradition that could be extended back to Bede, or at least to John Wycliffe, but that had gained its true distinctiveness and its enduring embodiment in the Church of England, born, Athena-like, from the head of Henry VIII at the English Reformation.[6] The parallel whig narrative of constitutional development provided an institutional account of the reasons for England's apartness while also appealing to geographical determinism as a partial explanation for the peculiar resilience of England's constitution. In the words of John Burrow, "Empire [was] not salient in Whig history."[7] Isolationist imperialism remained vigorous well into the twentieth century: Herbert Butterfield suggested in 1944 that "the real alternative to whig history in recent times—the real tory alternative to the organization of English history on the basis of the growth of

compare Davies, *Domination and Conquest: The Experience of Ireland, Scotland and Wales, 1100–1300* (Cambridge, 1990); Robin Frame, *The Political Development of the British Isles, 1100–1400* (Oxford, 1990); A. F. McC. Madden, "1066, 1776 and All That: The Relevance of English Medieval Experience of 'Empire' to Later Imperial Constitutional Issues," in John E. Flint and Glyndwr Williams, eds., *Perspectives of Empire: Essays Presented to Gerald S. Graham* (London, 1973), 9–26.

[2] Though for important caveats, see Jack P. Greene, *Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of the British Empire and the United States, 1607–1788* (Athens, Ga., 1986), 8–9.

[3] Robert Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change, 950–1350* (Princeton, N.J., 1993), is an inspiring exception to this general observation; the program suggested in Merrill Jensen and R. L. Reynolds, "European Colonial Experience: A Plea for Comparative Studies," *Studi in onore di Gino Luzzatto* 4 (Milan, 1951), 75–90, has yet to be followed through in detail.

[4] Jack P. Greene, *The British Revolution in America* (Austin, Tex., 1996); Eliga H. Gould, "A Virtual Nation: Greater Britain and the Imperial Legacy of the American Revolution," *AHR* 104 (April 1999): 476–89.

[5] J. G. A. Pocock, "The Limits and Divisions of British History: In Search of the Unknown Subject," *AHR* 87 (April 1982): 311–14.

[6] Michael Bentley, "The British State and Its Historiography," in Wim Blockmans and Jean-Philippe Genet, eds., *Visions sur le développement des états européens: Théories et historiographies de l'état moderne* (Rome, 1993), 154, 162–64.

[7] J. W. Burrow, *A Liberal Descent: Victorian Historians and the English Past* (Cambridge, 1981), 233.

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liberty—was the story of British expansion overseas." But even he realized that "the shock of 1940" had shaken the English from their narrowly whiggish slumber only to discover that the history of the British Empire was in fact the extension of the history of liberty, not the alternative to it.[8] By 1944, it was almost too late for such a reconstruction of the English history of liberty as a British history of empire, Winston Churchill's long-meditated *History of the English-Speaking Peoples* (1956–58) and Arthur Bryant's even more belated *History of Britain and the British Peoples* (1984–90) notwithstanding.[9] Historians on the left, suspicious of the paternalist claims made on behalf of the British Empire, yet embarrassed by the part played by the empire in shaping a conservative patriotism, all but avoided the subject.[10] Only with the end of the empire would the necessary rewriting of English, British, and imperial histories become both viable and generally acceptable; only in the last two decades has that review actually begun to take shape.[11]

How could the history of the British empire-state be written? J. R. Seeley's *Expansion of England* (1883) offered one possible model. As every schoolchild once knew, Seeley's compact volume was one of the best of all best-sellers in late Victorian Britain. Seeley had presented his theses as two sets of lectures to Cambridge undergraduates in 1881–1882, and would have left them unpublished were it not for the urging of Florence Nightingale. The book remained in print until 1956 (the year of the Suez crisis), returned to circulation in 1971, and has only recently lapsed once more.[12] Seeley is still remembered by historians of the British Empire as the founding father of their subfield;[13] historians of Britain have also

[8] Maurice Cowling, *Religion and Public Doctrine in Modern England*, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1980), 214; Herbert Butterfield, *The Englishman and His History* (Cambridge, 1944), 81–82; J. C. D. Clark, "National Identity, State Formation and Patriotism: The Role of History in the Public Mind," *History Workshop Journal* 30 (1990): 95.

[9] Winston Churchill, *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples*, 4 vols. (London, 1956–58); Arthur Bryant, *The History of Britain and the British Peoples*, 3 vols. (London, 1984–90).

[10] Stephen Howe, "Labour Patriotism, 1939–83," in Raphael Samuel, ed., *Patriotism: The Making and Unmaking of British National Identity*, Vol. 1: *History and Politics* (London, 1989), 127–39. The absence is especially conspicuous in the work of Christopher Hill, Lawrence Stone, and E. P. Thompson, each of whom has written about the empire only very belatedly in their long careers: for example, Hill, *Liberty against the Law: Some Seventeenth-Century Controversies* (London, 1996), pt. 3, "Imperial Problems"; Stone, "Introduction," in Lawrence Stone, ed., *An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689 to 1815* (London, 1994), 1–32; Thompson, *"Alien Homage": Edward Thompson and Rabindranath Tagore* (Delhi, 1993); Robert Gregg and Madhavi Kale, "The Empire and Mr Thompson: Making of Indian Princes and English Working Class," *Economic and Political Weekly* 33, 36 (September 6–12, 1997): 2273–88.

[11] For synoptic evidence of this, see Nicholas Canny, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, Vol. 1: *The Origins of Empire* (Oxford, 1998); P. J. Marshall, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, Vol. 2: *The Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 1998); Andrew Porter, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, Vol. 3: *The Nineteenth Century* (Oxford, 1999); Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis, eds., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, Vol. 4: *The Twentieth Century* (Oxford, 1999).

[12] J. R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England* [1883], John Gross, ed. (Chicago, 1971); Deborah Wormell, *Sir John Seeley and the Uses of History* (Cambridge, 1980), 93–98, 154–65.

[13] Peter Burroughs, "John Robert Seeley and British Imperial History," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 1 (1972): 191–211; J. G. Greenlee, "A 'Succession of Seeleys': The 'Old School' Re-examined," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 4 (1976): 266–82; David Fieldhouse, "Can Humpty-Dumpty Be Put Together Again? Reflections on Imperial History in the 1980s," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 12 (1984): 9.

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begun to recall him from the intellectual oblivion into which he had slipped.[14] Seeley protested against just the separation of domestic and imperial history that these recent successors have also deplored. In particular, he condemned the whiggish introversion of his contemporaries who "make too much of mere parliamentary wrangle and agitations about liberty" in the eighteenth century but "do not perceive that in that century the history of England is not in England but in America and Asia."[15] By shifting the horizons of historiography, Seeley hoped to create—or even recreate—a consciousness among his listeners and readers that they were inhabitants not of little England but rather of "Greater Britain."

Although Seeley put the term "Greater Britain" into general currency, he had not coined it. The credit for its invention goes to Sir Charles Dilke, whose imperial travelogue of 1868 had used it to describe the colonies of white settlement through which he had earlier toured.[16] Seeley's strictly armchair survey of the same territories encompassed the Canadian Confederation, the West Indies, southern Africa (especially the Cape Colony), Australia, and New Zealand as part of an "ethnological unity" with "England" that was held together as a community by common ties of "race" (or "nationality"), religion, and "interest."[17] There were many peculiarities in Seeley's conception of Greater Britain. He excluded India, because it had been acquired by conquest rather than settlement, although he still included the West Indies and Australia. He described the settlements as racially homogeneous—far from true even for the white settler populations, which included the francophone Québécois and the Boers of the Cape. He also assumed a community of interest between white Britons at home and abroad that would not be tested until World War I some thirty years later. Even though Seeley's work gave comfort to the Imperial Federation movement of the 1880s, on whose political fringes he operated, his main aim was to effect an expansion of the English historical imagination, particularly as it remembered the eighteenth century. He argued forcefully that Greater Britain was the eighteenth century's legacy to the nineteenth, "the single monument of a state of the world which has almost passed away."[18] The English had striven to forget this fact, but Greater Britain would not be overlooked so easily.

The political conception of Greater Britain lasted only as long as the hopes for Imperial Federation, just as the decline in the popularity of Seeley's work followed the same trajectory as the British Empire itself. Why, then, should his ideas matter

[14] Bernard Bailyn and Philip D. Morgan, "Introduction," in Bailyn and Morgan, eds., *Strangers within the Realm: Cultural Margins of the First British Empire* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1991), 1–2; Linda Colley, *The Significance of the Frontier in British History* (Austin, Tex., 1995), 7–8; Philip Lawson, "Sources, Schools and Separation: The Many Faces of Parliament's Role in Anglo-American History to 1783," in Lawson, ed., *Parliament and the Atlantic Empire* (Edinburgh, 1995), 11–12; Bill Schwarz, "Introduction: The Expansion and Contraction of England," in Schwarz, ed., *The Expansion of England: Race, Ethnicity and Cultural History* (London, 1996), 2–4; Keith Robbins, *Great Britain: Identities, Institutions and the Idea of Britishness* (London, 1998), 211–12.

[15] Seeley, *Expansion of England*, 12, 13.

[16] C. W. Dilke, *Greater Britain: A Record of Travel in the English-Speaking Countries during 1866 and '67*, 3 vols. (London, 1868); Dilke, *Problems of Greater Britain* (London, 1890). The term was later appropriated, for very different ends, by Sir Oswald Mosley, *The Greater Britain* (London, 1932). My thanks to Chris Waters for pointing this out.

[17] Seeley, *Expansion of England*, 15, 43–44.

[18] Seeley, *Expansion of England*, 39.

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now? Why should historians of Britain and the Atlantic world pay any attention to a long-dead English Latin professor turned historian, whose political vision was utopian and whose other major works are mostly slumbering memorials to evangelical Broad Churchmanship, Victorian Prussophilia, and introverted diplomatic history?[19] One reason is the family resemblance between Seeley's vision of "Greater Britain" and J. G. A. Pocock's appeals, almost a century later, for a new approach to British history. Beginning in 1973, Pocock began to call for a "new subject" of "British history" that paid equal attention to both the interactions of peoples, nations, and states within the "Atlantic archipelago" and the extension of those interactions across the maritime expanses of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans. The long, withdrawing roar of empire could be heard behind this plea, which Pocock first made in New Zealand, in the voice of an aggrieved and abandoned New Zealander. The decision by Edward Heath's Conservative government that Britain should become a full member of the European Economic Community in January 1973 demanded British entry to a Common Agricultural Policy. This benefited European farmers but thereby blocked cheap imports from the Commonwealth, with obvious economic consequences for former beneficiaries of imperial preferences like the sheep farmers of New Zealand and more subtle psychological effects for their compatriots like Pocock.[20]

Pocock's "New British History" would be a history of Greater Britain as a fluid, dynamic, and interactive system, rather than the majestically static "ethnological" union Seeley had envisaged. It would recover the white settler communities of the former British Empire from the distant verges of the globe, so that by encompassing them within an imperial past they might remain partners in a Commonwealth present. It explicitly defined Britain as an oceanic entity that looked to the west and the south, and whose connections with Europe were implicitly accidents of submarine geology rather than a determining set of relations (this despite the fundamental place of French and Italian humanism within Pocock's own two most influential books).[21] Pocock's "New British History" therefore attempted the revivification of British history as an imperial history, both within Britain and Ireland and across the oceans; however, it still gave comfort to a species of Euro-skeptical exceptionalism, now cast as the attribute of Greater Britain rather than of little England.

THE NEW BRITISH HISTORY has now borne fruit, a quarter-century after Pocock first planted the seeds in New Zealand. That fruit has mostly fallen in the gardens of

[19] [J. R. Seeley], *Ecce Homo: A Survey of the Life and Work of Jesus Christ* (London, 1865); Seeley, *The Life and Times of Stein, or Germany and Prussia in the Napoleonic Age*, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1878); Seeley, *The Growth of British Policy: An Historical Essay*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1895).

[20] J. G. A. Pocock, "British History: A Plea for a New Subject," *New Zealand Historical Journal* 8 (1974): 3–21; Pocock, "History and Sovereignty: The Historiographic Response to Europeanization in Two British Cultures," *Journal of British Studies* 31 (1991): 361–64, 380–89; Pocock, "Deconstructing Europe," *London Review of Books* (December 19, 1991): 6–10.

[21] J. G. A. Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century: A Reissue with a Retrospect* (Cambridge, 1987), chap. 1; Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton, N.J., 1975), chaps. 4–9.

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British and Irish historians, however. "England" can no longer be used as a synecdoche for "Britain," let alone for "Britain and Ireland"; what was once the marginal "Celtic fringe" to English historians is now the encompassing "Celtic crescent" around the southeastern English core-state.[22] England is now rightly recognized as but one among three kingdoms and at least four nations that have coalesced, colluded, and collided within what, in the aftermath of the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, we are now encouraged to call the "Islands of the North Atlantic" (IONA).[23] The theological complexities of incorporating four (or more) nations into Three (or fewer) Kingdoms bedeviled politicians throughout the early modern period; the solution to such dilemmas eluded those politicians as long as they clung to essentially English notions of unitary parliamentary sovereignty; historians equipped with hindsight have been more open to alternatives, even if some (like J. C. D. Clark) have preferred to assume the hegemony of the English Anglican-Parliamentary Leviathan since the Reformation, both within Britain and Ireland and outward into the Atlantic world.[24] Yet one important result of the New British History might have been comparative rather than integrative. The Three Kingdoms present an ideal opportunity for internal comparisons within geographically circumscribed conditions.[25] As yet, this possibility has been mostly exploited by economic historians, even though England has rarely been considered as one of the objects of comparison.[26] The disunity that preceded, accompanied, and later succeeded the brief parliamentary union of Britain and Ireland between 1801 and 1922 offers less evidence of an obstinate teleology of integration than of a persistent history of interaction. It therefore rebukes English exceptionalism even as it palliates Anglo-British self-congratulation.

The opportunity for comparative histories of the Three Kingdoms has nevertheless rarely been taken, largely because of the statist assumptions that underlie most of the New British History of the early modern period. As Jane Ohlmeyer notes in this *Forum*, "[t]o date, the New British and Irish Histories have focused on political developments, such as state formation and the impact of the Protestant reformation in Ireland."[27] They have therefore reproduced the categories of nineteenth-century

[22] Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development 1536–1966* (London, 1975); Michael Perceval-Maxwell, "Ireland and the Monarchy in the Early Stuart Multiple Kingdom," *Historical Journal* 34 (1991): 279–95; Jenny Wormald, "The Creation of Britain: Multiple Kingdoms or Core and Colonies?" *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6th ser., 2 (1992): 175–94; Allan Macinnes, "Gaelic Culture in the Seventeenth Century: Polarization and Assimilation," in Steven G. Ellis and Sarah Barber, eds., *Conquest and Union: Fashioning a British State, 1485–1725* (London, 1995), 162–94.

[23] Fintan O'Toole, "The Meanings of Union," *New Yorker* (April 27 and May 4, 1998): 61.

[24] J. C. D. Clark, *The Language of Liberty, 1660–1832: Political Discourse and Social Dynamics in the Anglo-American World* (Cambridge, 1995).

[25] J. H. Elliott, *National and Comparative History: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered before the University of Oxford on 10 May 1991* (Oxford, 1991); Elliott, "Comparative History," in Carlos Barros, ed., *Historia a Debate*, Vol. 3: *Otros Enfoques* (Santiago de Compostela, 1995), 9–19.

[26] Notable exceptions include L. M. Cullen and T. C. Smout, eds., *Comparative Aspects of Irish and Scottish Economic Development* (Edinburgh, 1977); and Rosalind Mitchison and Paul Roebuck, eds., *Economy and Society in Scotland and Ireland, 1500–1939* (Edinburgh, 1988); however, Keith Wrightson, "Kindred Adjoining Kingdoms: An English Perspective on the Social and Economic History of Early Modern Scotland," in R. A. Houston and I. D. Whyte, eds., *Scottish Society, 1500–1800* (Cambridge, 1989), 245–60, seems to have encouraged few imitators.

[27] Jane Ohlmeyer, "Seventeenth-Century Ireland and the New British and Atlantic Histories," *AHR* 104 (April 1999): 449.

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historiography without actually transcending them and have retained the form even as they have challenged the substance of the preceding historiography. The abundance of scholarship on the mid-seventeenth-century crisis owes a particular debt to the European model of "composite monarchy" derived from the work of J. H. Elliott and H. G. Koenigsberger, which has been found more broadly applicable to state formation throughout early modern Europe.[28] This model has greatly illuminated the instabilities within the state system ruled, lost, and then ruled again by the Stuart monarchs of the seventeenth century, although critics among Scottish and Irish historians have complained that it has not yet provided the multicentered perspective necessary to explode Anglocentric exceptionalism.[29]

Perhaps because they have a stake in avoiding the state-centered narrative that for so long informed English history, historians of Ireland have been at the forefront of attempts to take Ireland out of "British" history in order to restore it in common patterns of European history. This goal, however, has been achieved partly at the expense of the Atlantic model of Irish history associated with the work of David Beers Quinn and Nicholas Canny.[30] This model has itself been criticized for stranding Ireland in the Atlantic as that "famous island set in a Virginian Sea," thereby involving it in a framework of colonial dependency on England, like New England or New Spain, rather than making it comparable to the outlying territories of other European composite monarchies such as Naples or Bohemia.[31] Raymond Gillespie's suggestion that early modern Ireland be treated "as a mid-Atlantic polity having some of the features of both the Old World and the New," yet fully part of neither, aptly captures the ambiguity of Ireland's position without ruling its peculiarities out of consideration or rendering it utterly exceptional and hence strictly incomparable to other patterns of early modern social and political development.[32]

Historians of Ireland aside, practitioners of the New British History have been

[28] J. H. Elliott, *The Revolt of the Catalans: A Study in the Decline of Spain, 1598–1640* (Cambridge, 1963); Elliott, "A Europe of Composite Monarchies," *Past and Present* 137 (November 1992): 48–71; H. G. Koenigsberger, "*Dominium Regale* or *Dominium Politicum et Regale*: Monarchies and Parliaments in Early Modern Europe" [1975], in Koenigsberger, *Politicians and Virtuosi: Essays in Early Modern History* (London, 1986), 1–25; Koenigsberger, "Composite States, Representative Institutions and the American Revolution," *Historical Research* 62 (1989): 135–54.

[29] Conrad Russell, *The Fall of the British Monarchies, 1637–1642* (Oxford, 1991); Keith Brown, "British History: A Sceptical Comment," in Ronald Asch, ed., *Three Nations—A Common History? England, Scotland, Ireland and British History, c. 1600–1920* (Bochum, 1993), 117–27; Nicholas Canny, "Irish, Scottish and Welsh Responses to Centralisation, *c.* 1530–*c.* 1640: A Comparative Perspective," in Alexander Grant and Keith J. Stringer, eds., *Uniting the Kingdom? The Making of British History* (London, 1995), 148.

[30] D. B. Quinn, "Ireland and Sixteenth Century European Expansion," in T. Desmond Williams, ed., *Historical Studies* 1 (London, 1958), 21–32; Quinn, *The Elizabethans and the Irish* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1966); Quinn, *Ireland and America: Their Early Associations, 1500–1640, Liverpool Historical Essays* 6 (Liverpool, 1991); Nicholas Canny, *Kingdom and Colony: Ireland in the Atlantic World, 1560–1800* (Baltimore, Md., 1988); Canny, *Making Ireland British, 1580–1650* (Oxford, forthcoming).

[31] The phrase is Fynes Moryson's, quoted in Canny, *Kingdom and Colony*, 131; Hiram Morgan, "Mid-Atlantic Blues," *Irish Review* 11 (1991–92): 50–55; John Morrill, "The British Problem, *c.* 1534–1707," in Brendan Bradshaw and Morrill, eds., *The British Problem: State-Formation in the Atlantic Archipelago, c. 1534–1707* (Basingstoke, 1996), 12–14; Willy Maley, "Review," *History Ireland* 4 (Winter 1996): 53–55.

[32] Raymond Gillespie, "Explorers, Exploiters and Entrepreneurs: Early Modern Ireland and Its Context, 1500–1700," in B. J. Graham and L. J. Proudfoot, eds., *An Historical Geography of Ireland* (London, 1993), 152.

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hesitant to make the turn toward the Atlantic and the other oceans recommended by Pocock.[33] This is all the more remarkable in that historians of Colonial British America (to use Jack P. Greene and J. R. Pole's term) have increasingly relied on "Atlanticist" models for their historiography in the last two decades.[34] There is, of course, nothing new in this. The admiring constitutionalism of Jeremy Bentham and Lord Bryce, or the navalist obeisance of Alfred Thayer Mahan, helped to forge channels of intellectual influence and interaction across the Atlantic throughout the nineteenth century.[35] Yet, as Bernard Bailyn has recently noted, one major species of "Atlanticism" originated in American anti-isolationism during two world wars, particularly in the journalistic internationalism of Walter Lippmann and Forrest Davis and the anticommunist, Catholic universalism of historians like Ross J. Hoffman and Carlton Hayes.[36] They forged their conception of an Atlantic community as a bulwark of Western civilization against Fascist and Communist barbarism, though also very much as an antidote to European integration, which history suggested could only be achieved by the force of a Napoleon or a Hitler: "To escape such a fate the British during the last four centuries have repeatedly fought world wars."[37] The very tradition that these Atlanticists sought to uphold was being reconfigured by Christian supersessionists as "Judeo-Christian" at the same time, in some of the same circles, in response to the same threats, and in search of a similar consensus.[38] When Hayes asked rhetorically, "The American Frontier—Frontier of What?" in his 1945 presidential address before the American Historical Association, the answer was unambiguous: "the Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian tradition."[39] Both Atlantic History and the Judeo-Christian tradition were shaped by similar conditions at their birth in the United States in the 1940s and have carried some vestigial features of their origins ever since.

The peculiar origins of this strain of Atlantic History in the United States may account for the initial reluctance of British historians to take the Atlantic model seriously, despite some scattered postwar attempts to teach the history of the United States not as "a separate national story to be laid arbitrarily alongside the national history of Great Britain, but an integral and vital part of the history of all

[33] For example, none of the major collections of essays on the New British History covers any British territories, populations, or influences outside Britain and Ireland: Asch, *Three Nations—A Common History?*; Grant and Stringer, *Uniting the Kingdom?*; Ellis and Barber, *Conquest and Union*; Bradshaw and Morrill, *British Problem*; Laurence Brockliss and David Eastwood, eds., *A Union of Multiple Identities: The British Isles c. 1750–c. 1850* (Manchester, 1997); Bradshaw and Peter Roberts, eds., *British Consciousness and Identity: The Making of Britain, 1533–1707* (Cambridge, 1998); S. J. Connolly, ed., *Kingdoms United? Great Britain and Ireland since 1500: Integration and Diversity* (Dublin, 1998); except for Tony Claydon and Ian McBride, eds., *Protestantism and National Identity: Britain and Ireland, c. 1650–c. 1850* (Cambridge, 1998).

[34] Jack P. Greene and J. R. Pole, eds., *Colonial British America: Essays in the New History of the Early Modern Era* (Baltimore, Md., 1984).

[35] H. L. A. Hart, "The United States of America," in Hart, *Essays on Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political Theory* (Oxford, 1982), 53–78; Edmund S. Ions, *James Bryce and American Democracy 1870–1922* (London, 1968); Anders Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right* (New York, 1995), 84–87; Christopher Hitchens, *Blood, Class, and Nostalgia: Anglo-American Ironies* (New York, 1990), chaps. 4–6.

[36] Bernard Bailyn, "The Idea of Atlantic History," *Itinerario* 20 (1996): 19–44.

[37] Ross Hoffman, "Europe and the Atlantic Community," *Thought* 20 (1945): 29.

[38] Mark Silk, "Notes on the Judeo-Christian Tradition in America," *American Quarterly* 36 (1984): 66–70, 83–85.

[39] Carlton J. H. Hayes, "The American Frontier—Frontier of What?" *AHR* 51 (January 1946): 215.

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those areas, European and American alike, which border upon the North Atlantic."[40] However, it cannot account for the continuing resistance among British historians to Atlantic History, when American historians have become so obviously indebted to British historiography. The work of Bernard Bailyn, Jack Greene, Ned Landsman, Susan O'Brien, David Cressy, David Hackett Fischer, Stephen Foster, Joyce Chaplin, James Horn, David Hancock, and Eliga Gould, among others, has amply revealed the necessity for historians of British America to attend to the economic, social, constitutional, intellectual, religious, and political history of Britain and Ireland in their studies of the polities of the northwestern Atlantic basin, especially in the period before 1783.[41] Early modern British history has become indispensable for historians of colonial America: why, then, have British historians almost completely failed to join hands across the ocean with colonial Americanists?[42]

Historians' categories have their costs. The very terms "early modern" to describe a period of British (and, more broadly, European) history and "colonial" to denominate a parallel period of American history indicate the incompatible master-narratives within which British and American historiography have existed for much of the twentieth century. Despite Greene and Pole's argument that America in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries should be seen as part of the wider "Early Modern Era," this periodization has found little favor with Americanists.[43] The narrative of modernity implicit in Europeanists' use of the designation "early modern" does not usually include empire among its defining features.[44] Its central terms have been the rise of capitalism, individualism, and the middle class; the creation of the nation-state, controlled by centralized regimes with armies and bureaucracies at their disposal but limited by representative bodies and the rule

[40] H. Hale Bellot, "Atlantic History," *History* 31 (1946): 62.

[41] Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, 2d edn. (Cambridge, Mass., 1995); Bailyn, *Voyagers to the West: A Passage in the Peopling of America on the Eve of the American Revolution* (New York, 1987); Bailyn and Morgan, *Strangers within the Realm*; Greene, *Peripheries and Center*; Jack P. Greene, *Pursuits of Happiness: The Social Development of Early Modern British Colonies and the Formation of American Culture* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1988); Ned C. Landsman, *Scotland and Its First American Colony, 1683–1765* (Princeton, N.J., 1985); Landsman, *From Colonials to Provincials: American Thought and Culture, 1680–1760* (New York, 1997); Susan O'Brien, "A Transatlantic Community of Saints: The Great Awakening and the First Evangelical Network, 1735–1755," *AHR* 91 (October 1986): 811–32; David Cressy, *Coming Over: Migration and Communication between England and New England in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, 1987); David Hackett Fischer, *Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America* (Oxford, 1989); Stephen Foster, *The Long Argument: English Puritanism and the Shaping of New England Culture, 1570–1700* (Chapel Hill, 1991); Joyce E. Chaplin, *An Anxious Pursuit: Agricultural Innovation in the Lower South, 1730–1815* (Chapel Hill, 1993); James Horn, *Adapting to a New World: English Society in the Seventeenth-Century Chesapeake* (Chapel Hill, 1994); David Hancock, *Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735–1785* (Cambridge, 1995); Eliga H. Gould, *The Persistence of Empire: British Political Culture in the Age of the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, 1999). For a recent overview of the possibilities presented by this historiography, see Alison Games, "History without Borders: Teaching American History in an Atlantic Context," *Indiana Magazine of History* 91 (1995): 159–78.

[42] J. C. D. Clark, "The Strange Death of British History? Reflections on Anglo-American Scholarship," *Historical Journal* 40 (1997): 787–809, offers a rather different set of answers to this question from that offered here.

[43] Greene and Pole, *Colonial British America*, subtitled "Essays in the New History of the Early Modern Era."

[44] This is also true of grand narratives like those of Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1986); and Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992*, rev. edn. (Cambridge, Mass., 1992).

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of law; and, more broadly, the disenchantment of the world and the emergence of rationality under the sign of science.[45] This broadly Weberian master-narrative owed a great deal to modernization theory, which had posited the postbellum trajectory of political, social, and economic development in the United States as a normative path to be followed by other "developing" countries. Curiously, though, this narrative of "American" modernity did not generate a preceding narrative of American "early" modernity.[46] This is all the more remarkable in that the "discovery" of America, intercontinental migration, and the globalization of commerce once figured prominently in earlier, European models of modernity, from the sixteenth century to the 1950s, and had been central to the historical visions of David Hume and Adam Smith, Karl Marx and Otto von Bismarck.[47] Like contemporary "colonial" Spanish America, British America evidently missed out on "early" modernity.[48]

It has been left to self-consciously *post*-modern counter-narratives to rediscover globalization, the "disembedding" of individuals effected by transnational capitalism (especially the slave trade), and the diasporic histories of pre-national peoples as aspects of modernity that could usefully describe features of the Atlantic world before the mid-nineteenth century.[49] In this context, the work of Paul Gilroy on the formation of a "Black Atlantic" between the eighteenth and the twentieth centuries and Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker's ongoing study of the creation of an "Atlantic working class" together offer a dynamic, circulatory, and interracial (albeit still somewhat provisional) model of the Atlantic world as a matrix of

[45] On which, see Dean C. Tipps, "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 15 (1973): 199–226. Keith Thomas, "The United Kingdom," in Raymond Grew, ed., *Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States* (Princeton, N.J., 1978), 41–99, provides a version of the modernization thesis as applied to Britain; for an outstanding account of such narratives and the historiography that has succeeded them in English (though specifically not *British*) history, see Peter Lake, "Retrospective: Wentworth's Political World in Revisionist and Post-Revisionist Perspective," in J. F. Merritt, ed., *The Political World of Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, 1621–1641* (Cambridge, 1996), 252–83.

[46] Though for a pioneering attempt to apply modernization theory to early American history, see Richard D. Brown, "Modernization and the Modern Personality in Early America, 1600–1865: A Sketch of a Synthesis," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 2 (1972): 201–28; compare also Joyce Appleby, "Value and Society," in Greene and Pole, *Colonial British America*, 290–316; Appleby, "Modernization Theory and Anglo-American Social Theories," in *Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 90–123; Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, *Telling the Truth about History* (New York, 1994), chaps. 2–3; Chaplin, *Anxious Pursuit*.

[47] Reinhart Koselleck, "'Neuzeit': Remarks on the Semantics of the Modern Concepts of Movement," in Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, Keith Tribe, trans. (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), 241–44; David Armitage, "The New World and British Historical Thought: From Richard Hakluyt to William Robertson," in Karen Ordahl Kupperman, ed., *America in European Consciousness, 1493–1750* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1995), 60–63. For a relatively recent example, see A. L. Rowse, "Tudor Expansion: The Transition from Medieval to Modern History," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., 14 (1957): 309–16, which starts from Bismarck's Eurocentric claim that the peopling of North America was "the decisive fact in the modern world."

[48] Though for evidence that "early modern" is not applicable solely to Europe, witness the essays collected in "Early Modernities," *Daedalus* 127 (Summer 1998).

[49] Benedict Anderson, "Exodus," *Critical Inquiry* 20 (1994): 314–27; James Clifford, "Diasporas," in Clifford, *Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, Mass., 1997), 244–77; Khachig Tölölyan, "Rethinking *Diaspora*(s): Stateless Power in the Transnational Moment," *Diaspora* 5 (1996): 3–34; Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., *Becoming National: A Reader* (New York, 1996); Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction* (London, 1997). Robin Blackburn, *The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern, 1492–1800* (London, 1997), provides the most explicit account of how these processes contributed to the formation of "modernity" itself.

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modernity itself.[50] This work also offers an alternative genealogy for Atlantic history that reaches back through Eric Williams's *Capitalism and Slavery* (1944) and W. E. B. Du Bois to William Blake and beyond, and thereby escapes the distorting compulsions behind the conception of a Euro-Atlantic community inherited from the beginnings of the Cold War. As Ned C. Landsman's essay in this *Forum* shows, the use of such "diasporic" models offers an illuminating alternative to narratives built around the concept of "ethnicity," especially when considering the outgrowth of the peoples of Britain and Ireland within the wider Atlantic world.[51]

Such comparative, postmodern, and diasporic models for the history of the Atlantic world challenge the relationships of dependency and marginality implied by the term "colonial" as a period of "American" history before the great caesura of 1783. "Colonial" carries the freight of the "Imperial School" of American historiography without its institutional framework or, more regrettably, its geographical expansiveness. This approach originated in the late nineteenth century, as an offshoot of transatlantic Anglo-Saxonism and the "germ theory" of institutional transmission. Even as J. R. Seeley was giving his lectures as Regius Professor in Cambridge in 1881–1882, the man soon to be his opposite number at Oxford, E. A. Freeman, was simultaneously touring the United States to recall the common racial and institutional ties that bound together two English peoples on either side of the Atlantic "as brethren in a higher brotherhood, born of one ancient stock, speaking one ancient tongue, sharers under different forms in one ancient freedom."[52] Such connections underlay the origins of professional medievalism in the United States, which, in the work of Charles Homer Haskins and Joseph Strayer, tied the field to a narrative of state building and institutional formation that lent particular weight to the history of "England": in Haskins's words, "English history is in a sense early American history."[53] In the hands of historians Charles McLean Andrews, George Louis Beer, and Herbert Levi Osgood, British history became fully part of early American history, as they revised the standard Bancroftian account of the American Revolution in favor of the imperial and institutional synthesis that would characterize their work as members of a distinctly "Imperial School" of early American historians.[54] Although their emphasis on an extra-American context for

[50] Paul Gilroy, "The Black Atlantic as a Counterculture of Modernity," in Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, Mass., 1993), 1–40; Peter Linebaugh, "All the Atlantic Mountains Shook," *Labour/Le travailleur* 10 (1982): 87–121; Marcus Rediker, *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700–1750* (Cambridge, 1987); Linebaugh and Rediker, "The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves and the Atlantic Working Class in the Eighteenth Century," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 3 (1990): 225–53; Jeffrey Bolster, *Black Jacks: African-American Seamen in the Age of Sail* (Cambridge, Mass., 1997).

[51] Ned C. Landsman, "Nation, Migration, and the Province in the First British Empire: Scotland and the Americas, 1600–1800," *AHR* 104 (April 1999): 463–75; David Armitage, "The Scottish Diaspora," in Jenny Wormald, ed., *The Oxford Illustrated History of Scotland* (Oxford, forthcoming).

[52] Edward A. Freeman, *Lectures to American Audiences* (Philadelphia, 1882), 10; Freeman, *Some Impressions of the United States* (London, 1883); Freeman, *Greater Greece and Greater Britain; And, George Washington, the Expander of England: Two Lectures* (London, 1886).

[53] Charles Homer Haskins, "European History and American Scholarship," *AHR* 28 (January 1923): 215, quoted in Paul Freedman and Gabrielle M. Spiegel, "Medievalisms Old and New: The Rediscovery of Alterity in North American Medieval Studies," *AHR* 103 (June 1998): 683.

[54] Charles M. Andrews, "American Colonial History, 1690–1750," and Herbert L. Osgood, "The Study of American Colonial History," *American Historical Association, Report for the Year 1898* (Washington, D.C., 1899), 47–60, 63–73; Wesley Frank Craven, "Historical Study of the British

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the undertanding of American history was salutary, their object of inquiry remained the colonies that would later make up the United States rather than the British Empire as a whole. This certainly coincided with the division of labor within contemporary British imperial history, which also separated the so-called "First" British Empire in the Americas from the "Second" British Empire in South Asia, Africa, and the Pacific. Each of these strains of historiography has had lasting consequences for the possibility of writing both Atlantic histories of "America" and imperial histories of "Britain." The reaction against the Imperial School within American historiography rendered the consideration of the links between Britain and America unfashionable until the new wave of British-American history broke in the late 1960s, by which time social, economic, cultural, and religious interactions took precedence over political and institutional continuities.[55] Meanwhile, British historiography maintained a separation between the history of the two supposedly distinct empires but treated both as extraterritorial histories divorced from the domestic history of Britain.[56]

THE REINTEGRATION OF IMPERIAL AND DOMESTIC HISTORY and the union of the New British History with Atlantic History could provide a historiography capable of eluding the pull of nationalist teleologies in both British and American history. Atlantic History potentially offers a transnational challenge to American particularism,[57] while the New British History confronts the whiggish pieties of Anglo-British self-congratulation. However, if Atlantic History ignores the wealthiest and most numerous British colonies in the Caribbean[58] and overlooks the territories that would later comprise the Canadian Confederation, it risks becoming merely the acceptable face of American (for which, read "*United States of* American") exceptionalism. Likewise, the New British History has been charged with becoming simply a more comprehensive means to explain the peculiarities and processes of

Empire," *Journal of Modern History* 6 (1934): 40–69; L. H. Gipson, "The Imperial Approach to Early American History," in R. A. Billington, ed., *The Reinterpretation of Early American History* (San Marino, Calif., 1966), 185–99; Richard R. Johnson, "Charles McLean Andrews and the Invention of American Colonial History," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., 43 (1986): 519–41; Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge, 1988), 80–84.

[55] Jack P. Greene, "Beyond Power: Paradigm Subversion and Reformulation and the Re-creation of the Early Modern Atlantic World," in Greene, *Interpreting Early America: Historiographical Essays* (Charlottesville, Va., 1996), 17–42.

[56] For pointed protests against that separation, see Peter Marshall, "The First and Second British Empires: A Question of Demarcation," *History* 49 (1964): 13–23; and Philip Lawson, "The Missing Link: The Imperial Dimension in Understanding Hanoverian Britain," *Historical Journal* 29 (1986): 747–51; for conspicuous efforts to overcome it, see the essays in Lawson, *A Taste for Empire and Glory: Studies in British Overseas Expansion, 1660–1800* (Aldershot, 1997).

[57] Ian Tyrrell, "American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History," *AHR* 96 (October 1991): 1031–55; Joyce Appleby, "Recovering America's Historic Diversity: Beyond Exceptionalism," *Journal of American History* 79 (1992): 419–31; Michael Kammen, "The Problem of American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration," *American Quarterly* 45 (1993): 1–43.

[58] Compare Jack P. Greene, "South Carolina and the Caribbean Connection," *South Carolina Historical Magazine* 88 (1987): 192–210; Andrew J. O'Shaughnessy, "The Stamp Act Crisis in the British Caribbean," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., 52 (1994): 203–25; O'Shaughnessy, *The Schism of Greater Britain: The American Revolution and the British Caribbean* (forthcoming). My thanks to Dr. O'Shaughnessy for allowing me to read his manuscript before publication.

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English history (especially in the seventeenth century), with little obvious benefit for Scottish, Irish, or Welsh history. The most recent developments in both Atlantic History and the New British History have consciously taken account of these charges and have turned away from the dynamics of the "English" Civil Wars to the "Celtic dimensions of the British Civil Wars" and from the colonies that would become the United States to consider British North America in the widest sense.[59] The next stage in the recreation of both British and American historiography in the period before the late eighteenth century should be to effect that rapprochement between the New British History and Atlantic History. Since the benefits of such methodological mingling have been perceived more often by historians of America than by those of Britain,[60] the latter part of this essay will consider the potential impact of an Atlantic turn on British historiography of the early modern period.

"What did its great overseas extension, its heroic conquering and colonizing effort, its attempt to rule over and defend its far-flung possessions, mean for the history of Habsburg Spain?" asked J. H. Elliott in 1982.[61] The parallel question has only just begun to be asked for Hanoverian Britain, but it has hardly been broached at all for the Stuart multiple kingdom of the seventeenth century.[62] As in the case of the parallel inquiry into the "impact" of the New World on the Old (however *mal posée* this way of framing the question now appears to be), those who have asked the question at all have been either minimalists or maximalists.[63] The minimalists stress the aggressive amnesia of eighteenth and nineteenth-century Britons: even though their lives were transformed by the colonial consumer goods, they remained insularly unaffected by the invisible influence of empire and cared little about the colonies.[64] The maximalists meanwhile have argued for the determinative force of the imperial experience on British popular politics, literature, and culture.[65] Both

[59] For the former, see, for example, Jane H. Ohlmeyer, *Civil War and Restoration in the Three Stuart Kingdoms: The Career of Randall MacDonnell, Marquis of Antrim, 1609–1683* (Cambridge, 1993); and John R. Young, ed., *Celtic Dimensions of the British Civil Wars* (Edinburgh, 1997); for the latter, see, for example, Elizabeth Mancke, "Another British America: A Canadian Model for the Early Modern British Empire," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 25 (1997): 1–36.

[60] As shown by Daniel Walker Howe, *American History in an Atlantic Context: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered before the University of Oxford on 3 June 1993* (Oxford, 1993).

[61] J. H. Elliott, "Spain and Its Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in Elliott, *Spain and Its World 1500–1700: Selected Essays* (New Haven, Conn., 1989), 10.

[62] Notable exceptions are David Harris Sacks, *The Widening Gate: Bristol and the Atlantic Economy, 1450–1700* (Berkeley, Calif., 1991); and Karen Ordahl Kupperman, "Needs and Opportunities: British Expansion," *Itinerario* 18 (1994): 130–36.

[63] Anthony Pagden, "'The Impact of the New World on the Old': The History of an Idea," *Renaissance and Modern Studies* 30 (1986): 1–11; J. H. Elliott, *The Old World and the New, 1492–1650*, 2d edn. (Cambridge, 1992); Elliott, "Final Reflections: The Old World and the New Revisited," in Kupperman, *America in European Consciousness*, 391–408.

[64] Compare James Walvin, *Fruits of Empire: Exotic Produce and British Taste, 1660–1800* (Basingstoke, 1997), with Linda Colley, "The Imperial Embrace," *Yale Review* 81, no. 4 (1993): 92–98; Jacob M. Price, "Who Cared about the Colonies? The Impact of the Thirteen Colonies on British Society and Politics circa 1714–1775," in Bailyn and Morgan, *Strangers within the Realm*, 395–436; P. J. Marshall, "Imperial Britain," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 23 (1995): 379–94; and Jack P. Greene, "Empire and Identity from the Glorious Revolution to the American Revolution," in Marshall, *Oxford History of the British Empire*, Vol. 2: *Eighteenth Century*, 208–30.

[65] See especially James E. Gillespie, *The Influence of Oversea [sic] Expansion on England to 1700* (New York, 1920); Jay Barrett Botsford, *English Society in the Eighteenth Century as Influenced from Oversea [sic]* (New York, 1924); Kathleen Wilson, "Empire, Trade and Popular Politics in Mid-Hanoverian Britain: The Case of Admiral Vernon," *Past and Present* 121 (1988): 74–109; Wilson, "Empire of Virtue: The Imperial Project and Hanoverian Culture *c.* 1720–1785," in Lawrence Stone,

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could, of course, be right, but only if the question were broken down further: for whom did the overseas extension of the Three Kingdoms have meaning, at what times, and why? How was nationhood defined by the experience of empire? In particular, why did so many people in the metropolitan nations seem to remain resistant to the lure of empire and so indifferent to the experience of expansion, yet also find their conceptions of themselves quietly altered as "Britain" annexed and conquered ever wider territories, populations, and markets?[66]

A constrictedly archipelagic account of British history only reproduces such imperial introversion; it should instead be attempting to understand it. One approach is suggested by the classical conceptions of colonization that informed the first century of English settlement in the Western Hemisphere.[67] Indeed, in the first century of transatlantic colonization, the classical tradition may have repressed imperial ambitions (at least among the significant proportion of the male population that had received a grammar-school education) more than it encouraged them, by transmitting skepticism about the wisdom of expansion and by constraining political theory to being literally the theory of the *polis*—the freestanding, autonomous, unitary community—rather than more complex forms of political organization such as unions and federations.[68] The model of composite monarchy that has been so fruitfully used by recent historians to examine the dynamics of the Three Kingdoms was more often experienced than conceptualized by contemporaries, especially by those—in Ireland and Scotland particularly—who felt the force of English claims to unitary sovereignty, whether backed by crown, Parliament, or church.[69] However, it does have its uses as a heuristic device for understanding the continuities between the challenges of domestic and transmarine governance, in

ed., *An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689 to 1815* (London, 1994), 128–64; Wilson, *The Sense of the People: Politics, Culture and Imperialism in England, 1715–1785* (Cambridge, 1995), 137–205, 237–84; Wilson, *The Island Race: Englishness, Empire and Gender in the Eighteenth Century* (London, forthcoming); Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (London, 1993); Felicity Nussbaum, *Torrid Zones: Maternity, Sexuality, and Empire in Eighteenth-Century English Narratives* (Baltimore, Md., 1995). It is notable in this connection that John Kerrigan's complaint, in "Birth of a Náison," *London Review of Books* (June 5, 1997): 16–17, that students of "English" literature have failed to take a "Three Kingdoms" approach to their subject, was almost immediately answered in David J. Baker, *Between Nations: Shakespeare, Spenser, Marvell and the Question of Britain* (Stanford, Calif., 1997); Andrew Hadfield, *Edmund Spenser's Irish Experience: Wilde Fruit and Savage Soyl* (Oxford, 1997); Christopher Highley, *Shakespeare, Spenser, and the Crisis in Ireland* (Cambridge, 1997); and Willy Maley, *Salvaging Spenser: Colonialism, Culture, and Identity* (New York, 1997).

[66] P. J. Marshall, "A Nation Defined by Empire, 1755–76," in Grant and Stringer, *Uniting the Kingdom?* 208–22; Marshall, "Empire and Opportunity in Britain, 1763–75," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6th ser., 5 (1995): 111–28; Marshall, "Britain and the World in the Eighteenth Century: I, Reshaping the Empire," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6th ser., 8 (1998): 1–18; H. V. Bowen, "British Conceptions of Global Empire, 1756–83," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 26 (1998): 1–27; John M. MacKenzie, "Empire and National Identities: The Case of Scotland," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6th ser., 8 (1998): 215–32.

[67] Anthony Pagden, *Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500–c. 1800* (New Haven, Conn., 1995), chap. 1.

[68] Andrew Fitzmaurice, "Classical Rhetoric and the Promotion of the New World," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 58 (1997): 221–44; David Armitage, "Literature and Empire," in Canny, *Oxford History of the British Empire*, Vol. 1: *Origins of Empire*, 99–123.

[69] John Morrill, "A British Patriarchy? Ecclesiastical Imperialism under the Early Stuarts," in Anthony Fletcher and Peter Roberts, eds., *Religion, Culture and Society in Early Modern Britain: Essays in Honour of Patrick Collinson* (Cambridge, 1994), 209–37; Canny, "Irish, Scottish and Welsh Responses to Centralisation," 147–69.

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order to connect the history of the Atlantic world more firmly to the problematics of early modern European history.[70]

The New British History has expanded, but also has not entirely abandoned, the statist and institutional perspective of English Whig historiography; even the historiography of the Anglo-British state must admit the shaping force of the imperial experience, both within and beyond Britain and Ireland. This reunion of the history of the state with the history of empire is one positive legacy to be taken from Seeley, for whom all history was the history of the state, of which the empire was but the extension.[71] Seeley's assumption that the empire exported the characteristics of the "English" state can be turned around in order to examine how the experience of expansion colored the growth of the state. The recent work of Robert Bliss has restored the American colonies to the context of English politics (although the larger, British dimension of their political salience is overlooked); David Ransome has emphasized the contribution of the disputes over the Virginia Company to the breakdown of consensus in the English Parliament of 1624; Karen Kupperman's reconstruction of the continuities between the activities of the Providence Island Company in the 1630s and the overlapping personnel of the parliamentary "Middle Group" in the 1640s has made the English Civil War partly appear to be the pursuit of the colonial undertakers' aims by other means; and Mary K. Geiter has firmly linked the foundation of Pennsylvania to the political horse-trading of the Exclusion Crisis.[72] Seventeenth-century English men and women were evidently not as insular as later historians might have believed; the demands of extending the nation oceanically tested their political imaginations, just as international conflict in Europe did.[73]

The findings of these scholars show the necessity of bringing the colonies into a pluralist account of the British Civil Wars, to see, for instance, how "British" populations outside the archipelago fought their own "American Civil Wars."[74] Activities in the Caribbean shaped the politics of the Interregnum, as the hostile response to the failure of Oliver Cromwell's "Western Design" may have been responsible for his decision to refuse the crown in 1658, and certainly provided a focus for discontent that struck at the very heart of the Protectorate and its policy

[70] Jack P. Greene, "Negotiated Authorities: The Problem of Governance in the Extended Polities of the Early Modern Atlantic World," in Greene, *Negotiated Authorities: Essays in Colonial Political and Constitutional History* (Charlottesville, Va., 1994), 1–24, is a pioneering attempt to forge this connection; meanwhile, Peter N. Miller, *Defining the Common Good: Empire, Religion and Philosophy in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Cambridge, 1994), has suggested the appropriate early modern intellectual framework within which such problems were thinkable for contemporaries.

[71] Seeley, *Expansion of England*, 11, 38.

[72] Robert M. Bliss, *Revolution and Empire: English Politics and the American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century* (Manchester, 1990); "The Parliamentary Papers of Nicholas Ferrar, 1624," David R. Ransome, ed., *Camden Miscellany*, 33, *Seventeenth-Century Political and Financial Papers* (Cambridge, 1996), 1–104; Karen Ordahl Kupperman, *Providence Island, 1630–1641: The Other Puritan Colony* (Cambridge, 1993); Mary K. Geiter, "The Restoration Crisis and the Launching of Pennsylvania, 1679–81," *English Historical Review* 112 (1997): 300–18.

[73] As revealed amply in Steven C. A. Pincus, *Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign Policy, 1650–1668* (Cambridge, 1996).

[74] Compare Robert Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London's Overseas Traders, 1550–1653* (Princeton, N.J., 1993); work in progress by Carla Gardina Pestana will illuminate the American side of the mid-seventeenth-century conflicts.

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ambitions, domestically and diplomatically.[75] The character of the post-Restoration state was partly shaped by the duke of York's experience as proprietor of New York and architect of the Dominion of New England.[76] The role of the colonies in the patronage system has been brought to light by Stephen Saunders Webb, although his thesis perhaps reveals more that the empire helped make a late seventeenth-century "opportunity state," especially for former military officers, than that it was the creature of "garrison government."[77] Finally, the very formation of the British state itself, by the Anglo-Scottish Union of 1707, was an event incomprehensible without its imperial context, since the compulsions that drove the Scots and the English together were cast on a global screen—from the Isthmus of Panama to the Low Countries—and the union provided an alternative to an independent colonial empire for the Scots, who had come late to the arguments of commercial reason of state.[78] Seeley saw what later historians have largely forgotten: the great process of the seventeenth century had been "the internal union of the three kingdoms" between the accession of James VI to the English throne in 1603 and the Anglo-Scottish Union of 1707; alongside that process, and growing out from it, "was the creation of a still larger Britain comprehending vast possessions beyond the sea."[79]

The greatest potential for the convergence of British and American history lies in the study of the eighteenth century, where the reigning, albeit frequently competing, syntheses of the period by J. C. D. Clark, Paul Langford, John Brewer, and Linda Colley can all be linked to developments in American historiography.[80] Colley's *Britons* has been accompanied by Edward Countryman's *Americans*, Clark's *English Society* by the opening chapters of Gordon Wood's *Radicalism of the American Revolution*, and Richard L. Bushman's *Refinement of America* by Brewer's *Pleasures of the Imagination*.[81] The receptivity of historians of eighteenth-century America to the British dimension of their subject means that some of this work has

[75] Blair Worden, "Oliver Cromwell and the Sin of Achan," in Derek Beales and Geoffrey Best, eds., *History, Society and the Churches* (Cambridge, 1985), 125–45; Karen Ordahl Kupperman, "Errand to the Indies: Puritan Colonization from Providence Island through the Western Design," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., 44 (1988): 70–99; David Armitage, "The Cromwellian Protectorate and the Languages of Empire," *Historical Journal* 35 (1992): 531–55.

[76] An adequate biography of the duke of York, as proprietor of New York, King James VII of Scotland, and King James II of Ireland, as well as James II of England, is an important need to be filled by the New British History, although W. A. Speck, *Reluctant Revolutionaries: Englishmen and the Revolution of 1688* (Oxford, 1988), 11–13, does offer some hints about the role of James's proprietorship in exciting suspicions about his incipient authoritarianism.

[77] Stephen Saunders Webb, *The Governors-General: The English Army and the Definition of Empire, 1569–1681* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1979); Webb, *Lord Churchill's Coup: The Anglo-American Empire and the Glorious Revolution Reconsidered* (New York, 1995).

[78] John Robertson, "Union, State and Empire: The Union of 1707 in Its European Setting," in Stone, *Imperial State at War*, 224–57; David Armitage, "The Scottish Vision of Empire: Intellectual Origins of the Darien Venture," in John Robertson, ed., *A Union for Empire: Political Thought and the British Union of 1707* (Cambridge, 1995), 97–118.

[79] Seeley, *Expansion of England*, 13.

[80] J. C. D. Clark, *English Society, 1660–1832: Ideology, Social Structure and Political Practice during the Ancien Regime* (Cambridge, 1985); John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783* (London, 1989); Paul Langford, *A Polite and Commercial People: England 1727–1783* (Oxford, 1989); Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837* (New Haven, Conn., 1992).

[81] Edward Countryman, *Americans: A Collision of Histories* (New York, 1996); Gordon Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution* (New York, 1992), chaps. 1–5; Richard L. Bushman, *The Refinement of America: Persons, Houses, Cities* (New York, 1990); John Brewer, *The Pleasures of the*

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already been absorbed into an Atlantic historiography, although the compliment has only just begun to be repaid by British historians.[82] As Edmund Morgan suggested forty years ago, the historiography of the American Revolution has always been peculiarly dependent on British history for its various explanatory frameworks. American historians are perhaps now long past the Namierite, *marxisant*, and localist explanations Morgan took to be the major shaping arguments in his own time.[83] Indeed, following Morgan's lead, T. H. Breen has recently taken explicit inspiration from the work of Brewer and Colley to suggest that the British state in the eighteenth century, with its lean and efficient administrative apparatus, extraordinary capacity to raise revenue and make war, and above all the aggressive patriotism it projected, "forced the Americans to leap out of history to defend colonial and human equality on the basis of timeless natural rights."[84]

The absorption of the American war and revolution into the internal history of Britain—foreshadowed by Seeley, who thought it "an event . . . on an altogether higher level of importance than almost any other in modern English [*sic*] history"—has shown how imperial history can be reintegrated into domestic history, even if British historians of the period before the late eighteenth century otherwise seem to remain largely unaware of the bridges thrown across to them by historians of the western sector of the British Atlantic world.[85] The United Kingdom of Great Britain and the United States of America were both political unions created in the context of international war during the eighteenth century, their fictive nationalisms were generated by many of the same conflicts, and the political—rather than ethnic, linguistic, or historical—categories of citizenship within each state make them comparable as few other states are. This fact alone should encourage historiographical convergence, even more so because such a comparison denies exceptionalism and disrupts cherished nationalist teleologies.

Imagination: English Culture in the Eighteenth Century (London, 1997); compare also David S. Shields, *Civil Tongues and Polite Letters in British America* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1997).

[82] The major examples of British repayment of this debt are Clark, *Language of Liberty*; and Colley, *Significance of the Frontier in British History*.

[83] Edmund S. Morgan, "The American Revolution: Revisions in Need of Revising," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., 14 (1957): 3–15.

[84] T. H. Breen, "Ideology and Nationalism on the Eve of the American Revolution: Revisions *Once More* in Need of Revising," *Journal of American History* 84 (1997): 13–39.

[85] Seeley, *Expansion of England*, 117; Dalphy I. Fagerstrom, "The American Revolution in Scottish Opinion, 1763–83" (PhD dissertation, Edinburgh University, 1951); J. H. Plumb, "British Attitudes to the American Revolution," in Plumb, *In the Light of History* (London, 1972), 70–87; John Derry, *English Politics and the American Revolution* (London, 1976); Colin Bonwick, *English Radicals and the American Revolution* (London, 1977); J. G. A. Pocock, ed., *Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776* (Princeton, N.J., 1980); James Bradley, *Popular Politics and the American Revolution in England: Petitions, the Crown, and Public Opinion* (Macon, Ga., 1986); John Sainsbury, *Disaffected Patriots: London Supporters of Revolutionary America 1769–1782* (Kingston, Ontario, 1987); Stephen Conway, *The War of American Independence, 1775–1783* (London, 1995), 187–214; Pocock, "Empire, State and Confederation: The War of American Independence as a Crisis in Multiple Monarchy," in Robertson, *Union for Empire*, 318–48; Eliga H. Gould, "American Independence and Britain's Counterrevolution," *Past and Present* 154 (February 1997): 107–41; H. T. Dickinson, ed., *Britain and the American Revolution* (Harlow, 1998); Gould, "Virtual Nation."

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Is "GREATER BRITAIN" therefore a useful category of historical analysis? "Greater British" history can be a prophylactic against other, more partial, histories that dissociate the processes of nation making at all points in the North Atlantic from those of state formation and empire building. By acknowledging the constitutional primacy of the British state (after 1707, at least), it would recognize the relations of power within the early modern British Atlantic world and draw attention to the cultural, economic, and emotional bonds that tied inhabitants of that world together as Britons in the broadest sense. Law, politics, and economics, as well as culture, religion, and social order, shaped and defined relationships between the Atlantic archipelago and the Western Hemisphere, from Central America and the Caribbean to Cape Breton, and from the Leeward Islands to the Oregon Territory. Both the extent and the limits of those relations need to be more closely defined if the full usefulness of Greater Britain as an analytical category can be realized. The history of "colonial America" can thereby be seen as an arena of internal comparisons just as much as the history of "early modern Britain." Like another "useful category of historical analysis," "Greater Britain" reveals seemingly fixed and determinate terms to be "at once empty and overflowing . . . Empty because they have no ultimate, transcendent meaning. Overflowing because even when they appear to be fixed, they still contain within them alternative, denied, or suppressed definitions."[86] "Britain" and "America" are both empty and overflowing in parallel ways: "empty" because not defined by anything other than the precisely localized, contextual impulses of distinctly earthbound nationalisms; "overflowing" because of the multiplicity of competing, repressed, or ignored histories each contains within it.

The New British History and Atlantic History are each, in their own ways, transnational historiographies. In their stress on geographical and political pluralism, their escape from the boundaries of nation-states, and their insistence on the contingency and fluidity of historical processes, each offers liberation from the categories of national history. However, if they remain in isolation from one another, they risk perpetuating merely ampler species of parochialism, within which the New British History can become a cloak for the "cloven hoof" of Anglocentrism,[87] or Atlantic History simply the kinder, gentler form of American exceptionalism. Just as Atlantic History needed to be freed from some of the distorting influences of Cold War, NATO historiography, so the New British History must avoid the lingering taint of anti-Europeanism bred into its bones in the early 1970s. The alliance between the New British History and Atlantic History could therefore become the first step toward novel integrative histories of "Greater Britain," as well as new comparative histories of "Atlantic America" and "Atlantic Europe."[88] By that means, it might be possible to show that "British" history did not always

[86] Joan Wallach Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," in Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History* (New York, 1988), 49, orig. pub. in *AHR* 91 (December 1986): 1053–75.

[87] Conrad Russell, "John Bull's Other Nations," *Times Literary Supplement* (March 12, 1993): 3–4.

[88] D. W. Meinig, *The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History*, Vol. 1: *Atlantic America, 1492–1800* (New Haven, Conn., 1986); E. Estyn Evans, "Atlantic Europe: The Pastoral Heritage," in Evans, *Ireland and the Atlantic Heritage: Selected Writings* (Dublin, 1996), 59–61.

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happen in Britain, or only to Britons, just as "American" history was not always the creation of Americans, nor did it take place solely in the Americas.[89]

[89] For the benefits of both integration and comparison in the history of the Americas in the early modern period, see J. H. Elliott, *Do the Americas Have a Common History? An Address* (Providence, R.I., 1998).

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AHR Forum

Seventeenth-Century Ireland and the New British and Atlantic Histories

JANE OHLMEYER

"THERE IS A SPECTRE HAUNTING IRISH HISTORIOGRAPHY, one more ominous perhaps than revisionism or nationalism—the spectre of the 'British Problem,' carrying with it the threat of another colonial impulse." So begins Willy Maley's review of two works on the "New British History" in a recent issue of *History Ireland*.[1] How legitimate are these concerns? Should the "British Problem" be regarded as some sort of academic imperialism intent on subverting the study of early modern Irish history and of polluting a distinctive historical tradition? Certainly, Ireland's often tortured relationship with England remains a particularly sensitive issue and the source of many scholarly debates.[2] Yet, like it or not, England ruled Ireland as a colony for much of the early modern period. The English legal and parliamentary systems, the British sovereign, and the Protestant faith had a dramatic impact on the formation of the Irish state, Irish political culture, and the Irish mind.

Any discussion of the "British Problem" or the "New British History" must begin with J. G. A. Pocock's seminal article of 1974–1975, in which he attempted to redefine the field of British history and set an agenda for its study within the context of the English-speaking Atlantic world.[3] Pocock implored Irish, Scottish, and, above

I am grateful to David Armitage, Nicholas Canny, Tom Connors, David Ditchburn, William Naphy, Eamonn Ó Ciardha, and Geoffrey Parker for reading and commenting on an earlier version of this article. A version was presented to the History Department Faculty Seminar at University College, Dublin, and I would like to thank the participants, particularly Tom Bartlett, for their suggestions for improvement. This article is dedicated to the memory of Father Donal Cregan (d. 1995), who impressed on me the need to situate the history of early modern Ireland in its local, national, and international contexts.

[1] Willy Maley's review of Brendan Bradshaw and John Morrill, eds., *The British Problem, c. 1534–1707: State Formation in the Atlantic Archipelago* (London, 1996), and Alexander Grant and Keith Stringer, eds., *Uniting the Kingdom? The Making of British History* (London, 1995), in *History Ireland* 4, no. 4 (1996): 55. Maley quite rightly draws attention to the lingering Anglocentrism of recent volumes, especially the one by Stringer and Grant that derived from the 1995 Anglo-American Conference on the "Formation of the United Kingdom."

[2] The debate between Irish "revisionists" and "anti-revisionists" continues to rage. The most important contributions have been reprinted in Ciaran Brady, ed., *Interpreting Irish History: The Debate on Historical Revisionism, 1938–1944* (Dublin, 1994). Also see D. George Boyce and Alan O'Day, eds., *The Making of Modern Irish History: Revisionism and the Revisionist Controversy* (London, 1996). This sort of controversy is by no means unique to Ireland. See, for example, the review essays on American exceptionalism in *AHR* 102 (June 1997): 748–68.

[3] J. G. A. Pocock, "British History: A Plea for a New Subject," *Journal of Modern History* 47, no. 4 (1975): 601–21, orig. pub. in the *New Zealand Historical Journal* 8 (1974): 3–12. The *Journal of Modern History* invited A. J. P. Taylor, Gordon Donaldson, and Michael Hechter to comment on Pocock's

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all, English historians to abandon the narrow, nationally centered approach that had traditionally characterized the study of British history. He argued that "British history" should instead "denote the plural history of a group of cultures situated along an Anglo-Celtic frontier" and should incorporate the history of the British colonies in North America (prior to 1783) and of those nations that formed part of the British Empire.[4] Where, a generation later, does Pocock's plea for a New British History stand? What effect has it had on the study of early modern Ireland?

It could be argued that historians of early modern Ireland have long been writing non-Anglocentric British history. Scholars working in the 1930s and 1940s, especially Donal Cregan and G. A. Hayes-McCoy, paid particular attention to the relations between Ireland and Britain, as did others, whose publications date largely from the 1950s and 1960s.[5] More recently, works by Toby Barnard, Brendan Bradshaw, Karl Bottigheimer, Ciaran Brady, Nicholas Canny, Michael Perceval-Maxwell, and David Stevenson—to name but a few—all show special sensitivity to the complex relations between the three kingdoms in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[6] However, this body of scholarship failed to capture the attention of the Anglo-American establishment. Accolades fell instead to Conrad Russell, whose two books on the "British theme" generated—and continue to generate—a lively

thesis; for their rather disdainful and unhelpful responses and Pocock's reply, see 622–28. For a full discussion of Pocock's publications on this subject and the important New Zealand context, see David Armitage's essay above, 427–45.

[4] Pocock, "British History: A Plea for a New Subject," 605.

[5] See, for example, G. A. Hayes-McCoy, *Scots Mercenary Forces in Ireland (1565–1603)* (1937; rpt. edn., Dublin, 1996); Hugh Hazlett, "The Financing of the British Armies in Ireland, 1641–9," *Irish Historical Studies* 1 (1938); Donal Cregan, "An Irish Cavalier: Daniel O'Neill," *Studia hibernica* 3 (1963): 60–100; 4 (1965): 104–33; and 5 (1965): 42–76; "Irish Recusant Lawyers in Politics in the Reign of James I," *Irish Jurist* 5 (Winter 1970): 306–20; and "Irish Catholic Admissions to the English Inns of Court, 1558–1625," *Irish Jurist* 5 (Summer 1970): 95–114; Aidan Clarke, *The Old English in Ireland, 1625–42* (New York, 1966); Hugh F. Kearney, *Strafford in Ireland, 1633–41: A Study in Absolutism* (1959; rpt. edn., Cambridge, 1989); Kearney, *The British Isles: A History of Four Nations* (Cambridge, 1989); and J. C. Beckett, *The Making of Modern Ireland, 1603–1923* (London, 1966). Beckett first coined the phrase "War of the Three Kingdoms."

[6] For references to Bradshaw's works, see note 15 below; Karl Bottigheimer, *English Money and Irish Land: The "Adventurers" in the Cromwellian Settlement of Ireland* (Oxford, 1971); and "English Money and Irish Land: The 'Adventurers' in the Cromwellian Settlement of Ireland," *Journal of British Studies* 7 (1967): 12–27; T. C. Barnard, *Cromwellian Ireland: English Government and Reform in Ireland, 1649–1660* (Oxford, 1975); Ciaran Brady, *The Chief Governors: The Rise and Fall of Reform Government in Tudor Ireland, 1536–1588* (Cambridge, 1994); Nicholas Canny, "The Attempted Anglicization of Ireland in the Seventeenth Century: An Exemplar of 'British History,'" in R. G. Asch, ed., *Three Nations—A Common History* (Bochum, 1993); David Stevenson, *Scottish Covenanters and Irish Confederates: Scottish-Irish Relations in the Mid-Seventeenth Century* (Belfast, 1981); Michael Perceval-Maxwell, "Ireland and the Monarchy in the Early Stuart Multiple Kingdom," in *Historical Journal* 34 (1991); "Ireland and Scotland, 1638 to 1648," in John Morrill, ed., *The Scottish Covenant in Its British Context* (Edinburgh, 1990); "Ulster 1641 in the Context of Political Developments in the Three Kingdoms," in Brian Mac Cuarta, ed., *Ulster 1641: Aspects of the Rising* (Belfast, 1993); and Perceval-Maxwell, *The Outbreak of the Irish Rebellion of 1641* (Dublin, 1994). Also see Jane H. Ohlmeyer, *Civil War and Restoration in the Three Stuart Kingdoms: The Career of Randal MacDonnell, Marquis of Antrim, 1609–1683* (Cambridge, 1993); and "Strafford, the 'Londonderry Business' and the 'New British History,'" in J. F. Merritt, ed., *The Political World of Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, 1621–1641* (Cambridge, 1996); Robert Elkin, "The Interactions between the Irish Rebellion and the English Civil Wars" (PhD dissertation, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 1961); and the various articles by John A. Murphy in *Journal of the Cork Historical and Archaeological Society*, especially "The Politics of the Munster Protestants, 1641–1649," 76 (1971): 1–20.

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debate and helped prepare the ground for the publication of further works on the "British theme."[7]

Others remain skeptical of the New British History and, with some justification, fear that this reinvention of the wheel will merely perpetuate the Anglocentrism characteristic of the study of early modern English history. In the words of Keith Brown, a professor of Scottish history at the University of St. Andrews, "It is all very well to have our subject treated as 'serious' history by the Anglo-American establishment, but there is a danger in reaching out too eagerly for what could be a poisoned chalice."[8] Nicholas Canny, a professor of Irish history at University College Galway, concurs. He criticizes the Anglocentric nature of many recent works of New British History and chastises Irish and Scottish historians, who have jumped on the British history bandwagon, for neglecting "developments that might be considered [by the English] of mere local or national significance" and for ignoring the impact that England had on Ireland and Scotland.[9] While the English historian Peter Lake is prepared to acknowledge the value of "collating and comparing Caroline policy in the three kingdoms," he maintains that "this . . . is not so much a new subject—British history—as a more integrated reading of English, Scottish and Irish histories."[10] He believes that to do more than this will facilitate "the introduction of a covertly Anglocentric, English master narrative through the back door."[11]

Which is, of course, precisely what the proponents of the New British History claim to be determined to avoid. All agree that British history should not use events in Ireland and Scotland simply to enrich English history.[12] But what, then, is the

[7] Conrad Russell, *The Fall of the British Monarchies, 1637–1642* (Oxford, 1991); and Russell, *The Causes of the English Civil War* (Oxford, 1990). In the preface to *Fall*, Russell noted how in the course of his research he became "convinced that it is impossible to tell the English story by itself, and this book has been slowly transformed into an attempt at genuinely British history" (p. vii). Russell's articles "The British Problem and the English Civil War," "Why Did Charles I Call the Long Parliament," "The British Background to the Irish Rebellion of 1641," and "The First Army Plot of 1641," have been conveniently reprinted in Conrad Russell, *Unrevolutionary England, 1603–1642* (London, 1990), pt. 4. Six recent collections of essays collectively demonstrate the enthusiasm with which some members of our profession have embraced the New British History: Bradshaw and Morrill, *British Problem*; Grant and Stringer, *Uniting the Kingdom*; Steven G. Ellis and Sarah Barber, eds., *Conquest and Union: Fashioning a British State, 1485–1725* (London, 1995); Brendan Bradshaw and Peter Roberts, eds., *British Consciousness and Identity: The Making of Britain, 1533–1707* (Cambridge, 1998); S. J. Connolly, ed., *Kingdoms United? Great Britain and Ireland since 1500: Integration and Diversity* (Dublin, 1999); and, most recently, Glenn Burgess, ed., *The New British History: Founding a Modern State, 1603–1715* (London, 1999). For the Middle Ages, see R. R. Davies, ed., *The British Isles, 1100–1500: Comparisons, Contrasts and Connections* (Edinburgh, 1988); and his presidential addresses to the Royal Historical Society entitled "The Peoples of Britain and Ireland 1100–1400," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6th ser., 4 (1994): 1–20; 5 (1995): 1–20; 6 (1996): 1–24; 7 (1997): 1–24; and Colm McNamee, *The Wars of the Bruces: Scotland, England and Ireland, 1306–1328* (Edinburgh, 1997).

[8] Keith Brown, "British History: A Sceptical Comment," in Asch, *Three Nations*, 117. He refines his arguments in "Seducing the Scottish Clio: Has Scottish History Anything to Fear from the New British History," in Burgess, *New British History*, 238–65.

[9] Canny, "Attempted Anglicization," 50. Also see the interview in *History Ireland* 6, no. 1 (1998): 54. For a recent perceptive discussion, see T. C. Barnard, "British and Irish History," in Burgess, *New British History*, 201–37.

[10] Peter Lake, "Retrospective: Wentworth's Political World in Revisionist and Post-Revisionist Perspective," in Merritt, *Thomas Wentworth*, 281.

[11] Lake, "Retrospective," 281–82.

[12] For instance, see Ellis, "Introduction," in Ellis and Barber, *Conquest and Union*, 2; and John Morrill, "The British Problem, c. 1534–1707," in Bradshaw and Morrill, *British Problem*, 4.

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New British History? Certainly, prior to union between England and Scotland in 1707 (never mind the union with Ireland in 1800–1801), the notion of a British state is misleading. Moreover, despite the efforts of James VI/I to create a common sense of nationhood for his English and Scottish subjects, the formation of a distinctive "British" identity was, as Linda Colley has argued, a product of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.[13] Much more helpful is the "composite monarchies" or "multiple kingdoms" model so eruditely articulated by H. G. Koenigsberger and developed by Conrad Russell (for England), by Jenny Wormald (for Scotland), and by Michael Perceval-Maxwell (for Ireland).[14] When viewed from the perspective of early modern Ireland, it could be argued that the phrase "British history" remains a synonym for the collective political histories of England, Scotland, and Wales. Moreover, it constitutes a history that has been written largely from the viewpoint of the ruling elite, which, being primarily Protestant and overwhelmingly male, cannot adequately encompass the complex relationships between all three Stuart kingdoms and their peoples. Thus if Ireland is to be included in future discourses, perhaps the more cumbersome term "British and Irish Histories" is more appropriate, though not entirely satisfactory.

TO DATE, THE NEW BRITISH AND IRISH HISTORIES have focused on political developments, such as state formation and the impact of the Protestant reformation in Ireland.[15] The origins and course of the "Wars of the Three Kingdoms"—the civil wars fought for, in, and between the subjects of the Stuart monarchies during the 1640s—have also attracted attention, as has the crisis, now dubbed the "Wars of the Three Kings," that gripped Ireland and Britain after 1688.[16] Just as these civil

[13] With the Union of the Crowns in 1603, James VI of Scotland became James I of England and Ireland. Dauvit Broun, R. J. Finlay, and Michael Lynch, eds., *Image and Identity: The Making and Remaking of Scotland through the Ages* (Edinburgh, 1998), 93–94; and Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837* (New Haven, Conn., 1992).

[14] H. G. Koenigsberger, "Dominium regale or dominium politicum et regale," rpt. in *Politicians and Virtuosi: Essays on Early Modern History* (London, 1986). For Russell, see note 7 above. Jenny Wormald, "The Creation of British Multiple Kingdoms or Core and Colonies?" *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6th ser., 2 (1992): 175–94; Perceval-Maxwell, "Ireland and the Monarchy in the Early Stuart Multiple Kingdom"; and "Ireland and Scotland, 1638 to 1648."

[15] Steven Ellis in particular has called for a "history of the British Isles that examines the relations between the different peoples of the archipelago and the process of state formation, which created the two modern states there"; Ellis and Barber, *Conquest and Union*, 3. Also see Ellis, *Tudor Frontiers and Noble Power: The Making of the British State* (Oxford, 1995); Brady, *Chief Governors*; and Colm Lennon, *Sixteenth-Century Ireland: The Incomplete Conquest* (Dublin, 1994). For recent discussions of the British context of the Irish reformation, see Brendan Bradshaw, "The Tudor Reformation and the Revolution in Wales and Ireland: The Origins of the British Problem," in Bradshaw and Morrill, *British Problem*, 39–65; Bradshaw, "The English Reformation and Identity Formation in Ireland and Wales," in Bradshaw and Roberts, *British Consciousness*, 43–111; and Mícheál MacCraith, "The Gaelic Reaction to the Reformation," in Barber and Ellis, *Conquest and Union*, 139–61.

[16] John Morrill, "The War(s) of the Three Kingdoms," in Burgess, *New British History*, 65–91. Martyn Bennett's recent book, *The Civil Wars in Britain and Ireland, 1638–51* (Oxford, 1997), offers the first integrated account of the Wars of the Three Kingdoms since S. R. Gardiner published his multivolume narrative in 1886. J. P. Kenyon and Jane Ohlmeyer, eds., *The Civil Wars: A Military History of England, Scotland and Ireland* (Oxford, 1998), compares and contrasts the course of the various civil wars and the relationships between the Stuart kingdoms in the 1640s. For the "Wars of the Three Kings," see W. A. Maguire, ed., *Kings in Conflict: The Revolutionary War in Ireland and Its Aftermath, 1689–1750* (Belfast, 1990).

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conflicts can only be fully understood within the context of all three kingdoms, processes—such as identity formation in early modern Ireland—cannot be explained without reference to Britain and the continent, and to sources written in languages other than English.[17] After the Union of the Crowns in 1603, the British kings viewed Ireland as an integral part of their personal dynastic heritage. Although James VI/I concerned himself more with the union between England and Scotland and treated Ireland as a colony rather than a kingdom, his *Magna Britannia* undoubtedly included Ireland.[18] He genuinely hoped to unite his three kingdoms "under one imperial crown" and to give his peoples the freedom "to commerce and match together, that so they may grow into one nation."[19] The same held true for Charles I. After 1638, he treated his problem in Scotland as a "British" one and mobilized Irish and English armies to quell his rebellious Scottish subjects. Throughout their struggle with the Westminster Parliament, the Stuarts shamelessly drew on the human and financial resources of Ireland and (after December 1647) of Scotland as well in a desperate attempt to gain back their English kingdom. Yet Charles I refused to grant his Catholic subjects political autonomy and freedom of worship in return for the manpower and military hardware that might have secured his English throne. Even the Catholic James VII/II proved reluctant to endorse the Declaratory Act of 1689, which established the legislative independence of the Irish parliament. Despite his total dependence on Catholic Ireland's support in his struggle against William of Orange, James—like his father before him—consistently refused to repeal Poynings Law (1494), which subordinated the Irish parliament to the English Privy Council and formed the lynchpin of Anglo-Irish constitutional relations.

Although the Stuarts regarded Ireland as an indivisible part of their imperial dominions, how their Irish subjects—Protestant as well as Catholic—perceived their relationship with the crown and their own national identity defies easy explanation, since Ireland and Irishness meant a variety of things to different

[17] Michael Cronin recently argued that Ireland suffered from "linguistic schizophrenia": "English-language histories ignore Irish-language material and Irish-language histories focus on exclusively Irish-language material," *Translating Ireland: Translation, Languages, Cultures* (Cork, 1996), 2. For many, the linguistic barrier remains a very real one; however, given the wealth of material that has been translated into English by bodies like the Irish Texts Society, it should not be an insurmountable one. For an excellent introduction to the wealth of material published in Latin and Irish, see Benignus Millet, "Irish Literature in Latin, 1550–1700," in T. W. Moody, ed., *A New History of Ireland*, Vol. 3: *Early Modern Ireland, 1534–1691* (1976; rpt. edn., Oxford, 1978), Brian O Cuiv, "The Irish Language in the Early Modern Period," in Moody, *New History of Ireland*, vol. 3; and also "Irish Language and Literature, 1691–1845," in T. W. Moody and W. E. Vaughan, eds., *A New History of Ireland*, vol. 4 (Oxford, 1986). Continental ideas, especially those of the Counter-Reformation, also influenced identity formation in Ireland, especially among the Catholic population. See, for example, Bernadette Cunningham, "The Culture and Ideology of Irish Franciscan Historians at Louvain 1607–1650," in Ciaran Brady, ed., *Ideology and the Historians* (Belfast, 1991); Donal Cregan, "The Social and Cultural Background of a Counter-Reformation Episcopate, 1618–60," in Art Cosgrove and Donal McCartney, eds., *Studies in Irish History, Presented to R. Dudley Edwards* (Dublin, 1979), 85–117; Franciscan Fathers, eds., *Father Luke Wadding* (Dublin, 1957), especially the chapters by Tomás Ó Fiaich, Aubrey Gwyn, and Lucian Ceyssens; Marc Caball, "Faith, Culture and Sovereignty: Irish National Identity and Its Development, 1558–1625," in Bradshaw and Roberts, *British Consciousness*, 112–39; and Hiram Morgan, "Faith and Fatherland in Sixteenth Century Ireland," *History Ireland* 3, no. 2 (1995): 13–20.

[18] Wormald, "Creation of British Multiple Kingdoms or Core and Colonies?" 175–94; Arthur Williamson, "Patterns of British Identity: 'Britain' and Its Rivals in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in Burgess, *New British History*, 138–73.

[19] *The Statutes at Large Passed in the Parliaments Held in Ireland* . . . (Dublin, 1786), 443, 442.

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people.[20] Moreover, as Toby Barnard recently pointed out, "In Ireland, ethnicity hardly reflects unpolluted gene pools of Gaels, English, Welsh and Scots, but comprehends mongrel populations."[21] In Ireland, as elsewhere in early modern Europe, identity formation proved to be an ongoing process that was defined and redefined by prevailing political, religious, and socioeconomic developments.[22]

Certainly, the only Irish Protestants who consistently referred to themselves as being British or Britons—and continue to do so—were the Scottish and English colonists in Ulster. This label was also applied to them by members of the "Old English" community who had converted to Protestantism. Interestingly, this group's sense of identity, so eloquently expounded by James Ussher, archbishop of Armagh, sought "to anchor the reformed Protestant firmly to the Gaelic past."[23] To confuse matters further, the "New English" settlers who colonized Ireland after the onset of the Protestant reformation in the 1530s largely flaunted their "Englishness." However, as Barnard's insightful study of the collective mentality of the Protestant community demonstrates, the onset of the first English Civil War (1642) forced Irish Protestants to choose between king and Parliament and resulted in something of an identity crisis for many. Those who opted for Charles I continued to tout their "Englishness," while those who sided with Parliament and later Oliver Cromwell viewed themselves primarily as Protestants of Ireland. Increasingly, religion became "the surest touchstone of reliability," preparing the ground for the Protestant Ascendancy of the eighteenth century.[24] Many of those who took up arms against the king after 1642, or collaborated with Cromwell, did so reluctantly. Similarly, after 1660, even though many Protestants found the Stuarts' perceived proclivity for "popery" odious and resented their eagerness to interfere in the Irish boroughs, law courts, land settlement, and army, few hoped to sever links with the crown. They simply wanted more political autonomy and greater control over the army, judiciary, and administration *within* the context of the Stuart composite monarchies.[25] Thus even during the brief and tempestuous reign of the ardent Catholic James VII/II, the majority of Protestants living in Ireland—including many Church of Ireland prelates—maintained their allegiance to him. Only William of Orange's military success led them to change sides with alacrity.[26]

[20] For a contemporary Protestant view on identity formation in Ireland, see Richard Cox, "An Apparatus or Introductory Discourse," in *Hibernica anglicana; or The History of Ireland from the Conquest thereof by the English to This Present Time* (London, 1689).

[21] Toby Barnard, "Identities, Ethnicity and Tradition among Irish Dissenters c. 1650–1750," in Kevin Herlihy, ed., *The Irish Dissenting Tradition, 1650–1750* (Dublin, 1995), 29.

[22] Explored at length in Bradshaw and Roberts, *British Consciousness*, especially the essays by Brendan Bradshaw, Marc Caball, Andrew Hadfield, Willy Maley, Alan Ford, and Jim Smyth; and see Nicholas Canny, "Fashioning 'British' Worlds in the Seventeenth Century," in Canny, Joseph E. Illick, Gary B. Nash, and William Pencak, eds., "Empire, Society and Labor: Essays in Honor of Richard S. Dunn," *Pennsylvania History* 64 (1997), supplemental issue (College Park, Pa., 1997): 26–45.

[23] Alan Ford, "James Ussher and the Creation of an Irish Protestant Identity," in Bradshaw and Roberts, *British Consciousness*, 206.

[24] T. C. Barnard, "The Protestant Interest, 1641–1660," in Jane H. Ohlmeyer, ed., *Ireland from Independence to Occupation, 1641–1660* (Cambridge, 1995).

[25] T. C. Barnard, "Settling and Unsettling Ireland: The Cromwellian and Williamite Revolutions," in Ohlmeyer, *Ireland*.

[26] J. I. McGuire, "The Church of Ireland and the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688," in Cosgrove and McCartney, *Studies in Irish History*, 137–49. Also see Ian McBride, *The Siege of Derry in Ulster Protestant Mythology* (Dublin, 1997).

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What, then, of the Stuarts' Catholic subjects? Like many of their Protestant countrymen, those of Anglo-Norman ancestry, such as the earls of Clanricard, stressed their "Englishness," often at the expense of their "Irishness."[27] Aidan Clarke's seminal work on the political connections and cultural makeup of this "Old English" community clearly demonstrates that throughout the first half of the seventeenth century they perceived themselves as the crown's loyal and devoted servants and argued that their Catholicism in no way jeopardized their fealty to a Protestant prince.[28] While emphasizing their fidelity, the Old English, in order to increase the crown's dependence on their services, often exaggerated the disloyalty and treachery of their compatriots, the "Old," or native, Gaelic-speaking Irish. Recent studies largely by Gaelic literary scholars, especially Brendean Ó Buachalla, suggest that, after the defeat in the Nine Years' War (1594–1603) and the "Flight of the Earls" in 1607, the native Irish, while acknowledging the centrality of Catholicism to their identity, increasingly adopted the same conciliatory, politique attitude toward the crown that had traditionally characterized the Old English.[29] Thus native Irish Catholics warmly welcomed the accession of James VI/I, seeing him as Ireland's "spouse" and rightful ruler. Even Peter Lombard, the exiled Catholic archbishop of Armagh, dedicated his *Episcopion Doron* (*c.* 1604)—penned in response to James's *Basilikon Doron* (1599)—to James and in the preface congratulated him on his accession as Ireland's legitimate ruler. He went on to beg the king to end the persecution of Irish Catholics and to grant them liberty of conscience, since the Irish were, Lombard maintained, his faithful and loyal subjects.[30]

James dismissed these overtures. In a speech delivered in London in 1614, he also accused the Irish of disloyalty, branding them as "half-subjects . . . [who] give your soul to the pope, and to me only the body; and even it your bodily strength, you divide it between me and the king of Spain."[31] The apparent mutual exclusiveness between loyalty to the crown and to Catholicism confounded the Irish political nation for much of the seventeenth century.[32] The determination of the second earl

[27] Joseph Th. Leerssen, *Mere Irish and Fíor-Ghael: Studies in the Idea of Irish Nationality, Its Development and Literary Expression prior to the Nineteenth Century* (1986; rpt. edn., Cork, 1996), offers the best overview of identity formation among the Catholic population in early modern Ireland.

[28] According to Aidan Clarke, there existed "a true community of secular interests between subject and prince [which] was a sufficient guarantee of loyalty without the additional cement of religious conformity," Clarke, "The Policies of the 'Old English' in Parliament, 1640–1," in J. L. McCracken, ed., *Historical Studies, V* (London, 1965); *Old English in Ireland*; and "Colonial Identity in Early Seventeenth Century Ireland," in T. W. Moody, ed., *Historical Studies, XI: Nationality and the Pursuit of National Independence* (Belfast, 1978).

[29] Breandan Ó Buachalla, "James Our True King: The Ideology of Irish Royalism in the Seventeenth Century," in D. George Boyce, Robert Eccleshall, and Vincent Geoghegan, eds., *Political Thought in Ireland since the Seventeenth Century* (London, 1993). Unfortunately, Ó Buachalla's recent tome on the Stuarts and the intelligensia, 1603–1788—*Ailing ghéar* (Dublin, 1997)—is not yet available in English. Also see Mícheál Mac Craith, "The Gaelic Reaction to the Reformation," in Ellis and Barber, *Conquest and Union*, 139–61; Bernadette Cunningham, "Irish Language Sources for Early Modern Ireland," *History Ireland* 4, no. 1 (1996): 41–48; Marc Caball, "Bardic Poetry and the Analysis of Gaelic Mentalities," *History Ireland* 2, no. 2 (1994): 46–50; and Michelle O Riordan, " 'Political' Poems in the Mid-Seventeenth-Century Crisis," in Ohlmeyer, *Ireland*; and O Riordan, *The Gaelic Mind and the Collapse of the Gaelic World* (Cork, 1990).

[30] John Silke, "Primate Lombard and James I," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 22 (1955): 124–49.

[31] Quoted in Silke, "Primate Lombard and James I," 131.

[32] For a general discussion of the tensions between temporal and spiritual authority, see Glenn

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of Antrim, for example, to preserve intact (and, where possible, to extend) his landed inheritance in both Ireland and Scotland, to keep his patrimony Catholic, and to uphold traditional Gaelic values created a personal dilemma for him. He sincerely wanted to succeed in, and be accepted by, two very different worlds, to be both lauded by Gaelic bards and painted by Van Dyck. For a time, he succeeded, but the outbreak of the Irish rebellion in 1641 exacerbated Antrim's predicament. While he wanted to see "the free exercise of the Roman religion, which I am devoted to and am engaged to maintain in duty to God and respect of my future happiness and salvation," he nevertheless remained for much of the 1640s a loyal supporter of Charles I.[33]

Other Irish Catholics—including Sir Phelim O'Neill and Lord Maguire, leaders of the 1641 uprising—faced related problems. During the 1640s, despite the fact that the Confederation of Kilkenny, the body that governed Catholic Ireland during the war, blatantly violated the king's royal prerogatives and consistently refused to obey his instructions, its members still referred to themselves as "loyal subjects," and the majority behaved as constitutional nationalists. Throughout the war, Gaelic poets lauded Charles I as "their rightful king" and saw themselves as "Charles's people."[34] The Confederates' response to the publication of the *Disputatio Apologetica de jure regni Hiberniae* (1645), written by Conor Mahony, a Jesuit priest from County Cork who had spent his adult life in Portugal, demonstrates this quite clearly. In his tract, Mahony congratulated the Irish on ridding Ireland of so many Protestants during the 1641 "massacres" and urged them to abandon Charles I and to choose in his stead a king from among the native nobility.[35] The Confederate supreme council ordered the book to be burned in Kilkenny, as did the mayor and corporation of Galway, deeming it "full of venomous and virulent doctrines, and damnable treasons against our King and country."[36] Hardly surprisingly after Charles I's execution in 1649, the majority of Irish Catholics, like the Scots, looked to Charles II as his legitimate successor and in 1660 joyously welcomed his restoration as "the prince of the three kingdoms."[37] "A Light to the Blind"

Burgess, *The Politics of the Ancient Constitution: An Introduction to English Political Thought, 1603–1642* (University Park, Pa., 1993), 130–38; and James Brennan, "A Gallician Interlude in Ireland," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 24 (1957): 219–37. This dilemma permeated the writings of numerous Catholic clerics. See several publications of the Franciscan theologian Peter Walsh: *Some Few Questions concerning the Oath of Allegiance, Propos'd by a Catholick Gentleman* (London, 1661); *The History and Vindication of the Loyal Formulary, or Irish Remonstrance . . .* ([London?], 1674); and *The Controversial Letters, or, The Grand Controversie, concerning the Pretended Authority of Popes . . .* (London, 1674).

[33] *A Copie of a Letter from the Lord Intrim [Antrim] in Ireland to the Right Honourable Earl of Rutland, Bearing Date the 25 Day of February . . . 1642* [*sic*] (London, 1642 [*sic*]), 3–4.

[34] Ó Buachalla, "James Our True King," 23. Much of this is developed in Micheál Ó Siochrú, *Confederate Ireland, 1642–1649: A Constitutional and Political Analysis* (Dublin, 1999).

[35] This is explored further by Tadhg O hAnnrachain, "'Though Hereticks and Politicians Should Misinterpret Their Good Zeale': Political Ideology and Catholicism in Early Modern Ireland," in Jane Ohlmeyer, ed., *Kingdom or Colony? Political Thought in Seventeenth-Century Ireland* (Cambridge, forthcoming).

[36] Cited in Nollaig Ó Muraíle, *The Celebrated Antiquary* (Maynooth, 1996). Edmund Borlase, *The History of the Irish Rebellion . . .* (1690; London, 1743), argued that despite their censure of the book "we do not find . . . destatation to Mahony's principle" (p. x); while Cox, *Hibernia anglicana*, asserted, "And though this book was burnt . . . yet it was suffered privately to be dispersed, and was never condemned by the popish clergy" (p. 198).

[37] Ó Buachalla, "James Our True King," 28.

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(ascribed to Nicholas Plunkett) described the Restoration in the following terms: "it pleased Almighty God after a long exile to bring back Charles II . . . There is nothing now to be seen or heard but joys and jubilees throughout the British Empire for the royal physician is come to heal the three bleeding nations of the British Empire."[38]

Nevertheless, Irish loyalty to the crown, which transcended sectarian and ethnic boundaries, did not—with the exception of Protestant Ulster—inculcate a sense of "Britishness." Rather, it qualified and refined both the "Irishness" of the native Catholic population and the "Englishness" of the Old English and Protestant communities. Events in Ireland, particularly the outbreak of the 1641 rebellion, and the rumors of the wholesale massacre of Protestants that allegedly accompanied it, also shaped the formation of a distinct English national identity.[39] The onset of war in Ireland turned the trickle of its migrants to England, particularly to London, into a flood, and these Protestant refugees brought with them tales of popish atrocities and Irish barbarity.[40] Preying on a deep-seated anti-Catholic paranoia, contemporary propagandists and parliamentary leaders, especially John Pym, exploited this ruthlessly, claiming that England was on the verge of being reduced to popery.[41] The publication of works like Sir John Temple's *Irish Rebellion* (1646) merely fanned the flames of animus and "played a powerful role in fixing an image of the Irish in the minds of the English." According to Kathleen Noonan, "Irishness" increasingly became "a touchstone against which to define Englishness," in much the same way that anti-Catholic, anti-French, and anti-Jacobite sentiments later forged a sense of "Britishness" in England and Scotland.[42]

FURTHER RESEARCH INTO THE complex and ever-shifting processes of identity formation is one possible way in which the New British and Irish Histories can be usefully applied to all three kingdoms in the early modern period.[43] There are also

[38] National Library of Ireland, MS 476, "A Light to the Blind," 189. I am grateful to Eamonn Ó Ciardha for bringing this reference to my attention.

[39] Brendan Bradshaw, Andrew Hadfield, and Willy Maley, eds., *Representing Ireland: Literature and the Origins of Conflict, 1534–1660* (Cambridge, 1993).

[40] Kathleen Noonan, "Brethren Only to a Degree: Irish Immigration to London in the Mid-Seventeenth Century, 1640–1660" (PhD dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1989). For pre-1640 migration, see Patrick Fitzgerald, "'Like Crickets to the Crevice of a Brew-house': Poor Irish Migrants in England, 1560–1640," in Patrick O'Sullivan, ed., *Patterns of Migration* (Leicester, 1992), 13–35; and Cregan, "Irish Recusant Lawyers," 306–20; and "Irish Catholic Admissions," 95–114.

[41] Peter Lake, "Anti-Popery: The Structure of a Prejudice," in Richard Cust and Ann Hughes, eds., *Conflict in Early Stuart England: Studies in Religion and Politics, 1603–1642* (London, 1989), 73, 82; Ethan Howard Shagan, "Constructing Discord: Ideology, Propaganda, and English Responses to the Irish Rebellion of 1641," *Journal of British Studies* 36, no. 1 (1997): 4–33; Keith Lindley, "The Impact of the 1641 Rebellion upon England and Wales, 1641–5," *Irish Historical Studies* 18, no. 70 (1972): 143–67.

[42] Kathleen Noonan, "'The Cruell Pressure of an Enraged, Barbarous People': Irish and English Identity in Seventeenth-Century Policy and Propaganda," *Historical Journal* 41, no. 1 (1998): 152, 168. Also see John Adamson, "Strafford's Ghost: The British Context of Viscount Lisle's Lieutenancy of Ireland," in Ohlmeyer, *Ireland*, 128–59. On "British" identity formation, see Colley, *Britons*.

[43] For early modern Scotland, see Arthur H. Williamson, *Scottish National Consciousness in the Age of James VI* (Edinburgh, 1979); Broun, Finlay, and Lynch, *Image and Identity*; Keith M. Brown, "Scottish Identity in the Seventeenth Century," in Bradshaw and Roberts, *British Consciousness*, 236–58; Roger A. Mason, ed., *Scots and Britons: Scottish Political Thought and the Union of 1603*

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others.[44] The "three kingdoms" model offers historians a further opportunity to examine the cultural, linguistic, dynastic, economic, religious, and geographic ties that bound—as well as divided—the Stuart monarchies during the early modern period.[45] For example, since earliest times, Irish and Scottish Gaeldom had formed a distinct cultural entity, with bards composing works aimed at audiences in Ireland and Scotland.[46] A verse dating probably from the mid-seventeenth century composed for Maol Domhnaigh Ó Muirgheasáin, a renowned Scottish poet, recounted how he visited the centers of poetic learning in Ireland "like a bee stealing honey from every flower."[47] In Scotland, Gaelic was described as "Irish," and well into the eighteenth century a dialect known as "Highland Irish" was spoken in County Antrim. The Irish parliament passed legislation in the mid-sixteenth century "against bringing in of Scots, retaining of them, and marrying with them" (which remained on the statute book until James VI/I had it repealed in 1612).[48] It had little impact between the 1560s and 1590s, when some 25,000 mercenaries found employment in militarized Ulster. Understandably, this exodus of troops to Ulster helped define the social structure of the Western Isles, which became more "geared to war than elsewhere in Scottish Gaeldom," with 6,000 fighting men, or

(Cambridge, 1994); and Mason, *Kingship and the Commonweal: Political Thought in Renaissance and Reformation Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1998), esp. chap. 6; and Keith M. Brown, "The Origins of a British Aristocracy: Integration and Its Limitations before the Treaty of Union," in Ellis and Barber, *Conquest and Union*, 222–26. Also see Orest Ranum, ed., *National Consciousness, History and Political Culture in Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore, Md., 1975), especially the article by J. G. A. Pocock; and Cynthia Herrup, "Britishness and Europeanness: Who Are the British Anyway? Introduction," and a series of articles on identity formation in *Journal of British Studies* 31, no. 4 (1992). Within England, outlying regions—such as Cornwall—maintained their distinctive identities. See, for example, Mark Stoyle, "Pagans or Paragons? Images of the Cornish during the English Civil War," *English Historical Review* 111, no. 441 (1996): 299–323; and Stoyle, "Cornish Rebellions, 1467–1648," *History Today* 47, no. 5 (1997): 22–28.

[44] Increasingly, early modern Irish historians, inspired by insights from other disciplines—especially historical geography, archaeology, anthropology, sociology, literary criticism, and gender studies—are undertaking innovative research that crosses national boundaries, as well as religious, ethnic, social, and gender ones. See, for example, Eamonn Ó Ciardha, "Tories and Moss-Troopers in Scotland and Ireland in the Interregnum: A Political Dimension," in J. R. Young, ed., *Celtic Dimensions of the British Civil Wars* (Edinburgh, 1997); Raymond Gillespie, *Popular Religion in Early Modern Ireland* (Manchester, 1997); Cynthia Herrup, "'To Pluck Bright Honour from the Pale-Faced Moon': Gender and Honour in the Castlehaven Story," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6th ser., 6 (1996): 137–60; and David Barker and Willy Maley, eds., *An Uncertain Union: The Problem in Renaissance Literature* (forthcoming). These developments tend, as Nancy Curtin pointed out, "to challenge in varying degrees the existence of concepts which transcend time and historical and social construction," Curtin, "'Varieties of Irishness': Historical Revisionism, Irish Style," *Journal of British Studies* 35, no. 2 (1996): 202–03.

[45] John Kerrigan, "Birth of a Náison," *London Review of Books* (June 5, 1997), suggests that "early modern historians of the 'British and Irish problem' need to think more intently about culture" (p. 17).

[46] For fascinating accounts of the linkages within Gaeldom, see Steven Ellis, "Nationalist Historiography and the English and Gaelic Worlds in the Late Middle Ages," in Brady, *Interpreting Irish History*, 166–71; and Ellis, "The Fall of the Gaelic World, 1450–1650," *Irish Historical Studies* 32 (November 1999). I am grateful to Professor Ellis for permitting me to read his article in advance of publication. Also see Jane Dawson, "The Gaidhealtachd and the Emergence of the Scottish Highlands," in Bradshaw and Roberts, *British Consciousness*, 259–300; and Dawson, "Two Kingdoms or Three? Ireland in Anglo-Scottish Relations in the Middle of the Sixteenth Century," in Roger A. Mason, ed., *Scotland and England, 1286–1815* (Edinburgh, 1987), 113–38.

[47] Cited in Moody, *New History of Ireland*, 3: 541.

[48] *The Statutes*, 443.

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"buannachan," allegedly ready for war in the 1590s.[49] Given the strategic threat to the domestic security of all three kingdoms posed by a united Gaeldom and the inherent political instability of this "dark corner" of their dominions, the Stuart monarchs sought to drive a wedge between Scotland and Ulster. Initially, they targeted the Catholic linkages, but increasingly the state sought to divide and harness the Protestant communities.

From the early seventeenth century, the "North Channel World" expanded to include Presbyterian preachers, planters, and profiteers who shuttled back and forth between Antrim and Ayrshire, forming a homogeneous unit that, like Catholic Gaeldom, was united by sea rather than land.[50] During the reign of James VI/I, these Protestant settlers assisted the king in his attempts to colonize and "civilize" Ulster. For instance, Andrew Knox, who as bishop of the Isles had played a central role in tackling problems in the Highlands and Islands, was later dispatched to tame the wild Irish of Donegal as bishop of Raphoe. Many other favorites of James VI/I also colonized Ulster during the early decades of the seventeenth century. Andrew Stewart, Lord Ochiltree, after serving as the king's lieutenant in the Western Isles, settled on escheated lands in County Tyrone, while Hugh Montgomery, sixth laird of Braidstone, became a prominent planter in County Down.[51] Yet, by the late 1630s, as relations between England and Scotland deteriorated, these colonists were perceived, particularly by the lord deputy of Ireland, Thomas Wentworth, earl of Strafford, as enemies—rather than servants—of the state. Activities such as those of the staunch English Presbyterian Sir John Clotworthy, who owned an extensive estate in County Antrim and was related by marriage to the parliamentary leader John Pym, justified Strafford's paranoia. He served as a vital human conduit, nurturing an increasingly complex web of alliances between the Scottish covenanters, the English parliamentarians, and the anti-Strafford interest in Ireland and played a crucial role at Strafford's impeachment (March–April 1641), marshalling evidence, testifying against the disgraced lord deputy, and introducing the bill for his condemnation to death.[52] Despite the political and military impotence of the Ulster Presbyterians, Oliver Cromwell carefully monitored them during the 1650s, as did Charles II after 1660. By the 1670s, the state perceived the Ulster Presbyterians, reinforced by the migration of militant covenanters from Scotland, to be an even greater threat to domestic security than the Catholic population.[53]

[49] Allan I. Macinnes, "Crown, Clan and Fine: The 'Civilising' of Scottish Gaeldom, 1587–1638," *Northern Scotland* 13 (1993): 33. No recent, in-depth study of sixteenth-century military migration between Ireland and Scotland has been written, and while Hayes-McCoy, *Scots Mercenary Forces*, provides a wealth of detail, it lacks analysis.

[50] Raymond Gillespie, *Colonial Ulster: The Settlement of East Ulster, 1600–1641* (Cork, 1985); G. Hill, *An Historical Account of the Plantation of Ulster* (1877; rpt. edn., Shannon, 1980); T. W. Moody, *The Londonderry Plantation, 1609–41: The City of London and the Plantation in Ulster* (Belfast, 1939); Michael Perceval-Maxwell, *The Scottish Migration to Ulster in the Reign of James I* (London, 1973); Philip S. Robinson, *The Plantation of Ulster: British Settlement in an Irish Landscape, 1640–1670* (Dublin, 1984). Jean Agnew, *Belfast Merchant Families in the Seventeenth Century* (Dublin, 1996), largely focuses on merchants of Scottish extraction.

[51] G. Hill, ed., *The Montgomery Manuscripts (1603–1706)* (Belfast, 1869).

[52] For a recent account of the trial, see Maija Jansson, ed., *Proceedings in the Opening Session of the Long Parliament (Including the Trial of Strafford)* (Rochester, N.Y., and London, forthcoming).

[53] Richard L. Greaves, " 'That's No Good Religion That Disturbs Government': The Church of Ireland and the Nonconformist Challenge, 1660–88," in Alan Ford, James McGuire, and Kenneth Milne, eds., *As by Law Established: The Church of Ireland since the Reformation* (Dublin, 1995), 120–35;

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Historians of any of the three kingdoms who ignore these religious, cultural, and political linkages between Ireland and Scotland do so at their peril. The same may be said for scholars of the Atlantic world. For, as Nicholas Canny recently noted, "the society that was evolving in Ulster in the decades previous to 1641 [might be regarded] as a prototype of what would come into being on the mainland of North America (and especially in the Middle Atlantic colonies) in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries."[54] The "Scotch-Irish" also played an important part in forging a distinctive American identity.[55]

CENTRAL TO POCOCK'S AGENDA for the revitalization of "British" history was the need to situate it in its Atlantic context or, in the recent words of J. C. D. Clark, to forge transatlantic bridges.[56] What role, then, did Ireland play in the Atlantic world, and what impact did the Atlantic world have on Ireland? Seen from the perspective of early modern Ireland, the continental context was more significant than the Atlantic one. Trade with European ports, especially France and Spain, formed the mainstay for the towns of Galway and Limerick.[57] Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Catholic princes of Europe carefully monitored, and occasionally intervened in, Irish affairs.[58] A constant transfer of Irish men and women to and from the continent accompanied these commercial, diplomatic, and military initiatives.[59] During the early decades of the seventeenth century, roughly

Phil Kilroy, "Radical Religion in Ireland, 1641–1660," in Ohlmeyer, *Ireland*, 201–17; and Kilroy, *Protestant Dissent and Controversy in Ireland, 1660–1714* (Cork, 1994); Allan Macinnes, "Covenanting Ideology in Seventeenth-Century Scotland," in Ohlmeyer, *Political Thought*; Marilyn J. Westerkamp, *Triumph of the Laity: Scots-Irish Piety and the Great Awakening, 1625–1760* (Oxford, 1988).

[54] Nicholas Canny, "The Origins of Empire: An Introduction," in Canny, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, Vol. 1: *The Origins of Empire* (Oxford, 1998), 16–17.

[55] James Leyburn, *The Scotch-Irish: A Social History* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1962); and Maldwyn A. Jones, "The Scotch-Irish in British America," in Bernard Bailyn and Philip D. Morgan, eds., *Strangers within the Realm: Cultural Margins of the First British Empire* (Chapel Hill, 1991), 284–313.

[56] Pocock, "British History: A Plea for a New Subject," 617–20; and J. G. A. Pocock, *Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776* (Princeton, N.J., 1980); J. C. D. Clark, "The Strange Death of British History? Reflections on Anglo-American Scholarship," *Historical Journal* 40, no. 3 (1997): 789, 809.

[57] Louis Cullen has used French regional archives extensively in his work on eighteenth-century trade. See especially L. M. Cullen, "Galway Merchants in the Outside World, 1650–1800," in Diarmuid O'Cearbhaill, ed., *Galway Town and Gown, 1484–1984* (Dublin, 1984), 63–89.

[58] Jerrold I. Casway, *Owen Roe O'Neill and the Struggle for Catholic Ireland* (Philadelphia, 1984); Marianne Elliott, *Partners in Revolution: The United Irishmen and France* (New Haven, Conn., 1989); Gráinne Henry, *The Irish Military Community in Spanish Flanders, 1586–1621* (Dublin, 1992); and "Ulster Exiles in Europe, 1605–1641," in Mac Cuarta, *Ulster 1641*, 37–60; B. Jennings, *Wild Geese in Spanish Flenders, 1582–1700* (Irish Manuscripts Commission, Dublin, 1964); and "Irish Swordsmen in Flanders, 1586–1610," *Studies* 36 (1947); 37 (1948); Hiram Morgan, *Tyrone's Rebellion: The Outbreak of the Nine Years' War in Tudor Ireland* (London, 1993); Jane Ohlmeyer, "A Failed Revolution? The Irish Confederate War in Its European Context," *History Ireland* 3, no. 1 (1995): 24–28; and "Ireland Independent: Confederate Foreign Policy and International Relations during the Mid-Seventeenth Century," in Ohlmeyer, *Ireland*, 89–111; C. Petrie, "Ireland in Spanish and French Strategy 1558–1815," *Irish Sword* 6 (Summer 1964); J. J. Silke, *Ireland and Europe* (Dundalk, 1966); and "The Irish Abroad, 1534–1691," in Moody, *New History of Ireland*, vol. 3; J. G. Simms, "The Irish on the Continent, 1691–1800," in Moody and Vaughan, *New History*, vol. 4; Micheline Kerney Walsh, *"Destruction by Peace": Hugh O Neill after Kinsale* (Monaghan, 1986); and Helga Robinson-Hammerstein, ed., *European Universities in the Age of Reformation and Counter-Reformation* (Dublin, 1998).

[59] The Irish diaspora—whether it was of clerics or civilians, merchants or mercenaries—has attracted scholarly interest. See, for example, L. M. Cullen, "The Irish Diaspora of the Seventeenth and

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25,000 Irish mercenaries served in the armies of France and Spain;[60] during the mid-seventeenth century, an additional 29,000 mercenaries, together with their families, left to fight in the continental armies;[61] and after 1690, an additional 18,000 left for France. Louis Cullen has recently suggested that an average of 500 men per annum migrated to the continent, and if women and children are included the figure probably stands at 700.[62] In contrast, Irish migration to the New World probably averaged 200 migrants per annum during the first half of the seventeenth century and 400 per annum during the second.[63] It was only in the middle and later decades of the eighteenth century that the Irish, especially those from Ulster, crossed the Atlantic in substantial numbers.

Though numerically insignificant, these Irish adventurers, hailing from a wide variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds, settled in the Amazon Basin, Newfoundland, Virginia, and the West Indies.[64] Moreover, Ireland's commercial relationship with the Atlantic world, albeit intimately linked to England's mercantilist demands, was defined during the later seventeenth century. Amazonia in particular offered to Irish traders "realistic and lucrative returns in tobacco, dyes and timber and the possibility of sugar cultivation."[65] This was also true of the West Indies, where, prior to 1690, "Ireland dominated the provisioning trade."[66] As Donald Akenson's fascinating case study of the tiny island of Montserrat during the early modern

Eighteenth Centuries," in Nicholas Canny, ed., *Europeans on the Move: Studies on European Migration, 1500–1800* (Oxford, 1994); and Jerrold Casway, "Irish Women Overseas, 1500–1800," in Margaret MacCurtain and Mary O'Dowd, eds., *Women in Early Modern Ireland* (Dublin, 1991), 112–32.

[60] Henry, *Irish Military Community*. Also see Robert Stradling's account of the "Ulster army" in Cantabria: *The Spanish Monarchy and Irish Mercenaries: The Wild Geese in Spain, 1618–68* (Dublin, 1994), chaps. 7–8. Apart from an interesting article by Pierre Gouhier, "Mercenaires Irlandais au service de la France (1635–1664)," *Irish Sword* 7 (1965): 58–75, the Irish serving in the French armies prior to 1690 have been neglected. A wealth of material exists for the later period: Richard Hayes, *Ireland and Irishmen in the French Revolution* (Dublin, 1932); Hayes, *Old Irish Links with France* (Dublin, 1940); and Hayes, *Biographical Dictionary of Irishmen in France* (Dublin, 1949). Also see the classic work by J. C. O'Callaghan, *History of Irish Brigades in the Service of France from the Revolution . . . (1688) to the Revolution in France (1789)* (Glasgow, 1870). Irish mercenaries serving in the imperial, Swedish, Polish, Russian, and Scandinavian armies during the seventeenth century also merit further research. See, for instance, J. Hennig, "Irish Soldiers in the 30 Years War," *Journal of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland* 82 (1952): 28–36. For some recent innovative research on Scottish mercenaries, see Steve Murdoch, "The House of Stuart and the Scottish Professional Soldier 1618–1640: A Conflict of National Identities," in Bertrand Taithe and Tim Thornton, eds., *War: Identities in Conflict, 1300–2000* (Stroud, Gloucestershire, 1998), 37–56.

[61] Sir William Petty, who spent most of his adult life in Ireland, estimated in his *Political Anatomy of Ireland* (London, 1691) that "There were transported of them [native Irish] into Spain, Flanders, [and] France, 34,000 soldiers; and of boys, women, priests . . . no less than 6000" (pp. 7, 19). In the absence of quantitative data, this figure must be regarded as a guesstimate, but it would seem a reasonably accurate one. Recently, Robert Stradling suggested that between 1651 and 1654–55 over 18,000 soldiers (approximately 3,600 per annum) left Ireland to serve in Spain. Others would have traveled to Flanders and, despite a parliamentary ban on French recruiting, to France as well. In addition, between 1644 and 1649, a further 11,000 soldiers were dispatched to the continental theater of war (7,000 for the French armies and approximately 4,000 for the Spanish forces). Stradling, *Spanish Monarchy*, 164.

[62] Cullen, "Irish Diaspora," 124, 139.

[63] Cullen, "Irish Diaspora," 126–27, 139.

[64] Donald Harman Akenson, *If the Irish Ran the World: Montserrat, 1630–1730* (Liverpool, 1997), provides an excellent overview of these early settlements. Also see essays by Canny (chaps. 1 and 7) and Hilary Beckles in Canny, *Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. 1.

[65] Joyce Lorimer, ed., *English and Irish Settlement on the River Amazon, 1550–1646* (London, 1989), 123.

[66] Thomas M. Truxes, *Irish-American Trade, 1660–1783* (Cambridge, 1988), 14.

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period shows, the Irish—"schooled in early English imperialism (sometimes quite unpleasantly)"—became aggressive and expert imperialists themselves.[67] By the mid-seventeenth century, the population of Montserrat consisted of roughly 1,000 families, the majority of whom were of Irish provenance and largely Catholics of both Old English and native Irish extraction. During the early decades of the seventeenth century, many traveled to the West Indies voluntarily as indentured servants destined to cultivate tobacco. (Only after 1680 did Montserrat become a sugar island.) Numbers increased significantly with the Cromwellian transportations of the 1650s (as many as 10,000 Catholics were shipped to the West Indies), and by the late seventeenth century nearly 70 percent of Montserrat's white population was Irish. According to Akenson, Montserrat "registered the highest concentration of persons of Irish ethnicity of any colony in the history of both the first and second English empires."[68] Moreover, he demonstrates that these Irish settlers not only prospered but "became more economically powerful" than their British counterparts largely because "they well knew how to be hard and efficient slave masters."[69]

England's colonial relationship with Ireland not only shaped the mindset of Irish imperialists in the West Indies, it also helped to define English attitudes toward their American colonies. Ireland was, after all, Britain's first colony and, as Jack Greene recently noted, a colony on the "near periphery" of the transoceanic British Empire, as America was one on the "outer periphery."[70] Howard Mumford Jones, D. B. Quinn, and Nicholas Canny have shown how English expansionists—including Sir Walter Raleigh, Humphrey Gilbert, and William Penn—whose colonial exploits traversed the Atlantic, used their Irish experiences to confirm their assumptions of savagism, paganism, and barbarism and applied these "to the indigenous population of the New World."[71] In an Irish context, the language of

[67] Akenson, *If the Irish Ran the World*, 7, 174.

[68] Akenson, *If the Irish Ran the World*, 107.

[69] Akenson, *If the Irish Ran the World*, 117.

[70] A suggestion made by Jack P. Greene at the American Historical Association, January 3, 1997, in response to the paper I contributed to a panel on the "New British History in Its Atlantic Context." Some inroads have already been made to construct a historiography around an Atlantic world. See, for example, Jack P. Greene and J. R. Pole, eds., *Colonial British America: Essays in the New History of the Early Modern Era* (Baltimore, Md., 1984), esp. chap. 1; Bailyn and Morgan, *Strangers within the Realm*, esp. the chapters by Nicholas Canny and Eric Richards; Karen Kupperman, ed., *America in European Consciousness, 1493–1750* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1995), esp. the chapters by David Armitage and Kupperman; Canny, *Europeans on the Move*. For an Irish perspective, see the essays by Canny, Brendan Bradshaw, and Karl Bottigheimer in K. R. Andrews, N. Canny, and E. H. Hair, eds., *The Westward Enterprise: English Activities in Ireland, the Atlantic and America, 1480–1650* (Liverpool, 1978); Raymond Gillespie, "Explorers, Exploiters and Entrepreneurs: Early Modern Ireland and Its Context, 1500–1700," in B. J. Graham and L. J. Proudfoot, eds., *An Historical Geography of Ireland* (Dublin, 1993); and W. J. Smyth, "The Western Isle of Ireland and the Eastern Seaboard of America—England's First Frontiers," *Irish Geography* 11 (1978). For a Scottish perspective, see Arthur Williamson, "Scots, Indians and Empire: The Scottish Politics of Civilization 1519–1609," *Past and Present* 150 (1996).

[71] Nicholas Canny, *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: A Pattern Established, 1565–1576* (New York, 1976), 160; Howard Mumford Jones, "Origins of the Colonial Idea in England," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 85, no. 5 (1942); and "The Colonial Implies: An Analysis of the 'Promotion' Literature of Colonization," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 90, no. 2 (1946); D. B. Quinn, "Ireland and Sixteenth Century European Expansion," in T. D. Williams, ed., *Historical Studies* (London, 1958); and Rolf Loeber, "Preliminaries to the Massachusetts Bay Colony: The Irish Ventures of Emanuel Downing and John Winthrop Sr," in Toby Barnard, Dáibhí Ó Cróinín, and Katherine Simms, eds., *"A Miracle of Learning": Studies in Manuscripts and Irish Learning* (Aldershot, 1998), 164–200. Attempts to situate Ireland in an "Atlantic context" have not been universally welcomed by historians of early modern Ireland. See, for example, Hiram Morgan,

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barbarism and civility dated from the twelfth century, when Giraldus Cambrensis consistently referred to the Irish as "a barbarous people," "a rude people" with "primitive habits" "living themselves like beasts."[72] Fynes Moryson, secretary to Lord Mountjoy, traveled extensively throughout Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and Turkey but saved his greatest scorn for the "mere Irish," whom he regarded as filthy, rude, barbaric wild beasts whose women were drunken sluts. By the seventeenth century, many contemporaries from the king down clearly regarded the Gaelic Irish both mentally and culturally as a lower form of humanity. These ethnocentric attitudes toward "natives" later characterized imperial rule overseas, whether in North America, Africa, or the Indian subcontinent.

Convictions of racial superiority also critically shaped attitudes about how Ireland might best be "civilized"—how these unruly subjects could be reformed, their overmighty lords tamed, thuggery and feuding replaced with law and order, and labor channeled into production rather than destruction. During the early modern period, the central government tried using a variety of strategies—including military conquest, the introduction of common law, English economic practices, interference in land titles, expropriation, and plantation—to establish political hegemony in Ireland.[73] Thus Ireland served as a laboratory for empire. Contemporaries remained painfully aware of this and their colonial status. The Old English historian John Lynch quoted the earl of Thomond as maintaining that "Ireland is another India for the English, a more profitable India for them than ever the Indies were to the Spaniards."[74] Yet how did the native Irish peoples respond to the colonial policies of an imperial crown? How, for example, did "civilizing" initiatives affect their culture and perception of themselves and of others, their political discourse, their dress, their architectural styles, and their marriage opportunities? Why did many native lords embrace the new order with apparent willingness?

Many of these questions remain to be answered in full. However, the response of the literati to these civilizing processes has been the subject of recent research. On the one hand, some poets readily accepted grants of land in the plantation scheme, while bards on both sides of the North Channel modified the traditional themes of their poetry to meet the new circumstances and the changed priorities of their new patrons.[75] On the other, many in the traditional learned classes, reeling in the wake of political—but not intellectual—collapse, abhorred the changes. Some bards criticized the "new methods of fortification, enclosure, and cultivation that followed the displacement of the native Irish by English and Scottish planters."[76] Fear Flatha

"Mid-Atlantic Blues," *Irish Review* 11 (1991): 50–55; and Andrew Hadfield's response, "Rocking the Boat: A Response to Hiram Morgan," in *Irish Review* 12 (1992): 15–19.

[72] Andrew Hadfield and John McVeagh, eds., *Strangers to That Land: British Perceptions of Ireland from the Reformation to the Famine* (Gerrards Cross, Buckinghamshire, 1994), 27.

[73] Discussed in Jane Ohlmeyer, "'Civilizinge of Those Rude Partes': Colonization within Britain and Ireland, 1580s–1640s," in Canny, *Oxford History of the British Empire*, 1: 130–43.

[74] John Lynch, *Cambrensis eversus*, Mathew Kelly, trans., 3 vols. (Dublin, 1851–52), 3: 75.

[75] Bernadette Cunningham and Raymond Gillespie, "The East Ulster Bardic Family of Ó Gnímh," *Egise* 20 (1984); and Ó Buachalla, "James Our True King," 10. For Scotland, see Colm Ó Baoill, ed., *The Harps' Cry: An Anthology of 17th Century Gaelic Poetry* (Edinburgh, 1994).

[76] Ó Cuív, "Irish Language," 526.

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Ó Gnímh, whose family had served as the traditional poets to the O'Neills, penned a lament ("Pitiful Are the Gaels") that described Ireland as "a new England in all but name."[77] Others vented their spleen against the newcomers, whom they regarded as lowborn thugs, as "English-speaking bastards," who according to John Lynch were "collected from the barbers' shops, and highways, and taverns, and stables and hogsties of England."[78]

In addition to examining the rhetoric of the dispossessed, it is vital to investigate the native reaction to the introduction of an imperial economic order that aimed to undermine the traditional "fighting and feasting" culture that underpinned Gaelic society. In their seminal collection of essays on the role the frontier played in shaping the histories of North America and South Africa, Howard Lamar and Leonard Thompson noted the speed with which even a small number of intruders could destabilize the economic infrastructure of native society and "quickly initiate profound systematic changes in the indigenous society. The material goods they introduce may cause intense competition to control or monopolize them among segments of the local population and may damage the interests of the local people who previously made and exchanged goods that served equivalent purposes."[79] Certainly, Irish chieftains quickly realized that in order to survive and succeed in this "civilizing" English world and to be considered "worthy subjects," they had no alternative but to exploit the economic advantages of the English system of landlord-tenant relations and of a commercial economy. Many reorganized their estates accordingly.[80] Yet, as a result, combined with increased conspicuous expenditure (on building, furniture, clothing, education, legal expenses, living at court, and marriage), many sank deeply into debt, and a considerable number mortgaged their estates, often to Protestant entrepreneurs.[81] Did these financial, economic, and cultural pressures prove, especially in the long term, to be more potent agents of change and of colonization in these outlying areas than political initiatives? The reactions of "the uncivilized Britons" to the colonizing policies of Agricola during the first century perhaps serve as an interesting parallel. According to the Roman historian Tacitus,

[77] Cunningham and Gillespie, "East Ulster Bardic Family of Ó Gnímh"; and Bernadette Cunningham, "Native Culture and Political Change in Ireland, 1580–1640," in Ciaran Brady and Raymond Gillespie, eds., *Natives and Newcomers: Essays on the Making of Irish Colonial Society, 1534–1641* (Dublin, 1986).

[78] Lynch, *Cambrensis eversus*, 3: 75.

[79] Howard Lamar and Leonard Thompson, eds., *The Frontier in History: North America and South Africa Compared* (New Haven, Conn., 1981), 9. For instructive insights from the Middle Ages, see T. E. McNeill, *Anglo-Norman Ulster: The History of an Irish Barony, 1177–1400* (Edinburgh, 1980), where it is argued that the settlers harnessed traditional Irish agricultural practices "by using their commercial contacts to change the old subsistence aims of the Irish chiefs into a marketing structure" (p. 122).

[80] For a specific example, see Ohlmeyer, *Civil War and Restoration*, 32–42. For Scotland, see Allan I. Macinnes, *Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603–1788* (Edinburgh, 1996).

[81] The books of the Irish Statute Staple, where debts could be registered (the ones dealing with Dublin are extant from the 1590s to the 1680s) offer a possible means of untangling webs of indebtedness and financial interdependence, especially when they are examined in conjunction with other major sources that deal with the transfer of land, especially patent rolls, land surveys, and estate papers. Jane Ohlmeyer and Eamonn Ó Ciardha, eds., *The Irish Statute Staple Books, 1596–1687* (Dublin, 1998); and Ohlmeyer, "The Statute Staple in Early Modern Ireland," *History Ireland* 6, no. 4 (1998): 36–40. Kevin McKenny is currently entering the most important landed records dating from the mid-seventeenth century into a database that will be published by the Irish Manuscripts Commission.

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Agricola's object was to accustom them to peace and quiet by promoting luxury. By private persuasion and public grants of aid he induced them to build temples, market places, and private houses. He praised industry and punished indolence, and as they came to covet his approval, competition did the work of compulsion . . . Gradually they yielded to the seduction of our Roman vices . . . This was part of their slavery. The ignorant called it "civilization."[82]

Of course, by comparing and contrasting the experiences of early modern Ireland and by situating them in a wider context—whether it be British, European, or Atlantic—one may be accused of detracting from the uniqueness of Ireland's history. Donald Akenson recently called on historians of Ireland to question "the assumption of Irish exceptionalism" and place "the nation's history in [an] international and comparative context." While he maintains that Ireland "is an exceptional country . . . it is not an exception to the patterns that have dominated western Europe since the end of the middle ages."[83] This is particularly true of the seventeenth century, when Ireland formed an integral component both of a wider multiple monarchy and a burgeoning Atlantic empire. Instead of feeling in any way threatened by the New British/Irish and Atlantic Histories and viewing them as some sort of specters that will haunt future generations of Irish (and for that matter American, Scottish, and English) historians, perhaps the time has come to embrace them more fully and use them to enrich national history. After all, what should scholars know of Ireland who only Ireland know?

[82] Tacitus, *Dialogus, Agricola, and Germania*, W. Hamilton Fyfe, trans. (Oxford, 1908), 67. I owe this reference to David Harris Sacks. Also see Debora Shuger, "Irishmen, Aristocrats, and Other White Barbarians," *Renaissance Quarterly* 50, no. 2 (1997): 500–01. I am grateful to Karen Kupperman for bringing this reference to my attention.

[83] Akenson, *If the Irish Ran the World*, 173.

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AHR Forum

Nation, Migration, and the Province in the First British Empire: Scotland and the Americas, 1600–1800

NED C. LANDSMAN

NOT MANY YEARS AGO, an essay on the topic of Scottish involvement with the Americas in the early modern period would have been located securely within the category of works on the subject of ethnicity in early America, at a time when one of the priorities of historians was to add the category of ethnic background, along with race, religion, region, and gender, to the available analytical apparatus for examining the social configuration of Britain's early American colonies. That it is appearing now as part of a forum on the new *British* history indicates some of the slippage that has occurred in recent years in the application of rigid territorial boundaries to the study of early modern British societies, paralleling, it has been suggested, the challenges those same borders have confronted in the contemporary world. The same need to re-think the historical meaning of national boundaries within the British state might lead one to question as well the utility of the traditional framework for understanding the experiences of the various European and especially British national groups in early America, and the applicability of ethnicity as a conceptual category in the manner in which it has most often been employed.

That concept of ethnicity in fact derived not from the experiences of groups arriving in the Americas during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries but rather their much later followers. It emerged principally to highlight those traits that groups managed to retain during the seemingly inevitable process of adapting themselves to a new American nationality. It fits rather imperfectly the situation of those whose movements represented less the adoption of new nationalities than the pursuit of opportunities within extended empires, at a time when imperial participation ranked as one of the principal integrating features of a new British identity and when American nationality had yet to be formed. The absence of such a nationality, and the fact that Britishness also was far from fully established, leaves very much open the question of how many colonial Britons understood the settlement effort in which they were participating, as well as what effects national experience within Britain may have had on the specific character of overseas involvements undertaken by diverse groups and on the various forms of provincial

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identity that emerged: in short, on the *British* dimension of colonial British America.[1]

This essay will reconsider the experience of one of the most prevalent and certainly among the most prominent of national groups to involve itself with early British America: the Scots, and in particular, Lowland Scots, a group for whom involvement in the Atlantic world everywhere overlapped national concerns; access to England's overseas empire was among their principal motives for becoming Britons. Moreover, the nature of those involvements led Scots to traverse both the physical and intellectual markers of national and provincial boundaries within the empire with considerable frequency, before as well as after England and Scotland united in the Union of 1707; indeed, the union itself represented just such a traversal for Scots, who were far more likely than their new countrymen to assume British identities, as North Britons.[2] Their ability to do so was rooted in both a long history of involvement abroad that predated the American colonization and in the creation of Great Britain, and it gives us an opportunity to consider some of the national, British, and European aspects of Scottish participation in the Atlantic world.

THE IMAGE OF THE SCOT AS COLONIZER has a long history and nearly as long a historiography. For generations, historians and hagiographers have traced the many and varied ways in which Scots and Scottish ideas figured prominently and often disproportionately in numerous areas of early American life, from commerce and political economy to moral and natural philosophy to imperial and educational

[1] On the role of imperial participation in the forming of British identity, see especially Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837* (New Haven, Conn., 1992); Colley devotes less attention to the different kinds of British identities that emerged among various national groups in Britain; some of their origins are discussed in David Armitage, "Making the Empire British: Scotland in the Atlantic World 1542–1707," *Past and Present* 155 (May 1997): 34–63. The designation "colonial British America" is from Jack P. Greene and J. R. Pole, in *Colonial British America: Essays in the New History of the Early Modern Era* (Baltimore, Md., 1984). On the later formation of American nationality, see David Waldstreicher, *In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776–1820* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1997).

On the concept of ethnicity, see especially Werner Sollors, *Beyond Ethnicity: Consent and Descent in American Culture* (New York, 1986), 21–24. Historians of American ethnicity have of course gone well beyond those original ideas of ethnicity, as even a brief perusal of a publication such as the *Journal of American Ethnic History* makes clear. Among the most insightful recent works on ethnicity in early America are A. G. Roeber, *Palatines, Liberty, and Property: German Lutherans in Colonial British America* (Baltimore, 1993); Donna Merwick, *Possessing Albany, 1630–1710: The Dutch and English Experiences* (New York, 1990); and Joyce D. Goodfriend, *Before the Melting Pot: Society and Culture in Colonial New York City, 1664–1730* (Princeton, N.J., 1992).

For works that have sought to transcend national boundaries in their approaches to the first British empire, see especially Jack P. Greene, *Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of the British Empire and the United States, 1607–1788* (Athens, Ga., 1986); and Greene, *Intellectual Construction of America: Exceptionalism and Identity from 1492 to 1800* (Chapel Hill, 1993); J. C. D. Clark, *The Language of Liberty, 1660–1832: Political Discourse and Social Dynamics in the Anglo-American World* (New York, 1994); and David Hackett Fischer, *Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America* (New York, 1989), which extends the power of ethnicity far beyond what this author considers reasonable.

[2] That Scots provided the most creative thinking on the Union of 1707 has been argued by John Robertson, "An Elusive Sovereignty: The Course of the Union Debate in Scotland, 1698–1707," in Robertson, ed., *A Union for Empire: Political Thought and the British Union of 1707* (New York, 1995), 198–227.

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administration.[3] For all that research, the overall pattern of Scottish involvement with the Americas has remained elusive. In fact, it was a much more particular pattern than has often been assumed, extending only to certain places and specific areas of activity. Moreover, it was predominantly an eighteenth-century phenomenon. Seventeenth-century Scottish connections to the Americas were rather meager.

Despite the celebrity attached to the Scottish presence in the Americas, Scots were relative latecomers to that colonization. The English, the Spanish, the French, the Dutch, and even the Swedes all may have been more active colonizers than the Scots until late in the seventeenth century. The New Scotland settlements of the 1620s did not come close to matching the simultaneous New English or New Netherlands or even New Swedish settlements, and the majority of Nova Scotia settlers may have been English. An attempted Scottish expedition to New York during the 1660s failed. Even the first permanent Scottish settlement, the Quaker-sponsored colonization of East Jersey, was in no way comparable, even on a per-capita basis, to the adjacent and related English Friends' settlements in West Jersey and Pennsylvania.[4] Not until the middle of the eighteenth century would Scotland establish a reputation in North America as a nation of emigrants. Indeed, until rather late in the seventeenth century, it would be difficult to find more than a handful of Scots who displayed any significant interest in the Americas.

By European standards, there is nothing surprising about the limited scale of those involvements, which was, in fact, more the norm than the exception in early colonization. Nearly every northern European nation except the English faced difficulties in inducing its people to migrate to the New World. New France, for all its importance, was never a heavily populated colony. New Netherlands, which could not compete with the lure of the Dutch commercial empire in the East, was peopled by anyone the Dutch West India company could persuade to migrate: English, Germans, Huguenots, Swedes, Jews, Africans, and others, as well as the various "Dutch" peoples. The population of New Sweden may well have been mostly Finns. The English were the exception here, and English men and women were apparently a good deal more willing than most others to try their fortunes in the unsettled environs of North America, perhaps because of the seemingly greater

[3] The classical explanation for that involvement is John Clive and Bernard Bailyn, "England's Cultural Provinces: Scotland and America," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., 11 (April 1954): 200–13. General surveys of the literature on Scottish influences in early America include W. R. Brock, *Scotus Americanus: A Survey of Sources for Links between Scotland and America in the Eighteenth Century* (Edinburgh, 1982); Richard B. Sher, "Scottish-American Cultural Studies, Past and Present," in *Scotland and America in the Age of the Enlightenment*, Sher and Jeffrey R. Smitten, eds. (Edinburgh, 1990), 1–27; Eric Richards, "Scotland and the Uses of the Atlantic Empire," *Strangers within the Realm: Cultural Margins of the First British Empire*, Bernard Bailyn and Philip D. Morgan, eds. (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1991), 67–114; and Ned C. Landsman, "The Provinces and the Empire: Scotland, the American Colonies, and the Development of British Provincial Identity," in *An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689 to 1815*, Lawrence Stone, ed. (London, 1994), 258–87. There has been no complete study of Scottish emigration to succeed Ian C. C. Graham, *Colonists from Scotland: Emigration to North America, 1707–1783* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1956).

[4] George Pratt Insh, *Scottish Colonial Schemes, 1620–1686* (Glasgow, 1922); N. E. S. Griffiths and John G. Reid, "New Evidence on New Scotland, 1629," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., 49 (July 1992): 492–508; Peter Gouldesbrough, "An Attempted Scottish Voyage to New York in 1669," *Scottish Historical Review* 40 (January 1961): 56–62; Ned C. Landsman, *Scotland and Its First American Colony, 1680–1765* (Princeton, N.J., 1985).

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importance of landowning as an attraction to English settlers. That was a prospect with which Scots settlers, few of whom had any opportunity to own land at home, would have been largely unfamiliar.[5]

If the colonization of New Scotland was therefore not that modest when judged against the general pattern of early seventeenth-century European migration to the Americas, it is striking when judged by another, wholly Scottish standard. During the seventeenth century, and for quite some time before that, Scots had amply demonstrated that they were very willing to emigrate. T. C. Smout has estimated that there may have been as many as 200,000 migrants from Scotland during the course of the seventeenth century, at a time when the population hovered around one million. That may have been the highest per-capita rate of emigration in western Europe and was almost certainly the highest rate of net out-migration, since few Europeans found much to offer in Scotland. It may have involved something approaching 20 percent of the nation's young men in the early seventeenth century.[6]

Most of that movement was directed toward the European continent. During those years, Scottish merchants and traders lived and worked extensively in the cities of France, Sweden, Denmark, and the Low Countries. Scots were especially prevalent in Poland, to which as many as 30–40,000 migrated over a period of several decades early in the seventeenth century; contemporaries believed that it represented the largest out-migration of Scots to any country during those years, exceeding even Ireland. Nearly as many may have gone to Scandinavia, many of those into military service. Those were both well-established routes before 1600 and far outstripped the fledgling colonies in New Scotland as competitors for Scottish migrants.[7]

The existence of such high rates of emigration before the union highlights a growing dichotomy within the literature on Scottish involvements abroad. On one

[5] See especially David Cohen, "How Dutch Were the Dutch of New Netherland?" *New York History* 62 (January 1981): 43–60; C. A. Weslager, *Dutch Explorers, Traders and Settlers in the Delaware Valley 1609–1664* (Philadelphia, 1961), chaps. 6–7; *New Sweden in America*, Carol E. Hoffecker, ed. (Newark, Del., 1995). On English Atlantic migration, see Nicholas Canny, "English Migration into and across the Atlantic during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," in Canny, ed., *Europeans on the Move: Studies on European Migration, 1500–1800* (Oxford, 1994), 39–75; and see Peter Moogk, "Manon's Fellow Exiles: Emigration from France to North America before 1763," 236–60, in the same volume.

[6] T. C. Smout, N. C. Landsman, and T. M. Devine, "Scottish Emigration in the Early Modern Period," in Canny, *Europeans on the Move*, 76–112, which can be compared with other articles in the same volume: Nicholas Canny, "English Migration into and across the Atlantic during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," 39–75; L. M. Cullen, "The Irish Diaspora of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," 113–49; and Jan Lucassen, "The Netherlands, the Dutch, and Long Distance Migration, in the Late Sixteenth to Early Nineteenth Centuries," 153–91.

[7] Smout, Landsman, and Devine, "Scottish Emigration in the Early Modern Period," 76–90; and see also Gordon Donaldson, *The Scots Overseas* (London, 1966); *Scotland and Europe, 1200–1850*, T. C. Smout, ed. (Edinburgh, 1986), especially the essays by Elsa-Britta Grage, "Scottish Merchants in Gothenburg, 1621–1850," 112–27, and Anna Bieganska, "A Note on the Scots in Poland, 1550–1800," 157–65; Thomas Riis, *Should Auld Acquaintance Be Forgot: Scottish-Danish Relations, c. 1450–1707* (Odense, 1988); and three books edited by Grant G. Simpson: *Scotland and Scandinavia, 800–1800* (Edinburgh, 1990); *The Scottish Soldier Abroad, 1247–1967* (Edinburgh, 1992); and *Scotland and the Low Countries, 1124–1949* (East Linton, 1996). Those studies built on three older works by T. A. Fischer: *The Scots in Germany* (Edinburgh, 1902); *The Scots in Eastern and Western Prussia* (Edinburgh, 1903); and *The Scots in Sweden* (Edinburgh, 1907); see also *Papers Illustrating the History of the Scots Brigade in the Service of the United Netherlands, 1572–1782*, James Ferguson, ed., 3 vols. (Edinburgh, 1899–1901), *Publications of the Scottish History Society*, First Series, vols. 32, 35, 38.

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side is a flourishing body of literature on Scotland's connections to the continent, well represented by a 1986 collection titled *Scotland and Europe*, which concentrates on the period before 1700. On the other side is the traditional literature on Scottish emigration, exemplified by an excellent 1985 collection of articles, *The Scots Abroad*, which views emigration as a product of the modern period and concentrates exclusively on the period since 1750, with hardly a mention of Europe.[8]

The assumptions of the latter work are clear: Scotland's opening to the world is attributed to the union, the empire, and English connections generally, while the kind of overseas contacts detailed in the more recent literature appear as incidental and fragmentary, where they are noticed at all. The more work that appears on Scottish involvement with Europe, the less persuasive such a view becomes. In fact, it may have the story backward. Rather than the union opening Scotland to outside involvement, it seems more likely that long-established involvements abroad substantially inhibited the participation of a people long noted for exporting population in the still-risky project of American colonization.

Neither the volume nor the direction of those movements was altogether consistent. They varied with economic and political conditions as well as policies of state. The influx of Scottish merchants and peddlers to the east, into Denmark and the Baltic, expanded during the late sixteenth century and probably peaked during the 1620s before tailing off. Some Scots settled down there and gradually assimilated into the Polish and Danish populations. Increasingly, political and spiritual motives propelled Scots to two other locales instead. Movement to the Low Countries began to rise during the religious wars of the early seventeenth century, as the Netherlands became a haven for Calvinist refugees, and Scots continued to go there thereafter. Thus Rotterdam housed a permanent population of Scottish merchants, mercenaries, and tradesmen, who built their own church serving a congregation of a thousand worshipers by 1700. Migration to Ireland greatly increased with the first plantation of Ulster, which has been called the first British imperial venture, and again during the wars of the mid-seventeenth century, which left the Presbyterian communities in western Scotland and Ulster closely linked.[9]

In spite of those fluctuations, there was almost always some migration from Scotland, a continuity that was deeply embedded within the Scottish social order. Migration provided a safety valve in the frequent times of overpopulation and dearth, or in times of religious conflict, probably rising during the 1620s, 1670s, and 1690s. Moreover, the chance to travel to overseas communities provided middling Scots with a greater range of opportunities than the domestic economy offered. The

[8] Smout, *Scotland and Europe*; *The Scots Abroad: Labour, Capital, Enterprise, 1750–1914*, R. A. Cage, ed. (Beckenham, Kent, 1985); see also the more recent *Scottish Emigration and Scottish Society*, T. M. Devine, ed. (Edinburgh, 1993).

[9] Riis, *Should Auld Acquaintance Be Forgot*, esp. 156; Bieganska, "Note on the Scots in Poland"; W. Steven, *The History of the Scottish Church in Rotterdam* (Edinburgh, 1832); M. Perceval-Maxwell, *The Scottish Migration to Ulster in the Reign of James I* (New York, 1973); Nicholas Canny, "Fashioning 'British' Worlds in the Seventeenth Century," in *Empire, Society and Labor: Essays in Honor of Richard S. Dunn*, Canny, Joseph E. Illick, Gary B. Nash, and William Pencak, eds., a special issue of *Pennsylvania History* 64 (1997): 26–45; and Jane Ohlmeyer, "Seventeenth-Century Ireland and the New British and Atlantic Histories," above, 446–62.

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fact that some of those communities maintained close Scottish connections allowed for the maintenance of a larger Scottish population overall than the impoverished countryside would otherwise have permitted.

Indeed, the term "emigration" may not have precisely the right connotations at all, as there evidently was a fair degree of regular movement between Scotland and other places; neither "emigrant" nor "sojourner," which has recently been introduced into the literature on Scottish overseas connections, fully captures the fluidity of those movements. Certainly, some Scots who ventured abroad were unlikely ever to return, including a high proportion of mercenaries and some of the peddlers and tradesmen who spent their lives in Denmark or Poland. Other groups, such as the large Scots contingent in Rotterdam, remained more distinct, forming something closer to viable overseas communities. Northern Ireland housed some Scots who settled there for generations, along with others for whom movement back and forth to Scotland would be frequent. Scots who traveled to any of those places evidently maintained a rather complex sense of nationality, and Scotsmen were never simply those who lived in Scotland.[10]

Migrants included not only impoverished Scots but a surprising number of skilled, trained, and educated persons of middling status or above: merchants, soldiers, clerics, and medical men, among others. Scotland was a consistent net exporter of such persons. Scots had long maintained some regular places in continental universities, for example, as well as in prominent commercial centers such as Rotterdam or Veere.[11] The persistent identification of the Scottish elite with the European world of letters and the expansive pattern of Scottish higher education were in part underwritten by Scotland's ability to export its surplus of educated persons.

Migration at that level also served distinct functions in Scottish society. Within the world of trade, Scottish merchants aggressively carved out distinct niches for themselves, seeking out trade in markets whose merchants had little motivation to travel to Scotland; such contacts evidently mattered a good deal more to Scottish traders inhabiting the European periphery than to their more centrally located commercial partners. Well before their notorious involvement in such branches of the American commerce as the tobacco trade, Scots were known for trading widely through extended networks of their own countrymen.[12] In so doing, they were behaving in a manner similar to that of the inhabitants of other smaller and weaker commercial nations, whose principal strategy has often been to develop informal trading networks of their countrymen overseas, often on the peripheries, where competition was limited.

[10] Alan L. Karras, *Sojourners in the Sun: Scottish Migrants in Jamaica and the Chesapeake, 1740–1800* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1992); and see Riis, *Should Auld Acquaintance Be Forgot*, on Denmark, as well as the sources cited in note 9, above.

[11] John Durkan, "The French Connection in the Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries," in Smout, *Scotland and Europe*, 19–44; James K. Cameron, "Some Scottish Students and Teachers at the University of Leiden in the Late Sixteeenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries," in Simpson, *Scotland and the Low Countries*, 122–35; and J. Davidson and A. Gray, *The Scottish Staple at Veere* (1909).

[12] T. C. Smout, *Scottish Trade on the Eve of Union, 1660–1707* (Edinburgh, 1963), chap. 5; Smout, "Scottish-Dutch Contact, 1600–1800," in *Dutch Art and Scotland: A Reflection of Taste*, Julia Lloyd Williams, ed. (Edinburgh, 1992), 21–32.

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THE EXISTENCE OF THOSE EUROPEAN CONNECTIONS probably slowed Scottish involvement with the Americas. Between 1629 and 1632, perhaps a few hundred Scots went to the New Scotland settlements. About the same time, what must have been tens of thousands of Scots traveled to Ireland, to Scandinavia, and to Poland. Between 1680 and 1690, a thousand or more Scots ventured to East Jersey and Carolina. But when a massive famine struck parts of Scotland in the following decade, only a trickle of settlers went to the New World, while Ireland attracted tens of thousands.

Even the union did little to increase Scottish emigration to the Americas in the short term. That was partly because the famine of the 1690s had reduced population dramatically through both starvation and migration. Conversely, the north of Ireland, which had attracted many of those emigrants, provided a disproportionate quantity of British emigration to America over the ensuing half-century.[13]

The groups that did expand their involvement with America considerably were emigrant Scots among the skilled and educated portions of the population. The movements of those men were less affected by demographic imperatives than were those of their less affluent countrymen and more by changing patterns in politics, diplomacy, and trade. Much of the prominence of Scottish influences in early America can be attributed to the very substantial representation of men of status and education among the migrants, from a time well before their countrymen had begun to emigrate in substantial numbers.

For those prominent groups, the turning point was less the Union of 1707 than the Restoration, especially the 1680s, when the Scottish elite embarked on an aggressive effort to expand their economy and narrow the distance between themselves and their southern neighbors, in an attempt to remedy their subordinate position to England under the Union of Crowns. Much of that effort was channeled toward the Americas, which most often meant the English colonial world. During that decade, about a hundred Scots of predominantly Quaker and Episcopalian backgrounds invested in a half-share in the East Jersey colony, to which they sent about seven hundred settlers. A Presbyterian group established a rival colony at Stuart's Town in Carolina. During those same years, the Scottish Episcopal clergyman James Blair settled in Virginia and began to establish a prominent Scottish presence within the Virginia church, at just about the same time that Scottish merchants began to push their way into the Chesapeake tobacco trade. The greatest undertaking of all came in the following decade, as a group of Scottish investors worked with English counterparts to establish the Company of Scotland, which raised an unprecedented sum of capital in an attempt to break the stranglehold of England's chartered trading monopolies by sending an ambitious but ill-fated initial expedition to Darien.[14]

[13] Still standard as a reference work on Ulster emigration is R. J. Dickson, *Ulster Emigration to Colonial America, 1718–1775* (London, 1966); but see also Bernard Bailyn, *Voyagers to the West: A Passage in the Peopling of America on the Eve of the Revolution* (New York, 1986), chap. 1; and Marianne S. Wokeck, "German and Irish Immigration to Colonial Philadelphia," *Symposium on the Demographic History of the Philadelphia Region, 1600–1860*, Susan E. Klepp, ed., *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 133 (June 1989): 128–43.

[14] Landsman, *Scotland and Its First American Colony*; Insh, *Scottish Colonial Schemes*; Parke Rouse, Jr., *James Blair of Virginia* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1971). On Darien, see George Pratt Insh, *The Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies* (London, 1932); David Armitage, "The Scottish Vision of Empire: Intellectual Origins of the Darien Venture," in Robertson, *Union for Empire*, 97–118; and

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Over the next three-quarters of a century, while overall emigration from Scotland to America remained modest, the involvement of Scottish merchants, clergy, physicians, and officials would grow rapidly, against the background of a British union that legitimized Scottish participation within the overseas empire and secured an extensive range of opportunities for ambitious Scots. As a group, those men were tied to no one settlement or region in the manner of many earlier American settlers but ranged widely across the British colonial world, becoming an important part of an increasingly interconnected British imperial elite. They contributed to the emergence within that elite of an identity that was neither wholly metropolitan nor purely local but imperial and provincial, one that cut across regional and provincial boundaries. That group would emphasize the benefits of empire and of a stronger political authority over the provinces at the same time that it asserted the claims of provincial communities to the full rights and privileges of Britons.[15] Theirs was a Britishness defined less by Anglicization than by the unifying but centrifugal forces of religion, population, and trade that were propelling a growing confidence among provincial citizens in Scotland and in America.

Scottish merchants were a prominent example. Historians have described how in the Chesapeake, and elsewhere in British America, traders from the west of Scotland developed commercial networks beyond the established mercantile sphere, often trading through networks of their countrymen, in an attempt to capture a share of a developing commerce for themselves. Scots were especially prominent on the peripheries, and everywhere they worked to expand the boundaries of trade—into the Virginia Piedmont, where they created an extensive network of Scottish factors or agents and storekeepers, throughout the backcountry, the lower South, and into sectors of the Caribbean, Quebec, and eventually the western Canadian territories.[16]

Bridget McPhail, "Through a Glass, Darkly: Scots and Indians Converge at Darien," *Eighteenth-Century Life* 18 (May 1994): 129–47.

On the efforts of the 1680s generally, see Gordon Marshall, *Presbyteries and Profits: Calvinism and the Development of Capitalism in Scotland, 1560–1707* (Oxford, 1980), as well as the sources cited in note 5, above. Roger Emerson has pointed out that during the same decade the Scots literati began to develop a keen interest in America; see Emerson, "The Scottish *Literati* and America 1680–1800," in *Nation and Province in the First British Empire: Scotland and the Americas 1600–1800*, Ned C. Landsman, ed. (East Linton, forthcoming).

[15] On Scots' use of the union to extend their places within the empire, see Colley, *Britons*, 127–32; Richards, "Scotland and the Uses of the Atlantic Empire"; Armitage, "Making the Empire British," and the discussion in the *Forum* below. On Scots within the imperial elite, see Ned C. Landsman, *From Colonials to Provincials: American Thought and Culture, 1680–1760* (New York, 1997), chap. 1.

[16] Jacob Price, "The Rise of Glasgow in the Chesapeake Tobacco Trade," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., 11 (April 1954): 179–99; Thomas M. Devine, *The Tobacco Lords: A Study of the Tobacco Merchants of Glasgow and Their Trading Activities, c. 1740–90* (Edinburgh, 1975); Richard B. Sheridan, "The Role of Scots in the Economy and Society of the West Indies," *Comparative Perspectives on Slavery in New World Plantation Societies*, V. Rubin and A. Tuden, eds. (New York, 1977), 95–106; and Karras, *Sojourners in the Sun*. On Canada, there are many works by David S. Macmillan; see especially "The 'New Men' in Action: Scottish Mercantile and Shipping Operations in the North American Colonies, 1760–1825," *Canadian Business History: Selected Studies, 1497–1971* (Toronto, 1972), 44–103; and "Scottish Enterprises and Influences in Canada, 1620–1900," in Cage, *Scots Abroad*, 46–79; and, of many works by J. M. Bumsted, *The People's Clearance: Highland Emigration to British North America, 1770–1815* (Edinburgh, 1982); and "The Scot and Canada," in Landsman, *Nation and Province in the First British Empire*; and on Scottish ventures into the periphery generally, Bailyn, *Voyagers to the West*, pt. 4. For the role of Scottish merchants in the creation of a global British trade

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Scottish doctors, a group who often sought employment within the Scottish regiments, also began to look for places in America. Their numbers were substantial, certainly approaching two hundred in the mainland colonies alone during the eighteenth century, with perhaps a majority of the physicians in the British Caribbean, including many of the most prominent medical men everywhere they went. The proliferation of Scottish physicians in America has often been attributed to the rise of the University of Edinburgh within the field of medical education, but some of the most prominent, such as Cadwallader Colden and William Douglass, had arrived in America before its rise. They were from a generation of physicians trained principally at London and especially Leiden, then the most renowned center of medical education in Europe. The prominence of that group in America illustrates the continuing importance of continental educations for the Scottish elite; the subsequent rise of Scottish medical training to world renown depended in part on the ability of the doctors it educated to find places abroad.[17]

The perspective of those men was broad. As men of letters, they attended to a variety of subjects, including medicine, politics, natural history, and natural philosophy. Many were active members of a transatlantic circle of natural history enthusiasts that corresponded regularly across the Atlantic and across provincial bounds. A few wrote important works of colonial history, the focus of which was not restricted to any single colony but ranged extensively throughout the provincial world.[18]

Another important group was the Scots clergy, both Presbyterian and Episcopalian. Scotland regularly produced a surplus of clergymen, who sought posts in Ireland, within established Scottish congregations such as the one at Rotterdam, and, increasingly, the American colonies. James McLachlan has counted more than a hundred Scottish Episcopal ministers in the eighteenth-century Chesapeake, who helped convey the principles of the Scottish Episcopal Enlightenment to that region.[19]

The influx of Presbyterian clergy was even more important to the emergence of distinct provincial identities, owing to the security granted that church in Scotland

network, see David Hancock, *Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735–1785* (New York, 1995).

[17] Roger Emerson, "Scots Gentlemen of Some Credit: Medical Emigres to America, 1685–1800," (unpublished paper presented at the Wellcome Unit Conference on Scottish Medicine, Glasgow, October 7, 1995), has estimated that Scotland was able to retain no more than a third of the physicians it trained during the eighteenth century. See also C. Helen Brock, "Scotland and American Medicine," in William R. Brock, *Scotus Americanus: A Survey of the Sources for Links between Scotland and America in the Eighteenth Century* (Edinburgh, 1982), 114–26, Appendix B; Richard B. Sheridan, *Doctors and Slaves* (Cambridge, 1985); Karras, *Sojourners in the Sun*, 55–60.

[18] William Douglass, *Summary, Historical and Political, of the British Settlements in North-America*, 2 vols. (Boston, 1747–52); Cadwallader Colden, *The History of the Five Indian Nations Depending on the Province of New-York in America* (New York, 1727–44); John Mitchell, *The Contest in America between Great Britain and France* (London, 1757). Mitchell may have been born in America, but he was Scottish educated and had close Scottish connections. The provincial natural history circle was first described by Brooke Hindle, *The Pursuit of Science in Revolutionary America* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1956), chaps. 2–3.

[19] James McLachlan, "The Scottish Intellectual Migration to British North America 1650–1770: New England and the Chesapeake," paper delivered at conference on Scotland and the Americas, John Carter Brown Library, Brown University, June 1994.

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under the Treaty of Union. As a result, after 1707, the Church of England could no longer claim to represent the ecclesiastical establishment of a British empire in the way that it had within the English dominions. This became evident almost immediately after the union, in the trial of the Ulster-born Presbyterian minister Francis Makemie, who was arrested early in 1707 within what was then still the English colony of New York, on the charge of preaching without a license from that colony's Anglican governor. After the union took effect on May 1 of that year, Makemie abruptly changed his defense, which had rested on the English Act of Toleration, which he now contended did not apply to New York, since no legal establishment existed there. On the contrary, Makemie maintained that Presbyterians now possessed, "since the Union, a National Establishment in Great Britain, as nighly related and annexed unto the Crown of England, as the Church of England themselves." Makemie was hailed by members of dissenting churches throughout the colonies for securing their liberties against a metropolitan establishment, which constituted but local law having "nothing to do with the Plantation," in the words of Cotton Mather.[20]

Presbyterianism grew especially rapidly during the ensuing half-century. That was partly because of the influx of Scottish and especially Scots-Irish settlers after 1717; it was also the result of the additional protections Presbyterian churches could claim under the law by affiliating with the Church of Scotland. Perhaps most important, Presbyterian clergymen, like their merchant counterparts, worked aggressively to extend their reach, building bridges across denominational boundaries and organizing both congregations and an unprecedented range of educational institutions on the colonial frontiers, far beyond where such institutions were otherwise found.[21]

Still another important group who came in substantial numbers was a large contingent of imperial officials, among whom Scots were noted for both their visibility and aggressiveness. Men such as James Abercromby, Henry McCulloh, James Glen, Alexander Spotswood, and Archibald Kennedy would become notorious in America for their often uncompromising insistence on the primacy of imperial authority. Yet what was imperial within the eighteenth-century empire was not necessarily metropolitan. Most of their specific policy recommendations, while subordinating local interests to larger imperial concerns, emphasized at the same time the right of provincials to be treated as equal subjects commensurate with their growing "strength and wealth," in Abercromby's words, drawing on the tenets of the new political economy then being popularized by Scots and other provincials. The basis for their position closely resembled that of Scottish Unionists in 1707: to

[20] Francis Makemie, *A Narrative of a New and Unusual American Imprisonment of Two Presbyterian Ministers, and Prosecution of Mr. Francis Makemie One of Them, for Preaching One Sermon at the City of New-York* (Boston, 1707), in *The Life and Writings of Francis Makemie*, Boyd S. Schlenther, ed. (Philadelphia, 1971), 193–244, 230; Mather is quoted on p. 25. A different view of the Makemie case more sympathetic to Lord Cornbury can be found in Patricia U. Bonomi, *The Lord Cornbury Scandal: The Politics of Reputation in British America* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1998), 71–72.

[21] For American links to the Church of Scotland, see "Case of the Presbyterian Congregation at New York, 1724," Church of Scotland Ms., Scottish Record Office, Edinburgh, 49: 43–58; for educational institutions, Douglas Sloan, *The Scottish Enlightenment and the American College Ideal* (New York, 1971); and Howard Miller, "Evangelical Religion and Colonial Princeton," in *Schooling and Society*, Lawrence Stone, ed. (Baltimore, Md., 1976), 115–45.

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promote the interests of empire, nation, and province over strictly local concerns within an expansive and secure political and commercial union. They were unusually active in promoting both colonial expansion and provincial unity, repeatedly pressing for political alliance across provincial and even racial boundaries on the colonial frontiers. Such measures did not always endear them to locally minded colonists, nor did they necessarily accord with policies emanating from the metropolis.[22]

Those officials brought other Scots with them, including doctors, military men, and other minor officials; the famous scientist-politician Cadwallader Colden, for instance, came to New York under the patronage of the soldier and literary man Robert Hunter, then governor of the colony, as did the prominent lawyer James Alexander and Hunter's successor, the equally literate William Burnet.[23] They also helped direct the emigration of common settlers, who often arrived as individuals or families attached to a trading firm, a clergyman, or a manor lord, especially when emigration accelerated after the end of the Seven Years' War.[24]

Collectively, those Scottish elites displayed something like what Bernard Aspinwall, describing nineteenth-century Scots and Scottish emigrants, referred to as a "portable" faith. That phrase certainly applied to the political economy employed by imperial officials and clergymen alike, which emphasized the ability of demographic and commercial forces to alter and even reverse the direction of established political authority, as represented by James Abercromby's insistence that imperial reform take into account the wealth and strength of the colonies. Adam Smith's well-known solution to the American crisis—extending parliamentary representation to the colonies on the assumption that one day even the imperial capital would move to America—constitutes only the most prominent articulation of a common prediction in eighteenth-century Scotland about the future flow of authority within the empire. A similar point could be made about an emerging moral sense philosophy that Scots preached in their ministries and taught in their colleges and

[22] On Scottish Unionists, see especially Robertson, "Elusive Sovereignty"; and see Ned C. Landsman, "The Legacy of the British Union for the North American Colonies: Provincial Elites and the Problem of Imperial Union," in *Union for Empire*, 297–317, for a discussion of that imperial elite. Abercromby's phrase is from "An Examination of the Acts of Parliament Relative to the Trade and the Government of Our American Colonies," in *Magna Charta for America*, Jack P. Greene, Charles F. Mullett, and Edward C. Papenfuse, Jr., eds. (Philadelphia, 1986), 76–77. A good example of the kind of measure Scots especially promoted was the Albany Plan of Union, for which Benjamin Franklin credited the active support of Archibald Kennedy and James Alexander and which coincided with Kennedy's repeated calls for alliance with the Six Nations. The plan was rejected by both locally minded colonial assemblies and imperial authorities. See Alison Gilbert Olson, "The British Government and the Colonial Union, 1754," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., 17 (January 1960): 22–34. Kennedy, Cadwallader Colden—author of the *History of the Five Nations*—Spotswood, Robert Livingston, and a host of others were famous for their efforts to promote Indian alliances. For Spotswood's role in promoting provincial union, see Bruce Lenman, "'Garrison Government'? Governor Alexander Spotswood and Empire," in Simpson, *Scottish Soldier Abroad*, 67–80. For the national significance of Scottish political economy, see especially Istvan Hont, "The 'Rich Country–Poor Country' Debate in Scottish Classical Political Economy," in *Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment*, Hont and Michael Ignatieff, eds. (New York, 1983), 271–316.

[23] On Hunter's circle, see especially Mary Lou Lustig, *Robert Hunter, 1666–1734: New York's Augustan Statesman* (Syracuse, N.Y., 1983).

[24] See Bailyn, *Voyagers to the West*, 392–97; and John Witherspoon, "Letter Sent to Scotland for the *Scots Magazine*," *The Works of the Reverend John Witherspoon*, 2d edn., 4 vols. (Philadelphia, 1802), 4: 281–89.

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academies, which gave primacy to the common judgments of an informed community of citizens rather than to long-established authorities.[25]

One of the most striking illustrations of the complexity of attitude toward nation and place can be found in the pronouncements of John Witherspoon, the Presbyterian pastor from Paisley who left Scotland in 1768 to become president of the College of New Jersey at Princeton and who took it upon himself to serve as spokesman for Scots and Presbyterians in the colonies. After his arrival in North America, Witherspoon began to work toward a reconsideration of nationality, basing his ideas on a political economy that emphasized people and community over boundaries and territory. Thus when critics at home attacked his sponsoring of continuing emigration from Scotland, Witherspoon responded with a vision of the Scottish nation far larger than the mere inhabitants of the homeland. What did it mean, he asked, for a man to be a friend to his country? Was it to promote the well-being of the land itself, or of the people, wherever they might happen to reside? Witherspoon would further develop his portable version of nationality during the revolutionary crisis, speaking to his fellow Scottish Americans in the guise of a Scottish patriot and "lover of his country" in order to justify American independence. Independence would benefit both them and their countrymen at home, who would be among the principal beneficiaries of an expanding American empire of liberty and trade.[26]

MUCH OF THE BEHAVIOR OF THOSE SCOTTISH AMERICANS is not easily encompassed by versions of ethnicity intended to assess the portions of Old World heritage that were ceded or retained. The best model for understanding Lowland Scottish Americans in the eighteenth century may not be Scottish communities at home but rather mobile Scots settlements abroad. The Scottish experience in British America was distinctive, at least before the upsurge in emigration of the 1760s, in the relative prominence of skilled and educated groups among the migrants for most of the colonial period, and by the fact that classical ethnic communities of Lowland Scots in America were rare before the eve of the American Revolution, compared to the experience of some other cultural groups, including Scottish Highlanders.

Most Lowlanders arrived in the American colonies as individuals or in small groups over diverse routes and only rarely in organized emigration parties before

[25] Bernard Aspinwall, *Portable Utopia: Glasgow and the United States, 1820–1920* (Aberdeen, 1984); Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner, eds., 2 vols. (Oxford, 1976), book 4, chap. 7. See also [William Thom], *The Present Conduct of the Chieftains and Proprietors of Lands in the Highlands of Scotland* (London, 1773), among many suggestions similar to Smith's. On moral philosophy, see T. D. Campbell, "Francis Hutcheson: 'Father' of the Scottish Enlightenment," in *Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment*, R. H. Campbell and Andrew S. Skinner, eds. (Edinburgh, 1982), 167–85.

[26] John Witherspoon, *An Address to the Natives of Scotland Residing in America*, in *Works*, 3: 47–60; and see "Letter Sent to Scotland for the *Scots Magazine*." By the end of the war, other Britons also would predict that American independence would lead to the expansion of Britain's informal empire, partly because a substantially provincial political economy emphasizing the determining power of population and commerce was prevailing in the metropolis as well. See Eliga H. Gould, "A Virtual Nation: Greater Britain and the Imperial Legacy of the American Revolution," below, 476–89; and see Ned C. Landsman, "Witherspoon and the Problem of Provincial Identity in Scottish Evangelical Culture," in Sher and Smitten, *Scotland and America in the Age of the Enlightenment*, 29–45.

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the 1760s. They attached themselves in small numbers to a variety of individuals and institutions: factors and storekeepers to the tobacco merchants in the Chesapeake, tradesmen and small traders to larger merchants in the mid-Atlantic cities and across the principal commercial routes, occasional parishioners with clergymen, small farmers beside the estates of wealthier landowners, with other farmers blending into common Presbyterian communities developing in the backcountry and frontiers. Where they did establish ethnic clusters, Scots moved freely among them. There was undoubtedly a considerable surplus of males among them, as there had been among the peddling and soldiering populations on the European continent; where Scottish families settled, there is some evidence that women also played important roles in linking geographically dispersed Presbyterian communities one to another. Everywhere, there was a sense of mobility and of internationalism: by the eve of the American Revolution, Scottish travelers in the colonies, for instance, often could not help but encounter a variety of other Scots, whether arriving, settled, or in the process of moving about—wherever in America they traveled.[27]

By the time Witherspoon and most of those travelers wrote, much of that pattern had begun to change. The upsurge in emigration during the 1760s and 1770s Bernard Bailyn describes led to a much greater influx of ordinary Scots and Scottish families, including farmers and artisans in well-organized land companies intending compact ethnic settlement, as Scottish Highlanders had also begun to attempt. After 1783, much of that settlement would shift northward, to the remaining provinces of British North America. The Canadian provinces would see a greater diversity in the forms of Scottish settlement. There, organized companies of Lowland farmers, artisans, and Highlanders would flourish in ethnic communities, like those of other national groups, alongside coteries of ambitious Scottish merchants, clergy, officials, and traders on the western frontiers, whose movements more closely resembled those of earlier generations of Scots migrants. The presence of those very different types of immigrant Scots would influence what would become Canadian culture in diverse and sometimes conflicting ways.[28]

[27] One of the rare Scottish Lowland communities was the outgrowth of the East Jersey colony. For ties to merchants and proprietors, see Landsman, *Scotland and Its First American Colony*, 211–22; for women in Presbyterian communities, 160–61, 249–50. For some interesting travel accounts, see "Correspondence of Hugh Simm," Princeton University Library, Princeton, N.J.; Journal of Robert Mercer, GD 1/787/37, Mercer of Pittendriech Mss., Scottish Record Office, Edinburgh.

[28] Bailyn, *Voyagers to the West*, pt. 5, esp. 604–37. Some contrasting legacies of Scottish culture in Canada are described in Bumsted, "Scot and Canada"; and Michael Vance, "Advancement, Moral Worth, and Freedom: Some Possible Meanings of Independence among Early Nineteenth-Century Glasgow Emigrants to Upper Canada," in Landsman, *Nation and Province in the First British Empire*.

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AHR Forum

A Virtual Nation: Greater Britain and the Imperial Legacy of the American Revolution

ELIGA H. GOULD

ANYONE SEEKING TO WRITE BRITISH HISTORY as something more than the combined histories of England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales must begin by accepting a paradox. It is certainly possible to speak of a collective "British" experience, one that at various points over the last three hundred years has encompassed all of the British Isles, together with large stretches of Africa, Asia, Australia, New Zealand, and the Americas. But to paraphrase the Scottish nationalist Tom Nairn, Britain's modern history has been a history of fragmentation.[1] Not only has the empire on which the sun never set largely vanished, but, for the better part of the last century, the United Kingdom itself has been beset by the centrifugal impulses of Celtic separatism. While none of this has prevented the "new British history" from attracting growing numbers of practitioners, Britain's "limits and divisions" remain no less conspicuous today than they were a quarter-century ago, when J. G. A. Pocock first noted their extraordinary persistence in his influential series of articles.[2]

For an essay on Britain and the American Revolution, this might sound like a rather self-evident point with which to begin. Despite the loss of the thirteen colonies, however, British historians have generally chosen to depict the eighteenth

Earlier versions of this essay were presented at meetings of the Northeast Conference on British Studies, the New England American Studies Association, and the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture. I wish to thank the participants for their helpful suggestions and comments, as well as to acknowledge the generous assistance of David Armitage, Trevor Burnard, J. H. Burns, Edward Countryman, Thomas Cogswell, John R. Gillis, Jack P. Greene, Nicoletta F. Gullace, Frank D. McCann, Elizabeth Mancke, P. J. Marshall, Peter Onuf, J. G. A. Pocock, John Sainsbury, Alan Tully, and the anonymous reviewers for the *AHR*.

[1] Tom Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism* (London, 1977). Nairn's conclusions about the weakness of a common British national consciousness find strong support in Benedict Anderson's now classic formulation, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. edn. (New York, 1991), esp. 2.

[2] J. G. A. Pocock, "British History: A Plea for a New Subject," *Journal of Modern History* 47 (1975): 601–28; Pocock, "The Limits and Divisions of British History: In Search of the Unknown Subject," *AHR* 87 (April 1982): 311–36. See also David Cannadine, "British History: Past, Present—and Future?" *Past and Present* 141 (1987). For an indication of how the interest in British history has continued to grow, see Margot Finn, "Editor's Introduction," *Journal of British Studies* 36 (1997): 1–3. No doubt one reason for this interest is the more general interest in transnational history: see John R. Gillis, "The Future of European History," *Perspectives* 34 (April 1996), as well as J. C. D. Clark's suggestive essay, "The Strange Death of British History? Reflections on Anglo-American Scholarship," *Historical Journal* 40 (1997): 787–809.

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century as a time of growing unity. Whether we take as our benchmark Linda Colley's magisterial study of the rising sense of British nationhood in England, Scotland, and Wales,[3] or the growing interest stimulated by Leigh Schmidt, Michael Crawford, and others in the varieties of British religious experience,[4] or the work of Bernard Bailyn, Ian Steele, and David Hancock on the commercial integration of the British Atlantic "community,"[5] the ties that bound men and women across vast distances currently loom far larger in the scholarly literature than the sorts of schismatic tendencies that resulted in the Declaration of Independence. This even holds for much of the research dealing with Britain's response to the American Revolution. Although generations of British and Irish radicals drew inspiration from its democratic example, scholars as apparently different as Pocock, Ian Christie, and Stephen Conway have tended to present the revolution as a rather exceptional event with limited relevance for British history, whose most lasting consequence was to rid the empire of the one group who could not be assimilated by the otherwise irresistible forces of Anglicization and imperial rule.[6]

As far as England, Scotland, and Wales are concerned, there are some persuasive reasons to treat the revolution as a momentary setback from which the British soon recovered. Despite a brief period of soul-searching and malaise, the defeat did practically nothing to alter Britain's standing as Europe's preeminent maritime power, nor did it thwart the subsequent development of a new British hegemony based on the world's most advanced industrial economy.[7] If we direct our attention to the empire that lay "beyond the sea," however, a significantly different picture emerges. Although the British themselves remained committed imperialists, the American Revolution ultimately served as a forceful reminder of the vast distances that separated those men and women who lived within the United Kingdom from

[3] Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837* (New Haven, Conn., 1992).

[4] Leigh Eric Schmidt, *Holy Fairs: Scottish Communions and American Revivals in the Early Modern Period* (Princeton, N.J., 1989); Michael J. Crawford, *Seasons of Grace: Colonial New England's Revival Tradition in its British Context* (Oxford, 1991). See also W. R. Ward, *The Protestant Evangelical Revival* (Cambridge, 1992); Mark A. Noll, *et al.*, eds., *Evangelicalism: Comparative Studies in Popular Protestantism in North America, the British Isles, and Beyond, 1700–1900* (Oxford, 1994), especially the essays by Susan O'Brien, "Eighteenth-Century Publishing Networks in the First Years of Transatlantic Evangelicalism," Harry S. Stout, "George Whitefield in Three Countries," and Leigh E. Schmidt, "Time, Celebration, and the Christian Year in Eighteenth-Century Evangelicalism."

[5] Bernard Bailyn, *Voyagers to the West: A Passage in the Peopling of America on the Eve of the Revolution* (New York, 1986); Ian K. Steele, *The English Atlantic, 1675–1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community* (New York, 1986); David Hancock, *Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735–1785* (Cambridge, 1995). For a perceptive account of how this commercial integration affected the movement of information, see also Charles E. Clark, *The Public Prints: The Newspaper in Anglo-American Culture, 1665–1740* (Oxford, 1994).

[6] J. G. A. Pocock, "1776: The Revolution against Parliament," in Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1985), 74–75, 85–88; Ian R. Christie, *Stress and Stability in Late Eighteenth-Century Britain: Reflections on the British Avoidance of Revolution* (Oxford, 1984); Stephen Conway, *The War of American Independence, 1775–1783* (London, 1995), esp. 235–38. The revolution performs a similar service for Colley in *Britons* (see esp. 144–45); see also T. H. Breen's suggestive essay, "Ideology and Nationalism on the Eve of the American Revolution: Revisions *Once More* in Need of Revising," *Journal of American History* 84 (1997): 13–39, in which he reverses this relationship by tying the revolution's origins to the colonists' own disillusionment over being excluded from Britain's increasingly unified sense of nationhood.

[7] See esp. Linda Colley, "The Politics of Eighteenth-Century British History," *Journal of British Studies* 25 (1986): 359.

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those who did not. Furthermore, even as the conflict left some people convinced of the need for a firmer hand in matters of imperial administration, it simultaneously demonstrated the high cost of using force to bind any of Britain's outlying provinces into a closer national union. Indeed, far from being an exceptional event with causes unique to North America, the disintegration of the "First British Empire" highlighted the limits of metropolitan authority in provinces as scattered as Nova Scotia, Jamaica, Bengal, and Ireland.[8] For these reasons, we might well say that the longest colonial war in modern British history holds one key to understanding why Britain's internal boundaries have proved so resilient and why the nation superimposed over those divisions remains, in some ways, more virtual than real.

IN RECENT YEARS, the formation of a British national identity has proved to be an especially fruitful area for research. Thanks in large measure to the pioneering work of Linda Colley, we have a much clearer sense of the extent to which eighteenth-century Britons of "all classes" and "both sexes" came to think of themselves as belonging to a single nation.[9] Driven by the escalating cycle of war with France, this "revolution in sensibility" manifested itself in a variety of social and political activities, including military service, royal and aristocratic patronage of the arts and sciences, and middle-class voluntarism. Perhaps the most striking aspect of Britain's self-invention, though, was the way it dovetailed with an apparently insatiable market for patriotic paraphernalia of every shape and size. As an indication of the extent of this demand, Colley's own work abounds with an impressive array of patriotic images and ideographic material, including the lavish portraits and historic tableaux of masters like Benjamin West and David Wilkie, as well as scores of prints and cartoons by lesser known and anonymous figures. Elsewhere, studies of Georgian political culture have documented Britain's growing national unity through sources ranging from George Frederick Handel's oratorios and the novels of Sir Walter Scott to mass-produced commodities like canes

[8] See Eliga H. Gould, "American Independence and Britain's Counter-Revolution," *Past and Present* 154 (February 1997): 107–41; Gould, *The Persistence of Empire: British Political Culture in the Age of the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, N.C., forthcoming). For general work on the British Empire before, during, and after the revolution, see also Jack P. Greene, *Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of the British Empire and the United States, 1607–1788* (Athens, Ga., 1986), esp. chaps. 1–4 and 9; Greene, "Negotiated Authorities: The Problem of Governance in the Extended Polities of the Early Modern Atlantic World," in Greene, *Negotiated Authorities: Essays in Colonial Political and Constitutional History* (Charlottesville, Va., 1994), 12–17; C. A. Bayly, *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780–1830* (London, 1989); P. J. Marshall, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, Vol. 2: *The Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 1998); Neil Longley York, *Neither Kingdom nor Nation: The Irish Quest for Constitutional Rights, 1698–1800* (Washington, D.C., 1994), esp. chap. 3; Andrew J. O'Shaughnessy, "The Stamp Act Crisis in the British Caribbean," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., 51 (1994): 203–26; Elizabeth Mancke, "Another British America: A Canadian Model for the Early Modern British Empire," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 25 (1997): 1–36.

[9] Colley, *Britons*, 5. Though Colley's formulation is by far the best known, it is certainly not the only one, nor was it the first. See also Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966* (Berkeley, Calif., 1975); Angus Calder, *Revolutionary Empire: The Rise of the English-Speaking Empires from the Fifteenth Century to the 1780s* (London, 1981); Richard S. Tompson, *The Atlantic Archipelago: A Political History of the British Isles* (Lewiston, N.Y., 1986). Despite the English focus of its title, John Brewer's *Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1689–1783* (New York, 1989) also has a good deal to say about the growth of Britain.

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embossed with the image of William Pitt, snuff boxes celebrating the naval victories of Edward Vernon ("Old Grog"), Edward Hawke, and Horatio Nelson, tokens and medallions, bunting and ribbons of every sort, plates, teacups, songbooks, poetry, almanacs—the list goes on and on.[10] Indeed, the casual observer might be forgiven for wondering whether ordinary men and women cared about anything else. Britain may have been something more than the nation of shopkeepers parodied by Samuel Adams and Napoleon Bonaparte. But it certainly was a nation in which the purveyors of patriotism had ample opportunities to peddle their wares.

While much of the work on popular patriotism has focused on England, there is no question that this "empire of goods"—to borrow T. H. Breen's apt phrase—proved equally alluring elsewhere in the British world.[11] Charting a course first mapped out by Bernard Bailyn and John Clive, students of eighteenth-century Scotland have long recognized the desire to imitate things English as a central force both in making Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Aberdeen leading centers of the Enlightenment and, indirectly, in transforming North Britain into a commercial and industrial dynamo capable of dominating key sectors of the Atlantic economy.[12] Based on Scotland's unusually high rates of overseas migration, Ned C. Landsman and David Armitage have even argued that these integrative pressures effectively transformed the empire from an "English" into a "British" polity during the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[13] To judge from the work of Philip Jenkins and S. J. Connolly, England's cultural and commercial exports held a similar appeal for local elites in Wales and on the far shores of St. George's Channel. Although Ireland's Protestant Ascendancy refused to concede quite as much to the forces of Anglicization as their counterparts on the British mainland, the dynamics of cultural replication were sufficiently powerful to make both "Irishness" and "Welshness" look like so many varieties of "Britishness," while the interest in metropolitan institutions and practices was no less conspicuous in Dublin or Cardiff

[10] See, for example, John Brewer, "Commercialization and Politics," in Neil McKendrick, John Brewer, and J. H. Plumb, *The Birth of a Consumer Society: The Commercialization of Eighteenth-Century England* (Indianapolis, 1982), 231–62; John Brewer and Roy Porter, eds., *Consumption and the World of Goods* (London, 1993); Christine Gerrard, *The Patriot Opposition to Walpole: Politics, Poetry, and National Myth, 1725–1742* (Oxford, 1994); Kathleen Wilson, *The Sense of the People: Politics, Culture and Imperialism in England, 1715–1785* (Cambridge, 1995); Ruth Smith, *Handel's Oratorios and Eighteenth-Century Thought* (Cambridge, 1995); J. R. Oldfield, *Popular Politics and British Anti-Slavery: The Mobilisation of Public Opinion against the Slave Trade, 1787–1807* (Manchester, 1995).

[11] T. H. Breen, "An Empire of Goods: The Anglicization of Colonial America, 1690–1776," *Journal of British Studies* 25 (1986): 467–499. See also T. H. Breen, "'Baubles of Britain': The American and Consumer Revolutions of the Eighteenth Century," *Past and Present* 119 (1988): 73–104.

[12] John Clive and Bernard Bailyn, "England's Cultural Provinces: Scotland and America," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., 11 (1954): 200–15. See also T. C. Smout, *A History of the Scottish People, 1560–1830* (London, 1969), chaps. 10, 12, 15, 19; and Smout, "Where Had the Scottish Economy Got to by the Third Quarter of the Eighteenth Century?" in Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff, eds., *Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment* (Cambridge, 1983), 45–72; Nicholas T. Phillipson, "Culture and Society in the Eighteenth-Century Province: The Case of Edinburgh and the Scottish Enlightenment," in Lawrence Stone, ed., *The University in Society*, 2 vols. (Princeton, N.J., 1974), 2: 407–48.

[13] Ned C. Landsman, *Scotland and Its First American Colony, 1683–1765* (Princeton, N.J., 1985); David Armitage, "Making the Empire British: Scotland in the Atlantic World, 1542–1707," *Past and Present* 155 (May 1997): 34–63. For the continuation of this pattern into the eighteenth century, see Bailyn, *Voyagers to the West*, as well as Ned Landsmen's contribution to this *Forum*, "Nation, Migration, and the Province in the First British Empire: Scotland and the Americas, 1600–1800," 463–75.

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than it was to the north and east.[14] In short, this largely voluntary process of assimilation helps explain why Britain's eighteenth-century rulers, despite their apparent deficiency in formal coercive powers, were able to extend their authority so effectively over what had historically been a rebellious and unruly hinterland.

Of the Whig regime's various outlying provinces, though, none appear to have been more susceptible to these metrocentric tendencies than the English-speaking colonies on the North American seaboard. For anyone familiar with actual conditions in the colonies, of course, the sheer diversity of the population—including Native Americans, Protestant immigrants from across northern and western Europe, and large numbers of Africans, free as well as slave—clearly distinguished British North America from either England or its Celtic periphery.[15] At the same time, though, early Americanists generally concede that on the revolution's eve Anglomania was a far more conspicuous feature of colonial society than the separatist sentiments that appeared so suddenly during the controversy over parliamentary taxation.[16] In matters of religion, commerce, education, law, and politics, the models that carried the greatest weight were those of the metropolis, and contemporaries often noted—and historians such as Jack P. Greene have subsequently confirmed—that until the third quarter of the eighteenth century, this mimetic patriotism helped British authorities gain a far broader voluntary obedience than they possibly could have hoped to secure through more authoritarian forms of government.[17] Even after the political relationship had been dissolved, Americans remained eager consumers of British goods of all sorts.[18] Indeed, there were more than a few observers on both sides of the Atlantic who expected that this cultural and economic hegemony would enable Britain to continue to maintain some sort of informal empire over its erstwhile provinces. As

[14] Philip Jenkins, *The Making of a Ruling Class: The Glamorgan Gentry, 1640–1790* (Cambridge, 1983); S. J. Connolly, *Religion, Law and Power: The Making of Protestant Ireland, 1660–1760* (Oxford, 1992); Connolly, "Varieties of Britishness: Ireland, Scotland and Wales in the Hanoverian State," in Alexander Grant and Keith J. Stringer, eds., *Uniting the Kingdom? The Making of British History* (London, 1995), 193–208. For the relationship between Anglicization and elite formation, see also David Cannadine, "The Making of the British Upper Classes," in Cannadine, *Aspects of Aristocracy: Grandeur and Decline in Modern Britain* (New Haven, Conn., 1994).

[15] The literature dealing with the colonies' multi-cultural character is discussed in greater detail below.

[16] For the Anglicization of colonial America generally, see Breen, "Empire of Goods," 467–99; and "'Baubles of Britain,'" 73–104; John M. Murrin, "The Legal Transformation: The Bench and Bar of Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts," in Stanley N. Katz, ed., *Colonial America: Essays in Politics and Social Development* (Boston, 1971), 415–49; Richard L. Bushman, "American High Style and Vernacular Cultures," in Jack P. Greene and J. R. Pole, eds., *Colonial British America: Essays in the New History of the Early Modern Era* (Baltimore, Md., 1984), 345–83; Greene, *Pursuits of Happiness: The Social Development of Early Modern British Colonies and the Formation of American Culture* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1988), esp. chap. 8.

[17] See esp. Jack P. Greene, "An Uneasy Connection: An Analysis of the Preconditions of the American Revolution," in Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson, eds., *Essays on the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1973); Greene, "The Seven Years' War and the American Revolution: The Causal Relationship Reconsidered," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 8 (1980): 85–105. For an indication of the extent of this loyalty, note the high rates of colonial participation in Britain's wars with France in Fred Anderson, *A People's Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years' War* (Chapel Hill, 1984).

[18] This is one implication of Richard L. Bushman's *Refinement of America: Persons, Houses, Cities* (New York, 1992), esp. pt. 2. See also Hancock, *Citizens of the World*, 386–88; Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, "Wheels, Looms, and the Gender Division of Labor in Eighteenth-Century New England," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., 55 (1998): 3–38.

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the Scottish diplomat Caleb Whitefoord is alleged to have remarked to his French counterpart at the Paris peace conference in 1783, it was possible that someday "the thirteen United States wou'd form the greatest Empire in the World." But Whitefoord was confident that, "from a similarity of Language, Manners and Religion, that Great Empire wou'd be *English*."[19]

By the time Whitefoord uttered these words, the English-speaking Atlantic had undergone an extraordinary transformation. Nonetheless, the literature on the coming of the American Revolution has largely confirmed the Anglicization thesis. For metropolitan politicians who supported George Grenville's ill-fated Stamp Act (1765), the proposition that Britain and America together comprised "one nation"—a nation whose members were "virtually represented" by the House of Commons—played an important role in perpetuating the mistaken theory that Parliament might tax the colonists in the same manner as it did the inhabitants of England, Scotland, and Wales.[20] While not all Britons accepted this logic, even so-called "friends of America" such as the English radical John Wilkes based much of their opposition to the government's actions on the premise that there should be "no difference between an inhabitant of Boston in Lincolnshire, and of Boston in New England."[21] But, most important of all, the colonists themselves justified their resistance in terms that were predominantly English, and as late as the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Americans were still working within the paradigms of Whig political theory.[22] In a sense, George III lost the greater part of his North American empire not because his colonial subjects rejected metropolitan norms and practices but because they had become so thoroughly "British" that they refused to sacrifice any of the rights of self-government enjoyed by their cousins on the European side of the Atlantic.

WHILE ALL THIS CONFIRMS THE BENEFITS of emphasizing the trend toward integration, however, there are sound reasons to question how much these tendencies did to alter Britain's underlying character as a composite, multi-polar polity.[23] Although English theorists generally assumed that Parliament's legal authority over the

[19] "Anecdotes of the Negotiations," in *The Whitefoord Papers: Being the Correspondence and Other Manuscripts of Colonel Charles Whitefoord and Caleb Whitefoord from 1739 to 1810*, W. A. S. Hewins, ed. (Oxford, 1898), 187.

[20] [Thomas Whately], *The Regulations Lately Made concerning the Colonies, and the Taxes Imposed upon Them, considered* (London, 1765), 109. See also Gould, *Persistence of Empire*, esp. chap. 4.

[21] John Wilkes to Junius, November 6, 1771, British Library, Add. MSS. 30,881, 27. The literature on the British "friends of America" is too voluminous to mention in full here, but see esp. Wilson, *Sense of the People*, 237–83; Colin Bonwick, *English Radicals and the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1977); John Sainsbury, *Disaffected Patriots: London Supporters of Revolutionary America, 1769–1782* (Kingston, Ontario, 1987); Peter N. Miller, *Defining the Common Good: Empire, Religion and Philosophy in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Cambridge, 1994), chap. 4.

[22] See J. R. Pole, *Political Representation in England and the Origins of the American Republic* (New York, 1966); Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967); Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1969); Pauline Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765–1776* (New York, 1972); J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton, N.J., 1975); Forrest McDonald, *Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution* (Lawrence, Kan., 1985).

[23] See esp. Gould, "American Independence and Britain's Counter-Revolution," 107–41; P. J.

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empire was uniformly absolute, the British state actually consisted of a consortium of realms and provinces, many of which maintained a substantial measure of local autonomy. To take the case of Scotland, the Treaty of Union (1707) that created a unitary British legislature at Westminster also guaranteed the independence of the established Presbyterian Church and the Scottish courts of law. As a result, Parliament's sovereignty north of the River Tweed remained somewhat less absolute than it was in England.[24] Elsewhere, Westminster did not have to contend with formal limitations of the sort that the Edinburgh parliament had managed to exact, yet this autonomy was hardly unique. Even within the subordinate polities of Ireland and the British colonies in North America and the Caribbean, Parliament's theoretical supremacy remained hedged about by the competing claims of provincial assemblies and a variety of customary local rights and privileges.[25] And this is to say nothing of the complications arising from the East India Company's momentous decision in 1765 to assume administrative responsibility for the Mughal emperor's northeastern provinces of Orissa, Bihar, and Bengal.[26]

Not surprisingly, some of the most innovative work on Britain's composite character has focused on the extraordinary racial and ethnic diversity that these legal arrangements fostered.[27] To take the much-studied example of Olaudah Equiano, the West African native and former slave whose autobiography became an international best-seller following its publication in 1789, neither "Briton" nor "African" does justice to the complex identity that emerges from the pages of his *Interesting Narrative*. In a sense, Equiano was both British and African.[28] Likewise, North America's "middle ground"—Richard White's suggestive term for the space

Marshall, "A Nation Defined by Empire, 1755–1776," in Grant and Stringer, *Uniting the Kingdom*, 208–22.

[24] Sir William Blackstone accorded the Treaty of Union the status of fundamental law, observing that any violation of the articles pertaining to the Scottish Church would "greatly endanger" its duration: Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England* (1765–1769), Stanley Katz, *et al.*, eds., 4 vols. (Chicago, 1979), 1: 97–98. See also Brian P. Levack, *The Formation of the British State: England, Scotland and the Union, 1603–1707* (Oxford, 1987); John Robertson, "Union, State and Empire: The European Context of British Union in 1707," in Lawrence Stone, ed., *An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689 to 1815* (London, 1994).

[25] See Greene, *Peripheries and Center*, esp. chaps. 2–7; H. G. Koenigsberger, "Composite States, Representative Institutions and the American Revolution," *Historical Research* 62 (1989).

[26] For the relationship between the administration of Bengal and British politics, see esp. H. V. Bowen, *Revenue and Reform: The Indian Problem in British Politics, 1757–1773* (Cambridge, 1991). See also Lucy S. Sutherland, *The East India Company in Eighteenth-Century Politics* (Oxford, 1952); P. J. Marshall, *Bengal—The British Bridgehead: Eastern India, 1740–1828* (Cambridge, 1987); Philip Lawson, *The East India Company: A History* (London, 1993), esp. chap. 6; Nancy F. Koehn, *The Power of Commerce: Economy and Governance in the First British Empire* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1994), esp. 132–38, 200–17.

[27] For the relationship between Britain's structure as a composite monarchy and the empire's multi-ethnic character, see the editors' introduction in Bernard Bailyn and Philip D. Morgan, eds., *Strangers within the Realm: Cultural Margins of the First British Empire* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1991), 1–31; Edward Countryman, "Indians, the Colonial Order, and the Social Significance of the American Revolution," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., 53 (1996): 342–62.

[28] Robert J. Allison, ed., *The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, Written by Himself* (1789; Boston, 1995). For the typicality of Equiano's experience, see Philip D. Morgan, "British Encounters with Africans and African-Americans," in Bailyn and Morgan, *Strangers within the Realm*, 157–219. For Africans and African-Americans in the English-speaking Atlantic generally, see Mechal Sobel, *The World They Made Together: Black and White Values in Eighteenth-Century Virginia* (Princeton, N.J., 1987); Sylvia R. Frey, *Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age* (Princeton, 1991); Ira Berlin, "From Creole to African: Atlantic Creoles and the Origins of African-American

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that Indians and Europeans jointly occupied in the vicinity of the Great Lakes—produced all sorts of opportunities for syncretism, ranging from the four Iroquois "kings" who mesmerized London with their carefully staged visit in 1710 to the more authentic patriotism of indigenous leaders Mary Brant and her brother Joseph, who served the crown with distinction during the Revolutionary War.[29] For such individuals, participating in the rites of British patriotism may have been a transformative experience, but it clearly did not mean abandoning alternative, even apparently opposed, identities. Significantly, in George Romney's famous portrait of 1776, Joseph Brant posed as both English gentleman and Mohawk sachem (see cover illustration).

When it came to individuals from Africa's Gold Coast or the trans-Appalachian West, eighteenth-century Britons were often prepared to accommodate a level of diverse cultural practices far beyond what was acceptable among people of European descent.[30] Nonetheless, the autonomy fashioned by Equiano and Brant was emblematic of a more general pattern that held for Britain's white inhabitants as well. The most significant manifestation of this diversity involved matters of religion. Although the great transatlantic awakenings of the mid-eighteenth century were beginning to erode Britain's confessional differences, the British still inhabited a religiously contested polity in which members of the dominant Church of England had to contend with a Presbyterian establishment in Scotland, dissenting majorities in most of British North America, and large and potentially restive Catholic populations in Ireland and Quebec.[31] Similarly, the same provincial manners that Anglicizing elites in Edinburgh, Dublin, and Philadelphia usually found so embarrassing could occasionally transmogrify into proud emblems of regional distinctiveness.[32] The Scots may have distinguished themselves as loyal Britons during the American Revolution, but the quasi-nationalist sentiments that surfaced in response to revelations that their legendary hero of the third century, Ossian, and his epic tale had been fabricated are a useful reminder that they were willing to go only so far in subverting their own history.[33]

Society in Mainland North America," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., 53 (1996): 251–88; W. Jeffrey Bolster, *Black Jacks: African American Seamen in the Age of Sail* (Cambridge, Mass., 1997).

[29] Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (Cambridge, 1991); Eric Hinderaker, "The 'Four Indian Kings' and the Imaginative Construction of the First British Empire," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., 53 (1996): 487–526; Colin G. Calloway, *Crown and Calumet: British-Indian Relations, 1783–1815* (Norman, Okla., 1987).

[30] It is worth noting that this diminishing tolerance for difference also held for native peoples living in areas of European settlement. See James H. Merrell, " 'The Customes of Our Countrey': Indians and Colonists in Early America," in Bailyn and Morgan, *Strangers within the Realm*, 117–56.

[31] The primacy of Britain's religious divisions is the subject of J. C. D. Clark, *The Language of Liberty, 1660–1832: Political Discourse and Social Dynamics in the Anglo-American World* (Cambridge, 1994). As Jon Butler points out, evangelicals were often less opposed to the perpetuation of clerical and denominational authority than historians have sometimes supposed: see Butler, *Awash in a Sea of Faith: Christianizing the American People* (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), 164–93. But for the awakenings' tendencies toward comprehension, see Susan O'Brien, "A Transatlantic Community of Saints: The Great Awakening and the First Evangelical Network, 1735–1755," *AHR* 91 (October 1986): 811–32; Ward, *Protestant Evangelical Revival*; Timothy D. Hall, *Contested Boundaries: Itinerancy and the Reshaping of the Colonial American Religious World* (Durham, N.C., 1994).

[32] Clive and Bailyn, "England's Cultural Provinces," 210–13.

[33] The Anglicization of Scottish historiography is the subject of Colin Kidd's *Subverting Scotland's Past: Scottish Whig Historians and the Creation of an Anglo-British Identity 1689–c.1830* (Cambridge,

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When viewed from the standpoint of these underlying divisions, the disintegration of Britain's first empire is hardly surprising. Supposing themselves to be equal members of a greater British nation, colonial polemicists initially responded to the Stamp Act by demanding that they be accorded the same rights of taxation and representation they assumed belonged to the British people in general, no matter where within the king's extended dominions they resided. Because Britain was a juridically composite state, though, the Americans had comparatively little difficulty in rejecting Parliament's subsequent requisitions, first by re-imagining the empire as a confederation of sovereign states bound to each other only by virtue of their allegiance to the same crown, and eventually by declaring full independence.[34] At each point along this path, the colonists were forced to depart from the conventions of English political thought, but these departures did not make the radicalism of the American Revolution unintelligible to men and women elsewhere in the British world. Significantly, by the time the emissaries of George III came to terms with the United States in 1782, the Irish Volunteers had already forced the government to recognize—briefly, as it turned out—the constitutional autonomy of the Dublin parliament,[35] and echoes of the Americans' disaffection could be heard as far away as British Bengal.[36]

Of equal importance, the revolution demonstrated the limits of imperial sentiment in England, as the self-styled patriots who flocked to join Christopher Wyvill's County Associations during the spring of 1780 demonstrated just how unwilling they were to make enormous sacrifices forcing the Americans to remain part of Britain.[37] In mounting their call for an end to the war in America, Wyvill and his supporters were following the radical example of "friends of America" such as

1993). For the Ossian myth as a response to these homogenizing tendencies, see Richard B. Sher, *Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Moderate Literati of Edinburgh* (Princeton, N.J., 1985), chap. 6; John Robertson, *The Scottish Enlightenment and the Militia Issue* (Edinburgh, 1985), 104, 238. Similar romantic revivals occurred elsewhere in Britain during the later eighteenth century: see P. Morgan, "From a Death to a View: The Hunt for the Welsh Past in the Romantic Period," in E. J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, 1983); N. Vance, "Celts, Carthaginians and Constitutions: Anglo-Irish Literary Relations, 1780–1820," *Irish Historical Studies* 22 (1981).

[34] Greene, *Peripheries and Center*, chaps. 6–7. See also J. G. A. Pocock, "States, Republics and Empires: The American Founding in Early Modern Perspective," in Terence Ball and Pocock, eds., *Conceptual Change and the Constitution* (Lawrence, Kan., 1988), 55–77; Pocock, "Empire, State and Confederation: The War of American Independence as a Crisis in Multiple Monarchy," in John Robertson, ed., *A Union for Empire: Political Thought and the British Union of 1707* (Cambridge, 1995), 333–45.

[35] J. C. Beckett, *The Making of Modern Ireland, 1603–1923* (London, 1966), 215–26; York, *Neither Kingdom nor Nation*, chaps. 3–4; Thomas Bartlett, "'A People Made Rather for Copies Than Originals': The Anglo-Irish, 1760–1800," *International History Review* 12 (1990): 11–25; James Kelly, *Prelude to Union: Anglo-Irish Politics in the 1780s* (Cork, 1992).

[36] P. J. Marshall, "The Whites of British India, 1780–1830: A Failed Colonial Society?" *International History Review* 12 (1990): 30–31.

[37] For the domestic crises of 1780–1784 generally, see Herbert Butterfield, *George III, Lord North and the People, 1779–80* (London, 1949); Ian Christie, *Wilkes, Wyvill and Reform: The Parliamentary Reform Movement, 1760–1785* (London, 1962); Philip Harling, *The Waning of "Old Corruption": The Politics of Economical Reform in Britain, 1779–1846* (Oxford, 1996). Despite the merits of each of these works, there is a pressing need for a study that takes into account the British and imperial dimensions of these events. For an indication of the possibilities of such an approach, see Wilson, *Sense of the People*; Gould, *Persistence of Empire*, chap. 5; David Armitage, "A Patriot for Whom? The Afterlives of Bolingbroke's Patriot King," *Journal of British Studies* 36 (1997): 397–418.

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Wilkes, Catherine Macaulay, and John Cartwright; however, the groundswell of opposition that finally forced the government to concede the inevitability of defeat was not limited to groups on the margins of metropolitan politics. Surveying the wreckage of Britain's North American empire in 1781, the conservative dean of Gloucester, Josiah Tucker, spoke for many loyal men and women as well, when he lamented that the British people would have avoided their present difficulties "had it not been for such Connections" on the far shores of the Atlantic.[38] The British may have regarded the American Revolution as a "civil war" between members of the same nation, but their sense of the boundaries between realm and province remained sufficiently clear for them to refuse to sacrifice their own peace and prosperity indefinitely to the greater cause of imperial unity.

IN THE EVENT, of course, Britain's history as an empire did not end with the recognition of American independence. Where the war was once thought to have dulled the appetite for colonial rule, scholars now recognize that it coincided with what C. A. Bayly has called "an imperial revolution in government."[39] Convinced that Britain had erred not in allowing the North American colonists too little liberty but in granting them too much, imperial officials after 1783 pursued a policy of aggressive conservatism both in the remaining colonies of settlement and in India, the cornerstone of the empire's new wealth and power in Asia. Of equal importance, British merchants continued to expand their empire of goods even farther, penetrating remote markets in China, Latin America, and the islands of the South Pacific.[40] On the eve of Victoria's accession (1837), nearly a quarter of the world's population was subject to Parliament's theoretically unlimited sovereignty, and millions more were caught in the spreading web of British trade and industry.

But just what sort of polity was the British Empire? Was it an extended nation, a vast Anglicized consortium? Or was it something else? Given the Victorian empire's striking ethnic and political complexity, historians have rightly tended to avoid sweeping generalizations. For a sense of what contemporary Britons thought about such questions, however, we might consider the work of J. R. Seeley, the Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge whose lectures on *The Expansion of England* (1883) were once required reading for anyone seeking to under-

[38] Josiah Tucker, *A Treatise Concerning Civil Government, in Three Parts* (London, 1781), 250. Tucker's early endorsement of American independence made him somewhat unusual, but a growing number of British thinkers were inclined to agree. For the reassessment of imperialism during the final quarter of the eighteenth century, see Miller, *Defining the Common Good*, chap. 6 and conclusion; Anthony Pagden, *Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France, c. 1500–c. 1800* (New Haven, Conn., 1995); Bernard Semmel, *The Liberal Ideal and the Demons of Empire: Theories of Imperialism from Adam Smith to Lenin* (Baltimore, Md., 1993), chaps. 2–4.

[39] Bayly, *Imperial Meridian*, 116–121. See also P. J. Marshall, "Empire and Authority in the Later Eighteenth Century," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 15 (1987): 105–22; David Milobar, "Conservative Ideology, Metropolitan Government and the Reform of Quebec, 1782–1791," *International History Review* 12 (1990): 45–64; P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism*, Vol. 1: *Innovation and Expansion, 1688–1914* (London, 1993), 96–98.

[40] P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, "The Political Economy of British Expansion Overseas, 1750–1914," *Economic History Review*, 2d ser., 33 (1980); Michael Greenberg, *British Trade and the Opening of China, 1800–1842* (Cambridge, 1951); D. C. M. Platt, *Latin America and British Trade, 1806–1914* (London, 1972).

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stand Britain's imperial past.[41] According to Seeley, the single factor that distinguished "Greater Britain" from the empires of its European competitors was the existence of a common "English" nationality, which gave its overseas territories an "ethnological unity." Although Seeley regarded India as an important exception, he attached considerable importance to the fact that the other four regions—Canada, the West Indies, South Africa, and Australasia—were all controlled by white settlers who, if they were not of English descent themselves, nonetheless took their cultural, political, and religious cues from the norms of metropolitan society.[42] In a word, Britain's second empire was much like its first. But there was also an important difference, one that even Seeley's politely racist nationalism could not obscure. For all its apparent vitality, Seeley's was an empire haunted by the "secession" of the American colonies, and he was quite sure that the revolution had created "in the English mind a doubt, a misgiving," which made it difficult for the metropolitan public to see in their "second Empire" anything but an unstable consortium whose subjects would eventually follow the same path to independence as their predecessors had a century before.[43]

With its ethnic bombast and smug belief in the desirability of Britain's imperial project, Seeley's *Expansion of England* is too much a work of its day to be regarded as anything other than a primary text. It is, however, a deeply revealing one, for it suggests that, in responding to the American Revolution, the British ensured that their overseas empire would remain, at best, a virtual nation—one still held together by a combination of force, maritime trade, and the affective bonds of a shared culture and history, but nonetheless lacking in the sort of uniform political institutions that Parliament had so disastrously attempted to establish during the 1760s and 1770s. Significantly, Parliament never again attempted to tax the crown's ultramarine subjects in the direct manner it had used for the North American colonists between 1763 and 1775. Rather, subsequent generations of colonial administrators chose to abide by the terms of the Declaratory Act of 1778, whereby the British government, as part of the attempt by Lord North's ministry to persuade the Americans to return to the imperial fold, denied its own power to tax colonists "for the Purpose of raising a Revenue." Indeed, in the discussions that preceded passage of the Canada Act in 1791, it became clear that whatever other policies officials might use to check the "political liberty" of the crown's remaining subjects in British North America, they were no longer free to impose parliamentary taxes.[44] As the great constitutional historian F. W. Maitland reminded his Cambridge

[41] For a perceptive account of Seeley's work and general influence, see the introduction to Bailyn and Morgan, *Strangers within the Realm*, 1–2. As the editors note, the lectures remained continuously in print until 1956, the year of the Suez Crisis. See also Peter Burroughs, "John Robert Seeley and British Imperial History," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 1 (1973): 191–211; Deborah Wormell, *Sir John Seeley and the Uses of History* (Cambridge, 1980); and David Armitage's contribution to this *Forum*.

[42] J. R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures* (1883; rpt. edn., Boston, 1900), 11–17, 54–60. Significantly, Seeley was convinced that India would eventually achieve independence.

[43] Seeley, *Expansion of England*, 17.

[44] Because of the theoretical breadth of its powers, Parliament could not actually "destroy" its sovereignty on this score; still, the British tended to act as though it had. For the significance of the Declaratory Act of 1778, see Gould, *Persistence of Empire*, chap. 6; Frederick Madden with David Fieldhouse, eds., *Select Documents on the Constitutional History of the British Empire and Commonwealth*, 4 vols. (Westport, Conn., 1985–), 2: 592, 611.

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students at the end of the nineteenth century, Parliament enjoyed a legally boundless sovereignty over "millions and millions" of people "who are not English"; however, the memory of the American Revolution meant that its members "habitually" refrained "from making laws of a certain class and must suspect that if [they] made such laws they would not be obeyed."[45]

This is not to deny the considerable breadth of Britain's imperial powers. As the controversy surrounding the abolition of slavery and the slave trade demonstrated, the British state remained capable of vigorous, unilateral action, far more so, in some ways, than the democratic republic that took its place on the North American mainland.[46] Likewise, the British government repeatedly betrayed a disturbing capacity for autocracy in India, with alternating bouts of repression and reform.[47] To a greater degree than is sometimes realized, though, metropolitan interventions in colonial affairs represented the exception rather than the rule. As P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins have argued in their influential reworking of the Robinson-Gallagher thesis, the nineteenth-century empire derived its cohesiveness less from a unified administrative vision than from the informal forces of "gentlemanly capitalism" and global trade.[48] Even in India, British power depended heavily on indigenous political structures and what P. J. Marshall has called the "co-operation or acquiescence" of natives who thought they could "manipulate the new regime for their own purposes."[49] Furthermore, insofar as Seeley and his fellow imperialists thought about the problem of common political institutions for Britain's world-wide consortium, they tended to pin their hopes not on an all-powerful parliament or imperial state but on the sorts of federal theories that they believed had solved the conflict between center and periphery in the United States and that the Loyal American refugees who settled Upper Canada during the 1780s helped import into the mainstream of British political thought.[50]

[45] *The Constitutional History of England: A Course of Lectures Delivered by F. W. Maitland*, H. A. L. Fisher, ed. (1908; rpt. edn., London, 1963), 339–41. Among the laws that Maitland specifically mentioned were revenue measures like the ones that had caused the American Revolution.

[46] For the divergent responses to abolitionism in Britain and the United States, see esp. David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770–1823* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1975). For British antislavery, see also Colley, *Britons*, 350–60; Oldfield, *Popular Politics and British Anti-Slavery*.

[47] British reform in India was often as high-minded as imperial repression: see Eric T. Stokes, *The English Utilitarians and India* (Oxford, 1959); Antoinette Burton, *Burdens of History: British Feminists, Indian Women, and Imperial Culture, 1865–1915* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1994). For similarities in the tendencies of British reform in Africa, see Susan Pedersen, "National Bodies, Unspeakable Acts: The Sexual Politics of Colonial Policy-Making," *Journal of Modern History* 63 (1991).

[48] The classic formulation is J. Gallagher and R. E. Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," *Economic History Review*, 2d ser., 6 (1953). For Hopkins and Cain's partial revision and revival, see P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, "Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas, I: The Old Colonial System, 1688–1850," *Economic History Review*, 2d ser., 39 (1986); Cain and Hopkins, *British Imperialism*, 1: 7–17.

[49] P. J. Marshall, "Britain and the World in the Eighteenth Century: I, Reshaping the Empire," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6th ser., 8 (1998): 16. See also A. J. Stockwell, "Power, Authority, and Freedom," in P. J. Marshall, ed., *The Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire* (Cambridge, 1996), 161–63; Tapan Raychaudhuri, "British Rule in India: An Assessment," in Marshall, *Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire*, 361.

[50] Seeley, for one, believed that Britain's best chance for preserving its empire was "to do what the United States does so easily, that is hold together in a federal union countries very remote from each other" (*Expansion of England*, 18–19). For Canada's role in the creation of this "imperial federalist" paradigm, see esp. John Kendle, *Federal Britain: A History* (London, 1997), chap. 2. See also Chester Martin, *Empire and Commonwealth: Studies in Governance and Self-Government in Canada* (Oxford,

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All this is to say that the British Empire remained at base a composite, multi-centered polity. Like Seeley, the Victorians who grappled with matters of imperial governance hoped that a common nationality and sense of patriotism would supply the glue necessary to hold its distant territories and possessions together. More often than not, however, things worked out rather differently. In Ireland, the part of the nineteenth-century empire where the attempt at British integration was probably most conspicuous, the Union of 1801 remained subject to recurring bouts of contestation, negotiation, and compromise, much of it in response to a nationalist movement heavily indebted to the example of the American Revolution.[51] Elsewhere, the effects of Anglicization proved even less predictable, as the British presence in both India and Africa increasingly produced new, syncretic indigenous cultures that, more often than not, ended by undermining the authority of the very officials they were meant to assist.[52] At times, even the English commitment to the empire could seem to flag. Despite the popularity of imperial and Unionist causes during the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, those who sought to hold Greater Britain together worried almost as much about "Little Englanders" at home as they did budding movements for independence in India, Africa, and Ireland.[53]

And what about the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland—that composite entity which, according to Benedict Anderson, is "as much the legatee of the prenational dynastic states of the nineteenth century as the precursor of a twenty-first century international order"?[54] In searching for the roots of the current pressure for devolution in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, historians have tended to look not to the American Revolution but to the so-called "British problem" of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[55] Nonetheless, it might be worth considering whether Britain's admission of defeat in 1783 created

1929); W. H. Nelson, "The Last Hopes of the American Loyalists," *Canadian Historical Review* 32 (1951): 22–42.

[51] The literature on Ireland under the Union is enormous, but see Tom Corfe, *The Phoenix Park Murders: Conflict, Compromise and Tragedy in Ireland, 1879–1882* (London, 1968); M. J. Winstanley, *Ireland and the Land Question, 1800–1922* (London, 1984); V. G. Kiernan, "The Emergence of a Nation," in C. H. E. Philpin, ed., *Nationalism and Popular Protest in Ireland* (Cambridge, 1987), 16–49.

[52] The literature on subaltern and postcolonial theory is far too extensive to do more than mention in brief here, but for the unintended, often self-subverting effects of British cultural imperialism, see Terence Ranger, "The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa," in Hobsbawm and Ranger, *Invention of Tradition*, 211–62; Homi K. Bhabha, "Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority under a Tree outside Delhi, May 1817," *Critical Inquiry* 12 (1985): 144–65; Paul S. Landau, *The Realm of the Word: Language, Gender and Christianity in a Southern African Kingdom* (Portsmouth, N.H., 1995).

[53] Samuel Hynes, *The Edwardian Turn of Mind* (Princeton, N.J., 1968), esp. chap. 2; John Turner, "Letting Go: The Conservative Party and the End of the Union with Ireland," in Grant and Stringer, *Uniting the Kingdom*, 255–74. See also Angela Woollacott, "'All This Is the Empire, I Told Myself': Australian Women's Voyages 'Home' and the Articulation of Colonial Whiteness," *AHR* 102 (October 1997): 1003–29.

[54] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 2.

[55] See, for example, John Morrill's suggestive remarks about the continuing "ambiguity" and "incompleteness" of British history in his introduction to the volume that he co-edited with Brendan Bradshaw, *The British Problem, c. 1534–1707: State Formation in the Atlantic Archipelago* (London, 1996), 38. See also J. H. Burns, "Ex Uno Plura? The British Experience," in J. C. Boogman and G. N. van der Plaat, eds., *Federalism: History and Current Significance of a Form of Government* (The Hague, 1980), 189–216; Alexander Grant and Keith Stringer, "Introduction: The Enigma of British History," in Grant and Stringer, *Uniting the Kingdom*, 3–11.

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a precedent that effectively limited how far the British people would be willing to press the cause of national unity in subsequent controversies, even when, as has been the case for the last quarter-century, those controversies involved the structure of the United Kingdom. There is no British equivalent to the popular support that the Republican Party was able to mobilize on behalf of the Union during the American Civil War.[56] Instead, the reemergence of the "Irish problem" during the 1870s and the first calls for devolution in Scotland not only gave rise to an unyielding Unionism but also produced the Gladstonian hope that implementing Home Rule would save the British state from a contest it was not likely to survive. The reasons for this ambivalence go beyond the response to the American Revolution. But by treating Britain's only military defeat of the eighteenth century as an exceptional event, British historians have perhaps overlooked one of the main reasons why the United Kingdom has remained a composite empire, in which the sentimental ties of Britishness appeared to bind its inhabitants into a closer political union but where the appearance of nationhood has been in some ways more virtual than real.

[56] The interpretive possibilities of broadening the study of Anglo-American history to include the Civil War are evident in Kevin Phillips, *The Cousins' Wars: Religion, Politics, and the Triumph of Anglo-America* (New York, 1999).

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AHR Forum

The New British History in Atlantic Perspective: An Antipodean Commentary

J. G. A. POCOCK

THIS FORUM PROPOSES TO BRING TOGETHER two historiographic enterprises closely but not necessarily connected: the "new British history," by which appears to be denoted the enterprise of writing the history of "the Atlantic archipelago"[1] as that of a changing population of interacting state-forms, nationalities, and indeed histories; and an "Atlantic history" pursuing not dissimilar objectives with regard to the North Atlantic region, especially in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the interactions being (at a minimum) those of the English and British kingdoms with a North America in time divided into the United States, the Caribbean, and Canada. In both scenarios, it appears to be "British history" that plays the role of protagonist; it is both enlarged and diversified, and in certain respects contextualized and diminished, by being viewed in these changing perspectives, and we find ourselves asking whether it can continue to be written, or even to be lived and exist. United States history is not thus contextualized, perhaps because it possesses a continental and a Pacific as well as an Atlantic dimension, but we end by asking whether British history is to be absorbed into that of the adjacent subcontinent of Europe. These geo-political and macro-historical concerns do not dominate either the "new British" or the "new Atlantic" history—both of these do their proper and valuable work of illuminating the several histories of which their respective universes are composed—but they recur in each, and may be found doing so at various points in the contributions to this *Forum*.

The present writer played some role—that of a voice crying in the wilderness, and pointing out that there was a wilderness to cry in—at the inception of the "new British" history, if not of the "new Atlantic" with which the former has nevertheless intersected, and this role has been, if anything over-generously, acknowledged in the numerous symposia—including this one—to which the enterprise has given

[1] The language of Mark Nicholls (*A History of the Modern British Isles, 1529–1603: The Two Kingdoms* [Oxford, 1999], 321), which characterizes "the Atlantic archipelago" as a "vapid term . . . from time to time deployed by those so wary of modern nationalistic prejudices that they would deny these islands their ancient, familiar name," seems unduly Eltonian. The term has been put forward because "the British Isles" entails a "British history" of which Irish history both is and is not part. The need to enlist Irish historians in this important enterprise would have been apparent to Thomas Cromwell. Nevertheless, the series that Nicholls's volume introduces is greatly to be welcomed, as are its Eltonian premises. As a historical pluralist, I welcome all interpretations, including the centralist; and as for the nation state, when valid and self-examining, the more there are of it the better.

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rise.[2] My vision was specific, and in some ways personal, at that distant outset, and this side of its character has been elaborated in the quarter-century intervening.[3] The "new British history" has been politically and ideologically involved in the processes of Britain's partial accession to the European Union and of the reconstruction of British and Irish relations around the problem of the North—both of which were well under way when I began speaking and writing about these matters in 1973. Comment on this "new history" has therefore been political and ideological in part, and three of the four contributions now before us seem to allude to this circumstance if they do not all take part in it.

I begin my response by wondering how far David Armitage wishes to press his apparent alignment of "the new British history" with the "Greater British" history proposed a century ago by Seeley. They are plainly very different; the former aims at the pluralization of a history that can only in part be told as that of a single imperial state, whereas the latter in order (but earlier in time) aimed at the extension of that state into the structure of a global empire. As Eliga Gould convincingly points out, Seeley's enterprise was doomed by the sheer existence of the United States, a continental federation that Seeley could only propose to match by an oceanic and naval federation of the United Kingdom with its colonies of settlement. American independence, Gould interestingly suggests, left such impediments to imperial thinking in the British mind that neither kingdom nor colonies could envisage such a scheme in practice; Parliament was as unwilling as ever to compromise its sovereignty in the archipelago by remodeling it around the government of an empire.

"Greater British" history was accordingly stillborn, from which it follows that the "new British" history takes shape in another, post-imperial age, as a means of reassessing the history of both archipelagic and oceanic empire and asking what its lasting effects have been. It is not without perplexity that I read Armitage's association of the one with the other, and not altogether without indignation that

[2] These symposia include R. R. Davies, ed., *The British Isles, 1100–1500* (Edinburgh, 1988); Steven G. Ellis and Sarah Barber, eds., *Conquest and Union: Fashioning a British State, 1485–1735* (London, 1995); Alexander Grant and Keith J. Stringer, eds., *Uniting the Kingdom? The Making of British History* (London, 1995); Brendan Bradshaw and John Morrill, eds., *The British Problem, c. 1534–1707* (London, 1996); Brendan Bradshaw and Peter Roberts, eds., *British Consciousness and Identity: The Making of Britain, 1522–1707* (Cambridge, 1998); Alexander Murdoch, *British History, 1660–1832: National Identity and Local Culture* (New York, 1998); Laurence Brockliss and David Eastwood, eds., *A Union of Multiple Identities: The British Isles, c. 1750–c. 1850* (Manchester, 1997). Further bibliography and historiography may be found by consulting each of these. The first and last volumes in this listing excepted, the focus is heavily on the early modern or "Three Kingdoms" period, and none is focused on the periods 1685–1707 or 1776–1800. For the former, however, the literature attending the tercentennial of the Revolution of 1688 is useful; see Jonathan I. Israel, ed., *The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and Its World Impact* (Cambridge, 1991); R. A. Beddard, ed., *The Revolution of 1688: The Andrew Browning Lectures, 1988* (Oxford, 1991); Lois G. Schwoerer, ed., *The Revolution of 1688–89: Changing Perspectives* (Cambridge, 1992); Dale Hoak and Mordechai Feingold, eds., *The World of William and Mary: Anglo-Dutch Perspectives on the Revolution of 1688–89* (Stanford, Calif., 1996).

[3] See—if I may be excused a self-centered bibliography—J. G. A. Pocock, "British History: A Plea for a New Subject," *New Zealand Historical Journal* 8 (1974): 3–12; reprinted with comment and reply, *Journal of Modern History* 47, no. 4 (1975): 601–28; "The Limits and Divisions of British History: In Search of the Unknown Subject," *AHR* 87 (April 1982): 311–36; "History and Sovereignty: The Historiographic Response to Europeanisation in Two British Cultures," *Journal of British Studies* 31, no. 4 (1992): 358–89; "Conclusion: Contingency, Identity, Sovereignty," in Grant and Stringer, *Uniting the Kingdom*, 292–302.

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I read his suggestion that in proposing the new history I was trying to perpetuate the Commonwealth relationship between Britain and the sometime dominions.[4] It is true that I was, and am, concerned to retain, and rediscover, significance in the histories of these societies, and in a British history that shall include their foundation and the trajectories they have subsequently followed; but it would have been a singular vulgarity in me to suggest that this could be done only by perpetuating the Commonwealth relationship or by privileging its history. Nor is it at all evident how the "new" British history could have led either to this result or to the history of a "Greater Britain."

The lecture first propounding this history was delivered in New Zealand in 1973, when negotiations about the United Kingdom's entry into whatever "Europe" was called at the time had been going on for at least a decade. It was evident that this would entail a redefinition of "Britain" and its history, either as "European" and nothing else or as "European" in a sense privileged above all others, and that this would face us inhabitants of the "neo-Britains"—as it is now appropriate to describe the nations established by British, and Irish, settlement in the nineteenth century[5]—with the need to establish that we were British without being European (situated as we were on the other side of the planet). "Being British" meant (and means) having a history and histories of our own, lived formerly within, and incapable of being narrated without, complex sets of relationships, one of which was the often difficult, tense, emotionally laden, and costly in wartime casualties relationship with the United Kingdom. As the history of a relationship, this could not be told without relating the history of both, or rather all, parties to it; and it was therefore necessary to devise a "British history" that was the history of a globally expanding culture to which the peoples of the Atlantic archipelago and those of the mainly Pacific (or Southern Ocean) neo-Britains all belonged. This history, which in the North Atlantic extends into those of the Caribbean, the United States, and Canada, could be related alongside, and interacting with, that of the British kingdoms as European states interacting with others—a history with which it was necessary to claim no more than parity of esteem. "Britain," or "the Atlantic archipelago," situated as "it" is, should be capable of existing in more than one history and recognizing the claims and contests arising between them.

This hope has not always been realized, and the two histories are too often placed in a zero-sum relation. For this, we may blame the difficulty historians sometimes have in counting higher than two, so that they think that, of any two histories, one must be truer or more important than the other; but we may also note the foggy imperialism of the "European" ideology, which seeks irrefutability by declining to define its terms. Armitage writes of "the taint of anti-Europeanism,"[6] attending the "new British" history; an interesting word, "taint," suggesting pollution, heresy, and sin. The equally sensitive and subtle intellect of the late Raphael Samuel moved him to suggest that there might be an "unconscious bias" against Europe in what I

[4] David Armitage, "Greater Britain: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis?" *AHR* 104 (April 1999): 431.

[5] I borrow the term from Professor James Belich, of the University of Auckland. See his *Making Peoples: A History of the New Zealanders; From Polynesian Settlement to the End of the Nineteenth Century* (Auckland, 1996).

[6] Armitage, "Greater Britain," 444.

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wrote;[7] it was, of course, neither unconscious nor a bias but a deliberate criticism, moved without concealment by the need to affirm my own historical being. Both cases, I think, have to do with the inability of the "European" project to accept criticism, or to distinguish between skeptical questioning and irrational archaic hostility. In the present case, it requires the annexation of "British" history to "European"; but the relation between the two, of enormous value and importance, must be falsified when it calls for the subordination of all other relationships. This is an aspect of the "democratic deficit" that characterizes the construction of "Europe"; by refusing to define itself in refutable terms, the enterprise enhances its authority in the short run but weakens it in the long. The unexamined authority is not worth obeying.

It is necessary to engage in these polemics if we are to understand the historiography as a political phenomenon. If the British were going to redefine themselves as European, which we neo-Britons were not, we needed a way—historically valid—of redefining British history as our own. If they were going to write their history as that of "Europe," they needed a plausible way of doing it, and here it was important that a merely Anglocentric history calling itself that of "Britain" was satisfactory neither in archipelagic nor in oceanic terms, nor in terms of that peninsular (misnamed "continental") history to which that of "Europe" is too often confined. It cannot be too often stressed that the reconstitution of "British history" as that of conflict and consent over sovereignty and the terms of association between several nations was intended, and has even operated, to enhance both that history's autonomy and its Europeanness. Involvement in archipelagic history has been the British and Irish way of being European; it has also involved these peoples and states in empires, settlements, and diasporas extending into the Atlantic and other oceans. That is one reason why the perfectly sound statement that "Britain" is part of "Europe" entails a modification of the concept of "Europe"—as is entailed whenever any historic nation is included in it.[8]

But this does not satisfy the Eurocratic mind. Any proposal to recount the British histories in their archipelagic setting is met with the response that this is not enough and the demand that they be situated in one more "European"—as if the term excluded the islands to be annexed to it. Whether this is the product of a desire to subject insular to some undefined peninsular history or of a desire to annihilate the histories of all particular nations is not quite clear. This is the point at which the words "nation state" are regularly used as a club to beat down any suggestion that peoples in the past have made and suffered histories of their own, and it is the point at which we are arrested by Armitage's further suggestion that "new British" history may still entail an "English exceptionalism."[9] The trouble with any exceptionalist thesis is less the exception it claims—the history of any autonomous entity has a certain claim to individuality and uniqueness, unless it be this that there is an

[7] Raphael Samuel (Alison Light, ed., with Sally Alexander and Gareth Stedman Jones), *Theatres of Memory*, Vol. 2: *Island Stories: Unravelling Britain* (London, 1998).

[8] See J. G. A. Pocock, "Deconstructing Europe" [1991], rpt. in Peter Gowan and Penny Anderson, eds., *The Question of Europe* (London, 1997), 297–317; "Vous autres Européens—or Inventing Europe," in *Filozovski Vestnik Acta Philosophica*, Tomaz Mastnak and Jelica Sumik-Riha, eds. (Ljublana, 1993); "What Do We Mean by Europe?" *Wilson Quarterly* (Winter 1997): 12–29.

[9] Armitage, "Greater Britain," 431.

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intention to deny—than the rule it establishes: the set of norms existing in an adjacent universe, from which the exception is said to depart. To say that England (or Germany, or whatever) has followed a *Sonderweg* because there exists a set of "European" norms not here followed is fairly certain to prove false, but it is merely to repeat the error to insist that the norms exist and the exception must be shown to have conformed to the rule. All charges of "exceptionalism" are therefore to be viewed with mistrust, and what we need in a pluralist historiography is not more norms but fewer.

A series of paradoxes ensues. The purpose of reconstituting "British history" as a contestation over sovereignty among nations in formation has been to propose to the inhabitants of that history that it has been complex and dialectical, containing but not reducible to the establishment of a unitary sovereignty and various modes of resistance to it. (At the moment, it exhibits two sovereigns, the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic, entering into a new relationship in order to manage a region that cannot be fully included in either.) There has been the further intention of explaining that their histories have gone on, and they must continue to conduct them, in a plurality of histories in which none is complete without the others. The pluralization of histories is intended to enhance their autonomy, not to diminish it. Since this further entails a redefinition of "British" as part of "European" history, the next step has been to propose a similar pluralization of the latter, as a concept changed and modified when "British" (or archipelagic) history is added to it, and therefore as a fluid and uncentered concept whose frontiers expand, contract, and change, and that consists in the convergence of many histories but not in their self-abolition or homogenization. The political intention here has been to resist the erection of "Europe" into an invisible idol, irresistible and omnipotent because its attributes can never be stated—an intention that entails no hostility to "Europe" as reality, only a desire that it be intelligibly propounded. The Euro-skeptic is not other than a candid friend, especially when not "European" himself.

This approach has not escaped those who would bend it in other directions. That is to say, a pluralization of British history intended to enhance its vitality by rendering it more problematic has been seized on by some intending to problematize it as a prelude to terminating or subordinating it altogether. Among these have been some who maintain that British history has been driven by forces that are European without being British; others, belonging to a British Old Left, who see the "new history" as a means to the "breakup of Britain,"[10] the demolition of any sovereign state, and the demotion of its national components to the status of quasi-autonomous "regions" of a European empire of the market—a curious objective for the Left to pursue, if one did not know the strategic convolutions of the Leninist mind. This is the political setting in which one must pursue the recent history of the "new British history." The contributions to the present *Forum*, however, do not follow this trajectory. Their concern is not with Europe but with "Atlantic history," in which one moves beyond Ireland to consider a triangle composed of the Caribbean, the United States, and Canada, and the question is how far the patterns of "British history" can be extended into this geo-political field.

[10] Tom Nairn, *The Breakup of Britain* (London, 1981); Nairn, *Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited* (London, 1997). Raphael Samuel's "unravelling Britain" is a project akin but not identical.

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The Federal Republic and its constitution have not yet been targeted for deprivation of autonomy, whatever the militias may think; and United States history can still be written.

JANE OHLMEYER'S ESSAY bears upon two themes: the place of Ireland and the Irish in the east Atlantic world of the British monarchy, and the place of this theme in what we are now accustomed to call "the War" or "Wars of the Three Kingdoms." The rubric of "Three Kingdoms history" is in some ways to be preferred to that of "British history" (to which this project has not been wedded since the injection early in its career of the term "Atlantic archipelago"). Inadequate to the extent that it does not verbally allow for a Welsh history of these wars—the "Three Kingdoms" included at least four nations, perhaps five if we acknowledge the distinctively Gaelic world called the Gaidhealtachd—it is less likely than "British history" to arouse fears of a covert Anglocentricity. The Irish and Scottish historians Ohlmeyer cites as mistrustful of the latter term[11] are perhaps calling for Irish and Scottish histories, autonomous and autocentric, and are fearful of their inclusion in a many-faceted history, so that any British-centered narrative presents to their minds an imperialist threat. On another hand, a recent exchange in another journal between Ohlmeyer and John Adamson[12] has had the latter pointing out that the course, if not the significance, of these wars was dominated by the superior power of the English, and any narrative must of necessity be Anglocentric in recognizing this fact. I would agree with Adamson to the point of arguing, as I have elsewhere, that what obsessed the English of the 1640s was less the wars they were fighting to dominate others than the civil war they were appalled to find themselves fighting with each other, that they could imagine only English causes of this catastrophe, and that Oliver Cromwell at Drogheda and Dunbar was engaged in eliminating Irish Confederates and Scottish Covenanters from the determination of a conflict the English were resolved to settle among themselves.[13] English ethnocentricity has many origins, and the national identity has been shaped between English and English, as well as between English and (overworked term) Others.

The value of the "Three Kingdoms" approach is its reminder that this war, like other processes, had many outcomes, as well as origins, and can be situated in many histories as well as the English; from which it must follow that the English have a history, as others do, both made by themselves and made for them by others. There are multiple and many-faced histories of all three kingdoms, as well as of North and South Wales,[14] Cornwall,[15] not a few English shires and county associations, [16] and

[11] Jane Ohlmeyer, "Seventeenth-Century Ireland and the New British and Atlantic Histories," *AHR* 104 (April 1999): 448.

[12] Jane Ohlmeyer, "The Wars of the Three Kingdoms," *History Today* 48, no. 11 (1998): 16–22; John Adamson, "The English Context of the British Civil Wars," *History Today* 48, no. 11 (1998): 23–32.

[13] J. G. A. Pocock, "The Atlantic Archipelago and the War of the Three Kingdoms," in Bradshaw and Morrill, *British Problem*, 172–91; "Thomas May and the Narrative of Civil War," in Derek Hirst and Richard Strier, eds., *Writing and Political Engagement in Seventeenth-Century England* (Cambridge, forthcoming).

[14] W. S. K. Thomas, *Stuart Wales* (Llandysul, 1988).

[15] Mark Stoyle, "Pagans or Paragons? Images of the Cornish during the English Civil War," *English*

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that Gaelic-speaking region spanning land and water from Antrim via the Isles to Argyll, whose history Ohlmeyer has recounted for us.[17] If we are to use the term "British history," it must denote the aggregate of all these histories, as well as the problematic history of how far they were brought together in the history of a single *imperium*. Terminology is important here, and I draw attention to her suggestion[18] that the "Second War of the Three Kingdoms" (1688–1691—the first having lasted from 1637 to 1651) might be renamed "the War of the Three Kings," namely James VII/II, William III the Stadholder-King, and Louis XIV. Where the first war was archipelagic, the result of the simultaneous breakdowns in government we term "the fall of the British monarchies,"[19] the second was the archipelagic face of the European War of the League of Augsburg; but, equally, it transformed that war into an archipelagic and oceanic event, both by bringing Dutch and French regiments as far as the walls of Limerick and by beginning the transformation of the Three Kingdoms into a British imperial state, capable of dominant action in the wars of eighteenth-century Europe, and of enlarging those wars into contests for empire in the Atlantic and Indian oceans, the North American continent, and the subcontinent of India.[20] Here is one route by which we pass from the history of the Atlantic archipelago to that of the Atlantic empire, and even beyond it.

From David Armitage, Jack Greene, John Robertson, and many others, it is possible to learn that the problem of this empire until its disruption in 1776–1783 was not only that of maintaining oceanic, Caribbean, and American strategic control, not only that of "the administration of the colonies," but that of including rapidly growing and expanding colonies of settlement in the system of parliamentary monarchy over the Three Kingdoms and the Atlantic archipelago to which the word "empire" was primarily applied.[21] The convention is now to point out that unified parliamentary sovereignty was not equal to the conduct of an Atlantic empire, and in the present climate of Europeanization to look on it with pursed lips as emblematic of that "nation state" we are all bidden to see as obsolete and about to be left behind. To the English of the eighteenth century, it was an absolute necessity, still the only means by which the Anglican church-state had been guaranteed against a recurrence of civil war, and they would rather lose an empire

Historical Review 111 (1996): 307–10; "The Last Refuge of a Scoundrel: Sir Richard Grenville and Cornish Particularism," *Historical Research* 71, no. 174 (1998): 31–51.

[16] The historiography of the English Civil War passed through a phase in which the quasi-autonomous "county community" was held to be the key to it. The question is reviewed by John Morrill in *The Nature of the English Revolution* (London, 1993), chaps. 8, 11. See also Mark Stoyle, *Loyalty and Locality: Popular Allegiance in Devon during the English Civil War* (Exeter, 1994).

[17] Jane Ohlmeyer, *Civil War and Restoration in the Three British Kingdoms: The Career of Randall MacDonnell, Marquis of Antrim* (Cambridge, 1993).

[18] Ohlmeyer, "Seventeenth-Century Ireland," 449.

[19] Conrad Russell, *The Fall of the British Monarchies, 1637–1642* (Oxford, 1991).

[20] Beddard, Israel, Schwoerer, Hoak and Feingold, n. 2 above.

[21] David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the First British Empire* (Cambridge, forthcoming); Jack P. Greene, *Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of the British Empire and the United States, 1607–1788* (New York, 1990); John Robertson, ed., *A Union for Empire: Political Thought and the Union of 1707* (Cambridge, 1995).

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than see it compromised.[22] There remained an extensive empire it was competent to control, and as the Age of the Three Kingdoms gave way to the Age of Union, the centerpieces of its history were, in order, Ireland, India, and Canada.

The theme of Ned Landsman's essay—Scottish traversal back and forth, first in the North European area prominent in the seventeenth century and then in the Atlantic-American area prominent in the eighteenth—has either two histories or a history with two faces. There is the history of the region through which Scots traversed, and there is the history of the culture, state, or nation that is and was called Scotland; two histories, perhaps, to be related in narratives differently constructed. With an eye to the eighteenth century, one looks for the origins within "Scotland" of journeying and emigration. These might include, at one level, the tensions between Episcopalian and Presbyterian, which lent a certain Scottish flavor to the Episcopal communion in North America, or the tensions between Moderate and Popular, which helped make John Witherspoon a leader of the American Revolution in flight from the Scottish Enlightenment,[23] and then an introducer to American universities of the Common Sense philosophy through which that Enlightenment retreated from the skepticism of David Hume. Here, as in many other ways, sequences of events moved back and forth in the constellation of cultures constituting the Atlantic region, between which boundaries were so far permeable that we need not pay too much attention to their existence. It is interesting to note that Landsman is in some doubt how far to include Scottish settlers in Ireland in the story he tells. At what point should we begin to speak of "the Scots-Irish"—it is an American term—as a distinct new nationality acting in the historical complexes under study? It is possible to imagine a narrative of this people acting and traversing in "British" and "Atlantic" history that would be other than a narrative of "the Scots." It would investigate the discontents that led to considerable emigration from Ulster to the Alleghenies and elsewhere, and might pursue their acting as revolutionaries in the American war, as revolutionaries in the Ireland of 1798, and subsequently as loyalists in the formation of Orange Unionism in Ireland, Britain, and Canada. It would be both a history of this people as a presumed entity—a status some have sought to deny them—and a history of the archipelagic, Atlantic, and American complexes organized around the theaters of their successive actions in it. So would a history shaped around emigration from the Highlands and Islands.

Landsman's survey of the Scots in "the first British Empire"—a term to be used with caution—concludes with Canada, but—perhaps because it terminates at 1800—this has a little the air of a coda or afterthought. Scottish-Canadian history

[22] J. G. A. Pocock, "States, Republics and Empires: The American Founding in Early Modern Perspective," in Terence Ball and Pocock, eds., *Conceptual Change and the Constitution* (Lawrence, Kan., 1988), 55–77; "Empire, State and Confederation: The War of American Independence as a Crisis in Multiple Monarchy," in Robertson, *Union for Empire*, 318–48; "Political Thought in the English-Speaking Atlantic: (i) The Imperial Crisis; (ii) Empire, Revolution and an End of Early Modernity," in Pocock, ed., with Gordon J. Schochet and Lois G. Schwoerer, *The Varieties of British Political Thought, 1500–1700* (Cambridge, 1994), 246–301; Pocock, *La ricostruzione di un impero: Sovranitá britannica e federalismo americano* (Macerata, 1996).

[23] See the essays by Landsman and others in Richard B. Sher and Jeffrey Smitten, eds., *Scotland and America in the Age of the Enlightenment* (Princeton, N.J., 1990), section 1: "Religion and Revolution: The Two Worlds of John Witherspoon."

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peaks, though it does not begin, in the slightly later era of the Highland Clearances, in which tenants were removed in favor of sheep, and the emigration both voluntary and enforced of Highlanders and Hebrideans to a still partly British North America. Here is an opportunity to link two histories: that of the final conquest and transformation of the Gaidhealtachd by the union of Scotland and England, that of the formation of Canada in its modern sense of a coexistence of First Nations, pre-Conquest French, predominantly Anglophone (but sometimes Gaelic) British, and American, European, and global immigrants. Like the history of Ulster in Ireland, those of Quebec in Canada and Scotland in Britain are still going on, still problematic, and not very likely to be finally resolved; and in the formation of Canada, we have begun catching sight of a plurality of contexts in which the American Revolution may be situated, leading toward a history different from—though in no sense displacing—that of the United States as a continental and global civilization whose history operates within its own parameters.

Because of the magnetic power of the latter history, it is tempting to think of the American Revolution as spelling the end of the old British-Atlantic world (or "first British empire") and the substitution of a new history that renders the former marginal. To historians of the United States, this is a legitimate perspective; but it is possible to continue a British-Atlantic history in which the independence of the thirteen colonies is one among a constellation of major phenomena. Empire survived in the slave islands of the Caribbean, and there is a narratable relationship between this circumstance and the termination first of the slave trade and then of slavery itself. One may speculate whether Emancipation would have been possible in the old empire, without fighting a sectional civil war half a century before that of 1861–1865; the problem of mainland slavery was transferred into the context of U.S. history, with what results we know. There open up from this point important differences between the Afro-Caribbean and the African-American historical experiences; a "Black Atlantic" historiography is beginning to affirm the capacity of Afro-Caribbean (and Indo-Muslim) people to recolonize Britain and become Britons of their own kind and their own pigmentations (I do not ask whether they think of themselves as Europeans). British history is once again connected with that of the Atlantic triangle; and—a second major phenomenon—empire survived in America north of the Great Lakes and in the St. Lawrence Valley, where the complex formation known as "Canada" continues an American, Atlantic, and British history not identical with that of the United States. We do not understand the American Revolution until we understand that American history is not its only outcome; Caribbean and Canadian histories claim a parity of esteem, derived from the sheer facts of their existence and their complicated continuity, and they still figure in a British history conceived as a history of empire in more than one sense of the term.

Nor are these histories detachable from that of the Atlantic archipelago and the kingdom of Great Britain. The history of Ulster Presbyterianism offers one set of links, that of the Church of Ireland leadership of the Patriot Volunteers another, between the American crisis of the 1770s and 1780s and the Irish crisis twenty years later; and if the rebellion of 1798 and the recoil of 1800 establish the confrontation between revolutionary and Unionist Ireland of which we are still attempting a

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reconciliation, any linkage between the Act of Union and the Catholic Emancipation of 1829 connects the former with the end of the English (and British) "long eighteenth century" in the legislation of 1829–1832. A British and even an Atlantic history of the English and their state remains possible and desirable, and I do not share J. C. D. Clark's pessimism about "the strange death of British history."[24] Academic fashion is one thing, but academic achievement outlasts it.

Eliga Gould's essay returns us—more valuably, I think, than Armitage's—to the themes considered at the beginning of this commentary: Seeley's Greater Britain and the problem of the Commonwealth. The British response to the American and French revolutions included a renewal and extension of sea-borne global empire, whose history—once we regard it as that of the formation, deformation, and transformation of peoples—seems to fall into a number of categories: among them imperial rule (misnamed "colonial")[25] over Indians and Africans, a set of relationships (by no means obvious in character) between the crown and the true "colonies" of settlement, and the middle case of societies of transported and then emancipated slaves. There is something to be said for treating these together, much for treating them apart. The histories of the colonies of settlement—the former dominions, or neo-Britains—form some of the threads in this pattern, or tangle; and one of the origins of the "new British history" lies in the perceived need they are under to rewrite British history, in order both to enhance their understanding of their own and to point out to the United Kingdom British that there is a history of common substance, which Europeanization must not be allowed to write out of existence.[26] But that history was and is problematic. The neo-Britains wrote their own histories in the act of creating them; they wrote them for internal consumption, and it was the easier for metropolitans to ignore them as provincial because they afforded less (though not no)[27] occasion for the display of virtuous disapproval with which historians like to write about "imperialism." Gould argues convincingly that Seeley was unable to write a Greater British history, enlarging that of the archipelago into that of the empire of settlement, because the United States loomed continentally before him, dwarfing both the history he hoped to write and the project of imperial federation he hoped to further by it. But it is a consequence that the histories of the neo-Britains themselves figure no more in Gould's narrative than in Seeley's. It is true that only one of them falls within the province of this *Forum*. Canadian history, seen from east to west, continues in patterns of its own the themes of archipelagic, Atlantic, and American history begun as far back as the year 1600; although there is a case for considering its Pacific coast settlements as the product not of overland but of overseas expansion, colonies established in the same nineteenth-century complex of oceans as Australia, New Zealand, and (an apparent case of failure)

[24] J. C. D. Clark, "The Strange Death of British History? Reflections on Anglo-American Scholarship," *Historical Journal* 40, no. 3 (1997): 787–810.

[25] A "colony" is a settlement established by emigration. It is by metaphor, and not particularly happily, that the term has been transformed to the case of indigenous populations subject to alien empire (thus permitting discontented settler nationalists to identify their case with the latter).

[26] It is to be hoped that Professor Belich (n. 5 above) will continue his studies of this history.

[27] The history of Australia has been written largely, though contestedly, in terms of resistance to British cultural subjugation; that of New Zealand less so.

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South Africa. These nations (unfashionable word) need to construct and write their own histories and their own British history; if Canada is the only one of them whose history begins in the early modern world of the archipelago and the Atlantic, to write the history of that world and its transformations serves as a beginning. There was a British world, both European and oceanic, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; it had a history, which will have successors.

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Review Essay

The Cold War: What Do "We Now Know"?

MELVYN P. LEFFLER

DURING THE LAST FEW YEARS, we have had a spate of important new books, articles, and essays reinterpreting the Cold War. Many of them have been based on new documents and memoirs from the former Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China as well as from European governments on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The books are provocative and insightful. They focus attention on the role of ideology and the importance of culture. They illuminate the complex interactions within the American and Soviet "empires." They assess the influence of small powers as well as highlight the strength of the two superpowers. They add greatly to our understanding of such key events in the Cold War as the Marshall Plan, the Korean War, and the Cuban missile crisis. They demonstrate the importance of individual leaders like Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, but they also highlight contingency and inadvertence. They suggest that we have to think more deeply about the connections between power, culture, and political economy as well as the linkages between beliefs, perceptions, and behavior. None of this can be done without appreciating the interaction between national decision-making and the evolution of the international system.

The object of this essay is to review some of the most important new scholarship, and to argue that the new evidence and the new writings do not leave us with a clear and unambiguous view of the Cold War. Although the most important and most influential of the new books is entitled *We Now Know*, my own view is much more modest.[1] Recent books provide us with new information, fresh insights, and provocative argumentation. Sometimes, they revive old controversies; at other times, they reconfigure these controversies in fascinating and unexpected ways. But what is striking is the extent to which the new scholarship leaves itself open to diverse conclusions.

It is striking, but not surprising. As students of international history weave more and more factors into their narratives—as they take ideas, values, language, and culture more seriously,[2] as they think about race and gender,[3] as they probe

[1] John L. Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford, 1997).

[2] For some excellent examples of how scholarly interest in culture, language, and ideas is affecting the writing of international history, see Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954* (Cambridge, 1998); David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis, 1992); Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second*

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relations between "strong" and "weak" powers,[4] as they link economics to geopolitics,[5] as they assess the impact of ideology on perceptions of power, threat, and opportunity,[6] as they evaluate the role of domestic political culture on strategy, diplomacy, war, and peace,[7] as they explore correlations between military capabilities and diplomatic initiatives[8]—the story of the Cold War is likely to become more contentious as it becomes more interesting and complex. The Cold War will defy any single master narrative.

This point is worth stressing in light of John Lewis Gaddis's new synthesis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*. This volume is likely to set the parameters for a whole new generation of scholarship. No historian is better known for his work on the Cold War. In 1972, Gaddis won the Bancroft Prize (Columbia University) for his monograph on the origins of the Cold War.[9] Several years later, he published *Strategies of Containment*, one of the most influential books ever written on post–World War II international relations.[10] Gaddis became known as the foremost

World War (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1994); Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Baltimore, Md., 1997).

[3] For race, see, for example, Brenda Gayle Plummer, *Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935–1960* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1996); Thomas Borstelmann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War* (New York, 1993); the articles and comments by Carol Anderson, Michael L. Krenn, Gerald Horne, Penny M. Von Eschen, Brenda Gayle Plummer, and Helen Laville and Scott Lucas in "Symposium: African Americans and U.S. Foreign Relations," *Diplomatic History* 20 (Fall 1996): 531–650; Paul Gordon Lauren, *Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination* (Boulder, Colo., 1988); for gender, see, for example, Andrew J. Rotter, "Gender Relations, Foreign Relations: The United States and South Asia, 1947–1964," *Journal of American History* 81 (September 1994): 518–42; Frank Costigliola, "'Unceasing Pressure for Penetration': Gender, Pathology, and Emotion in George Kennan's Formation of the Cold War," *Journal of American History* 84 (March 1997): 1309–39; Robert D. Dean, "Masculinity as Ideology," *Diplomatic History* 22 (Winter 1998): 29–62.

[4] For excellent examples, see Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan* (New York, 1994); Nick Cullather, *Illusions of Influence: The Political Economy of United States–Philippines Relations, 1942–1960* (Stanford, Calif., 1994); Ilya Gaiduk, *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War* (Chicago, 1996).

[5] For different approaches to these linkages, see, for example, Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York, 1987); Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, 2 vols. (Princeton, N.J., 1981, 1990); Thomas J. McCormick, *America's Half Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War* (Baltimore, Md., 1989); Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, Calif., 1992).

[6] See, for example, William Curti Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1993); Deborah Welch Larson, *Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations during the Cold War* (Ithaca, 1997).

[7] For illustrative studies, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J., 1995); Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958* (Princeton, 1996); Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post–Cold War World* (Princeton, 1993).

[8] These correlations are critical for understanding key events in the Cold War, such as the Cuban missile crisis. See, for example, Aleksandr Fursenko, *"One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964* (New York, 1997); Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Cambridge, Mass., 1997); see also Richard Ned Lebow, "Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump through Them?" *International Security* 9 (Summer 1984): 147–86; Richard K. Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance* (Washington, D.C., 1987); Marc Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy* (Princeton, N.J., 1991).

[9] John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947* (New York, 1972).

[10] John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York, 1982).

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proponent of a school of interpretation called post-revisionism.[11] In contrast to revisionists, who had focused considerable attention on U.S. economic motives and who assigned the United States a share of responsibility for the Cold War, Gaddis stressed the importance of geopolitics and power balances. American officials, he believed, were not seeking economic gain. Constrained by domestic politics, hamstrung by bureaucratic imperatives, and preoccupied with correlations of power in the international system, they sought to contain Soviet influence and Communist power. In so doing, Gaddis acknowledged, the United States established its own empire, but it was an empire of liberty, an empire of diversity, an empire that allowed for the exercise of autonomy by allies who were happy to be part of it. Overall, Gaddis spent rather little time talking about ideas or assigning blame. He held the Soviet Union primarily responsible for the Cold War, but he did not dwell on this matter. In Gaddis's view, however, Stalin, an authoritarian leader, had the flexibility to act more rationally and behave more discreetly within his own sphere of influence. U.S. officials, in contrast, could not be expected to act quite so rationally because of the pressures emanating from democratic politics in a pluralist system.[12]

What is so distinctive about Gaddis's new book is the extent to which he abandons post-revisionism and returns to a more traditional interpretation of the Cold War. In unequivocal terms, he blames the Cold War on Stalin's personality, on authoritarian government, and on Communist ideology. As long as Stalin was running the Soviet Union, "a cold war was unavoidable." He waged cold wars incessantly: within the international system, within his alliances, within his country, within his party, within his personal entourage, [and] even within his family." "It took men," says Gaddis, "responding unpredictably to circumstances, to forge the chain of causation [leading to the Cold War]; and it took one man in particular, responding predictably to his own authoritarian, paranoid, and narcissistic predisposition, to lock it into place."[13]

Stalin was what he was because he was an ideologue, a particular sort of ideologue, a Marxist-Leninist. We now know, writes Gaddis, that ideology "often determined" the behavior of such regimes. Ideology was not simply a rationale or a justification but a source of behavior and a point of reference for understanding the world. Most important, stresses Gaddis, Stalin was a revolutionary. "He never gave up on the idea of an eventual world revolution, but he expected this to result . . . from an expansion of influence emanating from the Soviet Union itself." More ominous still was the fact that Stalin fused Marxist internationalism with czarist imperialism. We now know, says Gaddis, that Stalin did not have limited ambitions, "only that he had no timetable for achieving them."[14]

Without closely examining Stalin's actions, Gaddis chooses to look at the structure of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and finds it distinctively different from the American empire. Here, he borrows from his former writings and

[11] John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Thesis on the Origins of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History* 7 (Summer 1983): 171–90.

[12] See especially the conclusion to his first book, *United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, 353–61.

[13] Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 292–93, 25.

[14] Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 290, 29–31.

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extrapolates themes first argued by the Norwegian scholar Geir Lundestad.[15] The Soviet empire was imposed from without; it was brutal, totalitarian, and ideologically driven. The empire was circumscribed only by Stalin's own perception of risk. In contrast, the empire established by the United States in Western Europe was a matter of invitation. It came about belatedly, only as other nations felt threatened and as the United States felt increasingly endangered. The source of American action was its feeling of vulnerability, a vulnerability emanating from fear of another Pearl Harbor. Nonetheless, the United States struggled to overcome its sense of vulnerability and defined its safety in multilateral terms of common security. The Cold War developed "when it became clear that Stalin either could not or would not accept this framework." Therefore, we now know that "the American empire arose primarily, not from internal causes, as had the Soviet empire, but from a perceived external danger powerful enough to overcome American isolationism."[16]

Whereas in Gaddis's early work, democratic pluralism was a complicating factor hindering effective policymaking, it emerges in his new book as one of the great attributes of the American empire. The "habits of democracy" encouraged compromise with allies and conciliation toward defeated enemies. In implementing the Marshall Plan, forming NATO, and designing military strategy, U.S. officials were "flexible enough to accept and build upon ideas that came from allies; they also frequently let allies determine the timing of actions taken." The result was that the French, British, and other West Europeans "came to feel that they had a stake in what Washington was doing despite the fact that it amounted to their own incorporation within an American sphere of influence." In fact, we now know that all the key American initiatives in Germany were improvisations suggested by allies or responses to Stalin's threatening behavior. The United States had no grand design.[17]

But it had market capitalism, and this was a key factor in determining the outcome of the Cold War. We now know that Stalin postulated another crisis in world capitalism and anticipated an intracapitalist conflict. He could be prudent and cautious as well as risky and opportunistic because in the long run Stalin knew that there would be another crash and another war, most probably between the British and the Americans. But while Stalin rejected the Bretton Woods accords and sought to isolate his sphere from the European Recovery Program, the Americans brilliantly improvised, wove together the best features of Bretton Woods and the Marshall Plan, engineered the recovery of West Germany and Japan, and allowed independent centers of power to flourish within its empire. Americans wagered that their system of democratic capitalism would serve as a magnet, and they were right.[18]

According to Gaddis, one of the great lessons to be learned from Cold War history is that power is multidimensional. The Soviets thought in terms of missiles,

[15] Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952," *Journal of Peace Research* 23 (September 1986): 263–77.

[16] Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 30–31, 36, 38.

[17] Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 44, 125.

[18] Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 189–207.

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warheads, and tanks, and sometimes the Americans did as well. But Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower, and their advisers, were especially shrewd in grasping that nuclear weapons were unusable in war as well as in diplomacy. Although the United States foolishly multiplied its arsenal, the strategy of massive retaliation was really designed to deter all conflict. Chairman Nikita Khrushchev, however, took the balance of military power more seriously, became ensnared in the arms race, and sought to enhance the influence, prestige, and power of the Soviet Union by excelling in the military realm. The Americans were duped into thinking that military might really mattered and foolishly exaggerated Soviet strength, thereby prolonging the Cold War far beyond its necessary time. In truth, says Gaddis, the bipolar configuration of power was over long before anyone realized it. The Soviets had only military power, and this was of little use in competition with an ideological system and political economy as resilient and appealing as democratic capitalism.[19]

Contemporaries, however, did not realize this truth, and hence the Cold War was fought on the periphery for no good reason whatsoever. Here, the United States often erred, but its errors were understandable, as officals in Washington simply sought to contain the outward thrusts of Soviet power. Gaddis employs a "hydraulic" theory of geopolitics: dams built and dikes bolstered simply diverted one Soviet expansionist thrust after another to a different location. Thwarted in Europe by the Marshall Plan, Stalin turned his attention to Asia. "He had never abandoned his commitment to world revolution." After initially equivocating in his support for the Chinese revolution, Stalin embraced Mao. "What is striking about Stalin's conversations with his new Chinese allies," writes Gaddis, "is the emotion—even the sentimentality—they reflect. It is almost as if the aging dictator saw, in Mao's victory, a vicarious return to his own revolutionary youth."[20]

The new evidence, argues Gaddis, demonstrates much closer ties between Stalin, Mao, Kim Il Sung, and Ho Chi Minh than we previously imagined. There was no communist monolith controlled by Moscow, "but there was a common sense of ideological euphoria—a conviction that the forces of history were on their side—which very much influenced" their actions.[21] Although Stalin previously had discouraged Kim's desire to attack South Korea, he reversed himself in early 1950. Believing that the Truman administration would not interfere in Korea, Stalin unveiled his instinctive opportunism to spread revolution. Mao, says Gaddis, was a willing accomplice. Indeed, we now supposedly know that Mao was inclined to intervene from the outset of the Korean conflict and was waiting for a propitious opportunity. He was certainly eager to support his communist friends in Indochina against the French, so why not drive the American imperialists out of Korea as well?[22]

Revolutionary romanticism, Gaddis tells us, was a common characteristic of the leaders in the Kremlin. Just as it inspired Stalin's adventurism in Korea, it impelled Khrushchev twelve years later to deploy intermediate and tactical nuclear weapons

[19] Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 284, 291–92, 221–80.
[20] Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 167, 67.
[21] Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 83.
[22] Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 77–82, 158–63.

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into Cuba. Gaddis says the new evidence makes it clear that Khrushchev acted to save Fidel Castro's revolution from a prospective intervention by the United States. "The Soviet leader gave first priority to defending Cuba; the strategic balance was, for him, an important but secondary consideration." Although this hierarchy of motives might seem surprising, it fits perfectly into Gaddis's overall interpretive framework: in Cuba, as elsewhere, "Marxism-Leninism produced more romanticism than realism."[23]

We now know, according to Gaddis, that capitalist democracies are not only more peace-loving and more productive but also more realistic in the making of their foreign policy. The swirl of democratic politics, the checks and balances of parliamentary government and legislative-executive relations, and the exigencies imposed by free markets inject prudence and compromise into the making of foreign policy and the conduct of diplomacy. Authoritarian regimes, subject to the whims of single leaders, are more prone to arbitrary, adventurist, and self-defeating behavior.[24]

Contemporaries understood the superiority of capitalist democracies. Gaddis says that historians in the past have been reluctant to label the Cold War as a struggle between good and evil, but people living at the time grasped this essential truth. In an arresting conclusion, Gaddis declares that "many people saw the Cold War as a contest of good versus evil." When they could, they fled from Soviet armies and from the Kremlin's puppet regimes. Raped by Russian soldiers, starved by wreckless agricultural and economic policies, and spiritually eviscerated by heartless regimes, peoples living under communist governments yearned for change. In contrast, democracies manifested generosity and wisdom, nurtured individuality and economic growth. The outcome of the Cold War, therefore, was largely preordained by the superiority of democratic capitalism in providing for people's material and spiritual needs. Gaddis concludes:

> civility on one side and its absence on the other played an enormous role in shaping the course of events. The rapes in [Germany] dramatized differences between Soviet authoritarianism and American democracy in ways that could hardly have been more direct. Social history, even gender history, intersected with humanity to make diplomatic history. What this suggests, then, is that historians of the Cold War need to look quite carefully at what those who *saw* distinctions between good and evil *thought and did* about them. For when people vote with their feet, it generally means that they have ideas in their minds. But to understand these, we have to take seriously what *they at the time believed*.[25]

I have taken time to summarize Gaddis's themes at length because he is the preeminent historian of the Cold War, and he is providing a new master narrative to serve as a framework for interpreting the new documents, digesting the new literature, and understanding the framework of international relations for much of the second half of the twentieth century. Gaddis writes with an encyclopedic knowledge of events. He has a probing intellect, an ability to identify core issues, a feel for the illuminating detail, a sense of irony, a penchant for memorable metaphors. Moreover, Gaddis's advice to take ideas seriously, look carefully at the

[23] Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 265–66.
[24] Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 49–53, 110–12, 198–203, 218–20, 266–69, 288–89.
[25] Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 286–87.

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conditions and aspirations of common people, and examine the impact of culture provides avenues for linking the history of international relations to important historiographical trends in other subdisciplines. The critical questions, of course, relate to whether Gaddis's volume accurately sums up current trends in the literature and integrates them effectively with what we already had learned about the Cold War. To what extent has he followed his own advice and looked seriously at what people believed at the time? To what extent is his book telling us more about the outcome of the Cold War than about its causes and evolution?

THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT GADDIS'S EMPHASIS on Communist ideology resonates deeply through some of the current literature.[26] In their extraordinarily interesting book, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*, Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov argue that ideology was a key element that shaped Soviet behavior from V. I. Lenin to Mikhail Gorbachev. There was "a lodestar" that guided Stalin. "It was the promise of Communist revolutionary universalism combined with the necessities of survival for the Soviet Union."[27] Nobody reading Stalin's early letters to Politburo member and later chairman of the Council of People's Commissars V. M. Molotov can doubt the presence of a ruthless ideological fervor.[28] Nor do Molotov's published reminiscences leave any doubt that ideology was his lodestar.[29] No matter how cynical they became, "the transformation of the world under the aegis and with the assistance of the Soviet Union remained a powerful raison d'etre for the corporate mentality of Soviet power elites."[30]

Stalin's personality and its ideological underpinnings is also the major theme of Vojtech Mastny's prize-winning book, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity* (1996). Domestic considerations and Communist ideology dictated Soviet behavior. Beliefs and principles, Mastny emphasizes, must be taken seriously. Although Mastny does not quite clarify which beliefs and principles must be taken most seriously, he suggests that most fundamental was the Bolsheviks' belief that "the outside world remained implacably hostile." Lenin, Stalin, and their co-conspirators knew that their regime was not an expression of popular will. They grasped the vulnerability of their rule. Stalin's major preoccupation was preserving his autocratic power. Sounding much like George F. Kennan on containment policy in 1946, Mastny

[26] See, for example, "Symposium: Soviet Archives: Recent Revelations and Cold War Historiography," *Diplomatic History* 21 (Spring 1997): 217–305; Douglas J. Macdonald, "Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism," *International Security* 20 (Winter 1995–96): 152–88.

[27] Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, Mass., 1996), 12; Vladislav Zubok, "Stalin's Plans and Russian Archives," *Diplomatic History* 21 (Spring 1997): 295–306.

[28] Lars T. Lih, Oleg V. Naumov, and Oleg V. Khlevniuk, eds., *Stalin's Letters to Molotov, 1925–1936* (New Haven, Conn., 1995).

[29] Albert Resis, ed., *Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics; Conversations with Felix Chuev* (Chicago, 1993); see also Steven M. Minor's essay, "His Master's Voice: Viacheslav M. Molotov as Stalin's Foreign Commissar," in Gordon A. Craig and Francis L. Lowenheim, eds., *The Diplomats: 1939–1979* (Princeton, N.J., 1994), 65–100.

[30] Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*, 77.

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argues that Stalin purposely conjured foreign threats in order to cement his rule at home.[31]

Yet Mastny's focus on the insecurity of Soviet leaders leads to a different characterization of Soviet foreign policy than that found in Gaddis's volume. "Despite Stalin's ideological dedication," Mastny stresses, "revolution was for him a means to power rather than a goal in itself." Stalin and his comrades were interested primarily in preserving their regime and their power inside the Soviet Union. Rather than being adventurous or romantic, they were innately cautious. "Only in response to the rising German threat [in the 1930s] did Stalin develop the concept of an empire as an operational goal related to security," writes Mastny. Much as he looked for evidence of Stalin's design to impose communist governments on his neighbors at the end of the war, Mastny could not find any. "Nowhere beyond what Moscow considered the Soviet borders did its policies foresee the establishment of communist regimes."[32]

For Mastny, ideology did not dictate an offensive, expansionist, revolutionary foreign policy. Nor in Zubok and Pleshakov's view did ideology mean the promotion of revolution. At the end of World War II, they stress, Stalin had no master plan, no design to foment insurrection or to establish a communist empire. He was a paranoid schemer, a cautious expansionist, a risk-averse opportunist, a brutal dictator, but, in the view of Zubok and Pleshakov, he was not a "revolutionary romanticist." "Stalin was the first statesman to grasp the notion that promoting world revolution was not a goal in and of itself, but rather that it provided the rationale for building a strong Soviet Union." "Stalin," they write, "knew all too well that once a revolutionary leader becomes a state potentate, he acts according to geopolitical realities, national conditions, the logic of power itself."[33]

In fact, the theme of realpolitik runs through a great number of the recent books and articles on the Cold War, a point that the reader of Gaddis's volume alone would not know. This is apparent in the analyses of one of the most intriguing subjects of recent Cold War scholarship: the relationship between Mao and Stalin. We now do know, as Gaddis argues, that the relationship between the two men was much closer than previously assumed. We now do know that, during the late 1930s and 1940s, there was ongoing, almost continuous communication between the Chinese Communists and the Kremlin. We now do know that Mao looked to Stalin for advice, support, and a model for communist development.[34] But it is far from clear that revolutionary romanticism or ideological fervor dictated either man's foreign policy. In a fascinating study of Mao's and Stalin's foreign policy actions up to and including the Korean War, Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue Litai conclude:

[31] Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (New York, 1996), esp. 3–5, 11, 24, 191; see Kennan's "Long Telegram," George F. Kennan, *Memoirs*, Vol. 1: *1925–1950* (New York, 1967), 583–98.

[32] Mastny, *Cold War and Soviet Insecurity*, 12, 15, 21.

[33] Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*, 69, 13, 62.

[34] Michael M. Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States* (Princeton, N.J., 1997); Sheng, "The Triumph of Internationalism: CCP-Moscow Relations before 1949," *Diplomatic History* 21 (Winter 1997): 95–104; Yang Kuisong, "The Soviet Factor and the CCP's Policy toward the United States in the 1940s," *Chinese Historians* 5 (Spring 1992): 17–34; Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York, 1994), 66–69.

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Ideology, we find, played a secondary role, despite the apparent similarities between their socioeconomic systems, bureaucratic doctrines, Kafkaesque institutions, and avowed adherence to Marxism-Leninism. On the surface, ideology served as an important link during the creation of the alliance and on some later occasions, but again the documents deflate ideology's significance. This is not to discount the significance of ideology on the foreign policies of the two nations altogether but simply to suggest that it carried far less weight than other facets of the essential dynamics shaping their foreign policy decisions.[35]

Since Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue published their study in 1993, much more information has come to light, especially with respect to the causes of the Korean War. Chen Jian, Shu Guang Zhang, Alexandre Y. Mansourov, and Kathryn Weathersby have examined with great care the complicated motives and actions prompting the behavior of Stalin and Mao.[36] In his introduction to *Mao's Military Romanticism*, Zhang says that it is necessary to use a cultural approach to grasp Chinese actions during the Korean War. The Chinese, he says, were not merely responding to perceptions of their security. We need to see how "aspirations, attitudes, beliefs, desires, idealism, sentimentality, and other 'manifestations of human consciousness' shaped the actions of Chinese revolutionary leaders."[37]

Yet, in the analysis leading up to the actual Chinese intervention, Zhang stresses that, "Given their abiding fear that the US might take provocative action either from the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, or Indochina, the Chinese communists viewed the American armed intervention in Korea as strong evidence of US hostility toward China." In a typical comment on August 4, 1950, prior to the successful American invasion of Inchon, Mao told his comrades, "If the US imperialists win [the war in Korea], they may get so dizzy with success that they may threaten us. We therefore must come to [North] Korea's aid and intervene in the name of a volunteer army, although we will select the best timing [to do so]." And although it is not Zhang's intention to illustrate the defensive orientation of Mao's actions in Indochina, his evidence does not lend support to Gaddis's extrapolation of military romanticism on behalf of international communist revolution. Zhang shows that many factors shaped Mao's thinking—tradition and suspicion as well as revolutionary fervor—and not least his desire to safeguard his revolution and thwart his enemies at home and abroad. His support of Ho, for example, stemmed, at least in part, from his perception that Vietnamese communist control of a buffer zone along the border would enhance the PRC's security.[38]

[35] Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford, Calif., 1993), 219.

[36] Chen, *China's Road to the Korean War*; Shu Guang Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949–1958* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1992); Alexandre Y. Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War, September 16–October 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6–7 (Winter 1995–96): 94–107; Kathryn Weathersby, "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence," *Journal of American–East Asian Relations* 2 (Winter 1993): 425–59; Weathersby, "New Russian Archival Materials, Old American Debates, and the Korean War," *Problems of Post-Communism* (September–October 1995): 25–32.

[37] Shu Guang Zhang, *Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–1953* (Lawrence, Kans., 1995), 9.

[38] Zhang, *Mao's Military Romanticism*, 56 and 63 (for the quotations); see also 67–85. In his book, Chen Jian writes, "The CCP's attitude toward Vietnam was first and foremost the logical result of the Chinese Communist perception of an Asian revolution following the Chinese model." But he goes on

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Chinese Communist assumptions about the intractable hostility of capitalist powers were inextricably interwoven with their perception of national interest and their desire to safeguard the revolution that they had pulled off against unlikely odds. In a multinational history of the Korean War, William Stueck writes that "Mao's revolutionary ideology joined with his commitment to his nation's traditional conception of itself as the 'Middle Kingdom.'" In the spring of 1950, prior to the outbreak of war in Korea, Mao had mixed goals: he wanted to seize Taiwan, eradicate Chinese Nationalist strongholds on his periphery, and project his influence into Korea and Indochina. Whether he would intervene in a prospective war in Korea appears entirely contingent. In a point elided by Gaddis, Stueck emphasizes that it was American action in October and November 1950 that precipitated the wider conflict. "Rather than deterring the Chinese, U.S. aggressiveness provoked them." U.S. officials did not intend to intervene in China, but the "course they pursued," argues Stueck, "gave Mao reason to suspect otherwise."[39]

Michael Hunt goes somewhat further in highlighting contingency and denying the saliency of Communist ideology in Mao's actions. In his thoughtful and finely textured account of Chinese Communist foreign policy, Hunt contends that, although Mao "took Marxist-Leninist theory seriously and paid tuition as a dutiful student of the lessons that the Soviet ideological system had to teach," he "refused to bind his policy to a fixed doctrine."[40] Most of Mao's comrades did not want to intervene in the Korean conflict, and Mao himself wavered. When General Douglas MacArthur ordered UN troops to the Yalu River, Hunt stresses, U.S. actions forced Mao to stop equivocating.[41] Mao's thinking, according to Hunt, "consisted of multiple strands twisted uneasily together, and his explicitly experimental style gave considerable play to combining ideas in different patterns as he faced changing circumstances." Chinese Communist foreign policy, in other words, was a potpourri of many traditions and clashing sentiments. "Though a socialist nation was to arise where a Confucian empire once stood, the old dreams of cultural glory and political dominance in Asia and the traditional hostility toward equal state relations and broad international contacts seemed to live on." Beijing may have seemed like an inflexible and dangerous ideologue, but Hunt's reading of the recent documents leads him to the conclusion that Marxist-Leninist ideology "has been one source for policy and that, as a source, it can sustain not one policy but a wide variety of them."[42]

Beliefs must be taken seriously, as Gaddis instructs us, but the beliefs are more

to say as well, "CCP leaders also believed that standing by their Vietnamese comrades would serve their goal of safeguarding China's security interests." The safety of the "Central Kingdom" "could not be properly maintained if its neighboring areas fell into the hands of 'hostile' barbarian forces." See Chen, *China's Road to the Korean War*, 104. Looking at similar documents, Qiang Zhai ranks the factors somewhat differently. A combination "of geopolitical, historical, and ideological factors," he writes, "determined Beijing's decision to intervene in the Korean fighting. Concern with China's security constituted the primary motive." Zhai, *The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949–1958* (Kent, Ohio, 1994), 75, 135–36; see also He Di, "The Most Respected Enemy: Mao Zedong's Perception of the United States," *China Quarterly* 137 (March 1994): 148–50.

[39] William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton, N.J., 1995), 39, 125.

[40] Michael H. Hunt, *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy* (New York, 1996), 208–09.

[41] Hunt, *Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy*, 187–89.

[42] Hunt, *Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy*, 210, 4–5.

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comprehensive and ambiguous than those encapsulated by Marxism-Leninism. After studying many new Chinese and Russian documents, Odd Arne Westad has decided that ideology is far more important than he thought it was when he first started his research on foreign intervention in the Chinese civil war. But, he admonishes, "it is necessary to establish a wider and more useful definition of ideology, encompassing not only a written tradition of authoritative texts and their exegesis but also credenda formed by personal and historical experience. In the case of the Soviet foreign policy elite, such a definition would cover Marxism (primarily in its Stalinist form) as well as the Soviet experience in international affairs and Russian traditional perceptions of themselves and others."[43]

In their study of the Kremlin's foreign policies from Stalin through Khrushchev, Zubok and Pleshakov employ this insight. Russia, they insist, "represented not only a nation but also a distinctive imperial civilization . . . Russian communists simply could not break with the imperial mode of thinking." Indeed, their faith in redemption through revolution blended with traditional Russian messianism and the Orthodox Church's stress on justice. Hence Zubok and Pleshakov use the revolutionary/imperial paradigm as a framework for encapsulating the different impulses that they see motivating Soviet foreign policy.[44] This paradigm undergirds some of Gaddis's analysis, but it is used more adroitly by Zubok and Pleshakov because they are less intent on finding revolutionary fervor behind all of the Kremlin's actions.

Yet even the imperial/revolutionary paradigm founders on complexity. Zubok and Pleshakov acknowledge this in their concluding postmortem. Throughout their book, they have stressed the twin pillars of empire and revolution to explain the course of Soviet foreign policy. But the logic of the evidence, they seem to admit, now forces them to focus on a third factor: "the policies of the West, primarily the United States." At the end of the war, they contend, Stalin grasped the Soviet Union's relative weakness. He understood that there was much to gain from a continuation of the wartime alliance, not the least important of which were American loans and reparations from the western zones of Germany. "Notwithstanding his reputation as a ruthless tyrant," Stalin "was not prepared to take a course of unbridled unilateral expansionism after World War II. He wanted to avoid confrontation with the West. He was even ready to see cooperation with the Western powers as a preferable way of building his influence and solving contentious international issues. Thus, the Cold War was not his choice or his brainchild."[45]

This conclusion seems to depart dramatically from Gaddis's views. In fact, Zubok and Pleshakov stridently assert that "Stalin's postwar foreign policy was more defensive, reactive, and prudent than it was the fulfillment of a master plan."[46] Stalin was reacting to the death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the ostensibly

[43] Odd Arne Westad, "Russian Archives and Cold War History," *Diplomatic History* 21 (Spring 1997): 264–66; for his earlier views, see Westad, *Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944–1946* (New York, 1993).

[44] Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*, 2–3; see also Westad, "Russian Archives and Cold War History," 266.

[45] Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*, 275–76.

[46] Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*, 277.

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more bellicose diplomacy of Truman, the apparent American employment of atomic diplomacy to extract concessions from Moscow, and the announcement of the Marshall Plan. In contrast to Gaddis, they do not think that American diplomacy was quite so passive.[47]

Mastny agrees with Zubok and Pleshakov that Stalin did not want a Cold War. Yet Mastny stresses that Stalin could not avoid a Cold War because of his paranoia and insecurity.[48] There is an irony here, because Mastny believes that Stalin's foreign policy should be understood in terms of Soviet insecurity; yet Mastny evades the question of whether Western actions did endanger Soviet security or encroach on Soviet sovereignty. At the very outset of his book, Mastny stresses the Kremlin perception of implacable Western hostility. "Whether this was true or not, their constant perception of a threat prevented Soviet leaders from ever feeling sufficiently secure."[49] Mastny does not carefully address whether there was or was not a threat, whether the Soviets had reason or not to fear Western actions. Later on in the volume, he provides a marvellous account of the Kremlin's purges in Eastern Europe and notes that they were in part the result of growing confrontational initiatives by the United States, including a host of covert operations in Albania and elsewhere. The looming threat, Mastny writes, "though genuinely perceived, was also deliberately exaggerated."[50]

And so it was, with devastating repercussions for the peoples of Eastern Europe. Postulating the West's hostility and psychologically unable to assess real from imagined threats, Stalin demanded, says Mastny, a sense of security that could not help but endanger the security of everybody else.[51] Here, Mastny does sound much like Gaddis, and they are joined by Zubok and Pleshakov. The latter two Russian historians write that, notwithstanding Stalin's desire to avoid confrontation, "he managed to draw closer to it with every step." For the explanation, they return to the revolutionary/imperial paradigm.[52]

WHAT UNITES THE WORKS OF Gaddis, Mastny, and Zubok and Pleshakov is their shared view that Stalin's actions made no sense in traditional diplomatic or geopolitical terms. The Kremlin's policies, they stress, reduced Soviet security and invited confrontation. These outcomes, they explain, underscore Stalin's paranoia, his lust for absolute power, and his embrace of the revolutionary/imperial paradigm.

Yet there are other ways to explain the outcome of Soviet policies. Nations frequently take actions that are designed to enhance their security but that have the opposite effect. Their initiatives endanger the security of others, thereby precipitating reactions that further intensify their own sense of vulnerability. This concept is known as the security dilemma, and is a phenomenon frequently noted by

[47] Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*, 36–53.
[48] Mastny, *Cold War and Soviet Insecurity*, 23.
[49] Mastny, *Cold War and Soviet Insecurity*, 11.
[50] Mastny, *Cold War and Soviet Insecurity*, 83.
[51] Mastny, *Cold War and Soviet Insecurity*, 27.
[52] Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*, 277–78.

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political scientists who study international relations.[53] In other words, Soviet actions in eastern Germany and Eastern Europe, though ruthless and counterproductive, might not have been a consequence of Stalin's revolutionary fervor, or an imperial/revolutionary paradigm, or an inbred, irrational paranoia. They might have been a result of his quest for security.

To explore this alternative explanation, it is necessary to consider how Stalin and his comrades conceived of Soviet security at the end of World War II. How did they perceive threats and interpret dangers? How did ideology shape their understanding of the lessons of the past, and how did Soviet culture affect the implementation of their strategic requirements?

We now do know that, during the war, Nazi armies destroyed over 1,700 cities and towns and more than 70,000 villages and hamlets. They ransacked the countryside, destroying tens of thousands of collective farms and machine and tractor stations. The Germans demolished over 31,000 industrial enterprises, 1,100 coal pits, and 3,000 oil wells. They stole or slaughtered 17 million head of cattle, 20 million hogs, 27 million sheep and goats, and 7 million horses. The suffering was horrendous. Twenty-seven million people inside the Soviet Union perished during the conflict, many as a result of Stalin's foolish actions and barbarities but even more from Nazi atrocities and battlefield casualties.[54] The legacy of the Great Patriotic War has been an enduring part of the nation's memory.[55] Did it affect Soviet foreign policy? Did it shape the Kremlin's perception of its postwar security requirements?

In Gaddis's volume, Soviet losses during World War II are mentioned in a sentence and then passed over. Interestingly, he argues that Pearl Harbor had a lasting impact on U.S. national security policy. At Pearl Harbor, 2,400 Americans died. During the entirety of World War II, 425,000 American servicemen were killed. It is interesting that, for Gaddis, the Japanese attack left an indelible imprint on postwar American conceptions of national security, but the war apparently had little impact on the Kremlin.[56]

Other historians have come to different conclusions after looking carefully at the social history of World War II, the Soviet conception of national security, and the Kremlin's perception of threat. The war years, writes Elena Zubkova, "shaped all of postwar life. Without an understanding of the phenomenon of the war as it entered the flesh and blood of that generation, postwar history and social behavior are incomprehensible."[57] In his superb book *Stalin and the Bomb*, David Holloway agrees with Gaddis that Stalin pursued his interests unilaterally. But Holloway

[53] For classic allusions to the security dilemma, see, for example, Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J., 1976), 66–76; John Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2 (January 1950): 157–80; Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," *World Politics* 50 (1997): 171–201.

[54] "War Damage in USSR," *USSR Information Bulletin* 7 (May 14, 1947): 5–6; United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, *Economic Survey of Europe* (1947) (Geneva, 1948), 145–48; Nicholas Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia* (New York, 1963), 585. Gaddis acknowledges the figure of 27 million deaths. See Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 13.

[55] Elena Zubkova, *Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments*, Hugh Ragsdale, trans. (New York, 1998). Zubkova cites the figure of 26.6 million dead; p. 26.

[56] Gaddis, *We Now Know*, chaps. 1–2 but esp. pp. 13 and 35–36.

[57] Zubkova, *Russia after the War*, 12.

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stresses that Stalin rejected a revolutionary agenda: he "put the interests of the Soviet state above those of international revolution." Envisioning a turbulent postwar era in which capitalism might be wracked by crisis and war, Stalin wanted to enhance "Soviet power and security." He sought "to consolidate Soviet territorial gains, establish a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, and have a voice in the political fate of Germany and—if possible—of Japan."[58]

Numerous other scholars have examined the new evidence, seeking to explore whether Stalin sought security or revolution. Of course, it is possible to argue that these were intertwined, as Gaddis sometimes does. But others seem less certain, and claim that the new documents support an interpretation that highlights traditional geopolitical conceptions of security. This orientation is hardly surprising given the fact that almost all Russians viewed World War II as a defensive war, a struggle they never anticipated fighting on their own soil.[59] Vladimir Pechatnov and Aleksei Filitov, for example, analyze Soviet planning for the postwar years that took place during the war itself and conclude that the overriding stress was on state interests and security.[60] The documents examined by Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue suggest that from the closing days of World War II Stalin's main concern was for "an alliance with China to curb Japan."[61] Norman Naimark writes that, notwithstanding all the contradictory impulses in Soviet policy in eastern Germany, the evidence reveals the Kremlin's primary goals prior to mid-1947 to have been "geostrategic and economic." The Soviets wanted reparations and "a German government that would not threaten Soviet security. To these ends, the Soviets were willing to sacrifice the interests of the German Communists and promote those of the 'bourgeois' parties."[62]

In their excellent collection of essays on Soviet policy toward Europe during the early Cold War, editors Francesca Gori and Silvio Pons conclude that, overall, the "new evidence emerges with regard to the importance of the geostrategic perspective—giving prominence to power politics and to unilateral considerations of security."[63] Looking at relations with nations on the Soviet periphery, Sven Holtsmark shows that the fundamental aim of the Soviet Union in Scandinavia was to keep Norway and Denmark out of an Anglo-American sphere. "The pursuit of Soviet offensive strategic objectives in Denmark and Norway gradually gave way to the traditional and basically defensive policy of confining the Western great powers' influence in, and control over, these countries."[64] With regard to Finland, Jussi Hanhimaki contends that the Kremlin's overriding concern was not to spread

[58] David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1954* (New Haven, Conn., 1994), 168.

[59] Zubkova, *Russia after the War*, 12–14.

[60] Vladimir O. Pechatnov, "The Big Three after World War II: Documents on Soviet Thinking about Post War Relations with the United States and Great Britain," Working Papers, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project, no. 13 (Washington, D.C., 1995); Aleksei Filitov, "Problems of Post-War Construction in Soviet Policy Conceptions during World War II," in Francesca Gori and Silvio Pons, eds., *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943–1953* (London, 1996), 3–23.

[61] Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, *Uncertain Partners*, 3.

[62] Norman Naimark, "The Soviets and the Christian Democrats: The Challenge of a 'Bourgeois' Party in Eastern Germany, 1945–1949," *East European Politics and Society* 9 (Fall 1995): 3.

[63] Gori and Pons, *Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War*, xxii.

[64] Sven G. Holtsmark, "The Limits to Soviet Influence: Soviet Diplomats and the Pursuit of

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communism but "to avoid the possibility that Finland might be used as a springboard for an attack against the Soviet Union."[65] Looking at Iran, Natalia Yegorova sees no evidence that Stalin had plans for the overthrow of the central Iranian government. It appears, she asserts, that American and British attempts to develop Iranian oil resources near the Soviet border really were taken as a threat to Soviet national security interests.[66] Studying Stalin's approach to Korea, Kathryn Weathersby writes that his "main concern regarding Korea was to ensure that the peninsula would not become a staging ground for future aggression against the USSR."[67] "Stalin continued for the rest of his life to base his policy toward Northeast Asia on the assumption that Japan would rearm and again threaten the security of the USSR."[68]

But there can be little doubt that, in terms of security, the control of German power was the overriding preoccupation of Soviet officials. As Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze told a group of visitors in 1990, the Soviet Union might have been waging a cold war with the United States for almost forty years, but when his grandchildren played war games, Germany remained the enemy.[69] Not surprisingly, in one of the first efforts to examine systematically the Soviet response to the formation of NATO, Yegorova finds that the Kremlin's defensive posture was overridingly focused on the prospective revival of German militarism.[70] This comports with Mastny's tentative conclusion based on circumstantial evidence that initial Soviet contingency plans mostly focused on a "Western attack rather than the initiation of a Soviet attack."[71] The revival of German power lingered as an overriding element of Soviet foreign policy. Khrushchev and millions of Soviets, comment Zubok and Pleshakov, believed the German threat must never rise again. The support of the GDR "was first and foremost a strategic imperative."[72]

In view of this evidence, it is interesting to ponder the significance of a new, prize-winning book by Carolyn Eisenberg. Focusing on U.S. policy toward Germany

Strategic Interests in Norway and Denmark, 1944–7," in Gori and Pons, *Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War*, 121.

[65] Jussi M. Hanhimaki, *Containing Coexistence: America, Russia, and the "Finnish Solution," 1945–1956* (Kent, Ohio, 1997), 38.

[66] Natalia I. Yegorova, "The 'Iran Crisis' of 1945–1946: A View from the Russian Archives," Working Papers, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project, no. 15 (Washington, D.C., 1996), esp. 18 and 21.

[67] Weathersby, "New Russian Archival Materials, Old American Debates, and the Korean War," 26.

[68] Kathryn Weathersby, "Making Foreign Policy under Stalin: The Case of Korea" (Oslo, Paper Delivered at the Norwegian Nobel Institute, 1998), 7.

[69] Comments made by Shevardnadze at a meeting in Moscow with American and Russian scholars and diplomats, which I attended in June 1990. "Germany and Berlin," writes Anatoly Dobrynin, "overshadowed everything; Germany was, of course, the historic balance at the center of Europe, as well as our historic enemy, the cause of two world wars, and now the main battleground of the cold war, with Berlin, literally, as the front line." Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (1962–1986)* (New York, 1995), 63.

[70] Natalia I. Yegorova, "Soviet Perceptions of the Formation of NATO, 1948–1953" (Oslo, Paper Delivered at the Norwegian Nobel Institute, 1998), 15–16.

[71] Vojtech Mastny, "New Evidence on the NATO–Warsaw Pact Relationship, 1949–1969 (Oslo, Paper Delivered at the Norwegian Nobel Institute, 1998), 5; see also Giberto Villahermosa, "Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised: Deja Vu All Over Again," *Soviet Observer* 2 (September 1990): 2–5; Matthew Evangelista, "Intentions, Capabilities, and Context," *Diplomatic History* 22 (Summer 1998): 443–46.

[72] Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*, 180, 197.

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in the immediate aftermath of World War II, Eisenberg mobilizes considerable evidence demonstrating that the United States was far from passive. Writing in a mode that resuscitates the power and force of revisionist historiography of the 1960s and 1970s, Eisenberg shows that U.S. plans for the recovery of postwar capitalism depended on the revival of the German economy. The United States, she contends, took all the initiatives that wound up dividing Germany. The United States had to do what it did because it was of utmost importance to integrate the resources of the Ruhr and the Rhineland into their postwar plans for western European renewal. The Kremlin, she suggests, was willing to settle for a neutral, unified Germany, but U.S. officials would not risk the possibility of western Germany slipping out of an American sphere of influence.[73]

This argument seemingly fits well with the spate of new evidence showing a decisive turning point in the Cold War in mid-1947 as a result of the United States announcing the Marshall Plan. Stalin clearly saw this as a threat because the offer to include his eastern European neighbors as well as the Soviet Union itself portended a Western economic penetration of his sphere of influence as well as a revival of German power. His perception is understandable when one recalls that the number one goal of George Kennan's newly formed Policy Planning Staff in 1947 was to revive coal production in the Ruhr and that the United States and Great Britain moved ahead during that summer to boost the permissible level of German industrial production. Although Stalin previously had talked about the possibility of coordinating the actions of European communists, the American initiatives of 1947 prompted Stalin to establish the Cominform, declare the establishment of two camps, encourage strikes and demonstrations in Western Europe, and clamp down mercilessly in Eastern Europe.[74]

Stalin's moves during the first half of 1948 were reactive yet portentous, carefully calibrated yet ultimately counterproductive, just as the security dilemma would postulate. As Stalin maneuvered to support the efforts of his communist minions in Eastern Europe to grab power and as he negotiated a series of bilateral security treaties, his main goal was to consolidate his sphere. In fact, we now know that he stepped back from support of the Greek communists, told the Italian Communist Party not to try to take power, and, after equivocating, settled for a defensive pact with Finland rather than support a communist coup.[75] Throughout, Stalin's focus was on Germany. He sought to thwart Anglo-American efforts to merge the three

[73] Carolyn Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944–1949* (New York, 1996).

[74] Scott Parrish, "The Marshall Plan, Soviet-American Relations, and the Division of Europe," in Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii, eds., *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944–1949* (Boulder, Colo., 1997), 267–90; Geoffrey Roberts, "Moscow and the Marshall Plan: Politics, Ideology, and the Onset of the Cold War, 1947," *Europe-Asia Studies* 46 (1994): 1371–86; Michail M. Narinskii, "The Soviet Response: The Turn to Confrontation," Working Papers, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project, no. 9 (Washington, D.C., 1994); Anna Di Biagio, "The Marshall Plan and the Founding of the Cominform, June–September 1947," in Gori and Pons, *Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War*, 208–21; Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*, 50–51.

[75] Antiom A. Ulunian, "The Soviet Union and 'the Greek Question,' 1946–1953: Problems and Appraisals," in Gori and Pons, *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War*, 151; Elena Aga-Rossi and Victor Zaslavsky, "The Soviet Union and the Italian Communist Party, 1944–8," in Gori and Pons, 174; Kimmo Rentola, "The Spring of 1948: Which Way Finland?" Paper Delivered at a Conference in Reykjavik, Iceland, June 1998.

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western zones, create the Federal Republic of Germany, and reform the currency. The Russian historian Michail Narinskii shows how Stalin thought he could intimidate the West to halt its offensive, but Stalin misjudged the determination of the Truman administration. In fact, the coup in Czechoslovakia and the blockade of Berlin prompted Congress to approve the Marshall Plan as well as a significant increase in military appropriations. More important, Stalin's ominous actions accelerated the negotiations leading to the North Atlantic Treaty. While the airlift of supplies won the loyalty of Berliners for the West, the blockade crippled any realistic prospect Stalin had for luring all of Germany into his orbit. In other words, the Kremlin's attempts to check Western moves and control the future of German power backfired. Feeling threatened and challenged in an area of vital importance, the Americans, British, and French moved directly to enhance their own security. Stalin wavered between options and the Soviet position worsened, but Stalin's goals were neither revolutionary nor his actions incoherent.[76]

Yet to say that Stalin was acting defensively to enhance the security of his state and his power does *not* mean that one should negate the influence of Marxist-Leninist ideology and Soviet culture. The Truman administration was not intending to threaten Soviet security, but ideological predilections ensured that the Kremlin would see a real threat. And insofar as the recrudescence of German power did constitute a possible long-term threat, Soviet fears were perfectly understandable. Ideological predilections and security concerns intermingled in critically important ways. If Soviet leaders postulated the inevitability of war, as they did, they certainly did not want to see a revived Germany coopted into a Western alliance. Hence Gori and Pons correctly emphasize that, although the new evidence highlights geopolitics, "it does not resolve the specific question of the interaction in Soviet thinking between a geopolitical approach and an ideological vision of the capitalist world—not least, the influence exercised by the doctrine that war was inevitable."[77]

Nor does the stress on geopolitics, power, strategy, and security negate the importance of Soviet culture in the unfolding of Soviet foreign policy. Although evidence mounts that Stalin had no plans to Sovietize or communize postwar eastern Germany or even Eastern Europe, once the Kremlin decided to clamp down it knew no other way to consolidate its power than through repression, oppression, and totalitarian rule. In a superb book on the Soviet occupation of East Germany, Norman Naimark shows how the Soviets gradually established a police state and a command economy in their zone of occupation in Germany, notwithstanding their initial desire to coopt all of Germany through moderate economic policies, coalition building, and support for unification. The Soviets, Naimark writes, "were driven by concrete events in the zone, rather than by preconceived plans or ideological imperatives." They "bolshevized the zone not because there was a plan to do so, but because that was the only way they knew how to organize society."

[76] Michail M. Narinskii, "The Soviet Union and the Berlin Crisis, 1948–9," in Gori and Pons, *Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War*, 57–75; Wilfried Loth, "Stalin's Plans for Post-War Germany," in Gori and Pons, 23–36; Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line*, 277–410.

[77] Gori and Pons, *Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War*, xxii–xxiii.

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They acted similarly wherever their troops occupied foreign lands and wherever they chose to stay.[78]

But where they would remain seems to have been very uncertain and contingent on their perception of threat and opportunity as well as on their assessment of prospects for cooperation with the West on terms they could accept. We now do know that most communists in Eastern Europe were uncertain about Soviet intentions. Looking at the new documents relating to Bulgarian-Russian relations, Vesselin Dimitrov emphasizes that Stalin did not want a revolution in Bulgaria. Examining the situation in Hungary, Eric Roman finds not a "shred of evidence" that the Kremlin planned to Sovietize Hungary. Indeed, in eastern Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland, and Czechoslovakia, local communists, intent on seizing power for themselves, chafed under the constraints imposed by Stalin. The Soviet leader wavered, assessing the chances for perpetuating the wartime alliance and gaining the advantages that would be derived therefrom. When he saw the correlation of forces turning against him as a result of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the Anglo-American initiatives in Germany, his equivocation ended. And when it ended, the dictates of Soviet culture took over with the complicity of indigenous communists. Although they were a minority, they often invited a bargain with the devil, a willingness to betray their nation's national interests in order to gain power and transform society.[79]

Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii remind us that it is imperative "to ask why significant elements within these [Eastern European] societies were susceptible to Communist solutions and how the Communist parties were able to transform themselves from underground cadre parties into mass parties with such rapidity." The answer is not one that jibes well with Gaddis's stress on good and evil. The fact remains, continue Naimark and Gibianskii, "that a strikingly large number of voters freely went to the polls in 1945–1946, and elected Communists."[80] Why?

It is easy for us now to forget, but for many contemporaries in 1945, democratic capitalism had not seemed to work. For the prior half-century, it had failed to keep the peace, provide for the material well-being of the masses, and establish the structures for a prosperous international economy. It had failed to reintegrate Germany after World War I and thwart the rise of fascism. It had failed to deal with

[78] Norman M. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949* (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), 467; also see, for example, John Micgiel, "'Bandits and Reactionaries': The Suppression of the Opposition in Poland, 1944–46," in Naimark and Gibianskii, *Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe*, 93–110; Weathersby, "Making Foreign Policy under Stalin." For the absence of intention to communize even Eastern Europe, see also Mastny, *Cold War and Soviet Insecurity*; Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*; Pechatnov, "Big Three after World War II"; Eric Roman, *Hungary and the Victor Powers, 1945–1950* (New York, 1996); Anita J. Prazmowska, "The Soviet Liberation of Poland and the Polish Left, 1943–45," in Gori and Pons, *Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War*, 76–88; for contrasting views, see Vladimir Volkov, "The Soviet Leadership and Southeastern Europe," in Naimark and Gibianskii, *Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe*, 55–72; Laszlo Borhi, "Soviet Rule in Hungary, 1945–1953" (Oslo, Paper Delivered at the Norwegian Nobel Institute, 1998).

[79] Vesselin Dimitrov, "Revolution Released: Stalin, the Bulgarian Communist Party and the Establishment of the Cominform," in Gori and Pons, *Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War*, 272–89; Roman, *Hungary and the Victor Powers*, 167; Naimark, *Russians in Germany*; Igor Lukes, "The Czech Road to Communism," in Naimark and Gibianskii, *Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe*, 243–65; Rentola, "Spring of 1948: Which Way Finland?"

[80] Naimark and Gibianskii, *Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe*, 9.

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rumblings of revolutionary nationalism in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Although support for communism varied from country to country and was nowhere a majority, faith in democratic capitalism was precarious and shallow. Tellingly, Igor Lukes writes, "many in Czechoslovakia had come to believe that capitalism . . . had become obsolete. Influential intellectuals saw the world emerging from the ashes of the war in black and white terms: here was Auschwitz and there was Stalingrad. The former was a by-product of a crisis in capitalist Europe of the 1930s; the latter stood for the superiority of socialism."[81] Even if some writers are unaware of it today, Western statesmen in 1945 grasped this reality. Referring to the afflicted peoples of Europe and Asia, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson told a Senate committee, "They have suffered so much, and they believe so deeply that governments can take some action which will alleviate their sufferings, that they will demand that the whole business of state control and state interference shall be pushed further and further."[82]

To grasp the origins of the Cold War in Europe, it is not sufficient to analyze the structures created, as Gaddis does so effectively, but is necessary to explain the complex motives, diverse intentions, and turbulent circumstances that allowed such structures to evolve as they did. Revisionist scholars writing in the 1960s and 1970s captured many of the ideas, aspirations, fears, and beliefs that prompted U.S. initiatives around the globe. They demonstrated how eager U.S. officials were to revive the structures of capitalism in Western Europe, how worried they were about communist support in France and Italy, how sensitive they were to the rumblings of revolutionary nationalism in the Third World, and how determined they were to coopt western Germany and Japan for an American-led orbit.[83] The new history, while emphasizing the importance of beliefs, seems to gloss over American ideas and the actions they inspired. Gaddis, for example, while advising that historians need to analyze more closely how governments responded to one another's initiatives, usually portrays the United States reacting passively to the revolutionary fervor of communist ideologues or to the more discreet overtures of its own allies.[84] Zubok and Pleshakov, while vividly portraying the men in the Kremlin, pay scant attention to what was happening in Washington until they get to their conclusion, when they acknowledge that Western actions were a key variable in explaining the Cold War.[85] The new documents, in other words, can lead historians astray and

[81] Lukes, "Czech Road to Communism," 249.

[82] Testimony by Dean G. Acheson, March 8, 1945, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, *Bretton Woods Agreements Act*, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C., 1945), 1: 35.

[83] For some of the most influential revisionist works, see William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (1959; New York, 1962); Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1966* (New York, 1967); Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954* (New York, 1972); Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941–1949* (Chicago, 1970); Barton J. Bernstein, ed., *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration* (Chicago, 1972); Thomas G. Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War* (Baltimore, Md., 1973); Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam* (New York, 1965).

[84] For Gaddis's advice, see Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 282. While Gaddis stresses the importance of interaction, he almost always portrays U.S. actions as reactive and passive, especially during the formative stages of the Cold War. See esp. chaps. 1–3.

[85] Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*, 275–78.

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prevent a full and nuanced analysis of the Cold War if they are not adroitly linked to what we have already learned about the American side.

POST-REVISIONISTS like Geir Lundestad made an important contribution when they stressed that the "empire" created by the United States in Western Europe was made possible by the willingness of host governments to collaborate with the United States in pursuit of their own interests.[86] Charles Maier has brilliantly shown how "U.S. ascendancy allowed scope for European autonomy."[87] But the new temptation to describe U.S. actions in Europe as mainly reactive seems to go beyond the evidence. In his perceptive new book on French foreign policy in the late 1940s, for example, William Hitchcock incisively examines how the French maneuvered to protect their interests despite their ostensible weakness. But does this mean that the French shaped the course of events as frequently as did the Americans, as Gaddis concludes? Or does it mean that the French acted imaginatively and intelligently within the framework set by Washington and London? Hitchcock shows quite conclusively that Washington's and London's determination to boost German industrial production and establish a west German state that would be aligned in an anti-Soviet coalition gave the French no choice but to focus on a viable European framework that would contain and harness German power for France's benefit. France, writes Hitchcock, "was obliged to defer to the American insistence that Germany be resuscitated and mobilized as part of the campaign to promote security and stability in western Europe." The French, in other words, altered their tactics and operated effectively within the confines of the options allowed to them, but the basic parameters were set elsewhere.[88]

It is important to understand intra-alliance relations, and Gaddis makes a unique contribution by demonstrating how the habits of compromise spawned by democratic institutions enabled the United States to run its empire so differently from the way the Kremlin ran theirs.[89] But at the same time, it is equally important to understand that the United States was the hegemon, as Maier stresses, pursued its own interests, as Lundestad acknowledges, and set the agenda leading to the divison of Germany and the restoration of West German sovereignty, as Eisenberg insists. Saki Dockrill addresses the issue of agency succinctly in her book on German rearmament: "However self-defeating were American efforts to force the French to end their procrastination over the issue [of German rearmament], the French and, indeed, the other European allies, were reluctant to antagonize the Americans

[86] Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation."

[87] Charles Maier, "Alliance and Autonomy: European Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives in the Truman Years," in Michael J. Lacey, ed., *The Truman Presidency* (Cambridge, 1989).

[88] William I. Hitchcock, *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944–1954* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1998), quotation on p. 3. For other illustrations of U.S. influence, see 34, 43–44, 63, 97–98. For Gaddis's extrapolation of the meaning of the book, see his foreword, ix–x. Such extrapolations bear significantly on the way he portrays U.S. relations with its European allies in *We Now Know*.

[89] Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 43–53, 189–220, 188–89.

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unduly and for too long, given their dependence on the US economically and militarily."[90]

Nor should the new evidence tempt us to understate the U.S. role in shaping the Cold War in Asia. The excellent new books on the Cold War by Gaddis, Mastny, and Zubok and Pleshakov, for example, pay almost no attention to the conscious U.S. initiatives to monopolize the occupation of Japan, divide Korea, deploy marines to China, and accept the return of French rule in Indochina—subjects dealt with extensively in an older literature.[91] Citing new articles and monographs illustrating that there was no chance of reconciliation with the Chinese Communists in 1948–1949, Gaddis conveniently minimizes the considerable, but by no means incontrovertible, evidence suggesting that American actions in 1945–1946 had an important bearing on Mao's thinking.[92] Communist ideology predisposed Mao to assume that the U.S. government would thwart his revolutionary efforts; American support for Chiang Kai-shek in 1945–1946 confirmed the veracity of these beliefs. In a new volume of Chinese primary source materials, skillfully edited and conveniently translated by Chen Jian and Shu Guang Zhang, document after document illustrates the Chinese Communist frustration, disillusionment, and anger with U.S. assistance to the Nationalists.[93] "Considering how actively the U.S. was supporting the GMD [the Chinese Nationalists]," concedes Michael Sheng, "the CCP certainly had sufficient reasons to hate the Americans."[94] Although the Truman administration subsequently curtailed its aid, it did not withdraw its recognition of the Nationalist government. U.S. actions left an indelible imprint, confirming ideological predilections. Michael Hunt writes, perhaps with some exaggeration, "Mao had grounded his postwar strategy on a set of badly flawed assumptions. He began by assuming that he could establish a collaborative link with American officials in China or, as an alternative, open direct contacts with Washington. Both proved wrong."[95]

A full account of the Cold War in Asia, especially its expansion to Indochina, must take cognizance of American actions and not dwell solely on Mao's ideological fervor and Stalin's revolutionary romanticism. In writing about the Vietnam War, Gaddis is unsparing in his criticism of U.S. embroilment. But he infuses almost no

[90] Saki Dockrill, *Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament, 1950–1955* (Cambridge, 1991), 175.

[91] See, for example, Marc S. Gallicchio, *The Cold War Begins in Asia: American East Asian Policy and the Fall of the Japanese Empire* (New York, 1988); Cumings, *Origins of the Korean War*, vol. 1; Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York, 1985); Howard B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945–1952* (Kent, Ohio, 1989); Walter LaFeber, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina, 1942–45," *AHR* 80 (December 1975): 1277–95; Lloyd C. Gardner, *Approaching Vietnam: From World War II through Dienbienphu, 1941–1954* (New York, 1988).

[92] For Gaddis's view, see *We Now Know*, 62–65; for views that illustrate Mao's flexibility, malleability, and uncertainty, see Qiang Zhai, "The Making of Chinese Communist Foreign Relations, 1935–49: A New Study from China," *Journal of American–East Asian Relations* 1 (Winter 1992): 471–77; He Di, "Most Respected Enemy," 146–48; Odd Arne Westad, "Losses, Chances, and Myths: The United States and the Creation of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1950," *Diplomatic History* 21 (Winter 1997): 106–08.

[93] Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, *Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: New Documentary Evidence, 1944–1950* (Chicago, 1996), 22–24, 35, 37, 39, 40, 44–45, 47, 50–51, 52, 54, 57, 72, 73–75, 76, 79.

[94] Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism*, 115. Sheng's acknowledgment is significant because he generally ascribes primacy to the role of ideology.

[95] Hunt, *Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy*, 199, 165–71.

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agency whatsoever into the American side. At one point, he goes so far as to say that "the cold war in Asia developed largely out of inadvertence."[96] He pays little attention to the reverse-course strategy adopted by the United States in Japan in 1947–1948, a policy reorientation that placed priority on the recovery of the Japanese economy rather than the reform of Japanese institutions. Many historians have shown how concern for resuscitating the Japanese economy convinced U.S. officials that Japan needed to retain markets and raw materials in Southeast Asia and Korea. These historians demonstrate that efforts to reconstruct, integrate, and coopt the latent power of Japan into an American-led orbit prompted the struggle against revolutionary nationalists in Indochina and elsewhere. But hardly any of this older scholarship, revisionist and post-revisionist, finds its way into recent writings.[97]

The new historians of the Cold War tell us something important when they stress the significance of ideas and beliefs. They should follow the logic of their argument and look closely at the beliefs in Washington as well as in Moscow and Beijing. U.S. officials and the American people held powerful beliefs about the superiority of their institutions, culture, and race. They were proud of their wartime achievements yet fearful of the postwar world. The war bequeathed an ominous international system. Astride Eurasia stood the latent power of the Soviet Union. Stalin said he wanted to cooperate, but his actions in Eastern Europe seemed portentous. Recent history, moreover, had taught that totalitarian governments had a strong penchant for expansion. Should Stalin opt for expansion, the possibilities were innumerable. There were vacuums of power in Germany and Japan, civil war in China, revolutionary nationalist uprisings in Indochina and the Dutch East Indies. Britain was nearly bankrupt, and the international economy had been sundered by the autarchic practices spawned by depression and war. Communist parties competed for power in France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere. American officials worried not only about the lessons of Pearl Harbor. They also worried that their own system of liberal capitalism might be endangered if a powerful adversary with a contrasting way of life gained control of the combined resources of Europe and Asia. They worried that Orientals might "embrace ideologies contrary to our own—or ultimately develop a pan-Asiatic movement against the Western world." They knew they could not allow these things to happen. Such beliefs prompted actions; such actions, for good and for bad, figured prominently in the story of the Cold War.[98]

We now do know a lot more about the making of foreign policy in the communist world. We now do know that ideas, beliefs, culture, and ideology count. But the question is how much they matter and how they relate to interests, strategy, power, and geopolitics. New documents alone will not answer such a question. We have seen, for example, that the focus on ideology does not necessarily translate into an

[96] Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 82.

[97] See, for example, Schaller, *American Occupation of Japan*; Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*; Andrew J. Rotter, *The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast Asia* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1987).

[98] Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*; for the quotation, see H. Freeman Matthews to James C. Dunn, April 20, 1945, National Archives, College Park, Md., Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, 856E.01/12–2045.

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emphasis on a revolutionary foreign policy, nor does a stress on culture obviate the need to analyze security. Perceptions of threat and opportunity intermingle, as do ideological, material, and cultural considerations. Realists can be ideologues, and ideologues can be realists. Ideology alone does not dictate policy, nor does security. Historians, like political scientists, must abandon their customary binary categories, test new theoretical approaches, and integrate notions of culture and identity with an understanding of political process and political institutions as well as with an examination of material and strategic interests.[99]

Likewise, it is not enough to examine the making of policy in any one nation. For a long time, scholars did this because they had access only to U.S. archives. But then the British and, gradually, the French opened their records. Now historians are gaining some access to documents in Moscow as well as in Prague, Berlin, Warsaw, and elsewhere. The Chinese, too, have printed and disseminated some records and published valuable memoirs. The Cold War International History Project, located at the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington, D.C., along with the National Security Archive have done a remarkable job prodding documents loose, translating some of them, and encouraging discussion of their significance and meaning. While we should rejoice at the new opportunities to examine the foreign policies of Moscow and Beijing, we should not isolate them from the web of interactions that were the product of a dynamic international system. That system spawned multiple threats and opportunities. The Cold War came about as leaders and peoples reacted to their perceptions of threat and opportunity. The United States was not slow to react, nor was the Kremlin. Nor were smaller governments, interest groups, and revolutionary movements.

Master narratives will soon be outdated if they are too influenced by contemporary fashions. Gaddis's *We Now Know* resonates with the triumphalism that runs through our contemporary culture, and in many ways it is the scholarly diplomatic counterpart of Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History*.[100] Some of this triumphalism is justified: after all, the United States and its allies did win the Cold War; the Soviet Union and its minions did murder tens of millions of people, crush the human spirit, thwart economic progress, and stifle the evolution of civil society. But if we are not careful, the recent collapse of Communism throughout much of the globe and the current popularity of market capitalism may distort historical vision as much as did the Vietnam War. Writing after the end of the Cold War is not such an advantage as Gaddis says it is, if historians forget what the world was like a half-century ago.[101]

Depression, war, and genocide engulfed peoples and nations and set the parameters for international relations in the second half of the twentieth century. What would be good and what would be evil seemed blurred to men and women enveloped by hunger and grief, expelled from their homelands, and yearning for peace, food, housing, and personal security. What would be good and what would be evil seemed uncertain to individuals who had seen colonialism persevere while

[99] For insights on how this might be accomplished, see the superb collection of essays edited by Peter Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York, 1996).

[100] Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York, 1992).

[101] Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 281–82.

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democracies faltered and capitalism tottered. What would be good and what would be evil seemed contingent on how governments would respond to people's clamor for opportunity, reform, ethnic equality, national autonomy, and respect for human dignity. In writing about the Cold War after the Cold War, we should not confuse its ending with its origins and evolution.

Melvyn P. Leffler is the Edward R. Stettinius Professor of American History at the University of Virginia, as well as the dean of the College and Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. He studied at Ohio State University with Marvin Zahniser, John Burnham, and Mary Young. His books include *The Elusive Quest: America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security, 1919–1933* (1978), *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (1992), for which he won the Bancroft Prize, and *The Specter of Communism* (1994). He is now writing on why the Cold War lasted as long as it did and is contemplating a book on U.S. relations with authoritarian and totalitarian nations in the twentieth century. He is grateful to the Norwegian Nobel Institute for providing the time, space, and intellectual stimulation that made the writing of this review essay possible.

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Reviews of Books

METHODS/THEORY

ALASTAIR IAIN JOHNSTON. *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. (Princeton Studies in International History and Politics.) Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1995. Pp. xiii, 307. Cloth $39.50, paper $18.95.

Alastair Iain Johnston's book has already become widely discussed among scholars working in premodern Chinese military history. By calling attention to the role of war in Chinese history and to the propensity of Chinese regimes to resort to war, even when peaceful alternatives seem available, Johnston challenges the more benign view of the Chinese past that comes naturally from the study of Confucian-Mencian philosophy. But despite its historical content, this work is offered as a contribution to contemporary international relations theory, and this must be kept in mind when considering the author's methodology and conclusions.

Johnston begins by defining strategic culture (ranked strategic preferences derived from paradigms common to decision makers) and reviewing the literature on it. He notes the common view that China's traditional strategic culture is derived from its dominant political philosophy: minimal violence, and only when necessary. He goes on to propose a methodology. If there is a Chinese strategic culture, it should be discoverable in a close reading of the ancient texts on warfare collectively known as the *Seven Military Classics*. And if this strategic culture actually guides behavior, this should be apparent in the policy proposals of officials charged with military command in some later period. Johnston chooses the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) and its wars against the Mongols as his test case.

Most of the book develops this scheme. After subjecting each of the *Seven Military Classics* to a close reading, including the construction of a "cognitive map," Johnston discovers in them the "*parabellum* paradigm" war is likely, security threats are best met by force, and total elimination of the enemy is the preferred outcome. This is moderated by the concept of "absolute flexibility" (*quan bian*): strategic choice depends on relative strength vis-à-vis the enemy, so that Chinese regimes will pursue pacific strategies when they are too weak to use force. Confucian-Mencian concepts affect strategy only on a "symbolic" level. The Ming materials yield the same results after also being cognitively mapped.

Johnston's understanding of classical Chinese and the Chinese-language secondary literature is impressive. I think that he is correct in identifying the *parabellum* paradigm as China's operative strategic culture. I also think that there are problems with the methodology. The *Seven Military Classics* mostly date from the Warring States period before 221 B.C., when the expectation was that the strongest state would eliminate all its rivals, as actually happened with the Qin conquest. However bellicose the language of Ming officials was, actual Ming policy after 1372 was defensive, never contemplating the annexation of all of Mongolia. There is, in other words, a difference between internal Chinese wars, in which only one winner can become emperor, and defence of an established empire against external threats. The Ming memorialists cited all were civilian officials in command over military officers. In the Ming period, the distinction between civil (*wen*) and military (*wu*) was unusually strong and the civil side unusually dominant. The fact that these civil officials, all intensely educated in the Confucian classics, nevertheless display the *parabellum* paradigm when writing about military matters is striking and seems to support the author's argument.

Or does it? For Johnston, it is important that the *parabellum* paradigm be culturally contingent, learned behavior. But, as he notes (p. 262), "operative Chinese strategic culture does not differ radically from key elements in the Western realpolitik tradition." Possibly, then, military behavior contrary to (actually normative) Confucian-Mencian values reflects the tendency of states in all cultures to reinvent the "hard realpolitik" tradition. Ideals may vary from culture to culture, but military realities take similar forms. Johnston hopes that his study will help to develop ways of "unlearning the dubious lesson" (p. 266) of the *parabellum* paradigm. Yet in Chinese military history, swords rust and bowstrings rot in periods of protracted peace, and forgotten military lessons often need to be relearned during the next crisis. Johnston takes note of these possible objections, and his meticulously re-

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searched and carefully argued book is a welcome addition to the literature.

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GABRIELLE M. SPIEGEL. *The Past as Text: The Theory and Practice of Medieval Historiography*. (Parallax: Re-Visions of Culture and Society.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1997. Pp. xxii, 297. $39.95.

Over the last three decades, the nature of history has been the subject of considerable debate, inspired mainly by theories such as structuralism, poststructuralism, semiotics, reconstruction, and feminism, which have raised questions about the conceptual foundations of historical knowledge. Initially it was disciplines other than history—philosophy, sociology, anthropology, literary criticism—that challenged our comfortable conviction that an objective knowledge of the past was possible. Increasingly, historians have come to accept the idea that written history does not simply correspond to some external reality, and a good number, the medievalist Gabrielle Spiegel among them, have allowed new theories to affect their historical practice.

The book under review contains eleven essays by Spiegel, nine of which appeared between 1975 and 1995 in *Speculum*, *History and Theory*, and other journals. The first four essays ("Theory"), two of them not previously published, address broadly the nature of historical knowledge; the remaining essays ("Practice") examine examples or aspects of medieval historical writing such as genealogy, largely within the context of historical works written in twelfth and thirteenth-century France. These are, in fact, two very disparate parts of the book, on two quite different subjects, but they are held together by Spiegel's search for a deeper understanding of what historians do. If we take the two parts together and allow ourselves to be guided by the author's helpful introduction, they give us an idea of the evolution of her own thought on these subjects, under the influence of the theorists who have done most to change our notion of what history is.

Spiegel belongs to the large center of liberal historians who are comfortable with a postmodern view of history; in other words, they see history as the historian's construction, a narrative invented and not something that corresponds to a pattern or story inherent in the events of the past. Spiegel's position is perhaps best defined by her essay, "Towards a Theory of the Middle Ground: Historical Writing in the Age of Postmodernism," which is chapter three of this book. Whereas earlier (see *Past and Present* 135 [1992]) she had cautioned against a postmodernist "textualism" that denies a "referential and material world," eliminates a distinction between historical study and literary criticism, and leads to the dissolution of history, in this essay she asks for "at least a partial acceptance of language's instrumental capacity to convey information about historical forms" and concludes that "We are capable of recovering some sense of the material world of the past." Since fiction is another way of knowing the past and historical writing has fictive and authorial elements, Spiegel proposes a deeper examination of the respective pursuits of history and literary criticism, especially their goals and obstacles. Readers will be interested in her discussion of how theory has informed recent historical works.

Of the two essays in this book not previously published, "Orations of the Dead/Silences of the Living: The Sociology of the Linguistic Turn" contemplates the relation of the Holocaust and Jacques Derrida's philosophy of writing and language, the parallels between the psychology of "the second generation" and postmodernism. Much of "In the Mirror's Eye: The Writing of Medieval History in North America" is devoted to a discussion of C. H. Haskins and J. R. Strayer, who shaped the American interpretation of the Middle Ages for most of this century (whose similar outlook on the usefulness of medieval history for Americans Norman F. Cantor examined several years ago). Spiegel's analysis of historical writing on the Middle Ages since the 1970s, largely under the influence of postmodernism, is particularly useful. Historical writing in America has been revolutionized. Spiegel sees this transformation in particular in a rejection of the certainties of positivism and foundationalism, a new vision of documents not as sources but as texts, and the emergence of feminist historiography and gender studies. Within that larger transformation, the historiography of the Middle Ages has experienced a massive interpretive shift, away from the view of the Middle Ages as a prelude to American history and toward a new focus on the otherness, even oddness, of that period.

These essays are well worth reading or rereading. If nothing else, they remind us of how unsettling but also how exciting and ultimately fruitful the debate of the last thirty years about the nature of history has been.

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THOMAS ERTMAN. *Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Pp. xii, 363. Cloth $59.95, paper $18.95.

Thomas Ertman has evidently thought about the various patterns of European state formation and read their histories (in several languages) for years. This book presents his argument for the importance of a linked set of factors, followed by supporting accounts of state building in the medieval and early modern period in each of the countries in a sample comprising all of what is now Western Europe plus Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia. Ertman is impressively aware of historical contingencies, even while he argues the case for a new model to explain the differences among European states. The book's language is clear and little troubled by obfuscating jargon.

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Wisely escaping the tyranny of old historical periodization, Ertman recognizes the importance of considering the entire period between roughly the twelfth and eighteenth centuries. He identifies three factors to explain the varieties of state building in this crucial late medieval and early modern era: the timing of intense geopolitical competition, the character of local government created as a state begins to form, and the nature of its representative institutions. Working within particular historical circumstances, these forces produce states that he categorizes both by type of regime—absolute or constitutional—and by state apparatus (using Weberian categories) —patrimonial or bureaucratic. The combinations produce such hybrids as patriarchal absolutism and bureaucratic constitutionalism.

The argument can lead to striking conclusions. Ertman is, for example, adamantly opposed to the commonly drawn contrast between Britain as a non-bureaucratic, constitutional state and France as a bureaucratic, absolutist state. He prefers quite different characterizations. The timing of political competition might have favored the creation of patrimonial absolutism in England, but there the territorial character of representation in at least one house of the emerging Parliament and its links to the durable local governmental institution of the shire made the crucial difference; under the pressure of war, England gradually became a bureaucratic constitutional state. At the center, its administration was sizeable and professional. Executive and legislative powers were separated. Most officials could be removed at will and were held to standards carefully watched by a political society highly sensitive to the protection—especially the protection of property—that government guaranteed.

In France, the results of the timing of competition were not deflected as they were in England. France developed a tricurial assembly; because it was based on status groups rather than local governing units, the assembly did not develop strength across lines of status, and each of its chambers more readily struck deals for private rather than public interests. Thus weakened, the idea of a genuine representative assembly had withered by the sixteenth century. France had also spawned a melange of overlapping local jurisdictions and units of governance since the Middle Ages. Under the intense pressure of early modern warfare, the result was patrimonial absolutism. If the king combined executive and legislative powers, elite groups (nobles, clerics, lawyers, financiers) gained control (often hereditary) over administrative posts.

Using his sets of factors and of types of regime, Ertman argues that the pattern seen in France was largely that of Iberia and the Italian peninsula. Germany, by contrast, developed bureaucratic absolutism. In Hungary and Poland, patrimonial constitutionalism triumphed; in Scandinavia, it began but soon failed.

Specialists in the history of all these regions will no doubt want to quarrel over the fit of their particular region of interest into the grand model. A medievalist for example, might insist on emphasizing that, in its medieval phase, the English government was, in contrast to France, far from bureaucratic (working, rather, by "self-government at the king's command"); also, in contrast to other early states, it was by no means under the control of its foreign financiers. It did not really, in other words, begin as any of the combinations supplied by the model, though it seems to have become one (bureaucratic/constitutional). Of course, this simply raises questions of the sort any argument with a large-scale architecture will provoke. Historians of all these regions and all these centuries must be grateful to Ertman not only for constructing his major interpretive scheme, and for his analysis of so much of the crucial process of state-building, but for provoking much in the way of exceptions and counter-arguments in a continuing scholarly conversation.

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IAN BOSTRIDGE. *Witchcraft and Its Transformations, c. 1650–c. 1750.* (Oxford Historical Monographs.) New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1997. Pp. 274.

A generation ago, Keith Thomas and Alan Macfarlane redirected the study of English witchcraft by exploring the circumstances that might trigger accusations at the grass-roots level. Despite the influence of this approach, a consensus has emerged that the chronology of witchcraft prosecutions is explicable primarily in terms of shifting patterns of belief among the elite, and their decline is usually linked to the rise of the new natural philosophy. Ian Bostridge offers a challenging new perspective. His concern is not with village tensions or the chronology of prosecution but with the survival, transformation, and eventual decline of "witchcraft theory." Bostridge makes two major assertions: first, that witchcraft theory retained its "vitality" (p. 84) through the Restoration period and beyond, and that its eventual decline owed little to the intellectual climate of the early Enlightenment. Second, he argues that this vitality reflected a continuing political significance as long as state and society were still viewed in terms of sacral unity, and that witchcraft beliefs also served to reinforce social and political unity. Their slow decline reflected the fading significance of this sacral conception of politics and the emergence of religious toleration and pluralism. Political and religious contingencies, rather than a changing intellectual climate, sealed their fate. By the 1710s, they were becoming counter-productive as writers harnessed them as a tool of party to blacken Whigs or high-flying Anglican Tories.

The book is constructed as a series of linked essays, broadly chronological, on major figures such as Thomas Hobbes and Robert Filmer, lesser-known writers such as Meric Casaubon and Richard Boulton, and on particular episodes. An interesting study of Daniel

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Defoe places his robust if short-lived defense of witchcraft beliefs in the *Edinburgh Review* (1711) in the context of current political controversies; Joseph Addison's urbane, skeptical essay the same year showed how far the issue remained open, and even Addison stopped short of open rejection. Bostridge accepts that Francis Hutchinson's *Historical Essay* (1718) was to prove the decisive assault on witchcraft beliefs but demonstrates how difficult it was for Hutchinson to publish a work he recognized would be unwelcome to the Anglican establishment. Against this background, Bostridge insists that the repeal of the witchcraft laws in 1736 is an event that needs to be explained, not dismissed as a mere "tidying up" operation, and shows how the fierce opposition by the Scot James Erskine can be understood in terms of concern for Scotland's traditional religious and political identity.

How convincing is Bostridge's case? He addresses one obvious objection, that an explanation rooted in English particularism is inadequate to explain a European phenomenon, by adding a revisionist essay on the situation in France, which demonstrates that the 1682 edict was less radical and "rational" than generally assumed and was itself the product of particular political concerns; witchcraft theory in France, too, survived far into the eighteenth century. More generally, Bostridge's evidence seems to document the tenacity rather than the vitality or centrality of witchcraft theory. The case that it had significant implications for political and ecclesiastical issues is well made and convincing, and it helps to explain why even some champions of the new philosophy felt unable to abandon witchcraft belief. But Bostridge may be pitching his revisionist claims rather too high. Detailed analyses of the brief discussions by Hobbes or Defoe, illuminating as they are, give greater weight to the subject than the writers intended; Defoe, indeed, was at pains to play down its significance. Writers on both sides of the debate agreed on the survival of witch beliefs among the populace but also on the level of skepticism among the judiciary and the elites. Conservatives defended witchcraft beliefs as a bulwark against the tide of atheism and deism, and here we are back to the broader intellectual shifts Bostridge plays down. The waning credibility, and respectability, of witchcraft beliefs at the end of the century paralleled the demise of astrology, alchemy, natural magic, and to a lesser extent the retreat of the Devil and of a providentialist, interventionist God. Although Bostridge makes a compelling case for adding a political dimension to the survival and decline of witchcraft theory, we would be unwise to divorce it from the wider intellectual shifts of the period.

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Donald R. Kelley and David Harris Sacks, editors. *The Historical Imagination in Early Modern Britain: History, Rhetoric, and Fiction, 1500–1800*. (Woodrow Wilson Center Series.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Pp. xii, 374. $69.95.

Many years ago, F. Smith Fussner argued that the early seventeenth century witnessed a "historiographical revolution" as those who wrote history—Walter Ralegh, John Stow, William Camden, Francis Bacon, and John Selden were his primary examples—established the basis for our modern understanding of the historian's craft by abandoning an older scholasticism and adopting a more scientific outlook. Since the appearance of Fussner's *The Historical Revolution* (1962), a number of scholars—F. J. Levy, Joseph M. Levine, and D. R. Woolf chief among them—have scoured the early modern period looking for the origins of modern English historiography. In order to explore this topic further, a conference was held at the Woodrow Wilson Center in 1993, and now, four years later, the conference papers have been published. The topic is immense, and this volume does not claim to cover it all, yet the thirteen papers collected here, all thoughtfully written by distinguished scholars, cover a wide range of subtopics. Degory Wheare, Thomas More, John Foxe, Adam Smith, and Edward Gibbon each receive one essay; Raphael Holinshed's *Chronicles* receives two; and Thomas Hobbes receives three. Essays on the cultural and social dimensions of antiquarianism, on natural history as discussed in English gardening books, and on the divergence of history and fiction as revealed by a rather obscure pamphlet, *The Second Spira* (1685), complete the collection. What becomes immediately apparent is how the historical revolution of the last thirty years, with its emphasis on cultural studies and the use of noncanonical texts, has broadened the way we now conceive a study of the historical imagination in the early modern period. The rather predictable group of historical writers who formed the core of Fussner's book receives only passing mention in the essays under review.

The first step in developing a modern historical method was to distinguish fact from fiction. Medieval historians, it seems, failed to separate the legendary from the true, and this confusion was overcome only in the early modern period. Not surprisingly, then, editors Donald R. Kelley and David Harris Sacks identify the tension between fact and fiction, between history and poetry, as the principal theme linking together the essays in their collection. Two examples will suffice to show how this works. Levine, in his article on Thomas More, considers *Utopia* (1516) the first work to make a clear distinction between history and fiction. What was striking about More was his ability to separate the real world of politics from the ideal world of his Utopia. Although he described Utopia as though it were real, he did so in such a way that no reader was ever in doubt as to its fictional character. It may never have occurred to medieval writers that truth and fiction were distinct entities, but More self-consciously distinguished between the two, and it was from this disjuncture that the modern genres of history and fiction

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would later develop. While Levine thus demonstrates how history freed itself from fiction, J. Paul Hunter explores how fiction freed itself from the need to resemble history. He does this by seeking the origins of the novel in the political culture of the 1690s. The reception accorded to *The Second Spira*, a fictitious account of the death of a religious apostate, provides his point of departure. What was it, he asks, about the 1690s that enabled a Protestant society, which still respected the Puritan injunction against fictional representation, to greet the pamphlet so enthusiastically? His answer is more suggestive than conclusive: following the Glorious Revolution, Protestants justified William III's accession to the throne by creating a series of fictions, and in this way "a tolerance for quiet acceptance of the practical need for convenient fictions slipped unnoticed into the cultural habits of mind in the Williamite years" (p. 317).

Not all the essays in this book, however, treat the theme of fact and fiction as closely as the editors might like, and while this deprives the collection of some unity, it has the advantage of allowing considerable breadth. The essays, for example, cover an immense period of time, beginning with the sixteenth century and ending with the eighteenth, which enables us to see how the historical imagination developed. Thus for Wheare—the subject of J. H. M. Salmon's paper—history should be didactic, a source of moral lessons aimed primarily at politicians. Wheare became the first Camden Professor of History at Oxford in 1623 and is now known for *The Method and Order of Reading both Civil and Ecclesiastical Histories* (1685), perhaps the best English example of the Renaissance *ars historica*. By the eighteenth century, however, this insistence that history pertain only to things public and political was beginning to change. The final essays by Mark Salber Phillips and Patricia Craddock show Smith and Gibbon wrestling with the classical tradition bequeathed by the Renaissance. For Phillips, Smith was a committed classicist who believed that history should narrate political events—and yet he also wanted history to probe the inner world of thoughts and sentiments. The need to reconcile these two positions led to the speculations on historical composition found in his *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres* (1722–1723), with their novel reading of Tacitus as a historian of private life. Craddock similarly portrays Gibbon as a writer steeped in the ancients who tried, with only partial success, to go beyond the classical tradition by enlarging our notion of heroism to include the contemplative heroes of civil life—poets, philosophers, scientists, inventors—instead of the men of action favored in the classics.

Some of the essays, again attesting to the collection's breadth, pursue the historical imagination into less familiar regions. Woolf, for instance, by documenting in great detail the discovery of a horde of Anglo-Saxon coins, sets out to uncover "the defining characteristics of early modern English historical culture" (p. 94). The discovery was made in 1611 on the estate of William Blundell, a rather unexceptional member of the Lancashire Catholic gentry, and Woolf attempts to discern exactly what the coins meant to Blundell, exploring such themes as the importance of place and ancestry. Woolf's ambitions are perhaps greater than his essay's achievements, but all the same he makes an interesting foray into the social history of English antiquarianism. Other contributions—Annabel Patterson's essay on anecdotes in Tudor historiography, for example, or Rebecca Bushnell's essay on natural history in English gardening books—also move in unexpected directions. Taken together, this collection contains much that is new and even surprising, which makes it a welcome addition to the literature on the early modern historical imagination.

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JOHN S. BROWNLEE. *Japanese Historians and the National Myths, 1600–1945: The Age of the Gods and Emperor Jimmu*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. 1997. Pp. viii, 256. $75.00.

MARGARET MEHL. *History and the State in Nineteenth-Century Japan*. New York: St. Martin's. 1998. Pp. x, 210. $65.00.

History is historiography. Without a clear sense of the latter, we can have no clear sense of the former. So books on history writing are welcome indeed. Perhaps one can measure the maturity of a field—Japanese history, in this case—by its books about historians. Margaret Mehl's book is a revised doctoral thesis; John S. Brownlee's is a more ambitious effort by a senior scholar.

Brownlee is a Canadian scholar who has made a specialty of historiography. He edited *History in the Service of the Japanese Nation* (1983); translated Sakamoto Taro, *The Six National Histories of Japan* (1991); and wrote *Political Thought in Japanese Historical Writing* (1991). This book considers selected Japanese historians and their relation to touchstone issues of Japanese national identity: not only the age of the gods and emperor Jimmu, as the subtitle states, but also the competing courts of the thirteenth century. In short chapters, he treats Hayashi Razan, the *Dainihonshi*, Arai Hakuseki and Yamagata Banto, Date Chihiro, and the *Kokagakusha*. Part two examines European influence, the beginning of "academic history," the Kume Kunitake incident (1890–1892), the development of "academic history," the controversy over competing courts (1911), the Commission of Inquiry (1940), and Tsuda Sokichi. The longest chapter by far treats "Eminent Historians in the Thirties"—Mikami Sanji, Kuroita Katsumi, Tsuji Zennosuke, and Hiraizumi Kiyoshi. A fifteen-page epilogue treats Sakamoto Taro and sketches postwar issues: the first postwar textbook, *Kigensetsu*, and the 1947 Constitution. The index is haphazard at best, listing only some personal names some of the time; the twenty pages of

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notes (some of which offer content) do not figure in the index. The bibliography runs thirteen pages of Japanese and English sources; it has lacunae, most notably Tetsuo Najita's important book on the *Kaitokudo* and Mehl's volume, which appeared in German in 1992. Brownlee thanks a dozen eminent Japanese historians and quotes from interviews with Ienaga Saburo and Inoue Kiyoshi. He writes smoothly.

Brownlee's account has distinct weaknesses. His labels are not helpful. "Positivistic" applies to *koshogaku* of the Edo period and to Mikami Sanji in the twentieth century (p. 139), but in the early Meiji era, European scholars opened Japanese eyes to "the limits of their traditional positivistic research" (p. 80). Mikami is "rationalistic" (p. 139), but so are Date Chihiro (p. 55) and others in the Edo period who show "sheer rationality" (p. 89). "Nationalist" applies to Tokugawa Mitsukuni in the seventeenth century and Hakuseki in the eighteenth (theirs was "instinctive nationalism," p. 45) and to the historians of the twentieth century. "Modern" and "secular" offer similar issues. This problem is not a superficial one, for Brownlee's comments about Western historians (pp. 78–79) seem naïve and misguided. How is one to write convincingly of Japanese historians if one is naïve about their Western counterparts?

A second major problem is Brownlee's focus on heads of the Shiryo hensanjo, a government sponsored and funded documents center; Brownlee calls each of them "the outstanding historian of his generation" (p. 108). Three of these four were born between 1865 and 1877 and died between 1939 and 1955—hardly three separate generations. The fourth, Sakamoto Taro, was born in 1914, but only a conservative (or the translator of one of his books) is likely to rank him above Ishimoda Sho (1912- 1986), Ienaga Saburo (b. 1913), Toyama Shigeki (b. 1914), or several others. Is it any wonder that Brownlee's subjects are "all nationalists" (p. 10)? How many American archivists and historians employed by the Library of Congress before 1945 wrote against the American master narrative? On June 18, 1942, Harvard President James Conant declared: "To speed the day when the Axis powers surrender without conditions, we now dedicate the resources of this ancient society of scholars [i.e. Harvard University]." Was this declaration anti-nationalist? During the McCarthy era, Harvard protected tenured professors but threw others to the wolves. Was that an anti-nationalist profile in courage?

A third problem grows out of Brownlee's familiarity with Sakamoto Taro. Brownlee cites him most often (the index lists ten references; I noted at least six others) but does not develop as much as I would like the extent of Sakamoto's involvement in conservative causes both before the war and after. The volume would benefit from more familiarity with historians outside Tokyo University: Inoue Kiyoshi and Ienaga Saburo, both of whom Brownlee interviewed, come immediately to mind.

Mehl's book is a translation of *Eine Vergangenheit fur die japanische Nation: Die Entstehung des historischen Forschungsinstituts Tokyo daigaku Shiryohensanjo (1869–1895)* (1992). That title is more accurate than the English version; still, some ten percent of this volume deals with events after 1900. Mehl translated herself, and the result—in the apparent absence of editing—is infelicitous English and haphazard punctuation. Mehl provides introduction and conclusion, five workmanlike chapters, thirty pages of notes, a select bibliography (works in German, Japanese, English, with three pages of manuscript sources), and an index. The jacket illustration, identified nowhere, is a manuscript copy of the imperial rescript of 1869, which Mehl translates on page 1; strangely, the lower half is printed upside down.

Mehl's era, 1869–1895, overlaps that of Brownlee, although Brownlee continues the story to 1945 and beyond. Her treatment is detailed. We learn more than necessary about bureaucratic maneuverings in the period before 1881; George Gustavus Zerffi, the Hungarian teaching at the University of London; Ludwig Riess, the German Jew who taught in Japan for fifteen years, married a Japanese woman, had five children, and left wife and children behind when he returned to Germany in 1903, visiting Japan only once before his death in 1928; and the Kume affair and the competing courts controversy. A substantial part of the conclusion is an essay comparing "history and the nation" in Japan and Germany.

Mehl concludes: "In the end the tensions experienced by Shigeno and his colleagues attempting to write a history for their nation—between truth and myth, fact and interpretation, disinterestedness and partisanship, science and art, research and writing—have to be confronted by historians in every time and place" (p. 166). The newly minted Ph.D. delivers a more judicious study than the senior scholar.

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KERWIN LEE KLEIN. *Frontiers of Historical Imagination: Narrating the European Conquest of Native America, 1890–1990*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1997. Pp. xi, 377. $45.00.

This book by Kerwin Lee Klein contains dozens of fascinating—even brilliant—insights. What it lacks is an interpretive theme and title that will allow readers to find and appreciate them.

The book's title and subtitle suggest two competing agendas. The title suggests an exploration of the nature of historical imagination in the twentieth century. How have historians imagined the story of the American people during the past one hundred years? What have been the limits of that imagination, and what problems have fresh ideas presented for professional scholars in the field? (Klein equates "America" with the United States throughout.) The book's subtitle suggests something slightly different: a narrative

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that will explore how people—historians and perhaps others—told the story of the Euro-American domination of the continent's indigenous peoples. This second task requires an analysis of how successive narrations of American conquest have interacted with one another over time.

The book's twin ambitions generate wonderful leaps from history to philosophy to literature and beyond, but they also diverge and leave the reader panting in Klein's wake. Invoking his main title, Klein takes us toward the cosmos, considering issues of meaning and language. We get Friedrich Nietzsche, we get Jacques Derrida, we get Henry Nash Smith. The subtitle leads in less exalted directions toward the historiography of the Native American experience. (We go back to Michel de Montaigne, forward to Leslie Marmon Silko, and stop along the way to consider Ruth Benedict, Roy Harvey Pearce, and Calvin Martin.) In the preface, Klein thanks his mentors for affirming his desire to read Derrida and Silko; we join the applause but wonder: how are we going to get from the broad theoretical concerns of Michel Foucault and Derrida to the tighter focus of a Francis Parkman or a Vine Deloria?

Klein links his twin themes in two ways. First, he asserts that American historical narrations inevitably intertwine with theoretical positions; all of our prose is marked by "ultimate contingency" (p. 6). Second, he claims that the "west" is the location of our national soul. In Klein's words, "We believe we have escaped Hegel, but his collision between the people with and without history still structures public memory" (p. 7). What readers are promised, then, is a theoretically sophisticated literary reading of frontier narratives. Much of the succeeding 300 pages of text and fifty pages of dense notes live up to that pledge.

Klein begins with Frederick Jackson Turner. Here he is on solid ground, and his portrait rivals Richard Hofstadter's (in *The Progressive Historians* [1968]) in its perception and verve. Cruising smoothly among historical philosphers Carl Hempel, Morton White, Elazar Weinryb, Arthur Danto, and Hayden White, Klein gives us Turner as "An American Dante." Klein demonstrates that the poet from Portage was not interested in hypotheses, but in literary—Emersonian—metaphors that could lift his readers to a plane where they might grasp the Hegelian currents running through the past to the present. The result was Turner's odd monographic style. His books, Klein argues, were neither tragedy nor romance. Instead they created an "emplotment" of American history "where conflict resolves into the balanced harmony of high comedy" (p. 87). Klein argues that Turner created a "cosmic story of spirit" (p. 96). This literary-critical language captures Turner's Victorian pretensions without sacrificing the scientific innovations that were embedded in his work. Klein goes on to trace vividly the ways in which Turner was read (and, in his view, misread) by John Dewey, Merle Curti, and others who overlooked his poetry and his ambition.

In the second half of the book, Klein traces ideas about Indians and the frontier in western thought and American historical and literary writing. Here we get to Benedict, E. H. Spicer, Martin, and the rise (and, he claims, the fall) of ethnohistory. Klein goes on to follow a similarly idiosyncratic lineage of literary scholars: Smith, Leo Marx, and Pearce. The readings emphasize the difficulty of containing the story of conquest in traditional disciplinary narratives. Here Klein's story turns depressing. Ethnohistory, Klein observes, "did not transfigure 'mainstream' American history" (p. 211)—an odd observation given the health of the American Society for Ethnohistory and its journal. Pearce, who Klein believes is not read or respected, "fell into a stylistic netherworld" (p. 249). Klein ends this section with two authors who "give voice" to the antagonism to "academic frontier tales" (p. 250): Américo Paredes and Gloria Anzaldúa.

As Klein shifts from Turner to Native American narratives, the book loses much of its sweep and power. Fascinating comments about Benedict make one curious about why Klein neglects the Native American authors who began to write in the 1920s and 1930s: Charles Eastman, John Joseph Matthews, Gertrude Bonnin (Zitkala Ša) and D'Arcy McNickle. Interesting readings of Pearce and Paredes create a similar discomfort. Klein completely ignores modern literary figures such as Gerald Vizenor and Scott Momaday. Why? Certainly they are narrating the conquest and both, but especially Vizenor, are intensely interested in literary theory. Are they not a part of this history? With no explanation, the book's grand titles begin to resemble neon lights in the desert.

It is hard to be critical of such an ambitious and literate book. The reach from Silko to Derrida, from Claude Lévi-Strauss to Benedict and back to Nietzsche provides a wonderful tour through the world of ideas. But even that world—contingent, cosmopolitan, and fluid—needs maps and descriptions of specific countries where authors and readers can focus their energies. This book promises a stimulating journey, but Klein would have done well to map the route a bit more clearly for his earth-bound readers.

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IORWERTH PROTHERO. *Radical Artisans in England and France, 1830–1870*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Pp. xvi, 424. $74.95.

Many mid-nineteenth-century English and French artisans shared a radical masculinist, democratic, anti-elitist politics directed both at those the state endowed with illicit privilege and power and at new professional elites like the one that monopolized the right to practice medicine. Iorwerth Prothero questions explanations of artisans' radical politics in terms of the sociology of labor. He also considers the language of politics analyzed by historians like Gareth Stedman

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Jones as inadequate to account for the nature of artisans' politics. Prothero characterizes the workplace as a locus of conflict and insecurity. Radical politics "operated precisely by transcending and ignoring work divisions and trade particularism" (p. 3). The world of radical politics drew on cultural and social practices outside the workplace, the subject of the most rewarding chapters of Prothero's rich study. He criticizes labor history dependent on language for failing to give sufficient attention to the ways political languages were formed, expressed, invoked, and given meaning through such practices.

Prothero is averse to referring to historians by name in his text, often relying on passive constructions to evoke those he contests. Like the leaders of popular mid-nineteenth-century anticlerical churches or the many radical homeopathic doctors outside the medical establishment, Prothero does not want to forsake his mission or bolster the institution of the academy by arguing within it. In this sense, he writes history like a radical artisan. An exception to reserving citations for endnotes is Prothero's alliance with the philosopher Jacques Rancière. Prothero and Rancière recognize that one of an artisan's most radical gestures was to practice "a resistance to work's exclusive dominance and monopoly of life" (p. 21). Like Rancière, Prothero points to historians' failure to recognize the origins of the categories of contemporary labor history in historical actors' assertion of interests. Both attribute delineation of artisans as a clearly separate social group—a concept embraced by most contemporary historians—to nineteenth-century plebeian elites' self-assertions of their superiority. Prothero notes that "many radicals" shared this elitist conceptualization of artisans (p. 19) but adds that "radicalism is against privilege and for equality" (p. 22). Prothero is thus not only a new cultural historian seeking to show how radical artisans thought; he also pursues the radical project of critiquing radicals' illicit construction of privilege.

The book's title sounds like a scholar's summation of the subject matter, but the text contests this intrusion of academic historiography in the way radical artisans challenged bourgeois characterizations of their world. Prothero criticizes use of individuals' status as artisans to account for their political ideas and practices. At the end of the book, he writes of "plebeian radicalism," and the sociological indeterminacy—but politically charged character—of the plebs suggests that plebeian fits his project better. Prothero rejects the idea of contrasting national political cultures in favor of identifying shared radical political practices in the two nations, while explaining differences in terms of the possibilities and constraints in particular political situations. In sum, Prothero emphasizes difference within the homogeneity evoked by artisans and similarity within the difference evoked by nations.

Although Prothero makes a parting jab at the "post-modern" world he inhabits (p. 317), this appears to be a reference to Margaret Thatcher's Great Britain. Prothero's text marks the intersection of an intense (English?) empiricism and a (French?) "post-modern" rejection of all-encompassing explanatory theories. Karl Marx was the contemporary of Prothero's artisans and is the absent presence in this book. Marx criticized not only what he saw as artisans' ineffective radical politics but the very significance of the "diversity" and "variety" with which Prothero characterizes radical artisans as well. Evocations of class can be a means of instilling and expressing the fundamental sameness inherent in Marxist identity politics; Prothero sees radical politics as offering a linguistic and organizational means of effecting alliances among those with differences.

Prothero offers little on the relation of the decades under examination to the periods that precede and follow. Mid-nineteenth-century radicals were fascinated by the French Revolution, but Prothero devotes scant attention to this experience, or to the world of E. P. Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963). And if the concluding paragraph suggests the significance of the radical legacy to the world before Thatcher, one is left wondering how this legacy was sustained until then. Prothero's inclusive characterization of radicalism bears a close resemblance to forms of populism in the United States. From the American experience, it is not only the recent effacement of radicalism's gains that merits our attention but the role of radicalism's successors in this effacement as well.

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JOSE C. MOYA. *Cousins and Strangers: Spanish Immigrants in Buenos Aires, 1850–1930.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1998. Pp. xviii, 567. Cloth $55.00, paper $25.00.

Jose C. Moya's excellent study does much more than tell the story of Spanish immigrants in Buenos Aires. By tackling the question of how immigration history has been constructed for the past five decades, his work provides readers with an exciting new methodology for understanding both the migration process and the relationship between minority groups and host societies.

In many ways, Moya offers the reader two books between one cover. One of the "books" is a study of individual and community transoceanic movement, focusing on the Spaniards who made up more than thirty percent of immigrants to Argentina between 1850 and 1930. Moya carefully illustrates that the immigration process begins long before any individual ever steps onto the steamer's deck, leading him to two important conclusions. First, he reevaluates traditional push/pull theories of immigration after noting that many geographic areas with strong "push" factors never had high levels of emigration, while regions that appeared to have the requirements to "pull" immi-

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grants often did not receive them. The recognition that local factors do not always lead to the expected results helps to propel a second critical proposition: that global structural factors explain why Spain became a country of emigrants, and Argentina a receiver of them, in the latter decades of the nineteenth century. Indeed, unlike many historians of immigration who explain unexpected movements as aberrations, Moya creates a theory that reclassifies the "unexpected" as entirely rational and not particularly surprising.

Moya's "global revolution" notion, and its relation to both emigration and immigration, will certainly cause controversy among scholars. Yet he makes an excellent case. By treating the "demographic," "Liberal," "agricultural," "industrial," and "transportation" revolutions as a series of interrelated changes, Moya is able to explain why certain regions of Spain with minimal "push" factors sent large numbers abroad. At the same time, he debunks the long-held notion in Latin American and Caribbean immigration studies that racist policies in favor of "white" European immigrants explain mass migration to the region. Indeed, there were many nations with pro-European immigration legislation that never received more than a few immigrants, even after providing subsidies. In the end, Moya argues, it was access to newly created information and transportation channels, much more than local push factors, that explains who immigrated and why.

The second "book" is a fascinating social history of the Spaniards in Buenos Aires. While Moya examines all the traditional areas (residence patterns, labor markets and occupational choice, the formation of community organization) he again breaks with convention by showing how webs of relations, rather than chain networks, help to explain everything from where people lived to whom they chose to marry. Using such lively and diverse materials as poetry and jokes along with "traditional" historical documentation, Moya shows that "Spanish" Buenos Aires was rich, varied, and often contentious. Like Rudolph Vecoli, whose studies of Italian immigrants in the United States marginalized Oscar Handlin's "sea change" theories overnight, the careful examination of Spanish regionalism, and its re-creation overseas, reminds readers that ethnicity is only occasionally nationally based. In fact, one of the richest parts of this second "book" is Moya's careful examination of how regional cultural forms moved from Spain to Argentina and then back again to Spain. Yet Moya is no cultural purist. Situating himself comfortably within the "new" (newest?) ethnic studies, he shows how host and hosted are in constant and changing negotiations over everything from food to language to politics.

Moya has written an important new addition to the study of Latin American history. Scholars of immigration will be pleased by Moya's use of graphs, maps and quantitative methods while those interested in broad social processes will find his rich documentation useful, challenging, and often fun. By asking hard methodological questions at every stage, Moya refutes some parts of the canon while upholding others. At the end of the book, readers know much more than the story of Spanish immigrants to Buenos Aires; they have a new sense of immigration as a process.

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CHRISTOPHER BRACKEN. *The Potlatch Papers: A Colonial Case History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1997. Pp. 276. Cloth $40.00, paper $16.95.

This is a book that is bound to delight or infuriate; it encapsulates the debate that has driven the Historical Society from the arms of the American Historical Association. The project will be unrecognizable and indecipherable to traditional historians, but to postmodernists it will be a lively romp through the thickets of colonial discourse. Bracken has elected to examine the documentary record of Canada's attempt to ban important practices known as the potlatch and tamanawas of northwest coastal First Nations. He treats the documents as a "text" and deconstructs that text for what it reveals about "white Canada" and its colonizing project. It is a literary analysis, not a historical study in the modernist mold.

This book is an extended metaphor. The author draws on Jacques Derrida to propose that the correspondence making up these documents "gives us access to the postal principle" (p. 6). Ideas, like letters, are folded and sent, creating a network of "postalities" at the heart of European philosophy. The postal system R us. The metaphor itself becomes an explanatory device that dominates much of the book. Now we know that the post in postmodern is actually the mail.

The leading lights of the linguistic turn are all here: Immanuel Kant, Martin Heidegger and Derrida, with Michel Foucault lurking behind the scenes. They sound curiously canonical for a school that claims to reject the canon. Derrida actually did write briefly about the potlatch, drawing on the work of ethnologist Franz Boas. However, the primary role of these theorists is to provide models and images to sustain Bracken's analysis. For example, it is widely believed that the word "potlatch" means "to give," so Bracken plays with the metaphor of "the gift," drawing on Heidegger and Derrida's discussion of the gift as the process by which language creates things. We are not to understand the gift in the sense of what it meant to the First Nations who were giving away their property at the potlatch, but for what it meant to a Europe/Canada that "gives non-European cultures to itself" (p. 23) in a process of defining limits and boundaries between civilization and savagery.

Although the emphasis is on a philosophical understanding of language, Bracken does occasionally pose historical questions. For example, he wonders why the potlatch was ignored in the 1860s but targeted for elimination in the 1870s. His answers, though, are always to be found in the language, not the historical

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context. The answer to this particular question is that the actual word "potlatch" does not appear in government correspondence until 1875. Until its meaning is fully constructed in a linguistic sense through civil servants' debates about it, there is nothing to crusade against.

Given the author's philosophical assumptions, it seems pointless to criticize the book for failing to meet standards based on an entirely different and competing set of philosophical assumptions. A modernist might note that the discussion is largely ahistorical and that no empirical evidence is offered for the interpretations. She would express frustration at the lack of historical context, the presentation of theory as if it were fact, or the generalizations that allow an individual missionary to represent all of European culture (perhaps a form of the literary device synecdoche). She would cringe at the acceptance of oral tradition at face value, even when the written tradition is so vigorously deconstructed. She would be puzzled by the fact that the author relies on Douglas Cole and Ira Chaikin's book, *An Iron Hand Upon the People: The Law Against the Potlatch on the Northwest Coast* (1990), while noting in a footnote that "the rhetorical mode of their narrative is that of the excuse" (p. 238). Surely, *An Iron Hand Upon the People* could also be deconstructed as part of the colonialist discourse on the potlatch.

The postmodernist, however, will delight in the extended word game that playfully hops and skips from one meaning to the next. He will enjoy the digs at traditional scholarship scattered throughout, such as the reference to bureaucratic correspondence on the potlatch as transmissions of "a whole canon of minor authors" (p. 1). He will appreciate the vivid use of metaphor as a means of enlightenment rather than of obscurantism; the project of assimilation, for instance, is a truer form of cannibalism than the feigned ceremonial cannibalism of the Kwakwaka'wakw. He will also appreciate the bleak pointlessness of the exercise. "Because it is postal destining that puts metaphysics in the mail," the author reports from Derrida, "it is always possible, and indeed necessary, that metaphysics will get lost and never arrive at itself. Metaphysics . . . cannot be reduced to a homogeneous totality because it is forever deferred, forever on the way, in the mail" (p. 242).

Canada Post has become the post-Innis staple for the postmodern.

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RUDY KOSHAR. *Germany's Transient Pasts: Preservation and National Memory in the Twentieth Century*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1998. Pp. xiv, 422. Cloth $59.95, paper $24.95.

In this provocative book, Rudy Koshar suggests that a picture-card album filled with the images of half-timbered houses, grand cathedrals, and stony castle ruins that shoppers had collected after buying cigarettes or margarine is a distinctively modern artifact. That such a commonplace album and its pleasant, sentimental scenes circulated so widely indicates the extent to which Germans participated in a discourse about the past and evinced feelings of attachment and belonging to the nation. Stollwerck's 1931 album showed all sorts of pictures of historic places, but it also revealed a way of seeing the nation as a whole, and it is this sightfulness that is the subject of Koshar's book.

One of the characteristics of being modern was loving the past, Koshar notes. What were the origins of this improbable appreciation? Koshar leans on Reinhart Koselleck to argue that the growing disjuncture between "the 'horizon of expectation' and the 'space of experience' becomes the fundamental condition of societal relationships" in modern times; "anticipation of the future worked without deferring primarily to the authority of remembrance" (p. 18). As a result, the past became a source of worry, an object of reflection, and an arena to reconstruct continuities into the past and the future (p. 22). This emergence of a "national optics" (p. 18) opened up imaginary possibilities to construct subjects of history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. "The phantasmagoria of other times" manifested by the cultivated preservation of historic Koblenz or ancient Trier embellished an interior space of the nation that Koshar compares to a pilgrim's map of the Holy Land. National monuments were made out of disrepaired castles and decrepit stonework. "By 1975, West Germans were convinced that one of every twelve buildings in the Federal Republic had historical value" (p. 9)!

Koshar compares the reconstructive work of the preservationists to colonialist memory work; he refers both to the exoticization of a no longer immediately accessible past and to the *bürgerlich* identity that such work upheld. Although acknowledging that national feeling is constructed, however, he insists that "nationalist speech makers" or "preservers of historic sites" do not have "unlimited scope to invent and manipulate cultural images inherited from the past because those images exert an unmistakable pull on the present" (p. 8). In a right-minded critique of Benedict Anderson, Koshar makes a compelling case for "the density and substantiality of national memory" (p. 9). Moreover, Koshar has little patience with Pierre Nora's elegant but ultimately preemptory contention that modern memory is dispersed and incoherent and no longer enables mutual recognition and common identity.

Given the endurance of the national idea, why the title "transient pasts"? Koshar works hard to present a picture of cultural activity overseen by Pierre Bourdieu rather than Clifford Geertz. Instead of seeing culture as a whole system, Koshar cherishes the ways in which "national memory and its artifacts may have very different meanings for different groups. Memory and tradition therefore represent not just sources of power for elites but also a potential source of noncompliance" (p. 10). But this pluralism and impermanence is

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never elaborated in Koshar's comprehensive analysis. Lots of general qualifications are made about different versions of the past, but the lingering impression that Koshar leaves is of the unifying logic of preservationist discourse. More consistent with his evidence is Koshar's incisive summation: "Modernity's awful lightness, promoted by its unending production of societal resources outside experiential boundaries, has been countered, evoked, explained, and even facilitated by the nation's unbearable and enduring weight" (p. 331).

Bourdieu doesn't work so well, but Friedrich Nietzsche certainly does. Koshar brilliantly takes Nietzsche's distinctions between monumental, critical, and antiquarian history to evaluate the formation of collective identities in the nineteenth century. Given the "national state's need to create objectified symbols of national identity that offered a point of contact and easily recognized visual referent for many disparate groups," the idea of national community "depended on the saturation of local communities with visual markers of the nation's perdurability" (p. 23). The historical accomplishments specified by monuments were not as able to fashion these affinities as were the indeterminacies of a vernacular or antiquarian style. Thus, preservationists were interested mainly in conjuring up the feeling of historical continuity. "For 'the preserving and revering soul of the antiquarian man,' wrote Nietzsche, 'the history of his city becomes for him the history of himself; he reads its walls, its towered gate, its rules and regulations, its holidays, like an illuminated diary of his youth and in all this he finds again himself' " (p. 25). This recognition of the historical self in physical space was the avowed goal of Germany's preservationists.

A historical landscape configured in vernacular terms was easily consumable. It often left "historical ensembles" vulnerable to transformation into hokey "milieu islands" and half-timbered "Disneylands" (p. 302). The historical garden of medieval village squares, illuminated cathedrals, and flag-topped castles along the Rhine also lent itself to National Socialism's *Inszenierung* of ethnic nationalism. Yet, Koshar helpfully points out, "the preservationist message was hardly designed for those"—like the Nazis—"who wanted unblinking sincerity, immediately and without compromise" (p. 149). It was always sensitive to the destruction that history wrought and thus ill-suited to accept the triumphalism of a thousand-year Reich. By the same token, preservationists after 1945 by and large refused to think seriously about the losses in the years 1933–1945, rapidly integrating the twentieth century's horrors into a general and basically sanitized pattern of loss and partial recovery. Koshar duly criticizes this "antiquitarian" posture but does not claim what seems increasingly clear as the story is carried into the postwar years: the resistance of preservationist discourse to the specificities of both monumental and critical history. What is remarkably durable is the contentment—a word Koshar uses repeatedly—that Germans had come to feel about their nation. This is the desired effect of historical preservation's "emotional regime" (p. 247), making Germans happier than historians often assume and, in turn, making historians frustrated with the irrelevance of their approaches.

Koshar argues for a critical capacity in preservationist discourse since the 1970s, pointing to the busy memory work in which a variety of politically diverse groups such as history workshops engage. Unfortunately, readers will find these last chapters tough going. The writing is dense, even obtuse, and the well-aimed insights of earlier chapters now appear as disorienting qualifications. It is ironic for an author who explores the visualization of specific things such as market squares and church bells to be so ungenerous with illustration, clarity, and detail. Koshar returns often enough to Cologne to have considered letting the city and cathedral anchor his narrative. This book is long and at times tedious; but the argument is striking for its theoretical agility and conceptual originality. The interpretive frame is powerfully built, and readers will be dazzled by Koshar's own work of construction.

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FREDERICK COOPER and RANDALL PACKARD, editors. *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1997. Pp. xii, 361. Cloth $50.00, paper $20.00.

A decade ago, scholars pronounced the death of development. Modernization theory had been languishing for over a decade, but during its prime it gave medicine, the social sciences, foundations, and governments a set of common convictions and an agenda: to help poor, traditional societies become modern, industrial ones. Behind this project lay the unstated assumptions that history moved toward a single destination and that Europe and North America had already arrived. "Development," Akhil Gupta writes in this remarkable book, "is Orientalism transformed into a science for action" (p. 321). Taking a cue from Edward Said, social scientists began in the 1980s to take off their developmentalist blinders and celebrate their liberation. It was time, Wolfgang Sachs wrote, to bid farewell to the defunct idea "in order to clear our minds for fresh discoveries" (*The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power* [1992], p. 1).

Explaining how ideas of modernization arose and flourished might seem to be a historian's job, but the profession hesitated before taking the subject on. If the royalties and prizes heaped on Jared Diamond's *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies* (1997) mean anything, it is that the cliches of modernization still appeal to readers of history. *Annales* historians have a natural affinity for dependency and other structuralist development theories. So scholars in other disciplines—notably Sachs, Arturo Escobar, and C. Douglas Lummis—began the work of histori-

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cizing development, describing how foundations and universities devised the standard concepts, trained a corps of professionals, and inscribed this mode of thinking on institutions and cultures around the world. This essay collection, edited by Africanists Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, lends historical and geographic breadth to the discussion and arrives at some different conclusions.

As a way of organizing knowledge, modernization theories have unusual power to define problems and mobilize resources. In a few short years, Packard explains, the discourse even produced new cures for disease. Colonial doctors, concerned with the health of a workforce, recommended screening windows and doors to prevent malaria. But when empires collapsed and markets integrated after World War II, Africa acquired a new economic function, as a buyer rather than a producer of goods. The mosquito now threatened consumers, not workers. Instead of being controlled, it had to be eradicated; screens were out, DDT was in. Eradication programs enjoyed some success, notably with smallpox, Packard observes, but with malaria and other diseases they failed, in no small part because of the way the development discourse limited the imagination.

A theme many of the essays return to is how the reliance on statistics and generalizations—"seeing like a state" in James C. Scott's phrase (*Seeing Like a State* [1998])—cripples humanitarian efforts. Local knowledge is simply too messy and particular, too *local*, to fit into the universal models that are the discourse's stock in trade. When developers set out to offer medical training to shamans and midwives in Nepal, Stacy Leigh Pigg explains, they first had to train people to fit those "traditional" categories. James Ferguson describes how anthropologists constructed a division between the modern and the traditional, built a discipline around it, and resented all the while its political and intellectual implications. In the 1950s, according to John Sharpless, demographers drew Washington's attention to the problem of overpopulation by framing it as a national security crisis. But by doing so, they turned the issue into a political hot button and made it even more difficult to study or discuss. The very effort to translate reality into terms that academics and bureaucracies can understand distorts it beyond recognition.

In two respects, these essays differ from earlier treatments. Escobar described a hegemonic discourse inflicted on other cultures. "The consolidation of 'development studies' in most major [American] universities," he wrote, "set into motion a powerful mechanism for producing truth and norms about the Third World" ("Power and Visibility: Development and the Invention and Management of the Third World," in *Cultural Anthropology* 3 [1998]: 431). Instead, these authors see a discourse originating in many sites and under diverse circumstances. Sugata Bose reveals that India's Congress Party appropriated developmentalism from the British as early as the 1920s by proposing an alternate development program. It offered a rationale for Jawarhalal Nehru's vision of a centralized state and ammunition against Mohandas Gandhi's antimodernism. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink trace the genealogies of development strategies through the World Bank and the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). Both find institutional imperatives behind changing definitions of development. While the World Bank's discovery of poverty in 1968 is usually attributed to Robert McNamara's influence, Finnemore explains that steering aid to poor segments within societies was virtually the only way the bank could dispose of its surplus funds. ECLA dropped structuralism in the 1980s in favor of neoliberalism, Sikkink believes, because of similar internal pressures. Generational change, pressure from democratic governments, and the failure of dependency to solve the economic problems of the 1980s all led to the reversal. Rather than a unitary, self-replicating ideology, these authors see a fluid discourse with numerous wellsprings, crosscurrents, and riptides.

They are also less eager to celebrate development's demise. In a fascinating introduction, Cooper and Packard depict the unusual coalition of end-of-history free marketeers and postmodernist critics ranged against modernization. The authors see universalizing rhetoric and the denial of all universality as twin evils, and they dread a future where humanitarianism is replaced by structural adjustment. For all its faults, the development discourse "gave African and Asian leadership a sense of mission" (p. 9) and a way to voice claims against rich and powerful nations. Pigg's question, "Can bad social analysis result in good development programs?" (p. 275), runs through many of these essays. Historicizing development, they contend, offers the best way to recapture the values that animated the early development efforts and to learn what can be salvaged from a half century of intellectual effort. In any case, Ferguson and Gupta argue, we cannot escape. Discredited developmentalist ideas, minus their souls, continue to shuffle along, setting agendas for powerful bureaucracies and the "practical" application of the social sciences, an undead whom their creators are powerless to destroy. "Development is not welcome in the house of anthropology," Ferguson writes, but "it just won't leave" (p. 165). These authors show us how to learn to live with it.

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COMPARATIVE/WORLD

STEPHEN J. PYNE. *Vestal Fire: An Environmental History, Told through Fire, of Europe and Europe's Encounter with the World*. Foreword by WILLIAM CRONON. (Weyerhaeuser Environmental Books.) Seattle: University of Washington Press. 1997. Pp. xvii, 659. $34.95.

This epic prose poem is both admirable and irritating. It taught me more about European and world history

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than any other single book I have ever read, abounding, as it does, in new information, new ideas, and new understandings of the past, thanks to Stephen J. Pyne's energetic and imaginative inquiry into the unique partnership between humans and fire—controlled, partly controlled, and uncontrolled. Yet I found the oracular, sometimes opaque, and frequently exaggerated rhetoric that Pyne prefers, together with sketchy footnotes and often meandering chronology, almost as irritating as his insight and scope are admirable.

The work is divided into three parts. Book one, "Elements," describes natural conditions affecting and created by fire in Europe; summarizes the impact of anthropogenic fires in allowing human beings to colonize the continent, cultivate parts of it, and elaborate their tool kits; and, in concluding sections, explores "Hearth and House," "Combustion and Cognition," and "Ceremony and Ritual." This part of the book was the least satisfactory for me, simply because Pyne's remarks, however provocative, were too slenderly rooted in time and place for me to feel comfortable or thoroughly convinced.

Book two repairs that defect abundantly by treating the varying relations between humankind and fire in five different climatic regions of Europe in successive chapters devoted to Mediterranean, Central, Boreal, Eurasian, and Atlantic Europe. Each chapter starts with initial human occupancy, and carries the story down to our own time with many a hop, skip, and jump, but with thoroughly convincing specificity whenever available records show major new departures in the way humans altered landscapes by firing them. Pollen samples from bogs and cores taken from lake bottoms and from glaciers can now provide a detailed and chronologically accurate record of local changes in plant assemblies and atmospheric gases, and Pyne relies very largely on such archaeological evidence for his reconstruction of the past, using literary evidence as supplement when available.

The biggest surprise for me was his discussion of Finnish expansion, beginning between 1100 and 1200. In his words: "For a century or so swiddening Finns hovered around Lake Ladoga. Then they swarmed north like hiving bees. Within two centuries they had reached the Arctic circle, pushed to the fringes of coastal settlements, and leaped the Gulf of Bothnia into the interior of central Sweden. Within another century they had banked around the northern Gulf, pushed the Lapps inland, and transported their pioneering ardor across the Atlantic to New Sweden on the shores of the Delaware river" (p. 230). They brought not just pioneering ardor but a specific, sophisticated technique for barking and felling trees, burning the dead wood a year or two later after it dried, and then sowing grain in the ashes. That kind of farming, Pyne says, could produce as much as 100 bushels per hectare for a couple of years, after which the Finns moved on to another carefully prepared plot carved from the forest, often miles away (p. 233). Finns transplanting itinerant pyrotechniques to North American forests seems a surprising scenario, although, as Pyne explains in another part of his book, Amerindians and other Europeans also contributed to a "syncretic stew" from which "emerged the fundamental practices of [American] pioneering" (p. 470).

Book three, "Earth," discusses how European uses of fire and convictions about how it ought to be managed impinged on the rest of the world. Compared to the 327 pages devoted to European regional diversity, Pyne's discussion of "Islands," "Continents," and "Planets" in a mere 147 pages is elliptical, fascinating, and largely unfamiliar, since the role of foresters and forestry in European imperial governance was as new to me as was the aerial prowess of Soviet fire-fighting. An amused disdain for the European imperial effort to banish fire from the face of the earth by confining it to internal combustion motors and industrial furnaces pervades this part of Pyne's book. But he leaves open the question of what policy is to be preferred, since he also points out the costs of allowing "natural" fires to burn unchecked, as American foresters did in Yellowstone Park in 1988.

In conclusion, he returns to the beginning. For fire kindled on earth long before humankind emerged, and, Pyne declares, "However far Europe moved or sought to move beyond the realm of fire, fire would persist. The Earth willed it." Whereupon he ends his book with the brief, portentous prophecy: "After Europe there would still be fire" (p. 547).

Overall, the case Pyne makes for the importance of fire in reshaping landscapes and facilitating agriculture and herding in Europe and around the world is thoroughly convincing; and his emphasis on swiddening as a world-girdling supplement to permanent fields corrects common assumptions about what rural life is and ought to be. More important still, Pyne extends paleontologists' ideas about how plants transformed their environment and "invented fire" by releasing oxygen into the atmosphere, and treats "the fast combustion of burning ecosystems" as an inescapable counterpart and alternative to "the slow combustion of respiring organisms" (p. 16). As he points out, animals and fire alike convert complex proteins and carbohydrates into simpler chemicals, and in doing so release energy. Fire and animal life thus become twins; and human efforts to manage fire, like our efforts to domesticate plants and animals or control infectious diseases remain amazingly succesful yet persistently liable to unforseen disasters.

Thus Pyne's more-than-Olympian vision of human history, with fire front and center, expands and corrects my own best efforts at understanding the human past, and I am duly grateful. Nonetheless, I wish he had refrained from using ten words when two would do and held back from unprofitable metaphor, such as the following: "Once sublimated into symbol, fire entered a cognitive ecology in which it smouldered in the soil of the subconscious and convected into clouds of abstraction" (p. 71). Or again: "To an India awash in savannas, seral jungles, swiddened hills, ancient pasto-

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ralists, and the pyric metronome of the Asian monsoon, accessibility mean [sic!] fire. Time and again these two tasks converged, like thematic Ganges and Brahmaputra Rivers, on the vexatious delta of Indian fire" (p. 488). "Ouch!" is all I can say.

A final reproach: maps and diagrams are often hard to decipher, and in at least one instance (p. 285) the keying appears to be incorrect. For a book that requires detailed geographical familiarity of its readers, this is a sad and wanton defect.

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JEREMY BLACK. *War and the World: Military Power and the Fate of Continents, 1450–2000*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1998. Pp. 334. $35.00.

With this volume, Jeremy Black provides an account of how war has been waged over the past five and a half centuries in the European and non-European worlds. He has written what is in effect a global history of armed conflict. Such an undertaking presupposes a wide-ranging familiarity with the subject matter, both in general terms and in its details. It also demands extensive research, and one would be hard pressed to come up with any printed source that Black does not seem to have consulted, or mined, in his effort to show the adaptability of a broad spectrum of social and political systems worldwide to the ultimate challenge of war. A reasonably well-read student of military history has some acquaintance with much of what is to be found in the book, namely those portions dealing with war in the European world, but said student is likely to be much less informed about how different realms of Southeast and Central Asia, not to mention the indigenous peoples of Africa and the Americas, made war.

At a number of places in the text, Black takes issue, either explicitly or in passing, with the Eurocentrism he considers as characteristic of most works on military history: the propensity to see non-Europeans as being of military interest only in relation to Europeans. The martial efforts of non-Europeans are usually conceived of as being anachronistic, and therefore bound to fail, all of which fits nicely into a familiar model for global history, the "Rise of the West." The exponents of this point of view tend to disregard the military vitality of many non-European peoples who have waged war quite effectively according to their own methods in order to achieve their particular ends: peoples such as the Ottoman Turks during the five or more centuries after 1350, the Mughals of India in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the Chinese under the first three rulers of the Manchu dynasty.

One of the themes Black deals with is the emphasis given by many students of war to superiority in military technology—thought to be a special forte of the Europeans—as the major factor in a polity's success in combat. He does not discount such superiority but reminds us that there are other specifically non-military elements that ought to be taken into consideration as well in assessing a realm's capability to wage war.

There was, however, one field where Europeans did possess a technological advantage over other societies, and that was in naval warfare, an advantage that non-Europeans could never overcome. It was because they were able to prevail in combat at sea that some European realms could achieve a global reach as early as the sixteenth century.

The Portuguese seem to have been the first here. By mounting cannons on their small but sturdily built, maneuverable ships as early as 1500, they could utilize them on the oceans of South and Southeast Asia to vanquish the vessels of the local rulers, thereby establishing an extended maritime empire through which they endeavored to assert monopoly control over the seaborne commerce of the region. They lost their predominance in that enterprise to the Dutch during the seventeenth century, while the British in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries succeeded in carrying out an even more impressive policy of expansion. They were not only able to dominate the sea lanes of the world but also to exert their sway over certain large areas of land such as Canada and India. By the mid-eighteenth century, Britain had become one of the strongest powers in the world.

The other realm that carried out a comparably effective policy of military expansion at about the same time, but almost exclusively on land, was China. With a huge population from which to recruit its armies, as well as a highly developed system of internal administration to marshal and supply them, China was able, by 1760, to gain control over a more extensive territory than it had ever achieved in its prior two-thousand-year history.

Black calls his work "only a contribution." Nevertheless, he has assembled a vast amount of information, a great deal of it extremely interesting. Along the way, he manages to refute many bits of accepted knowledge concerning warlike matters. Having brought together so great a quantity of factual and interpretive material, all within the compass of some 300 pages, he leaves readers on their own as to what to make of it all. This reader, at least, as he makes his way through this compilation of data, might wish that it were organized and presented in a more "user friendly" fashion, that there were more guidance than the author has cared to furnish as to what is or is not significant.

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DANIEL GOFFMAN. *Britons in the Ottoman Empire, 1642–1660*. (Publications on the Near East.) Seattle: University of Washington Press. 1998. Pp. xv, 310. $50.00.

Daniel Goffman defines his task as one of examining "those marginalized Britons who populated the cul-

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tural and commercial overlays between the British and Ottoman worlds during the mid-seventeenth century" (p. 12). This task has a commendable and revisionist purpose: to redress the imbalance of earlier scholarly treatment of these two empires by suggesting that the "boundary" between them was "pluralistic and plastic." The desired revisionism, especially for the period that Goffman had set out to examine, has as its purpose the examination of English men and women who had been changed substantially by the encounters that they had in the alien Ottoman context. The evidence Goffman musters to test his contentions is derived from Ottoman and British (some even archival) sources. In other words, we have in Goffman a scholar with credentials as an Ottoman specialist who is dissatisfied with the separation and specialization he finds in the field of history, as these militate against understanding the mutual effect wrought by Europeans and non-Europeans prior to the rise of the imposing and hegemonic imperial Europe of later centuries. The author took upon himself the task of bridging this gap by acquiring knowledge of English society in the seventeenth century.

The means Goffman adopts to convey the results of his research are those of an empiricist, where facts are made to speak for themselves. He thus resorts to a narrative approach in order to convey to the reader the events that constituted the fate of English merchant-diplomats who lived in the Ottoman empire, mainly in Constantinople, with diversions in the narrative about the lives of English men in Izmir and Aleppo as well. English society was undergoing a civil war, and Charles I was beheaded, while Ottoman society similarly lost its ruler, Ibrahim, at approximately the same time. The main impression that the reader is left with is one of a squabbling English community in the Ottoman centers of commerce fighting over petty issues and occasionally referring these squabbles to the mother country (whether centered in the crown or Parliament). It is not clear what Goffman expects his reader to get out of this narrative: is it that the English residents of the Ottoman lands became like the Ottomans, sometimes turning petty or even venal?

Knowledge of Ottoman Turkish as well as English gives Goffman first-hand access to the historical sources. Although he wishes to give both societies equal consideration, however, he is not able to overcome the major difficulty of knowing each society in, for, and by itself at a particular time and place in its history. Only then would he have been able to situate the actions of the historical actors in his narrative. Goffman could have conveyed some measure of understanding of the internal history of English society of the seventeenth century by engaging the major revisionist scholarship of Robert Brenner, especially *Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London's Overseas Traders, 1550–1653* (1993). A comparison between English and Ottoman societies of the period would have illuminated the context for interactions between members of the two societies. Instead, Goffman seems to be more concerned with the fact that Brenner, in the process of situating the role that the overseas merchants played between Parliament and monarch, does not pay heed to any of the English diplomats who resided in the Ottoman empire. Perhaps, given the dynamics of English society at the time, these individuals played a minor, if not trivial, role.

Finally, a remark on terminology and language. Throughout his narrative, Goffman uses the term "Turk" anachronistically when he is referring to Ottoman subjects. This may be in part because his English sources more frequently than not use such a designation to describe the Muslim inhabitants of the Ottoman state. Furthermore, one is surprised to find the use in an unproblematized fashion of such terms as "Western civilization"—as opposed to Ottoman civilization—to characterize the two societies that the author is trying to study comparatively. Does the reference to the term "civilization" stand for the characterization of the other? Furthermore, what is the reader to make of Goffman's utilization of the following terms to characterize or describe the behavior of Ottoman individuals or institutions: as having "tendrils" (p. 31), being "swallowed" and "devoured," undergoing "violent metamorphoses" (p. 33), and possessing "bewilderingly" (p. 34), "infamously," and "hidebound traditions" (p. 35) and "peculiarities" (p. 53)? The behavior of an English ambassador who attempted to evade the application of Ottoman law to the estate of an English subject who had died intestate (pp. 134–35) is treated as clever and somewhat normal; at other times the term "prudent" (p. 135) seems appropriate, and blackmail when practiced by the English in an Ottoman context is not charaterized as such (p. 142).

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Volker Then. *Eisenbahnen und Eisenbahnunternehmer in der Industriellen Revolution: Ein preußisch/deutsch-englischer Vergleich.* (Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, number 120.) Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 1997. Pp. 512. DM 78.

In the last five years, research on German railroads has launched a new phase of comparative history on the railroad industry and its relationship to state, society, and economy. Moving beyond the narratives of J. H. Clapham, W. O. Henderson, and Wilhelm Treue, as well as the foundational quantitative work of Rainer Fremdling, such historians as Colleen Dunlavy, Dieter Ziegler, and Allan Mitchell have posed comparative questions to reconsider long-held assumptions about state-building, political behavior, and economic development. Volker Then's study of English and Prussian-German railroad companies joins this new cluster of scholarship. The book's impressive empirical base (six English and twelve German railways), skillful blend of

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social and business history, and constructive engagement with historiography combine to make a substantial contribution to the social history of early industrialization.

Then's comparison of English and German railroads and their entrepreneurs might be seen as a methodological fusion of Alfred D. Chandler and Jürgen Kocka. Whereas the former emphasized the firm's internal management structure as critical for understanding the dynamics of capitalist expansion, Kocka has long sought to integrate such exogenous factors as the state, education, and political economy into analyses of industrial relations and entrepreneurial practices. Then recognizes the importance of both, adroitly situating the relative autonomy of managerial strategies and corporate structures within larger political, legal, and cultural frameworks that constrained and conditioned railroad construction and administration. Using this dual focus, the book's chapters address critical economic issues of incorporation, capitalization, capital markets, legal frameworks, government-business relations, and state ownership. In addition to this business history framework, Then further investigates the social profiles of stockholders, entrepreneurs, and directors, thus adding an important social-historical dimension to the study.

The study shows that railroad construction and administration is one international process with national and regional variations. Similarities emerge: the preponderant influence of bankers, entrepreneurs, and professionals; the dominance of the commercial bourgeoisie and the importance of its financial networks; the tendency of regional railways to diversify into sectors of allied industrial production; and the legal and financial constraints that narrowed the parameters of entrepreneurial independence. Then argues, too, that differences between economic and political centers and regional levels of development are more important than "national" structures when assessing entrepreneurial strategies. Yet the study's findings nonetheless accent critical national differences in financing and administrating railroads. In spite of regional differences, one sees in England pervasive connections between old money and bourgeois commercial circles. British landed wealth and nobility subscribed stock in greater magnitude and sat on boards with greater frequency. Nowhere in Germany could one find the example of the Marquis of Stafford, who subscribed twenty percent of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway's initial stock (p. 168). In England, the presence of a developed national exchange, which had matured with eighteenth-century canal, turnpike, and coal enterprises, facilitated the participation of old landed money in the railroad industry. This largely obviated state subsidies or guarantees on interest. By contrast, German states suffered from underdeveloped stock exchanges (which handled mostly state paper), inexperienced investors, and a nobility that played a negligible role in building railroads. Not having the advantage of either noble capital or mature markets, German entrepreneurs developed a greater reliance on the state for interest guarantees on common stock, just as German railroads recruited more government officials for administrative expertise and political connections. Overall, the widespread linkage of gentry and rural titled classes with the English railroad world stands in stark contrast with German railways, the leadership of which remained urban and bourgeois. This case study confirms the view of an English "open" elite. Not only did English railroad directors possess more country estates, but their sons also attended university and moved into the free professions with greater regularity. On the German side, Then's data compiles yet more evidence to bury the thesis of German bourgeois "feudalization."

A short review cannot do justice to the wealth of detail in Then's wide-ranging comparisons, and historians will long benefit from his tables and charts. The book's breadth of analytical categories, however, does mean that not all subjects are handled with necessary depth and clarity. A fuller discussion of entrepreneurial political strategies is necessary. Although English railroad businessmen served as liberal MPs, the reader never learns how Parliament specifically nurtured or shaped railroad development. Similarly, Then rejects a socioeconomic *Sonderweg* for Germany, but the politics of building bourgeois railroad empires through indirect and extraparliamentary means—the putative legacy of bureaucratic absolutism—is never satisfactorily explored. Although such critical topics receive scant attention, Then's work deserves praise, for it unites business, social, and economic history with intelligence and aplomb.

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JULIA CLANCY-SMITH and FRANCES GOUDA, editors. *Domesticating the Empire: Race, Gender, and Family Life in French and Dutch Colonialism*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. 1998. Pp. xi, 348. $59.50.

This collection of essays, edited by Julia Clancy-Smith and Frances Gouda, is a welcome addition to the growing literature on gender and colonialism. Its central theme—the complexity of women's contribution to European imperialism—is similar to that of *Western Women and Imperialism: Complicity and Resistance*, edited by Nupur Chaudhuri and Margaret Strobel (1992). Unlike the former work, whose essays, with two exceptions, concentrate on women and the British Empire, this volume focuses on French and Dutch colonialism, areas that have received far less scholarly attention to date. While the collection as a whole is avowedly indebted to the earlier work, the individual essays shed new light on the dynamics of gender and imperialism and highlight the diverse nature both of women's experiences and of the mechanics of gendering in different colonial settings. The work emphasizes the nationally and even regionally specific nature of European colonialism.

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Over and above the desire to move away from the centrality of Britain in matters of colonialism and gender, France and the Netherlands were chosen for a number of reasons. These include drawing attention to the distinct social, political, and cultural practices of the French and Dutch in their colonies in order to test hypotheses, established largely with British India in mind, concerning "metropolitan ideas about gender relations, race and class alignments," and their transposition overseas (p. 4). The essays are thus intended to provide a wider panorama of the way in which national values with regard to gender, race, and family life were changed or, on occasion, warped beyond recognition" (p. 5) in the transition between metropolitan hub and colonial periphery. The pattern of oscillation, seldom friction-free, between metropole, periphery, and metropole, with each contributing to creating or refashioning colonial discourses and social or cultural paradigms, is a thread throughout the work and one of its major strengths.

The collection comprises an introduction and twelve essays, of which seven are on aspects of French colonialism and five on Dutch. Although not grouped under topical headings, they are ordered thematically with some approximation to chronology. Some are illustrated but, unfortunately, there are no maps. Central to all the essays is the way in which gender differences were conceived. By examining the methods used to articulate these differences on a daily basis, the essayists expose the familial imagery and gendered vocabulary which was an integral part of colonial discourse.

The manipulation of gendered tropes was not, however, the prerogative of colonial officials, as Gouda demonstrates in her fine essay on feminine imagery in colonial and anticolonial rhetoric in the Dutch East Indies. She shows how parental metaphors were used by Dutch colonial officials to validate their authority in the archipelago and how these same metaphors were assimilated into the political language of the nationalists to ridicule and subvert the very authority they were originally intended to legitimize.

In examining the parental and gendered metaphors used to impose a relationship of command and subordination in the colonies, the question arises as to whether, if at all, they replicated those of the metropole between the elites and the laboring classes. Jean Pederson addresses this in her essay on paternity suits and citizenship in France and the colonies from 1870 to 1912, demonstrating the subtle differences in attitudes between metropole and colony in their hierarchical distinctions. While shedding light on the complex intersection of class, gender, and race in the definition of national identities, Pederson also highlights the varying attitudes among social reformers, physicians and social workers, and feminists—underscoring an argument common to all the essays, namely diversity and paradox in the colonial situation. The ambiguities of class and gender are further developed by Elsbeth Locher-Scholten in her examination of colonial rhetoric about Javanese servants. She demonstrates how domestic service became yet another trope for colonial relations, mirroring the way in which Dutch paternalism was embedded in an idiom of parental obligation.

Race is an important dimension to many of these essays. The two old chestnuts concerning women and race in the colonies—namely, that European women were more racist than European men and that racism only became entrenched in the colonies when women arrived there in large numbers—are well and truly buried. Pointing to the ambivalent nature of the relations between women and their indigenous servants, and to the fact it was men who often emphasized the otherness of servants, Locher-Scholten demonstrates that racism was not a female prerogative. Similarly, Penny Edwards, in her essay on colonial Cambodia, shows that it was not women who instigated racism in the colonies but fears of hybridity and degeneration, more often than not voiced by men. Themes of degeneration and renewal permeate several of the essays. Whether they emerged from *fin-de-siècle* fears of national decadence, as in the French colonies, or in twentieth-century preoccupations with racial purity, as in Dutch New Guinea, they embodied the paradoxical nature of the colonial racial discourse. Whereas colonized cultures were seen to be degenerate, the colonial space was seen as a site of regeneration.

Religion adds a further nuance, as Clancy-Smith demonstrates in her essay on the relationship between Islam and gender in Algeria. She states that in the period 1870 to 1900, "Islam moved from the battlefield to the bedroom" (p. 155). In the process, the Arab woman became a trope for indigenous Algerian cultures (p. 166). This interesting contention brings out the overtly erotic nature of much of French colonial gendering, a fact underlined in the other essays on French colonialism. It was a contrast to the more familial tropes created by the Dutch.

In spite of the overall richness of the volume, some questions do arise. If colonial India has attained quasi-normative status in the analysis of women and British imperialism, Algeria risks a similar fate with regard to France. Of the four essays on specific French colonies, three concern Algeria. Enlightening though they are, the reader is left speculating about other outposts of the French empire. What about Madagascar, whose interest to France predated formal colonization? Were the North African protectorates idiosyncratic in their discourses, or did Algeria set the tone?

For readers unfamiliar with the specifics of French and Dutch colonialism, some essays would benefit from ampler footnotes to explicate or substantiate the text. To cite but two examples: Alice Conklin's essay on redefining Frenchness in France and West Africa from 1914 to 1940 opens with a brief discussion of the 1993 Méhaignerie law, stating that children of immigrants applying for citizenship "may be rejected on any of the grounds listed in the new law" (p. 65). In view of

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the controversy that surrounded this law and the fact it was never ratified by both houses, it would have been wise to say as much and to be more precise regarding the nature of the exclusions. As it happens, the Guigou law of March 1998, implemented September 1st, has replaced it, and, subject to five-year (non-consecutive) residency, children of immigrants will automatically obtain citizenship at the age of eighteen. In a different vein, Clancy-Smith's essay mentions the post-1900 "flood of literature" devoted to Muslim women in Algeria (p. 155). As no essay is ever long enough do justice to such a statement, it would be useful to have a sampling of the disciplinary range of this proliferation. Finally, in the transliteration of Arabic terms, uniform spelling has not always been respected, *viz.* Ouled Nail (p. 158) and Oulaid-Nail (p. 203). These are, however, minor drawbacks to what is a cogent contribution to the literature on this topic.

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JOHN HORNE, editor. *State, Society and Mobilization in Europe during the First World War.* (Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare, number 3.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Pp. xv, 292. $59.95.

JAY WINTER and JEAN-LOUIS ROBERT. *Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin, 1914–1919.* (Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare, number 2.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Pp. xvii, 622. $90.00.

Study of the Great War has undergone a revival and transformation during the past decade, due in no small part to the initiatives of the group of scholars gathered around the Historial de la Grande Guerre in Péronne, a small town in the French department of the Somme that now houses an important museum and research center devoted to this topic. Recent work on the war has advanced on a number of different but often overlapping fronts. One, inspired by cultural history, has emphasized representations of the conflict: the way the war was perceived, thought, written, pictured, commemorated, and remembered. Another has attempted to broaden our understanding of what it meant to participate in the war, moving beyond the plans and decisions of generals and politicians to the experience of combatants and civilians, especially women and children. Yet a third approach, driven by frustration with the constraints and limitations of national history as it has normally been practiced, has sought to understand the war comparatively. The two books under review reflect all three of these historiographical tendencies and, at the same time, have the ambition of carrying them to a higher level of sophistication.

The volume edited by John Horne, the product of a conference organized by him and held in Trinity College, Dublin, in June 1993, focuses on the relationship between national mobilization and total war. Declaring himself dissatisfied with national approaches to what he considers to be a transnational or supranational phenomenon, Horne himself sets out in an excellent (and admirably brief) introduction to provide a comparative framework for an understanding of the thirteen nationally oriented essays that follow. The first two years of the war, he says, were characterized by the "self-mobilization" of civil society in which coercion was less important than persuasion. Soaring casualty rates, the receding prospect of victory in any foreseeable future, and, above all, the military crisis of 1917–1918, which all belligerents experienced to one degree or another, forced the warring states to intervene more energetically in order to "remobilize" their populations during the last year and a half of the conflict. As liberal-democratic nation-states with institutions that guaranteed political participation, Britain and France were able to draw on reserves of legitimacy that Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Italy lacked. Germany, which resembled Britain and France in the development of its civil society and the degree of national integration, ultimately failed the test of remobilization because the necessity of renewing national consensus through the promise of domestic reform conflicted with the regime's commitment to authoritarian political institutions and the privileged status of the military.

Horne's collaborators flesh out this general picture, taking care to emphasize the factors that made for successful or unsuccessful mobilization and remobilization. We learn that French and Italian primary school children were subjected to a militarization of the curriculum in which their teachers, acting as agents of the state, sought to stimulate their patriotism, often at the expense of learning. Essays on the German Jewish community "between integration and rejection" and the failure of German mobilization in the annexed provinces of Alsace-Lorraine reveal a self-defeating impulse in Germany toward the persecution and marginalization of potentially patriotic groups perceived as "internal enemies." A section on the British, French, German, and Austro-Hungarian armies during the last years of the war explores the crisis of morale on both sides of the line and suggests some of the reasons why the Allies were able to hold out in what David Englander, commenting on the British case, calls "a close run thing" (p. 141). Paul Corner and Giovanna Procacci present a comprehensive survey of the Italian experience, which culminates in the arresting argument that Italian fascism represented an attempt to achieve the total mobilization that the Italian state had been unable to realize during the war.

Jay Winter and Jean-Louis Robert's book, though related to Horne's volume in its central theme, is an altogether more ambitious, coordinated, and longer undertaking. It is, in many respects, a model for what a collaborative study should be. Winter and Robert believe that the best way to penetrate behind "the illusory veil of a unitary national experience" is by

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studying community life, and this, they hold, can best be done within the framework of the wartime capitals of London, Paris, and Berlin. Aiming a shot across the bow of some recent cultural histories, they also declare their determination to escape from the "trap of idealism," in which there is no such thing as historical reality and only representations exist. Conscription, shortages, spiraling food prices, disease, and death were all facts of everyday life, and in the authors' view they can best be studied on the urban rather than on the national level.

Winter and Robert seek to explain in detail what is merely suggested or asserted in the Horne volume: the relative success of the Allied war effort and the failure of Germany's. Though they do not claim that the war was won or lost on the home front, they argue that a necessary if not sufficient condition of Allied victory was the maintenance of the well-being of their civilian populations, which, basing themselves on the work of Amartya Sen, they define in terms of the ability to go on functioning under conditions of hardship. "By moving to the urban level, and within that, to the district and (when possible) the street and family level, we have been able to test more completely than ever before the hypothesis that on the Allied side of the line the well-being of the population, defined in terms of capabilities and functionings, was more successfully defended than in Germany" (p. 20).

To substantiate this claim, Winter and Robert, aided by a team of ten collaborators, explore various aspects of life in their three capital cities. Almost all the indices they calculate turn out to the disadvantage of Berlin after the summer of 1916. Though Paris suffered much more from the transition from a peacetime to a wartime economy in 1914–1915 than either London or Berlin, by 1916 Berlin faced a labor shortage, which it was never able to resolve. The middle classes suffered hardship in London and Paris, but it was only in Berlin that they suffered a social and economic disaster, aggravated by the realization in the later stages of the war that the deprivation they were experiencing served no wider collective purpose. Inflation was also more successfully contained in London and Paris than it was in Berlin. Prices rose at a rate at least twice as great in Berlin as in London and at least one and a half times the rate in Paris; and whereas the authorities in London and Paris were able to guarantee their populations the necessities of life, by 1916 in Berlin what had formerly been considered rights—food, coal, housing—had been reduced to privileges, "and privileges were a function of who knew whom and who could operate the black market most effectively" (p. 289). The same divergence between capitals appears in the field of public health; in Berlin, after 1916, mortality rates rose so dramatically that they constituted a demographic crisis, which continued into the 1920s. Perhaps the only equalizing trends that appear in all three cities are a rise in mortality rates for illegitimate children and the elderly and an ascending incidence of tuberculosis among young women.

Why did Berlin fare so much worse than London and Paris during the final years of the war? In part at least, Winter and Robert think, because of England's overseas wealth and resources and the ability of the Allies to solve urban problems on an international level. England was able to shore up the more precarious situation of the Parisian population, which had undergone a serious crisis in 1914–1915. No such international support was available to the inhabitants of Berlin. The authors are also satisfied that, with some important qualifications, their research has confirmed Winter's earlier argument, in *The Great War and the British People* (1986), that the war had the effect of diminishing the difference in mortality rates between more prosperous and poorer sectors of the population. Winter is inclined to account for this by wartime changes in material conditions and extensive migration, which brought together healthier and unhealthy groups in all three capital cities. In London and Paris, this leveling process paradoxically worked to the advantage of the less privileged and lowered their mortality rates; in Berlin, where physical deprivation reached crisis proportions, it had the opposite effect, raising the mortality rates of the formerly privileged.

Winter, Robert, and their collaborators are to be congratulated for the intellectual rigor and the sharp focus of this volume. This is a model of what a collaborative historical enterprise should be. The editors promise that in a following volume they intend to emphasize the intermediary levels of experience and the actions and reactions of the family, the *quartier*, and social movements to the daily circumstances of the waging of war. "We have only begun to describe their lives in this, the first volume, of our study. The rest of their story is yet to come" (p. 554). I hope, however, that in volume two they will enliven the bountiful statistics of volume one with some insights into the lives of individual Londoners, Parisians, and Berliners, showing in biographical detail how they coped with the ordeal of the war. Their unrelenting insistence on the failure of the Wilhelmine regime to meet the challenge of the war would also be more convincing if they showed some of the strengths of German society as well as persistently dwelling on its weaknesses and failures. Still, the mass of evidence presented and so skillfully analyzed here goes far toward explaining why any effort to remobilize the German population in 1917–1918 was doomed to failure and why the legacy of the wartime years would prove so bitter and long-lasting in the Weimar Republic.

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MARK HARRISON, editor. *The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998. Pp. xxiii, 307. $49.95.

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This collection of essays, edited and with a synthesizing introduction by Mark Harrison, discusses the war economies and the postwar reconstructions and macroeconomic policies of the great powers (Germany, Italy, Japan, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States). It provides a convenient source of important and often comparable data and valuable overviews of the larger war economies.

The authors identify vexing problems with the quality and availability of data (especially for Italy and Japan), and the data from different countries are not always completely comparable. Nonetheless, Harrison is able to draw some illuminating comparisons. For example, the maximum percentage of national income devoted to the war effort varied from twenty-three percent for Italy to seventy and seventy-six percent for Germany and Japan respectively, with the United States at forty-two percent, Britain at fifty-five percent, and the Soviet Union at sixty-one percent. Harrison ascribes the degree of mobilization primarily to the immediacy of the threat, with Italy the great exception and the Soviet Union able to moderate its mobilization by drawing on its allies' resources. He also notes that if one excludes the Soviet Union, the other belligerents experienced a remarkable convergence of per capita GDP in the postwar years. The key factor was not that losers did better than "winners" but that relatively poor countries, including France, for example, tended to grow faster.

Harrison is unable to provide fully satisfactory comparative assessments of the war's immediate impact on national wealth and productive capital. He does try to compare the countries' gross war losses of human and physical assets, but the data are incomplete. All the authors comment on the level of net investment in their country, and Harrison notes that all six countries, and France, increased their stocks of machine tools. Unfortunately, though, he does not compare systematically pre- and postwar levels of productive assets. Distinguishing between national wealth and national productive base is crucial, because a country could (as did Germany) suffer enormous wartime losses of wealth but enjoy net increases in productive assets that contributed substantially to future economic development.

Each contributor attempts to assess labor allocation and productivity. However, the lack of data for Italy and Japan, the lack of comparability of labor categories among countries, and problems in assessing productivity make it difficult to move much beyond fairly obvious generalizations. Governments did shift workers from consumer goods to war-goods production. They also increased productivity in favored branches, albeit often at the expense of less favored branches and with limits imposed, apparently, by problems of diminishing returns.

Overall, Harrison argues, the more self-sufficient and developed a country was, the more successful its mobilization. The least self-sufficient countries, Italy and Japan, had great difficulties providing adequate munitions because they depended on imports that proved difficult and eventually impossible to obtain under wartime conditions. Further, the more developed a country, the more sophisticated its administrative and economic infrastructure, which assisted it in restructuring its economy for war production. The Soviet Union made up for its relative backwardness with a high degree of self-sufficiency and a prewar administrative structure already designed to direct resources to state-chosen ends. The authors emphasize the importance of economic output in explaining victory. They allude to, but do not sufficiently emphasize, the importance of non-economic factors (e.g., political legitimacy, administrative efficiency) in explaining the degree of mobilization and level of output.

The various authors differ on how war experiences contributed to postwar macroeconomic regimes and economic growth rates. Harrison emphasizes, for the market economies, both a new openness to global trade and the postwar bargains among labor, government, and business that led to moderate wage demands, favorable tax policies, and high investment. Other authors emphasize the opportunities to catch up on backlogs of demand and technology (Stephen Broadberry and Peter Howlett, U.K. and Werner Abelshauser, Germany), the triumph of Keynesian policies of demand maintenance (Hugh Rockoff, U.S.), or shifts in economic structure toward more advanced industries (Vera Zamagni, Italy and Attira Hara, Japan). Harrison also argues that the Soviet economy suffered from the postwar survival of a burdensome, inflexible military-industrial complex and of a sclerotic leadership clique legitimized by its wartime service.

Broadberry and Howlett deplore what they see as the Keynesian bias in the literature and call for a reassessment of the role of market-based incentives, but they do not explain how governments could have relied on such incentives. An incentives-based market economy elicits productive behavior by rewarding productive individuals with opportunities to make consumption choices. The problem for a war economy is to get people to produce war goods they cannot consume as individuals. All individuals may arguably have an incentive voluntarily to renounce consumption to ensure that the society can protect itself and them, but the free-rider problem reasserts itself: Given free choices as an incentive, individuals bid resources away from the war effort to consumer goods and services they want, as governments discovered at the start of World War I. Broadberry and Howlett's suggestion that the incentives could have been supplied out of a deterioration of the balance of payments begs the question of how a beleaguered Britain that rapidly became dependent on U.S. lend-lease aid could have financed significant additional imports of consumption goods to provide incentives. The only feasible incentive seems to be the one governments offered: government-imposed limits on wartime consumer-goods production and imports balanced by the promise that, if

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citizens bought war bonds during the war, the government would use its taxing power to provide them a higher share of postwar national production through debt service.

Moreover, the promise of future benefit to war-bond purchasers is by itself a dubious incentive. The citizens of the various belligerents could not easily shift even part of the burden of war to "future generations" but had to pay for almost all of it themselves, while it was going on. No country could fire in 1943 an artillery shell manufactured in 1956; each could only utilize for its war efforts goods and services made available before (a tiny percentage) or during the war. Citizens had already paid for war by its end, through increased productive effort and (voluntarily or involuntarily) foregone consumption. Moreover, whether one was a net beneficiary of postwar war-debt service depended not on what generation one belonged to but on what amount of war debt one had purchased or inherited, the degree of inflation one's country experienced, and whether one's postwar tax payments exceeded one's share of the war-debt service. The main exception here is the United Kingdom's war-related foreign debt, which it had to service after the war by exporting goods and services that were then unavailable to future generations of Britons. Another indirect exception lay in the degree of net wartime investment. Some countries, like the Soviet Union, ran down machinery and plant during the war, leaving future generations with a smaller productive base. Others, like Germany, actually made substantial net investment during the war, leaving future generations with a larger productive base.

Given the wide variations in available data and national war experiences, Harrison and his authors have done a commendable job of providing solid, insightful, and relatively comparable assessments of the wartime economic experiences of the World War II great powers.

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MICHAEL M. SHENG. *Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1997. Pp. x, 255. $39.95.

Was Mao Zedong a "genuine" communist and internationalist ready to subordinate China's interests to those of the Soviet Union or a nationalist with only a superficial attachment to Marxism-Leninism? Most of the historical writing of the last two decades has emphasized Mao's independence from and longstanding antagonism toward Moscow.

Challenging this perspective is Michael M. Sheng, who openly declares his study of Chinese Communist-Soviet relations from 1935 to 1949 as "traditionalist," confirming the view that a "systemwide Soviet bloc threat" to the United States existed (p.196). In Sheng's view, Mao was thoroughly wedded to Marxist-Leninist ideology, irrevocably hostile to the capitalist order led by the U.S., and determined, even eager, at times, to sacrifice Chinese national interests to those of the Soviet Union. Sheng bases his study on a reading of the many new primary source materials, memoirs, and published studies on Chinese Community Party (CCP) history that have become available in China in recent years.

In Sheng's study, many familiar issues are discussed in very different ways. Joseph Stalin endorsed Mao's assumption of the CCP's leadership in the 1930s, making him "Stalin's chosen man" (p. 7). The Long March's main significance was that Mao was seeking a way to retreat into Soviet territory. Mao and the CCP, rather than forming a nationally specific form of communism in isolated Yan'an in the 1930s, remained in direct communication with Moscow and slavishly followed the Soviet Union's erratic policy toward Nazi Germany. Mao did not consistently oppose Japanese aggression but toward the end of the war actually hoped that Japan would weaken nationalist resistance in order to advance Communist ambitions (p.187). Americans who met the Chinese Communists during the 1940s, from the Dixie Mission to George C. Marshall, were all deceived by their united front tactics. Mao could never have accepted a negotiated settlement with the Guomindang since he and his comrades would have suffered a "personality breakdown" and might have been charged with "treason for his secret conduct during the anti-Japanese war" (p. 194). Mao actually hoped for a "Polish solution" for the Chinese revolution with the direct intervention of Soviet forces to defeat the Nationalists; and there never was a "missed chance" in early improved U.S.-China relations since Mao, with his "class struggle" prejudices, saw the world only in terms of two hostile camps. Above all, in 1948–1949, Mao maintained "absolute loyalty" to Stalin (p. 167).

In this study, Mao appears to be an opportunist, dogmatic, erratic, and foolish leader who would have doomed the Chinese Revolution if it had not been for the intervention of Stalin. In Sheng's interpretation, Stalin actually emerges as far-sighted, consistent, and relatively faithful to the interests of the Chinese Communists. One wonders by the end of the book how Mao and his generation, as Sheng labels Mao's comrades, ever developed any links with the Chinese people and emerged victorious in 1949.

There will be few scholars who will agree with everything Sheng argues in this book, and there will be many who vehemently protest points of his account. Nevertheless, Sheng's book will not be dismissed, since it is the product of considerable work in the still-emerging documentary base of Communist Party history. Sino-Soviet party history is especially complicated because of leadership intrigues and party factions, deliberate efforts at disinformation, propaganda aimed at different audiences and levels, and above all, enigmatic supreme leaders, all of which Sheng acknowledges but inconsistently appreciates. Above all, however, Sheng's study makes clear that the

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Chinese leadership placed tremendous emphasis on maintaining comradely relations with, and receiving the goodwill of, Stalin and the Soviet Union.

One final note on this provocative book: Sheng advances an explanation for why Mao and other CCP leaders were wedded to an inflexible version of Marxist-Leninist ideology that, in Sheng's view, repeatedly divorced them from reality. The author uses the ideas of the psychoanalyst Erik Erikson to explain what appears to be this persistent irrationality. Marxism-Leninism was more than a political theory for Mao and his comrades; once they were converted through "sociogenetic evolution," communist ideology became essential to their individual and group "ego identification" (p. 10). They enjoyed "gratification" when they had tactical success; while setbacks caused an "identity crisis" for some, Mao and his comrades "toughened their ideological commitment." Therefore, in victory or defeat, the CCP leadership's dedication to Marxism-Leninism was reinforced.

Sheng criticizes the neo-realists in political science for advancing explanations based on a "totalizing ahistorical structure" (p. 3) that negates human agency in making history. One wonders whether "psychologizing" the Chinese Communist leadership winds up doing something very similar.

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RICHARD W. BULLIET, editor. *The Columbia History of the Twentieth Century*. New York: Columbia University Press. 1998. Pp. xiii, 651. $49.95.

On the eve of the twenty-first century, historians searching for thematic coherence to the century soon to end seem of two minds. Some prefer to frame it within the great conflicts that have deeply scarred the past hundred years. The outbreak of World War I marks its bloody beginning; the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union bring the story to a (chronologically) premature but dramatic conclusion. In Eric Hobsbawm's succinct labeling, that period represents the "short twentieth century."

A second school of thought, of which the volume under review is an exemplary case, looks to the formative processes that have shaped human relations in the midst of this century's tumult of wars, revolutions, and international confrontation. It searches through all aspects of human endeavor, asking, in the words of editor Richard W. Bulliet, "in what areas of life have developments been so remarkable as to distinguish this century from any preceding era?". It does not offer the reader a narrative account of major events of the century, for its objective is to uncover "the broad currents of change" that reveal "how our lives got to be the way they are today" (pp. 3–4).

The potential scope of such a search is encyclopedic in its dimensions. The paths taken here in pursuit of the most noteworthy developments follow a topical approach to historical change. They cover all major areas of historical inquiry. The topics include the customary subjects of war, imperialism, nationalism, socialism, and internationalism, but also introduce important economic issues in essays on agriculture, industry, international finance, and transportation, and even extend into more exotic fields such as ecology, scientific discovery, athletics, and popular culture. Each topic (of which there are twenty-three in all) is the domain of a different author who brings to the subject a specialist's knowledge. Their opportunity to spell out their views of significant trends in their particular field is limited, for the chapters are typically between twenty and thirty pages in length. Most include, in addition to footnotes, a brief bibliography. Of particular use to the general reader is the detailed comprehensive index, more than eighty pages (double columned) in length. Attempting to sum up the importance of an entire century of world history is a daunting undertaking. Individual topics are likely to prove enlightening to some readers, less interesting to others, in what amounts to a treasure hunt for insight and information. This volume's success can be measured by the amount of pertinent information and views made available in each essay, and also by the general picture of the century that emerges from the chapters taken together.

Several of the essays stand out by the quality of their analysis and the thoughtfulness of their judgment. I was particularly impressed by James Mayall's searching probe of the role of nationalism in this century. Mayall recognizes the pervasiveness of national identity throughout the world, yet he insists that "these identities are not primordial" (p. 174). The task of the historian must be to uncover the manner in which nations have been constructed out of the events and trends of recent times. He locates these forces in four domains: colonialism, the impact of wars, revolutions, and (somewhat ironically) internationalism. In Mayall's telling, the story is global in its impact yet directly linked to the European empires whose collapse opened the era of nations. But the better life promised by nationalists was void of specific ideals or practices by which to build that life for the peoples of these states. Wilsonian internationalism judged national self-determination the stable basis for postcolonial state formation, but, unfortunately, "the number of nationalists always exceeded the supply of nations" (p. 195).

In this perspective, the reader may well conclude that Akira Iriye's short essay (lacking, footnotes and bibliography) on "the international order" indulges in wishful thinking. He asserts that internationalism (which he presents in opposition to nationalism) is one of the "legacies of achievement" to be passed on by this century to the next. One may agree that the array of attempts to construct viable forms of international cooperation is impressive. Modified versions of Wilsonian internationalism (which he barely mentions) have had a remarkable resurgence in recent decades, and non-governmental organizations (not discussed at all)

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have moved into the most remote regions of the globe in defense of international peace, human rights, and the well-being of humanity. Yet in what one might call the everyday realities of global relations, economic forces, not internationalist institutions, have proven the most potent elements of transnational integration.

In this light, the presence in this volume of several thoughtful essays on economic aspects of the century's history greatly enhances its overall contribution to our understanding of "the greatest one-century period of change in human history" (p. 1). In one sense, economic history must still address issues of survival as old as humanity. The story of agriculture, told in a vivid, perceptive manner by B. F. Stanton, is summed up in his observation that the world's farming sector has succeeded in feeding a global population that is nearly four times as large now as in 1900. Crucial to this achievement were the creation and diffusion of new, high-yield crops by research institutes like those run by Norman Borlaug, whose discoveries earned him the 1970 Nobel Peace Prize. Environmental concerns and the search for sustainable agricultural systems have pointed toward a very different path for global agriculture. Still, in the short term the so-called "green revolution" was in countries such as India the only defense against mass famine.

In an equally substantial essay on "money and economic change," William C. McNeill brings to light the vital role of money in twentieth-century history. He makes clear how indispensable the monetary system based on the gold standard was to the integration of the "commercial-industrial economy" of the early century. Its collapse in the early 1930s insured that the depression would be both longer and more widespread than any previous international economic crisis. The last half of the essay spells out the remarkable achievements, and the shortcomings, of the Bretton-Woods system launched at the end of World War II. Its limited success (minus a fixed exchange-rate system) insured, in his terms, both "systemic order and disorder" in what has come to be known as the global economy. These excellent essays, and many others, bring to this volume a wealth of information and insight, making it an invaluable guide to the past 100 years of tumultuous change.

Yet something important has been left out, in my opinion. Having chosen to exclude any "master narrative" in favor of topical "currents of change," Bulliet has gathered a set of essays that, taken as a whole, create the impression of a rather bloodless century. One might have expected that the subject of this era's extraordinary mayhem and destruction would receive from some authors ample historical reflection and judgment. Yet the subject is discussed, if at all, *sotto voce*. War, the subject of one chapter, seems more an affair of policy and institutions than mass killings; the essay on ethnicity and racism subsumes the Holocaust under "festering ethnic tensions across the globe"; another chapter conflates communism and socialism to "describe the variety of meanings" of "socialist practice" (p. 203), relegating Stalinism and Maoism to phases of socialism. The tragic story of mass repression and violence, neglected here to highlight "remarkable developments," stands out vividly when the century is contained within a narrative history of the period 1914 to 1991. In these terms, our century's most meaningful tales are told within the short twentieth century.

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ASIA

DON J. WYATT. *The Recluse of Loyang: Shao Yung and the Moral Evolution of Early Sung Thought*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. 1996. Pp. xii, 340. $42.00.

Shao Yung has fascinated generations of the Chinese people, but few have actually studied him. It is thus an irony that he should receive two book-length studies in English within the last decade. Although the books offer different interpretations of his thought, he is now definitely better understood in this part of the world than in China. This says also how interesting Shao is for modern students. It is not that traditional Chinese interpreters did not appreciate his importance, but they have not quite been able to make him out in terms of his relations with his intellectual contemporaries. One of the objectives of this book is to demonstrate why interpreters in China have unduly neglected Shao.

Don J. Wyatt argues that the best approach to depict Shao as a man and thinker is to return to the original sources, and he uses them with competence. His reading of temporal dimension into *ching-shih* is a good example. Readers of Chinese now need to keep in mind that "ordering the world" means for Shao comprehending the cosmic process in a temporal sense.

The strength of this book is the careful reconstruction of Shao's life. Wyatt's study of Shao's intellectual lineage is imaginative; the discussion on Shao's relations with the two Ch'eng brothers, however, is less convincing. More could have been said about their different intellectual outlooks and the reason for their different relationships with Shao. Ch'eng I, in contrast to Ch'eng Hao, had been occasionally but coherently critical of Shao. His criticism offers a good lead as to how Shao did and did not quite embrace the political agenda for which Ssu-ma Kuang was pressing. The truth is that Ch'eng I was not very close to Ssu-ma Kuang. What were the dynamics behind the differences between the anti-reformers, with their political aspirations, and those who were more concerned with creating the new intellectual outlook that eventually grew to become Neo-Confucianism?

Could Shao's lack of sensitivity to politics and aversion to political life have anything to do with his continued and somewhat solitary interest in the "image-number" way of approaching the *Book of Changes*? Wyatt challenges the traditional belief that

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Shao, because of his preference for the "image-number" over "meaning-principle" approach, is not a moralist. By doing so, he returns Shao to the main stream of Northern Sung Neo-Confucianism. However, I feel that Wyatt is somewhat too simplistic in defining, if only suggestively, a "moralist" as one that adopted the "meaning-principle" line of learning. Readers may well take Wyatt to task for such a definition. After all, Wyatt is addressing a greater identity that has significance for China's intellectual history.

Simply put, Wyatt wants to establish that Shao was a moralist in the Neo-Confucian mainstream. This is good as far as it goes, but he fails to offer a clear definition of the idea of a "moralist." To be fair, Wyatt does modify his characterization by saying that Shao was actually a moralist in action. This characterization of Shao as a moralist *cum* actor commands our attention.

The involved relations between Shao as a thinker as well as an actor in the political arena and the anti-reformers who were developing Neo-Confucian thinking make him a particularly difficult subject to understand. Shao is unquestionably profound and yet plainly uninteresting. His aversion to politics is well known, but he was deeply involved in political controversies and seemed to enjoy them. No wonder Wyatt uses "enigmatic" to describe this difficult issue! He uses the word frustratingly but properly.

How then is Shao both a moralist and an actor? The answer has to come from Wyatt's argument that Shao's cosmological speculation is basically descriptive. By reflecting on things as they are (*kuan-wu*) and by approaching cosmological thinking descriptively, Shao maintains a detached and noncommittal attitude toward the world, politics included. It is therefore wrong to think that Shao's "descriptive approach" means a philosophically studied stance, to the exclusion of explanatory attempts. What Wyatt does is illuminate Shao's mental attitude, which unified and informed his thinking and action. If Shao preferred thinking in descriptive terms, he understandably handled worldly affairs with the same kind of direct and noncommittal attitude. This is how I understand Wyatt's contention that Shao's learning is more descriptive than explanatory.

The publication of this book is timely and should be welcomed. It helps us understand better that Shao was indeed a moralist and that he was direct but plain in his cosmological outlook and politics.

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RODERICK MACFARQUHAR. *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution*. Volume 3, *The Coming of the Cataclysm, 1961–1966*. (Studies of the East Asian Institute.) New York: Oxford University Press and Columbia University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1997. Pp. xiv, 733. $47.50.

After many years of anticipation, the third volume of Roderick MacFarquhar's massive effort to document the origins of the Chinese Cultural Revolution has now appeared. It is an impressive, even awe-inspiring effort; at the same time, it is both sobering and depressing, particularly for the generation of graduate students who entered the field of Chinese studies around the late 1960s, when China seemed a beacon of light to those who were disenchanted by the perceived failings of the American and Soviet models. With the United States increasingly bogged down in the quagmire of Vietnam and "modernization theory" under assault in social science departments, Mao Zedong's brand of "Marxism" appeared, to a generation of radicalized graduate students, to offer the third world an alternative model of independence and development. MacFarquhar's meticulously researched study shows that it was not just the Chinese masses that were deceived by Maoist rhetoric; the deception was much more widespread.

With this volume MacFarquhar reiterates the theme first stated in volume one (1974) and then continued in volume two (1983): "Why did Mao decide to tear down and rebuild a regime he had done so much to create?" MacFarquhar's answer—offered with some qualifications, as could be expected in so careful a work—is not that Mao had lost power and was trying to regain it. Indeed, MacFarquhar is extremely effective in showing that Mao was still very much in command prior to the Cultural Revolution. Rather, he argues that Mao's ultimate dread was the death of the revolution and, not being content to settle for power and stability, he set about finding some new recipe to rejuvenate the vanguard party's original elan. At the same time, MacFarquhar recognizes that principled disagreements are insufficient to explain Mao's motivation, explicitly acknowledging the importance of the personal in Chinese policy struggles. He convincingly demonstrates that Mao perceived that his power would remain unassailable only if he were able to set the policy agenda and that the agenda would have to be a revolutionary one since—unlike economic construction, for example—this was the one area in which no colleague could challenge him. As MacFarquhar notes at the outset, the two most fundamental changes in orientation from earlier volumes are a more critical view of Mao and his motivation (i.e. Mao's "original sin") and a greater emphasis on the critical importance of rural China to understanding the origins of the Cultural Revolution.

While all three volumes are outstanding, volume three is the crowning achievement. In part this is due to the amount of primary source material that was simply unavailable earlier, but perhaps equally important, the translation of MacFarquhar's earlier volumes into Chinese has established his scholarly legitimacy within China. Thus, for this volume the author has received valuable information beyond the documentary sources, ranging from interviews with former officials to suggestions from ordinary Chinese readers.

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The footnotes alone, running almost 200 pages, can be excavated by future researchers on a wide variety of topics that even MacFarquhar's massive tome can only treat in a general manner. A good example of this is the debate over whether to promote the deceased soldier Lei Feng as a revolutionary model back in 1963 (p. 604).

In addition to what we have learned about Maoist China, the reader also comes away from MacFarquhar's magnificent trilogy with a far greater understanding of why Deng Xiaoping embarked on his radical reform program in 1978. Reading like a detective story, MacFarquhar's account compares the original pre-Cultural Revolution documentation to Cultural Revolution and post-Cultural Revolution reconstructions, carefully weighing the available evidence. Most readers will be convinced, as Deng presumably was, that the Communist Party had squandered its good will and the enthusiasm of the Chinese people during two decades of leftist extremism. One hopes that the current fascination with China under reform will not preclude the future emergence of scholars like MacFarquhar, who are willing to devote their entire academic careers to resolving the most fundamental political and historical questions.

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CLIVE J. CHRISTIE. *A Modern History of Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism.* (Tauris Academic Studies.) London: I. B. Taurus. 1996. Pp. x, 286. $19.95.

A prospective reader approaching this book for the first time is likely to assume that it is yet another textbook designed for use in introductory courses on Southeast Asia. In fact, Clive J. Christie's intentions are quite otherwise: to investigate the origins and fate of the many ethnic and regional separatist movements that emerged simultaneously with the transition to independence in the region after World War II.

Since the end of the Pacific War, considerable scholarly attention has been directed to the rise of nationalist parties in Southeast Asia during the first decades of the twentieth century, and to the creation of nation-states in the region by such parties following the restoration of independence. Separatist movements, whether based on ethnic, religious, or regional differences, have been viewed by outside observers as well as by the governments concerned primarily as problems to be dealt with by the central authorities. History, after all, is not generally kind to the losers.

In recent years, however, there has been a perceptible increase in attention to separatist activities around the world, a phenomenon that has undoubtedly been sparked in part by the fact that many such movements have erupted in Africa, Asia, and Europe in the aftermath of the Cold War. Some have even suggested the future emergence of a new paradigm, marked by the decline of the nation-state and its replacement by smaller territorial units operating within an increasingly interdependent global community.

For Christie, the experience of Southeast Asia, where a number of separatist movements arose to challenge the thrust of emergent nationalism in the immediate postwar era, provides an opportunity to examine the origins of such activities and the impact that they have had on the formation and consolidation of national units within the region. Selecting examples from several different countries (including the Arakanese and the Karen in Burma, the Straits Chinese on Penang island, the Montagnards in French Indochina, the Patani Malays in southern Thailand, and the Aceh revolt in northern Sumatra), he concludes that all such movements were products of a common historical experience: the gradual appearance of a sense of community among the peoples throughout the region in the closing years of the colonial era. Their ultimate objectives, however, were often quite different. Some, like the Karen in Burma and the Moluccan rebels in eastern Indonesia, sought autonomy or independence, while the Patani Muslims in southern Thailand preferred membership in a neighboring state. The Acehnese, for their part, sought without success to redefine the new Indonesian national ideology in the image of a purified Islamic community.

Prior to the European conquest, most such groups subsisted as small and often isolated minorities located on the periphery of larger "ethnic empires," as Christie describes the traditional states within the region. Their sense of separate existence was often encouraged by the colonial authorities as a means of fragmenting hostile forces that had risen in opposition to European rule. In the end, however, the force of nationalism triumphed throughout the region, and departing colonial regimes abandoned such minority groups to their fate. After the restoration of independence, most of the minority peoples have been integrated, to varying degrees, into the larger national community.

Why did such movements fail? Christie concludes sensibly that one source of their weakness was the strong desire for national unity and stability that marked the region in the years following the end of the colonial era. But he also argues that success or failure was not "the consequence of irresistible and immutable 'laws' of ethnicity or nationalism but rather reflects identifiable failures or successes of statecraft at a critical stage in the history of the states concerned" (p. ix).

What then of the future, at a time when international communism has collapsed and centrifugal forces appear to be gathering strength in a number of regions around the world? Christie notes that several unpredictable factors have entered the equation, including the rise of a more assertive China and the democratization of politics, which gives voice to populist movements such as the growing separatist movement in Timor and a more militant Islam in several countries in the region. He concludes, however, that the electorates

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in the region have "a natural bias towards stability" (p. 210) and possess a built-in reluctance to take risks with their political systems. Those words were written before the onset of the financial crisis that swept the region in the summer and fall of 1997. One must wonder whether that "bias towards stability" will long endure in a new and uncertain environment.

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LAURIE J. SEARS. *Shadows of Empire: Colonial Discourse and Javanese Tales*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1996. Pp. xxi, 349. Cloth $49.95, paper $16.95.

This is an important and stimulating book in which Laurie J. Sears triumphs over problems of evidence regarding *wayang* theater to produce an attractive and credible argument.

Contrary to the views of scholars who regarded Javanese civilization as having always been essentially "Hindu" with only a thin glaze of Islam, Sears argues that Islamic influences are seen even in such classic "Hindu" works as *Ramayana* and *Bratayuda*. She sees increasing, genuine Islamization under way in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, based on texts of that period. But then things fell apart: "By the second half of the nineteenth century, the intertwining of *wayang* and Islam begins to fracture. This arises out of the contact of some Javanese Muslims with the Arabian Wahhabi movement, the colonial suppression of the outward expression of Islam by Bupati . . . and others connected to the colonial regime, and systematic Dutch scholarly preferences for 'Hindu-Javanese' rather than Islamic knowledges" (pp. 25–26).

By the early twentieth century, Dutch-educated Javanese intellectuals created a revised version of Javanese traditions as expressed in the *wayang*. They were attracted to theosophy, which here, as in India, seemed to provide a quirky bridge between East and West. They found little appeal in Islam and were the progenitors of the so-called "secular" nationalist movement. Others set up conservative cultural institutions to preserve Javanese traditions as they understood, defined, and shaped them: a version of Javanese culture that downplayed Islamic influences and was consistent with the views of Dutch scholars and administrators. Village storytellers were brought into this process of redefining Javanese tradition through Surakarta courtly schools for performers set up in the 1920s. A sort of Hindu-Javanizing process thus moved from urban circles into rural Central Java.

From the years of the revolution (1945–1949) to the horrific killings of 1965–1966, President Sukarno's radicalizing regime sought to use *wayang* as part of its campaign to exclude Western cultural influences. Subsequently, during the thirty-two years of Soeharto's New Order government, *wayang* had a significant role to play in the conservative, hierarchical, authoritarian, self-consciously Javanese cultural environment of the regime, which was increasingly in tension with the forces of modernization, development, globalization, and urbanization. Sears investigates the way in which there has been a blurring of the concepts of patrons, performers and scholars in recent years. Puppeteers trained in modern styles at the government-funded Academy for Indonesian Performing Arts in Surakarta continue to have powerful allegiances to the world of secret knowledge and occult powers of their predecessors.

If, to some extent, Indonesian cultures have been Javanized in the decades since independence, so also has Javanese culture, including *wayang*, been influenced by the Indonesian language and other Indonesian cultures. The *Ramayana* may now be found as an Indonesian-language comic. Sears's last chapter looks at "new texts and technologies." These new *lakons* (stories) are perhaps less "Petruk becomes king" than "Kresna at the keyboard."

Sears fruitfully marries cultural criticism and history. Like all historians, she has to work with the sources at hand. Like some cultural critics, she does not let absences of evidence silence her. Her sources appear to be published and oral. There is no sign of extensive research on unpublished Javanese manuscripts. It has to be said that the historical evidence for her account of the period from the eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries consequently remains thin. That is, however, unavoidable.

Her interpretation—even when the evidentiary foundation is weak—is an attractive one. It is consistent with my own understanding of changes in the Javanese cultural and intellectual realm resting on other (and, it must be said, not yet any stronger) evidence for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Sears makes important points frequently. Consider the following: "Islam and shadow theatre were closely intertwined in the early nineteenth century . . . These connections came under assault after the Java War. By the late nineteenth century, Dutch scholarship had placed 'Hindu-Javanese' literary traditions at the center of what they saw as Javanese culture, and *wayang* was seen as the only remaining vehicle of older traditions that Javanese elites and peasants could still—albeit imperfectly—understand. The Dutch scholars of the latter part of the nineteenth century had devoted considerable attention to translating and annotating as many examples of Hindu-Javanese literature as they could find. But it was not until the second decade of the twentieth century that the *wayang* theater, through its elevation in Theosophical thought, also became a useful vehicle for the propagation of Hindu-Javanese mythologies that could serve as the content of a Javanist religion or *Agama Jawa* (emptied of Islam) in the uplifting of the Javanese native (*de opheffing van de Javaansche inlander*). Rather than Dutch colonial rulers or even Dutch scholars, it was Javanese intellectuals themselves who seized the initiative and became the manipulators of *wayang* plays and stories" (p. 131).

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This is a lively, fine first book. Let us hope for many more from Sears.

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OCEANIA AND THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

Helen Irving. *To Constitute a Nation: A Cultural History of Australia's Constitution*. (Studies in Australian History.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Pp. xiii, 253. $64.95.

There have been several recent histories of Australian federation and the making of the nation's constitution at the turn of the century. Helen Irving's approach differs radically from all of them. Informed by disciplines as diverse as anthropology, literary criticism, and cultural studies, Irving attempts what she calls a cultural history of the Australian constitution. Whereas previous historians have been preoccupied with the models and precedents provided by the American experience, she draws our attention to the language and metaphors that framed the discourse of late nineteenth-century politics. The wise grey men who wrote the document have long been studied and celebrated. Irving suggests a wider field of authorship, locating the constitution in what she calls "the values and standards" of "ordinary people" (pp. 27, x).

Much of this involves a search for what Benedict Anderson has called "an imagined community." The constitution, Irving insists, was not a dry-as-dust document or a "treaty of mutual convenience" among six jealous and diverse Australian colonies (p. 84). Rather it was a living thing, "tied in the community" that ultimately created it, expressive of the "complex web of affinities" that underlay it (p. 26). Reimagining that community poses a challenge for any historian. The writing of the Australian constitution was a complex, tedious, and, above all, elitist process involving the deliberations of several constitutional conventions, made up entirely of men and representing a narrow and self-interested cross section of Australian society. It is to Irving's credit that she takes her readers beyond the intrigues and trade-offs of colonial politics. Her "imagined community" is rediscovered in the rituals and iconography surrounding the federation celebrations; in the vital arena of "first-wave" feminism, wherein suffragettes struggled to have "women's issues . . . drawn into the political and constitutional landscape"; in her sensitive reconstruction of the cultural universe of White Australia; and in her search for what she calls "the intersection of public issues and personal views" through the study of letters and diaries of any number of tireless lobbyists (pp. 192, x). Indeed, here the most prosaic of constitutional debates are found to be rich in metaphor and meaning. Viewed as "an artefact of its time," the Australian constitution lends itself to such a culturalist reading (p. 28).

This is a challenging and suggestive book. The analysis is intelligent and imaginative, the prose elegant and engaging. But as with all such innovative histories, Irving's argument is not without an element of danger. In a chapter entitled "The Imaginary Nation," she goes so far as to suggest that the federal constitution embodied "the Australian character." There was, she contends, something "characteristically Australian" in "scavenging" a constitution from the ruins of colonialism, piecing it together from British, European, and American precedents, and balancing practicalities with innovation and vision (p. 35). Attractive as it all may sound, the Australian character is a problematic concept. It is to be approached with far greater caution by historians.

Other of the book's claims are arguably more tenuous. Irving describes the late 1890s as "the people's years" when those "outside the political framework" claimed "the right to speak and organise" (p. 190). Other historians have argued that the second half of that decade saw a dramatic contraction in such political possibilities. The union movement had been defeated in a series of disastrous strikes, the labor party had been split and compromised, and mass movements by the unemployed had been broken by hunger and repression. Irving's book is, as she puts it, "a success story," a tribute to optimism, confidence, and imagination (pp. x, 211). But the cost of that tribute is the social context of the federation movement. The depression of the 1890s, which plunged those "ordinary Australians" into poverty, appears but twice in her index. Cultural historians may well evoke the ties of family and kinship and explore, with some finesse, the fine-sounding rhetoric that binds together those imaginary communities. One wonders if that rhetoric rang hollow to families separated by the thankless search for work and to communities paralyzed by doubt and fear and insecurity. We are told that the Australian people "anticipated a spiritual greatness and material security for their imagined nation" (pp. 210–211). But where are the Australian people in this book? Are they the committees of prominent citizens who devised federation arches, or the political elite who drafted the constitution, or the school children obliged to attend the founding ceremonies? Perhaps in a community divided by such extremes of wealth and poverty the imaginary community was just that—imaginary.

It is a measure of Irving's achievement that the strengths of her book outweigh its weaknesses. The approaching centenary of federation in Australia has already generated a number of publications. Irving's cultural history is by far the most challenging and innovative.

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David Hanlon. *Remaking Micronesia: Discourses over Development in a Pacific Territory, 1944–1982*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. 1998. Pp. xv, 305. Cloth $50.00, paper $34.95.

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In this book, David Hanlon surveys nearly forty years of post-World War II attempts at development in Micronesia, most initiated by the United States administering authority in what, until the early 1980s, was termed the Trust Territory of the Pacific. This is not to say that the book is a portfolio of project descriptions, cost analyses, and charts. Indeed, the author skips lightly over the dull stuff of the projects themselves, using them as little more than a point of departure for his "discourses" on development. Development—that battle cry of John F. Kennedy's New Frontier (and much earlier) and the blessing that was intended to be shared by U.S. emissaries everywhere with the Third World—is found to be heavily burdened with cultural freight. The fundamental truths of economics are permeated with cultural assumptions, as Marshall Sahlins points out in his well-known epigram that "all production is ultimately concerned with the reproduction of a definite mode of life." Hence, what the U.S. was busily promoting for all those years in the South Pacific, as everywhere else in the world, was at heart an ethnocentric program. Even worse, the author concludes, it was an exercise in domination cloaked in the garb of humanism. Relying on Michel Foucault's analytical lens with its all but exclusive focus on power relationships, Hanlon sees the development programs in Micronesia as still another imposition of American power on the "colonized" islanders.

Hanlon does not have to work very hard to show how misguided the efforts of the U.S. administering authority were in promoting development. He cites a number of inglorious examples: the failed attempts at establishing commercial fishing ventures; the extension of the Family Feeding Program to Micronesia, resulting in uneaten cans of meat and macaroni being used as pig feed; and even the eventual frustration of the "can do" spirit of U.S. Peace Corps volunteers, who watched project after project come to nothing. Hanlon shows clearly in his select case studies that the failure of most development programs was due in large part to the very different agenda that islanders possessed. The most telling example is of Pohnpeian villagers who were opening "mom and pop" stores only to go broke in a few years due to uncollected credit. In subverting the normal rules that guide businesses and in "losing big," the islanders were, in fact, converting money into an even more valuable resource for any Pohnpeian: prestige in the eyes of the community. Hanlon, echoing Sahlins, correctly observes that "what development specialists or economists might call 'waste' or 'backwardness' is actually a form of cultural enhancement determined by local values and logic" (p. 12).

Hanlon suggests—quite accurately, I believe—that the seeds of destruction lay in the failure of development planners to take account of this cultural gap. The plans they pushed would appear to have exercised little power over the imagination of island peoples, and often enough when they were embraced by local leaders it was, in the minds of planners, for the wrong reasons. On a few occasions islanders strenuously and vocally resisted development projects, as the Yapese once did over the planned tourist resort in a village there, but most simply voted with their feet and ignored the proposed reforms, even while continuing to spout the rhetoric of development. If the development strategy in Micronesia, from the end of World War II up to the eve of independence, is to be seen as a colonial effort to redefine Micronesia and its people, it was a spectacularly unsuccessful one.

Hanlon is masterful here, as in his other works, in portraying the various cultural understandings of a historic event. His description of the contretemps that ensued shortly after the war, when a wealthy Pohnpeian showed up at the military governor's office wearing one of the new pairs of trousers that the Americans had distributed to the needy, is a good case in point. Hanlon writes convincingly and with rare insight when he analyzes such situations in a cross-cultural framework. The problem with this book is that he is not content to do this; instead, the cultural clashes that continually erupt between Micronesian and expatriate are discussed in a political context. The ideological positions of Homi Bhabha, Edward Said, and Foucault hang heavy on this work, more often confusing than clarifying. Is it helpful to portray the island peoples as victims of a sinister colonial stranglehold, even in respect to development policies that were manifest failures? The U.S. Navy's military interest in retaining political control of island Micronesia is a matter of record, but does this mean that all its development policies were veiled attempts to further cripple the political will of the local population in order to protect their own interests? Must we believe that Amata Kabua, the first president of the Marshall Islands, was a victim of the "infectious legacy of colonialism" when he urged his fellow islanders to end their sit-down strike and accept the attractive financial terms that the U.S. was offering for Kwajalein? The differences between local groups often run as deep as those between foreigner and Micronesian, Hanlon admits. Yet, the book draws a sharp contrast and clear battle lines between the islander and the "other." If the ideological position he embraced did not prevent him from doing so, he might have done well to turn his reconstructive tools toward the "colonized" island people themselves to identify the real issues that underlay the positions they outwardly embraced. Hanlon has done this before very successfully. To have done so here would have made this book even better than it is.

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CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

LORI CHAMBERS. *Married Women and Property Law in Victorian Ontario*. Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History. 1997. Pp. x, 237. Cloth $55.00, paper $18.95.

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Legal history, as a rule, is not for the fainthearted, concentrating as it must on detail and precedent of cases. Lori Chambers's study of married women's property law in nineteenth century Ontario is a pleasant exception: interesting, well-written, and informative. Using hitherto neglected sources—unrecorded legal cases—the book has been arduously and scrupulously researched in an effort to revise previous historiography on the topic. This database amply demonstrates the author's claim that recorded cases, by their very nature, are unrepresentative inasmuch as they "legitimate and reinforce specific studies of conduct" and the putative consequence of deviance (pp. 5–6). Moreover, her use of uncategorized documents from Ontario courts highlights the ambiguities of legal decisions when conceptualized in the complexity and realities of gender relations.

Nonetheless, even this richness of source material and a cogently argued case for the significance of such new evidence cannot circumvent the overall conclusion that remains constant throughout the historiography on this topic: that the series of marriage property acts passed between 1837 and 1884 "left an ambiguous legacy for the twentieth century" because "(t)he central ideological presumption that underlies these reforms—the notion of chivalry—legitimates male control and protection of women on the basis of the belief that women themselves are helpless and defenceless" (p. 12). Such reforms, Chambers concedes, were better than none and were important for the status of all wives both symbolically and tangibly (p. 182).

In short, despite laws that undoubtedly reflect judicial sympathy and public support for abused women and the necessity for property reform, at no time can this be construed as constituting a critique of "marriage itself." Indeed, by emphasizing that her study is an examination of the law and not the institution (p. 7), Chambers separates her work from this claim. The reforms were always interpreted in a context of traditional views of marriage and family while striving impartially to protect betrayed, deserted, separated, and abused wives. Property and sexual relations were intertwined (p. 12). Neither were judicial perceptions of the complementary roles of spouses, especially in terms of masculine authority, fundamentally altered (pp. 180, 379).

Yet incremental reform did take place: from a time when women had only the right to hold property they owned or had inherited before marriage to later acts that generalized the practice of giving all wives control over their earnings and the alienation of their chattels and money. After 1872, women could use their separate property for daily maintenance, although it was not until the following year that they could dispose of separate real estate and eleven years after, in 1884, that they could claim the earnings of dependent children. Each chapter of Chambers's study constitutes a thoughtful analysis of particular reforms.

Sufficient dilemmas remained throughout this period to support Chambers opening statement that "In all common law jurisdictions marriage, for women, represented civil death" (p. 3). So much for the author's valiant attempts to separate herself from a radical criticism of "marriage itself." It cannot be done. No more could formal women's organizations, which followed on the informal pioneering work of nineteenth-century protofeminists, separate the two at the League of Nations, where they continued to debate married women's property laws, wages for housework, and "nationality" in relation to their husbands' citizenship. At least not according to my own work in this area.

Chambers does, however, argue eloquently for the neutrality of the law in that it did not, in theory, distinguish between "the gentlewoman and the factory girl," whereas in fact women of privilege were its claimants and its beneficiaries (p. 7). Neither can it be overlooked that the law meant nothing to the majority of men and women alike who owned nothing, who did not earn a just wage, and who were claiming their labor alone as their property and patrimony. However, the leveling principle on which women of all classes, races, and ethnicities could identify was that their household labor was neither recognized nor remunerated, thus keeping many in abusive marriages. Wages for housework therefore becomes Chambers's predominant theme. Without such earnings, wives who were in no need of protection continued to collude with husbands, and husbands were able to perpetuate fraud, manipulation, and coercion. Without rights to their own earnings and to the joint ownership of property accumulated during marriage through joint labor, the benefits of reform were theoretical and protection, for all but extreme circumstances, difficult to effect.

Perhaps my only quibble with Chambers has to do with the ongoing dilemma of feminist historical interpretation on which she depends. While she argues for female "agency," thus attempting to transcend the temptation to see the plaintiffs solely as victims, this approach remains problematic as it is difficult to see betrayed, abused, deserted, and impoverished wives as champions of their own fates. Although Chambers argues that the petitioning and networking efforts of protofeminists contributed much to reform, she cannot avoid the conclusion that patriarchal authority set the parameters for change. Moreover, if the state, as she insists, is obliged "to provide support and shelter for those who flee domestic abuse" (p. 184), one cannot suppose that the resulting invasive patriarchal models of bureaucratic interventions overcome what is a perennial dilemma. In their simultaneous demands for equality and for protective legislation to meet gendered needs, women and feminists continue to depend on a mixture of justice and chivalry.

While not minimizing the quality of the research or the coherence of argument in this work, I did find the format irritating. The notes do not include dates or details of books and articles and therefore impede the reader's sense of historiographical relevance and efficient cross-referencing. Having constantly to refer to

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the bibliography was tedious. I hope that the Osgoode Society discontinues this practice and initiates a more user-friendly format. Despite this objection, I commend the book itself to all who are interested in both legal and feminist history, as it is a worthwhile contribution to both fields.

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BEVERLY BOUTILIER and ALISON PRENTICE, editors. *Creating Historical Memory: English-Canadian Women and the Work of History*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. 1997. Pp. xii, 308. $75.00.

This fine collection of essays examines English-Canadian women historians. Because most were not academic or even university trained, the various contributors are able to play with categories such as "academic," "amateur," and "popular" history. The irony is that while the writers of the former claimed the right to set standards, it is the writers of latter two types of history who have been most read.

An excellent introduction, written by editors Beverly Boutilier and Alison Prentice, argues that history writing as it emerged in the late nineteenth century and early decades of the twentieth century was masculinist in nature. Perhaps because of this, the work of the early women historians was pioneering in its social dimensions. The call by some senior academics in Canada for a return to political history, and to what they see as the history of the nation, underscores even more the generalization that the women studied in this collection of essays were attuned more to the history of the Canadian *people*.

The book is divided into four sections. The first focuses on women whose writing emerged from their local communities. In a sophisticated analysis of Agnes Maule Machar, a prolific nineteenth-century writer of many genres, Dianne M. Hallman argues that for Machar "history became almost a heuristic device to illustrate the unity of providentialism, progress, and a particular construction of national character—one that assumed a Eurocentric basis, Christian values, and differentiation by gender" (p. 35). For both Machar and Sarah Anne Curzon, the subject of Boutilier's essay, the national character was British, albeit a British identity refashioned in North America. Thanks to Curzon, Laura Secord became the epitome of that identity and a household name for Canadians. Curzon built on her Secord research through her involvement with the Women's Canadian Historical Society of Toronto. This and similar groups of women were among those with heightened awareness of the role that history had in forging national character. A similar group was the Women's Institutes of Ontario, studied by Linda Ambrose. Members of the Institutes undertook to write the histories of their local communities. Written with an appreciation of the impressive source material that such studies provide, Ambrose gives insight into the local pride displayed in them and questions the dismissive attitude of academic historians.

The second section focuses as well on community record keeping and on individual authors who were influenced by some of the canons of "scientific" history even while remaining outside academe. Elizabeth Smyth examines three communities of Ontario women religious whose histories of their respective orders represented a personal continuity between generations of women religious. In addition, Smyth extends the scope of what counts as history by drawing attention to the role of these religious in the teaching of history and to the visual material history exhibited in their communities through stained glass windows. Equally personal in origin was the work of Constance Lindsay Skinner, who, Jean Barman argues, worked as an "experiential" historian drawing on her childhood in the Cariboo region of British Columbia. She was one of the few non-academic historians who worked on the prestigious Yale University Press's Chronicles of America series, not only writing her own volume, *Pioneers of the Old Southwest* (1918–1919), but also rewriting Herbert Eugene Bolton's volume, *The Spanish Borderlands* (1921) for which he gave her minimal credit. Barman points to the interdisciplinary aspects of much of her prose, poetry, and history, which drew on folklore, ethnography, and oral history. Terry Crowley makes a similar point with respect to Isabel Skelton. Skelton, he argues, was interested in broadening the scope of history by writing what we would now call cultural history. In Skelton we meet a woman trying to juggle family life with her desire to put her university education to use. Asked to write for the Chronicles of Canada series on the topic of women heroines, she recontracted it to describe the lives of ordinary women in the settlement period.

The third section examines the careers of women working within the academy or on the margins of it in Canada, the United States, and Britain. Prentice examines women university historians in Canada, delineating the barriers they faced not only from the general society but also from the men who taught them. Prentice's piece, however, is more than a listing of obstacles; she points out the differences between universities and their treatment of women—the smaller ones were seemingly more welcoming to women than were the larger. One woman who did manage to graduate was Esther Clark Wright, who received a Ph.D. in economic history from Harvard University. Barry Moody's essay brings Clark to life. Married to a man who supported her abilities but seemed incapable of exerting his own, Wright ended up with the Ph.D. whereas her husband, whose studies took them to Harvard in the first place, did not. Eventually she returned to New Brunswick and led a life separate from that of her husband. Moody ends his essay with the conditions in place for Wright's extraordinary career in writing the social history of New Brunswick long before regional history had become popular. Even more extraordinary was the career of

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Kathleen Wood-Leigh, who devoted her life to medieval history. After receiving a Cambridge Ph.D., she was unable to get a position and instead worked as a casual tutor in the Cambridge system. Despite the financial constraints this imposed on her, she continued her research. As authors Megan Davies and Colin Coates point out, this in itself was remarkable, even more so since Wood-Leigh was blind.

The last section brings the examination of women historians to the near present with Deborah Gorham's study of the 1970s. Many of the women mentioned in this essay (including myself) focused on women's history (albeit coming to it for different reasons) and did so in an academic setting. This was an era of tremendous university expansion and social upheaval which led to a redefinition of the discipline. Although historians as a collective certainly did not have an easy road, compared to those women described in the earlier essays, we were and are a privileged group.

WENDY MITCHINSON
University of Waterloo

CHRISTOPHER ARMSTRONG. *Blue Skies and Boiler Rooms: Buying and Selling Securities in Canada, 1870–1940*. Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press. 1997. Pp. x, 390.

Although this is a book about the development of stock markets in Canada, it is more particularly about the growth of stock-market regulation there. Christopher Armstrong is partly going to favorite haunts: business-government relations, federal-provincial imbroglios, and the emergence of a regulated economy that are found in several books co-authored by himself and H. V. Nelles. This volume is the first of an envisioned two, and brings the tale—and tale it is, as the author loves to construct an analytical narrative—from its beginnings in the 1870s to World War II. The second volume will, one assumes, approach the present.

Armstrong admits that his concerns are with activities at the margins of the stock markets. He focuses on mostly evanescent mining and mineral companies, whose stock-pushing froth drove the emergence of a regulatory framework. Otherwise core brokerage and financial figures such as James Dunn, Arthur Nesbitt, Herbert Holt, E. R. Wood, Sir Henry Pellatt, or Max Aitken are not dominant here. For example, Aitken (later Lord Beaverbrook), with his brokerage, his large industrial mergers, and his watered stocks is better studied in some of Armstrong's other writings, and in Greg Marchildon's *Profits and Politics: Beaverbrook and the Gilded Age of Canadian Finance* (1996). Armstrong's men are a dubious lot of promoters seeking loopholes to exert market leverage. Ike Solloway, a morose-looking scalawag, is Armstrong's chief example. Solloway fashioned a national brokerage during the euphoric market of the late 1920s through what he later called "accepted" practices: "bucketing" and using clients' money as his own. These sorts of activities were significantly responsible for the transition from the blue sky laws that existed in some provinces to provincial organizations such as the Ontario Securities Commission. As Armstrong tells it, government and private regulation emerged in an evolutionary, near national fashion, despite provincial jurisdiction. The interplay among private, national, and provincial interests, at once antagonistic and complementary, generated a system that found an uneasy balance between private and public concerns. This is not a tale of co-option.

Only occasionally do we catch vivid glimpses of the internal workings of the broker firms. The best of these is the tale of the tortured meanderings of F. H. Deacon and Company, as this mid-sized firm survived difficult times. Deacon's firm was organizationally chaotic, a state of affairs obscured in the 1920s by the flow of profits. The firm was sustained in the following decade through the leniency of the Toronto Stock Exchange's self-regulatory process (despite the threat of government involvement), although Deacon found the regulation draconian. Armstrong's assertion that Deacon's experience was representative is only tentatively supported. It is a pity that so few brokerages proved willing to open up records to Armstrong. In part, this forced his emphasis on the regulatory process. One begins to wonder whether the mainstream operations of the market were as unenlightening as Armstrong asserts.

Its emphasis on the marginal makes this book Toronto and Ontario-centered, for Toronto was at the heart of resource exploitation at this time. While the competition between the Montreal and Toronto stock exchanges is evident to the discerning reader, its effects are not ascertained. The Montreal exchanges remain shadowy; the relative places of the exchanges in the international sphere are not assessed. Armstrong addresses the operations of other minor exchanges in a workmanlike manner. However, only when the western provincial blue sky laws are discussed, or when federal-provincial tensions come to the fore, do the western provinces get significant attention.

The book is free of minor errors. The volume lacks a bibliography and should have more than a nominal index: for example, entries on central topics such as "bucketing" or "wash sales" or "blue sky laws" are lacking.

In company with Marchildon's volume, E. P. Neufeld's older *The Financial System of Canada: Its Growth and Development* (1972), and variously authored articles over the last ten years, Armstrong's important study goes a long way in providing a fuller picture of the system of stock markets and brokerages in Canada. His is the view of the underbelly: it is a scholarly reading with a muckraking tang. We see a central irony of capitalism in evolution, as regulatory

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systems were integrated—apparently of necessity—into the heart of the modern free market.

BEN FORSTER
University of Western Ontario

CARMAN CUMMING. *Sketches from a Young Country: The Images of* Grip *Magazine*. Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press. 1997. Pp. xiv, 275. Cloth $55.00, paper $21.95.

Illustrations from *Grip*, the satirical magazine published in Toronto from 1873 to 1894, have long been used to enliven Canadian history books about the late nineteenth century. Too often, suggests Carman Cumming, the images have been taken for granted and their biases ignored; however, a serious consideration of the lampoons, verbal as well as visual, can provide "a kind of running account and critique of the era's attitudes" (p. 4), showing much about Canada's past that might otherwise be ignored. Alas, for the most part, the paths through *Grip* he has chosen to follow do not stray far from familiar territory.

The book has two main threads. One strand is biographical, centering on the magazine's two most important editors—founder John Wilson Bengough and Phillips Thompson, labor journalist and humorist who collaborated sporadically through the first two decades, then took over the helm for a short period in the 1890s when new management gained control. The other thread is a consideration of the materials they produced, which generally supported Liberal Party leaders and policies, notwithstanding Thompson's more radical leanings. The analysis is organized thematically, but with heavy chronological overtones, in chapters dealing with the journal's views on politics, race and religion, the press, western development, radical ideology, imperialism, and social issues. Containing more than a hundred illustrations, the volume is a visual treat.

Cumming is far more sympathetic to Bengough than Thompson, not just because the former supplied most of the drawings and was more extensively involved. According to this account, Bengough was more genial, more intellectually open, more sensitive to the surrounding zeitgeist. Admittedly, he was racist, anti-Semitic, patronizing to women, and at times anti-Catholic, but in the context of the period, we are assured, his views were moderate. Thompson, on the other hand, is characterized as a socialist sourpuss whose angry didacticism killed the magazine. If Cumming inverts common opinion by suggesting that Bengough—less bright than Thompson and less sophisticated in his social analysis—is the more absorbing of the pair, probably it is because he approaches them from an interest in journalism rather than ideas. From his perspective, Thompson is a marginal figure, while Bengough is "wonderfully authentic in showing what was going on in the minds of Ontario's Christian, liberal, reformist, Anglo-Protestant dominant class," (p. 237). Some of the assessments are debatable. To attribute *Grip*'s demise to a single individual is suspect, especially considering that it is not clear who was actually in charge when it went downhill. To condemn Thompson's ideological stridency while glancing over Bengough's obsession with the Single Tax movement seems inconsistent. However, the larger point is that neither treatment approaches a full intellectual portrait of its subject.

After promising to illuminate lese familiar aspects of Canadian history, Cumming's interrogation of *Grip's* content is surprisingly traditional and shallow. Far more attention is given to explaining its political stances and allegiances than to exploring deeper tensions, values, and assumptions. Occasional probes below the surface are not pushed very far. For example, a section on the treatment of women notes in passing that Bengough sometimes portrayed men in female clothing, usually when he wanted to show them as irresponsible. No examples are dissected. Instead, most of the discussion describes the magazine's views on women's education, female suffrage and spousal abuse—not exactly novel themes in Canadian historiography. The book's strength, then, is its nuanced delineation of an influential stream of Ontario Liberalism in the Sir John A. Macdonald era. It does a good job of explaining what Bengough and Thompson were consciously trying to get across to readers. It is less successful at deciphering what they revealed obliquely and unconsciously.

While Cumming's concentration on politics, especially national politics, mirrors that of *Grip* itself, the journal did have things to say about other matters and could be mined with greater originality. Generalist readers, for whom nineteenth-century Canadian party wars are an exotic subject, may find his approach unusual. Scholars of the period will more likely feel they are reviewing old chestnuts, and some may wish he had said more about themes like the growth of Toronto, the perils of farm folk in the city, gender stereotyping, and shifting boundaries between public and private life.

KEITH WALDEN
Trent University

NEIL SUTHERLAND. *Growing Up: Childhood in English Canada from the Great War to the Age of Television*. Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press. 1997. Pp. xviii, 327. Cloth $55.00, paper $21.95.

This book, which examines children born between 1910 to 1950, is a chronological sequel to Neil Sutherland's *Children in English-Canadian Society: Framing the Twentieth-Century Consensus* (1976). The scope and approach of the book differs from the previous project, as Sutherland sets for himself the ambitious task of uncovering the experiences and stories of childhood "from the children's point of view" (p. vii). The result is a book centered in the "communities of childhood" with the focus of action taking place in the home, classroom, congregation, street, and play-

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ground. The themes pursued range from stories of physical, sexual, or emotional abuse to movie excursions, picnics at the beach, and Christmas displays. These reconstituted scripts of childhood memory are best captured in the rather dazzling shifts of subject. In one moving example, a discussion of family funerals moves directly to memories of the death of family pets. The result is an evocative, suggestive book in which the reader emerges with a sense of the complexity of examining childhood but few generalizations or explanatory insights.

Sutherland bases his study on over 200 extensive interviews from three British Columbia communities: working-class and middle-class neighborhoods in Vancouver and an agricultural frontier in the northern interior. This set of interviews is supplemented by oral histories from a working-class neighborhood in Halifax, Nova Scotia, a middle-class neighborhood in Toronto, and published autobiographies and contemporary short stories. In the three main communities, there was an attempt to link informants to verify impressions and create a multidimensional tableau. This approach creates an interesting perspective but the author found that in order to ensure confidentiality (as the informants obviously knew each other) all identifying codes were removed. The result is that the informants blur across time and space and the chronological, gender, and class framework set out in the general project disappears. The important exception is the distinction maintained between the rural and urban experience throughout the book.

The most successful chapters of the book are those that deal with the paid and unpaid labor of urban and rural children. Urban and rural experiences are well-contrasted, and in these chapters are the clearest examples of change over time. Sutherland provides convincing evidence that the kinds of jobs undertaken by rural children remained relatively unchanged. Change was evident, however, in work for urban children. Children's labor continued to be important, but their contribution to household income was less direct than in earlier periods. In addition, the author argues that after World War II, working-class children were more likely to keep some of their own earnings for discretionary spending. Here, we see the socialization of children not only as workers but also consumers.

Overall, Sutherland probably does not get at the experience of childhood itself but rather at the common and shared scripts adults remember about that period in their lives. At times, this version is nostalgic, but there is constant attention to the uglier side of childhood—poverty, ill health, sexually and physically abusive relatives, and cruel teachers.

Continuity is more apparent than change as Sutherland concludes that "the emotional dimensions of childhood have remained virtually unchanged" over the twentieth century (p. 245). He points to the patriarchal organization of most families, the large discrepancy in the availability of resources available to different children, and the importance of childhood as a period when an individual identity is formed in terms of gender and relations with others. In Sutherland's timeless world of twentieth-century childhood, the particular forces of change are not always obvious. An increased general standard of living, the adoption of new pedagogical stances, and the dissemination of child psychology may form at least part of the answer, but in the light of the periodization offered, it is strange that so little attention is paid to technology and popular culture. Despite some qualms, this book is rich in the details of childhood and a moving testimony to the persistent and general powerlessness of children in North America over the twentieth century.

SUZANNE MORTON
McGill University

RONALD RUDIN. *Making History in Twentieth-Century Quebec*. Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press. 1997. Pp. xiii, 294. Cloth $55.00, paper $21.95.

Historian Ronald Rudin offers readers a study of the evolution of Quebec historiography through the present century. He has several theses that he wishes to defend. Finding inspiration in the work of Peter Novick, he asserts that historians are never really objective; they always reflect the values, interests, and biases of the larger society. Nor, he insists, can today's history be assumed to be better, that is more "scientific," than yesterday's.

First and foremost, however, Rudin disagrees strongly with the so-called "revisionists." In earlier days, he notes, historians were preoccupied especially with Quebec's distinctiveness. Impressed by French Canada's cultural survival in the face of daunting obstacles, they searched for explanations. Then, in the 1950s and early 1960s, many historians sought rather to understand how French Canadians came to be politically and economically weak when compared to English-speaking Canadians. Some asserted that the British conquest of 1759 was at fault. Others blamed internal weaknesses, linked to Quebec's institutions and even to the character traits of its inhabitants.

Then came the revisionists, historians writing in the 1970s and 1980s. They had different preoccupations, mirroring Quebec's transformation into a truly modern society, especially in the wake of the "Quiet Revolution" of the 1960s. Contrary to what ruling Liberal politicians, journalists, and so many other observers were saying, these historians were convinced that the "modern" era did not begin in 1960. Quebec society, they said, had always been modern, "normal," like other Western societies. Roman Catholicism, anti-industrialism, and ruralism did not have the determining influence they were once thought to have on Quebec's development. The province's evolution was not unique.

Rudin is convinced that the "revisionists" have gone overboard in what he perceives as their zeal to deny Quebec's distinctiveness. Moreover, he does not ac-

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cept their claim to be Quebec's first modern, highly professional historians, their pretensions that the history they write is better than that written by their predecessors, or their assertions that they are truly objective, uninfluenced by political and other considerations.

Rudin's views are controversial. To a certain extent, they have already been presented elsewhere, often provoking much bitter commentary. The portrait he traces here of Canon Lionel Groulx's historical work, particularly in the 1920s and 1930s, will not please contemporary historians who judge the priest's nationalistic views to have interfered blatantly with his history. Rudin sees Groulx, on the contrary, as a very professional historian, whose history was as good as that being done elsewhere. He does not think very highly of the contributions, back in the 1950s and early 1960s, of Montreal's "nationalistic" historians Guy Frégault, Maurice Séguin, and Michel Brunet, nor of historiographers such as Serge Gagnon, whom he judges to be insufficiently critical, or, in Jean Lamarre's case, overly admiring of the Montreal "school." He has much more sympathy for the Quebec City historians who did not blame the English for Quebec's problems. Yet he accuses one of these, Fernand Ouellet, of making "rash assertions, unsupported by evidence" (p. 165). As stated above, today's revisionists, Paul-André Linteau and numerous others, dissatisfy him mightily. The rare historians with "post-revisionist" views, who believe that Quebec is at the same time similar to and different from other societies, hold more promise.

Let me be frank: Rudin has done a lot of research and particularly a lot of reflection in producing this book. It has considerable merit. Inevitably, however, few readers will be fully satisfied. Just as the historians whose ideas he seeks to portray reflect the society in which they live or have lived, so does Rudin himself. I believe that Rudin has done an excellent job in presenting a new, updated manner of looking at Canon Groulx and his work, particularly at a time when other researchers have shown him in a highly unfavorable light, particularly in view of certain anti-Semitic comments he made.

Many readers will conclude that Rudin's harsh criticism of the "revisionists" goes too far. When Linteau and others began their research, current belief had it that the Roman Catholic Church had literally dictated the behavior of the faithful since at least 1840; that Quebec's inhabitants were moved mainly by nationalistic concerns; and that the province was still, in 1950, a rural, folkloric backwater with an agricultural economy. The revisionists attempted to show that this portrait was untrue; in this regard their research has certainly advanced our knowledge of the past. But Rudin is surely right in insisting that Quebec has always been and still is a distinct society and that historians have to achieve a balance in presenting similarities and differences when comparing Quebec with other Western societies.

RICHARD JONES
Laval University

PATRICK BRODE. *Casual Slaughters and Accidental Judgements: Canadian War Crimes Prosecutions, 1944–1948*. Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History. 1997. Pp. xix, 290. $39.95.

Approximately 5,000 soldiers are buried in two Canadian war cemeteries in Normandy. While most of them were killed in action, died of wounds, or were killed in combat-related accidents, 158 were murdered by the German SS after they had been taken prisoner.

Patrick Brode's excellent book shows the continuing failure of the Canadian government and military to take war crimes seriously in the abstract or to prosecute the perpetrators of these particular murders. That failure was strange indeed since it was Canadian soldiers who were the chief victims of German war crimes in the Battle of Normandy, and those crimes were usually perpetrated by one particular German formation: the 12th SS Panzer Division (Hitlerjugend). Brode points out: "In case after case, [war crimes] investigators had shown that troops of the 12th had systematically killed Canadian prisoners far behind the lines. These were no 'heat of battle' killings but planned, deliberate butchery" (p. 45). Brode calls one of the killing episodes, in which thirty-one Canadian soldiers were mowed down in a field by machine-gun-toting SS guards, a Canadian "Malmedy" (p. 45).

The most notorious of those incidents was also the most controversial, because it provided the one direct link between the SS commander and the killings. On 8 June, 1944, eighteen Canadians were shot to death, one by one, within earshot of Regimental Commander Kurt Meyer at the Abbaye d'Ardennes to the northwest of Caen. Shortly thereafter, Meyer became the divisional commander and was captured in the fall of 1944. After the war, he was tried by a Canadian military court, convicted, and sentenced to death. His sentence was commuted to life in prison in Canada; by 1954, he was back in Germany, a free man.

As Brode shows, the Canadian government was most reluctant to involve itself in the entire issue of war crimes, let alone atrocities against civilians, well before the Battle or Normandy. But then, the Canadian government was reluctant to involve itself in any but a very restricted number of "high-policy" matters during the course of the war. Ottawa waged a yearlong and ultimately successful campaign for full membership on the War Food Board, for example, but pressed no claim for representation on the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

What Brode shows conclusively in this well-written, scrupulously researched, groundbreaking book is that many high-ranking Canadian army officers were extraordinarily reluctant to try Meyer and other SS

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officers directly culpable in the murder of Canadian POWs. As Brode writes of Major-General Harry Foster, former divisional commander in Italy and France and president of Meyer's court martial: "In the back of his mind there unquestionably lurked a sympathy for Meyer; while in command both [men] had given orders that in peacetime seemed absolutely damning" (p. 78). Brode also shows that Foster's superior, Major General Chris Vokes, also a wartime divisional commander, held similar views and thought the chief Canadian war crimes prosecutor (a former officer but with limited combat experience) a "pathetic striver" (p. 105).

Vokes commuted Meyer's sentence to life in prison despite eyewitness testimony at the court martial that the Canadians murdered at the Abbaye d'Ardennes were killed at his express order. Vokes believed "there isn't a general or a colonel on the Allied side that I know of who hasn't said 'well, this time we don't want any prisoners'" (p. 105).

What Brode has uncovered in the high command of the Canadian Army of the day was a club-like atmosphere in which apparently brave Nazi opponents of equally high rank were held in high esteem, even feted, no matter how many Canadian foot soldiers they had ordered murdered. That seems to have been apparent to some of the press of that day. One prominent Canadian newspaper warned "there is no place for professional admiration where war crimes are involved" (p. 110). Perhaps Foster, Vokes, and others were just not sure war crimes were, in fact, involved because they knew that Canadian and other Allied troops did sometimes murder enemy prisoners.

Was there a difference? When 12th SS Panzer was formed and trained in Belgium in 1943 and 1944, its eastern-front veteran officers and NCOs reinforced the Nazi convictions of the division's young toughs that theirs was a race war with no quarter offered or expected. On the Canadian (and Allied) side, by contrast, "there was no driving ideology . . . that denied the opposition's humanity" (p. 223). Brode's lesson is inescapable: in a democracy, war may not be too important to be left to the generals, but war crimes certainly are.

David J. Bercuson
University of Calgary

Noble David Cook. *Born to Die: Disease and New World Conquest, 1492–1650.* (New Approaches to the Americas.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998. Pp. xiii, 248. Cloth $54.95, paper $15.95.

For twenty years, Noble David Cook has taken a leading role in the debates concerning the fate of the indigenous population of Hispanic America after 1492. Cook has consistently held that the crucial factor in Amerindian demographic catastrophe was infectious disease. He now pursues this theme on a larger canvas. This book "focuses on the nature and impact of the best-known episodes of disease that buffeted the Americas from Hudson's Bay to Tierra del Fuego from initial contact between the two hemispheres to the mid-seventeenth century" (p. 14). Cook's stated purpose is "to bring together in a succinct volume what is currently known of epidemic disease, especially as it relates to the conquest of native America" (p. 12).

The scope of the book recognizes the limited relevance of political boundaries to disease history. Cook includes examples from Brazil, from throughout Spanish America, and from parts of English and French America. He reserves his closest scrutiny for Hispaniola, the first major island to feel the effects of what Cook calls the "uniting" of the American and Afro-Eurasian hemispheres. Mesoamerica and the Andean region also come in for considerable attention, as does Spanish Florida. Cook has much less to say about English North America (outside of Massachusetts) and French North America. The geographic coverage is uneven, and not merely because Cook wanted to confine his study to the "best-known episodes." Nearly a quarter of the book is devoted to Hispaniola and good chunks to the Andes. This reflects the emphases of Cook's previous writings.

Chronologically, the book focuses on the early decades after Columbus. Cook discerns two American pandemics, one of smallpox beginning in 1518 and one of measles starting in 1532. A third devastating round of epidemics came in 1545, and more followed in 1566–1574 and 1576–1591. A welter of local and regional epidemics complicate this picture. The seventeenth century is treated less closely.

Cook says that Amerindian population declined by more than ninety percent between 1492 and 1650, a view favored by scholars who, like Cook, believe in the lethal power of disease among non-immune populations. But he does not say what that meant in absolute terms. He is fuzzy on the controversial question of just what that population was in 1492 (aside from offering a range of estimates for Hispaniola). For the entire hemisphere, Cook gives the impression that the 1492 population was around 22 million, by suggesting a ninety percent depopulation and endorsing Bartolomé de Las Casas's estimate of 20 million Indians killed (p. 5). I am sure Cook did not intend this, for he favors much higher estimates. But one must know when Las Casas wrote in order to realize that his estimate was a partial one. This is a vital issue, and Cook needed to provide a clear paragraph explaining where he stands.

In general, the book requires a fair amount of contextual knowledge. At the outset, Cook takes pains to acknowledge that Spaniards and other Europeans often behaved cruelly to Amerindians. He knows that some readers might misread his emphasis on disease as exoneration of European colonialism. This is useful context for the general reader. But elsewhere the uninitiated reader is often left without a compass. Readers familiar with the main lines of Amerindian history and demography will have no difficulties appreciating Cook's work. But they are the audience least in need of it.

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Cook touches on some of the consequences and implications of catastrophic mortality. He shows, now and again, connections to intellectual and religious currents. In particular, he contrasts the Puritan interpretation (God cleared the way for deserving Puritans) with the Spanish who "largely bemoaned the disappearance of the Amerindian" (p. 200). He might have allowed for a wider range of views among both English and Spanish, but consideration of these questions is welcome. There is less (and too little for my taste) on the social and economic meaning of the population catastrophe.

Specialists in Amerindian population and disease history will find a capable survey of their field. Cook relies heavily on previously published work (although there is a sprinkling of citations to the Archivo General de Indias). He does not aim for new ideas or interpretations. Instead, he synthesizes a mass of data in compact fashion, covers most of the Americas affected by new diseases in his period, and shows (as he and others have done before) the overwhelming dominance of infectious disease in depopulating the Americas. In doing all this, he has performed a useful service for historians.

J. R. McNeill
Georgetown University

Pauline Maier. *American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence*. (A Borzoi Book.) New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1997. Pp. xxi, 304. $27.50.

Pauline Maier has now written three superb books about the American Revolution. Her first, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765–1776* (1972), remains the best account we have of how loyal British subjects became American revolutionary republicans by 1776. Her second book, *The Old Revolutionaries: Political Lives in the Age of Samuel Adams* (1980), contains five stimulating biographical essays about American leaders active in the resistance movement by 1765 and thus older than the Founding Fathers of 1787, including the most perceptive analysis ever written about Samuel Adams. This new book undertakes a double assignment. Maier does not ask, and probably does not much care, whether Thomas Jefferson drew on John Locke or on the Scottish Enlightenment for his central ideas. Instead, she insists, the political turmoil of the first half of 1776 shaped the Declaration, just as nineteenth-century political passions reshaped it into the antislavery text celebrated by Abraham Lincoln. The book's title is ironic. To the extent that the Declaration (and the Constitution or the Bill of Rights) has become a sacred text, a shrine open to the public in the rotunda of the National Archives, it has also become lifeless. It has lost the power to reshape our lives.

In her most innovative chapter, "The 'Other' Declarations of Independence," Maier analyzes some ninety state and local pronouncements (instructions, resolutions, declarations) in favor of independence. The results are quite surprising. Hardly any of them quoted or paraphrased Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* (1776) or accepted his condemnation of Britain's mixed and balanced constitution as inherently corrupt. They condemned King George III, not the institution of monarchy. Except for frequent references to the Declaratory Act of 1766, they rarely looked farther back than 1775 to justify the decision for independence. George III had refused to answer any of Congress's humble petitions, had placed his American subjects outside his protection, had launched a servile war in Virginia, was encouraging Indian attacks against frontier settlements, and was engaging foreign mercenaries to butcher his own subjects. Most colonial spokesmen at this lower level believed that "necessity," especially the right of self-defense, justified American independence. They also understood that without colonial unity, the effort would fail.

Maier then turns her attention back to Congress and Jefferson's Declaration, which she locates in the political ferment of 1776. Unlike quite a few Jefferson scholars who have shared his mortification at the many amendments passed by Congress, Maier praises this process and insists—persuasively, in my opinion, although she is not the first historian to make this case—that the full Congress tightened the text and made its central arguments much more convincing.

The Declaration's immediate impact was strong enough to shift Independence Day from July 2, when Congress had adopted Richard Henry Lee's resolution dissolving all political ties with Britain, to July 4, when it approved the Declaration that justified this step to the American people and the world. But as Maier shows, the Declaration was all but forgotten in the late 1770s and 1780s. It was not quoted in state constitutions or bills of rights and was almost never read in public, although, as David Waldstreicher has shown, July Fourth orations were becoming ritualized performances in the 1780s. The Declaration was revived by Democratic-Republicans in the turbulent politics of the 1790s. Federalists bitterly resisted this trend. As Simon P. Newman has recently demonstrated, they preferred to celebrate Washington's birthday, not July 4. Maier then traces the process through which the second paragraph became an antislavery text in a way that Jefferson had never intended. While other historians give Lincoln almost sole credit for this transformation, Maier again insists that this process was intensely political and involved large numbers of people.

Maier's analysis does not supersede all earlier accounts of the Declaration of Independence. The studies by Morton White, Garry Wills, Ronald Hamowy, Jay Fliegelman, and even Carl Becker retain their value. But she has placed the document in a broad, even tumultuous political context that invigorates it and gives it new meaning. This is a wonderful book.

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DAVID CURTIS SKAGGS and GERARD T. ALTOFF. *A Signal Victory: The Lake Erie Campaign, 1812–1813*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Pres. 1997. Pp. x, 244.

The naval battles of the War of 1812 are the stuff of legend, but in recent years they have not been the subject of much serious scholarship. Practitioners of "the new naval history" have moved on to other topics. The best recent operational narratives have appeared in general histories of the war, and in biographies of the protagonists. For a new generation to re-examine these well-traveled waters is appropriate and timely.

The campaigns on and around the Great Lakes were among the war's most distinctive features. In less than a year, both sides built miniature fleets literally from scratch, extracting what materials they could from the region's natural resources and importing everything else—men, weapons, ammunition, cordage, canvas, and all the other impedimenta needed to operate a navy—over considerable distances at great expense. The British and American commanders, many of them youthful and all of them inexperienced in dealing with matters of such gravity, were playing a complex game of diplomacy, race relations, and logistics as well as military strategy. When the two little fleets (nine American vessels vs. six British ones) fought their one battle, on September 10, 1813, the fate of British Canada hung in the balance.

David Curtis Skaggs and Gerard T. Altoff bring much expertise and enthusiasm to the subject. In addition to their research in published and unpublished primary sources, they have done the reader a service by synthesizing recent scholarship, much of which has appeared in books and journals that probably are unfamiliar to enthusiasts outside the Midwest.

The book's only substantive weakness is that it is a bit too short to do everything it tries to do. The Lake Erie campaign draws much of its fascination from the intricacy of the forces that brought it about. Skaggs and Altoff clearly understand that story, but in trying to tell it in barely sixty pages they have undertaken the near impossible. The average reader will resort to some rereading and head scratching in sorting out all the officers and place names. An additional map or two would have helped.

In chapter three, when Commodores Perry and Barclay start building their ships, the pace slows and the authors come into their own. Their account of the battle itself is methodical, evocative, and thoroughly grounded in documentary sources. Barclay comes across as a brave man defeated by a combination of political and logistic necessity, tactical errors, and miserable luck. Oliver Hazard Perry is depicted as a master of organization and, most remarkably, of the fine art of inter-service cooperation. He and William Henry Harrison conducted one of the most effective combined army-navy operations of the nineteenth century. The authors also see Perry as a less-than-exemplary squadron commander, absorbed in maneuvering his own ship at the expense of the rest of the fleet. Jesse Elliot, often presented as the villain of the piece, gets thoroughly objective treatment. The authors emphasize that, as Perry himself acknowledged, Elliot did make a positive contribution to the action. The Perry-Elliot controversy seems to have been generated as much by the protagonists' friends as by Perry and Elliot themselves.

The most thought-provoking part of the book is the last chapter, in which the authors consider the battle's long-term consequences. It was a turning point of the war in the Old Northwest, in that it made possible the offensive that culminated in the Battle of the Thames. That American victory ended the threat of a British takeover of Michigan and Wisconsin and wrecked the British-supported Indian confederacy that had menaced white settlement in the region. By concentrating their naval effort on Lake Erie, however, the Americans may have picked the wrong strategic venue. Lake Ontario, Skaggs and Altoff assert, was more important strategically. Had Commodore Isaac Chauncey, the American naval commander in the lake theater, built a fleet on Lake Ontario instead, the American offensive into Canada would have had a better chance of success. In forcing the issue on Lake Erie, the British military governor, General Isaac Brock, made skillful use of minimal resources to divert the American effort from the more important point. Brock thereby guaranteed the continued British possession of Canada.

Skaggs and Altoff have given us a workmanlike, handsome book that undoubtedly will become the standard source on this interesting and important campaign.

JOHN A. TILLEY
East Carolina University

CHRISTINA VELLA. *Intimate Enemies: The Two Worlds of the Baroness de Pontalba*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1997. Pp. xiii, 426. $29.95.

This is an excellent yarn. At the age of seventy, a New Orleans magnate fathered Micaela, the future Baroness de Pontalba. The year was 1795. Three years later he was dead, leaving his widow to manage the family and its fortune. Taking her responsibility seriously, the widow proved herself more than adept. She expanded the family real estate holdings in the city still further, and then married her fifteen-year-old daughter into a wealthy French family. The widow emigrated with her daughter and took on the Parisian real estate market as well. Meanwhile, the Pontalbas (father-in-law and husband) plundered Micaela's fortune and became so infuriated as she increasingly resisted that the old baron tried to murder her. Unsuccessful, he then committed suicide.

But wait, there is more. The new baroness recovered, and though she was now missing several fingers and carried two bullets in her chest, her husband brought suit to get more of her inheritance. In several scandalous trials that rocked Paris, the baroness persevered despite many a judicial setback until she

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succeeded in both getting a legal separation and regaining much of her fortune. Then she, too, took up the family building legacy, leaving at her death, among other properties, the massive hotel Pontalba that would become the United States ambassadorial residence in France and the Pontalba complex in the heart of New Orleans—both of them bearing the mark of her architectural interventions. There is hardly a contemporary story—not in the *National Enquirer*, not in *Fortune*—to match this one for violence, cruelty, hunger for wealth, and sheer verve. By the end of her life in the 1880s, the baroness was managing the affairs of her demented husband and running a real estate empire that spanned two continents.

This book is thick with context. The baroness, apart from her birth, barely figures in the first third. Instead, one reads the history of New Orleans and the biographies of the baroness's father, Andrés Almonester, and father-in-law. Christina Vella has combed the sources to find out what people ate in the early nineteenth century (chocolate, anchovies, olive oil, and meat were favorite foods) and to provide multitudinous details of everyday life. Despite there being sixteen shoemakers in New Orleans, for example, wealthy urban women habitually went barefoot at home. Information about numbers of slaves, the professions and other occupations, the architecture of New Orleans, smuggling practices, and charitable activities is featured in this section. After her marriage, Micaela comes somewhat into prominence, but not very much. The excitement is elsewhere: in the legal maneuvers of the Pontalbas against her: the real estate, financial, and legal transactions of her mother; and the careers of famous lawyers and judges. This is a book with countless subplots, many of them reconstructed for the first time from primary research, and some of them fascinating.

The legacy that the baroness constructed from the shambles of her adult life is clear by the story's end, but she herself remains the most shadowy of protagonists. Her extraordinary will and savvy were most evident in the accounts of her repeated suits for separation, the architectural detail of the Pontalba Buildings, and the final disposition of her fortune. Yet despite allusions to her letters, they are rarely quoted and with less effect than those of the old baron to his wife or those of the Ney family. Micaela's intellect, emotions, and intimate thoughts (if she had them) are skimpily drawn in comparison with the force given to the charitable disposition of her father or the driving greed of her father-in-law (interpreted at one point as ordinary French concern to enhance family wealth). It may be true that, in the long run, an individual's life is but the sum of circumstance, legal status, wealth, and public actions. Yet many look to biography for the illusion (at least) of psychic richness, including motivation, fears, and other signs of individual complexity. Despite the extraordinary complications of the world in which she lived, the baroness only rarely appears complex herself. Perhaps that is the way she was.

BONNIE G. SMITH
Rutgers University

ALBERT E. MOYER. *Joseph Henry: The Rise of an American Scientist*. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution. 1997. Pp. xii, 348. $45.00.

This biography parallels the years covered in the well-researched, multivolume papers of Joseph Henry, currently edited by Marc Rothenberg and others, and details the formative years of the enterprising scientist. Neither the papers nor this biography yet assess Henry's leadership of the Smithsonian Institution, which he headed from its inception in 1846 and which recently celebrated its two hundred and fiftieth anniversary. Given the rich archival and published sources available, Albert E. Moyer has chosen to pursue an analysis that highlights the nature of Henry's scientific work during his most productive period, the character of this successful and highly visible mid-century scientist, and the national aspirations shaping the emergent scientific enterprise and its leaders. The result is a nuanced, thoughtful, and well-written biography.

Careful research in the laboratory notebooks of Henry—and comparative work on Michael Faraday and others engaged in similar work in Europe and the United States—enables Moyer to analyze the nature of scientific work in this period. He particularly concentrates on the complex factors of information sharing as well as competition on a scientific subject of intense investigation; of necessity, he also tackles the issue of simultaneous discovery. A largely self-trained investigator, Henry picked up quickly on the exciting developments linking electricity and magnetism in the 1820s. His demonstrations at the newly founded Albany Institute (1824) and as faculty member at the Albany Academy after his appointment in 1826 led to publications in Benjamin Silliman's *American Journal of Science*. Encouraged by colleagues, Henry built ever stronger electromagnets and was determined to theorize about the phenomenon of electromagnetism. He proved a careful and reflective experimenter, but the cycle of his productivity suggests the problem of doing research while teaching. Nonetheless, Henry managed to produce a result, independently, like that of Faraday in Britain. Moyer points out, however, that the term "simultaneous discovery" is complex, because analysis reveals that Henry and Faraday followed somewhat different paths to the same result; in fact, each also relied on earlier work by the other.

The discovery of mutual induction had the effect of putting Henry into the same scientific league as a well-acknowledged British scientist. At the same time, it made Henry highly conscious of the importance of establishing priority for scientific innovation. Henry found subtle but also not-so-subtle ways to gain recognition, and he challenged those like Samuel F. B. Morse and colleagues who seemed to understate or

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ignore his contributions. Moyer is intrigued by the character of the often publicly self-effacing scientist who described his goals and achievements in high-minded terms of service to others. This same Henry also skillfully promoted his own achievements in anonymous publications and through such good friends as Alexander Dallas Bache. In a psychological analysis that may but also may not be the full explanation, Moyer traces Henry's hard-driving and sometimes controlling personality to his childhood with an alcoholic father and then life with maternal relatives. His subsequent rise to prominence in Princeton and Washington, D.C., included, perhaps inevitably, some painful breaks with his past in Albany.

Henry, while arguably a "rarity among rarities," demonstrated by his own life that science could be a vehicle for mobility for those with scientific talents and powerful mentors (in Henry's case, the Van Rensselaer family). Because of his enthusiasm and skill, Henry joined the local Albany Institute at its formation in 1824 and sometimes dominated its proceedings with his sometimes dramatic presentations. His hard work and initiatives paid off in an appointment to teach at the Albany Academy (which represented his own highest education) and his discoveries to the faculty appointment at the College of New Jersey (later Princeton) in 1832. There he quickly became part of neighboring intellectual communities a short train ride away both in New York City and in Philadelphia. Friends and colleagues from the City of Brotherly Love were instrumental in promoting him for the appointment to the Smithsonian Institution in 1846, a facility he shaped into the preeminent national agency for research and the dissemination of science in the last half of the century.

Moyer persuasively argues that the alignment of Henry's aspirations with the nation's cultural aspirations worked to enhance both. Careful scrutiny of commemorations at the time of Henry's death and in the decades that followed makes clear that this conflation created Henry as idealized symbol and then transformed him into a literal bronze icon standing today before the Smithsonian "castle." This is a well-crafted history that illustrates, through a biographical case study, the place of scientific enterprise in the first half of the nineteenth century.

SALLY GREGORY KOHLSTEDT
University of Minnesota

CHRISTINE LEIGH HEYRMAN. *Southern Cross: The Beginnings of the Bible Belt.* (A Borzoi Book.) New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1997. PP. xi, 336. $27.50.

Christine Leigh Heyrman has written a sweeping interpretation of the origins of an American religious tradition. Since the serious scholarly study of religion in the American South began three decades ago, evangelicalism has dominated discussions of what has made that regional religion distinctive in the United States, but no one before has produced such a detailed, well-researched, and provocative account of its origins.

Heyrman's story is one of transformations. Her substantive introduction outlines her argument. Evangelicals began prosyletizing in the South in the 1740s, but it took a century for most southerners to embrace the religious outlook that would, in the 1840s, be institutionalized in regionally separate Baptist and Methodist churches (and later, in the Civil War, in a southern Presbyterian church) and dominate the South thereafter. Even in 1810, only twenty percent of white Southerners had joined evangelical churches and fewer than ten percent of African Americans were members. In four detailed, well-crafted chapters, the book outlines the specific ways that evangelicals changed the minds of other southerners about their religion and, in the process, were themselves changed.

Building on the work of Rhys Isaac, John B. Boles, and Robert M. Calhoon, among others, Heyrman shows that evangelicals began their work in a world dominated by Anglicanism, with its Christian orthodoxy but enjoyment of such "customary pleasures" as dancing, drinking, and gambling—all anathema to the new ascetic Protestants of the late colonial South. The decline of Anglicanism during the American Revolution left a churchly void that created opportunities for Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians. But opportunity alone was not enough at first to bring evangelical triumph. Heyrman succeeds in making readers feel the strangeness of evangelicalism when it first appeared in the South. The Separate Baptist stress on physical contact (kiss of charity, extending the right hand of fellowship, foot washing) seemed inappropriate physical intimacy for many, and the sharing of religious experiences at Methodist "love feasts" was more sharing of emotional intimacy than many people (especially men) could tolerate. The watery baptism by immersion was an alien ritual, which "inspired the greatest fascination and horror among non-Baptists" (p. 20).

The early evangelicals were egalitarian, gaining most of their converts among women, the young, and African-American slaves. Their ideology challenged, however, the hierarchical orthodoxies of a patriarchal, paternalistic slave society, leading to their further marginalization. They were not only strange; they were subversive. They treatened the slaveowners' authority, but they also challenged the authority of male-dominated households in general. In this traditional, face-to-face, honor-bound society, evangelicals had set themselves off as dangerous, even to plain folk who accepted the expectations of a hierarchical code that gave stability to their lives. Heyrman has a strikingly original insight in stressing that the primary obstacle to evangelical success in the South was not that the upper class rejected them but that "they were long held at arm's length by most of those less exalted" (p. 25).

Heyrman shows how evangelicals reinvented themselves in the process of converting the South. The faithful, for example, once embraced a vivid supernaturalism, complete with belief in satanic possession, but

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this doctrine receded in the early decades of the nineteenth century. The devil remained an unseen entity but not the visible presence of earlier days, thus diminishing the "strangeness" of evangelicals to other Southerners. Early evangelicals celebrated the wonder-working powers of young preachers, creating a lore of wonders similar to earlier popular religion, but church leaders gradually restricted the authority of young itinerants who had been a challenge to older, local church pastors. If church leaders harnessed the devil, they also penned up youthful challengers to hierarchical authority in the South.

Using the specific case study of the Mead family in Virginia, Heyrman demonstrates how changes in evangelical attitudes toward the family contributed to their success in appealing to others in the region. Early evangelicals had demanded ultimate loyalty of their converts, superseding even traditional bonds of kinship. They seemed to embody a new ideal of family, of like-minded holy people, and they sometimes were emotionally ruthless in proselytizing their blood families. Non-evangelicals categorized them in the same league as Quakers, Shakers, and Native American tribes that represented unorthodox family arrangements beyond the pale. By the early nineteenth century, the metaphor of family had already become the key one in southern culture upholding relations of authority, including slavery and the broader household in which it was said to rest. Evangelicals changed their views on family, though, settling into a comfortable embrace of gender roles that created a southern version of the "cult of domesticity." They moved away from their earlier criticism of slavery, seeing it now as simply a part of the well-ordered, male-dominated southern household. After this dramatic change, conversions increased among the planters who had for so long shunned the evangelicals.

Finally, Heyrman discusses how evangelicals adapted their views on the role of women. A long tradition had recognized the active spirituality of godly women who were seers and prophesizers exercising their gifts in public. In the early nineteenth century, evangelical leadership offered a new model of acceptable religious behavior for women, one "less assertive and more private than those exhibited by southern women before 1800" (p. 197). Women were now to achieve spiritual bliss through devotion to their families, neatly reinforcing the authority of southern patriarchs. Evangelical men were themselves to be more assertive, in ways that could fit comfortably with the South's code of personal honor. The result was "to meld the South's regional mores of masculinity and martial honor with the evangelical ethos" (p. 205).

This stimulating book rests on extensive research, utilizing especially well the memoirs, sermons, and other materials of itinerant ministers. Heyrman's reliance on these sources gives her story a particular strength in terms of the Methodists. She discusses Presbyterians early in the study, but they virtually disappear from the narrative after a point, raising the question of their role as evangelicals. A useful appendix contains quantified estimates of evangelical church membership in the period Heyrman is discussing. Her prose has a clarity and often a beauty that matches that of the best narrative histories.

Historians have traditionally focused on the role of camp meetings and the evangelical acceptance of slavery as the ways that Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians successfully came to dominate the religious life of the South. Heyrman wisely explains the transformation of religion in the region as broader than that, reflecting widespread adaptations among evangelicals to southern life even as they worked to change it. The neatness of her categories is appealing and the specificity of her transformations is convincing. But the transformations may be too stark, especially given that her study ends in the 1840s, before the dramatic changes of the Civil War and the postwar expansion of denominational membership produced the apogee of the Bible Belt. Moreover, Heyrman's study does not take social class factors into much account. Evangelicalism is a broad tradition in the South, and plain folk churches continued long after the 1840s, existing in tension with many hierarchical expectations of mainstream southern society after Heyrman's transformations had occurred. Still, this book stands now at the center of historiographical discussions of the development of southern religion.

CHARLES REAGAN WILSON
University of Mississippi

JOE WILLIAM TROTTER, JR., *River Jordan: African American Urban Life in the Ohio Valley*. (The Ohio River Valley Series.) Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 1998. Pp. xvi, 200. Cloth $29.00, paper $17.00.

A recent publication in the University Press of Kentucky's Ohio River Valley Series, this book presents a comprehensive overview of African-American urban life from colonial days to about 1960. Joe William Trotter, Jr. focuses on four cities—Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Louisville, and Evansville—and provides perspectives on differences and similarities among those cities' African-American communities. He establishes at the outset a series of goals for analysis: illuminating the "impact of the Ohio River [region] in the context of the larger American society" (the stated objective of the series), documenting the emergence of an urban black middle class, exploring interracial alliances, and highlighting "similarities and differences in the social history of the Ohio Valley cities" and showing "how these factors influenced the development of African American life" (p. xiv). Using a wide array of secondary sources, Trotter mostly succeeds in these purposes.

The story, as one would expect, is one of racial discrimination, relentless in a general sense but also with variation and glimmerings of progress. Within this context, Trotter utilizes his sources and his own insights to pinpoint several not-always-recognized but provocative issues. For example, he revisits Steven

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Ross's assertion that in the early nineteenth century, when settlers of both races began entering the urban frontier, whites of all classes used republican ideology to construct a racial solidarity that helped to reinforce the subordination of African Americans. As well, Trotter claims, the hostility of many settlers to slavery in the antebellum Ohio Valley reflected not just humanitarian abolition sentiment but also fear that southerners would release their troublesome and inferior blacks into the Northwest Territory and that an enlarged free black population would compete with whites for land and jobs. Trotter cites the work of Henry Louis Taylor, Jr., and Vicky Dula in pointing out how, also in the nineteenth century, urban African Americans, although concentrated in neighborhoods pejoratively referred to by whites as "Bucktown" and "Little Africa," used these communities to create and utilize their own institutions and establish racial cohesion. This kind of community-building continued to proceed when more isolated ghettos were created in later decades. Furthermore, when, early in the twentieth century, industrial employers pointed derisively to blacks' alleged unreliability and inconsistency in jobholding, Trotter suggests that another way to interpret such behavior would be to see it in terms of black workers' efforts to improve their conditions by seeking better jobs. As well, Trotter cites several historians who have indicated that in economic hard times such as the Depression, blacks increasingly relied on the "underground economy" to compensate for lost jobs and family needs—although some elaboration on this point would have been welcome if not necessary.

Unfortunately, these topics and others could not support elaborate analysis in a synthetic and brief volume. More troublesome are some minor but not insubstantial points raised but not fully examined or explained in the book. For example, in most segments of the book Trotter discusses Evansville, a small and apparently not economically significant Ohio River city, as something of an afterthought, a community included only because it perchance happened to be located in the area under study. The African-American population of Evansville did not surpass ten thousand (the other Ohio River cities contained eight to ten times as many blacks as did Evansville) and the proportion of African Americans in the city's population did not rise beyond seven percent until after 1980, well after Trotter's description ends. The Indiana city might have provided a useful and contrasting example of what happened to African Americans in a city where their critical mass did not reach a size that provoked the kinds of social interaction and tensions that characterized larger cities, but Trotter does not pursue this avenue of analysis. Moreover, a reader sometimes wonders what was so unique about African-American communities in Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, and Louisville that they merit a special volume. Trotter legitimately believes that the social and economic patterns involving blacks in these cities often replicated those of blacks in other cities, but his frequent use of the phrase "as elsewhere" (I counted at least seventeen such references) leads one to conclude that similarities were more important than differences.

Occasionally, Trotter makes unsubstantiated statements—such as the declaration that blacks attained "full employment" after World War II (p. 141)—that both historians and unemployed black Americans might question. Still, the book offers a quick and informative history for undergraduates and general readers.

HOWARD P. CHUDACOFF
Brown University

DANIEL S. DUPRE. *Transforming the Cotton Frontier: Madison County, Alabama, 1800–1840*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1997. Pp. xii, 269. $40.00.

Community studies have become a useful medium for understanding antebellum America. They have done much to illuminate the major tendencies of the era: rapid westward settlement, more complex economic relationships and interdependencies, new ideas about the good society and the possibilities of moral reform, a democratized politics marked by intense partisanship, and the looming specter of North-South conflict. Daniel S. Dupre has made a major contribution to this genre, one that will be of particular interest to students of the Old South. His book is tightly organized and argued; also notable is its clear, jargon-free prose.

Dupre focuses on Madison County, located in northern Alabama between the Tennessee River and the Tennessee state line. The region initially attracted subsistence farmers, but planters and slaves swarmed in during the postwar cotton boom. In 1819, cotton prices ebbed, inflated land values tumbled, and recrimination became the order of the day. Proto-Jacksonians blamed hard times on "royalist" speculators and a "monied aristocracy" (p. 79). Proto-Whigs called for transportation improvements, notably at Muscle Shoals downstream on the Tennessee River. These debates about economics had cultural counterparts. Would-be moral reformers, especially in the growing town of Huntsville, pushed an agenda of gentility, piety, and self-control; those who found identity in the masculine culture of honor feared that Whiggish busybodies would infringe personal liberty. As the two-party system coalesced in the 1830s, Madison County became a Democratic stronghold. The county's Whig minority clustered in Huntsville.

A commendable feature of this book is the author's refusal to exaggerate divisions within white society. He finds no hard-and-fast separation between "subsistence-oriented agrarians" and "commercially oriented merchants and planters" (p. 115). Yeomen often grew some cotton and were receptive to arguments in favor of a canal around Muscle Shoals. Moral reformers apparently persuaded many common folk that community well-being was ill served by electioneering spectacles in which candidates would "drink raw whiskey, eat

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rawer shoate, dance bare foot on a puncheon floor . . . and pull at a gander's neck" (p. 185). One leading reformer, James Gillespie Birney, mayor of Huntsville in 1829, worked to restrict "Tipling houses" (p. 162) and was active in the Bible Society. Several years later, however, Birney left the state after failing to stir interest in African colonization. The departed Birney, who became a political abolitionist and ran for president as candidate of the Liberty Party, was thereafter condemned as a dangerous renegade in his former home. Dupre argues that perceived threats to slavery unified those who disagreed about lesser matters.

Two Huntsville newspapers, the *Democrat* and the *Southern Advocate*, provide the principal underpinnings for this study. Other sources are judiciously interwoven, but the argument is most often developed from a close reading of newspaper text. In this respect and others, Dupre's book resembles Harry L. Watson's *Jacksonian Politics and Community Conflict: The Emergence of the Second American Party System in Cumberland County, North Carolina* (1981). Like Watson, Dupre emphasizes the integrative role of partisan competition, which served to deflect conflict away from the community "by absorbing it within a national institutional framework" (p. 7). Watson is more interested than Dupre in the local roots of partisanship; Dupre frames the economic, cultural, and ideological contexts within which partisanship developed.

This impressive book could have been researched more aggressively. Dupre has compiled data on slaveholdings and criminal prosecutions, but he does not attempt a statistical analysis of the U.S. Census. Instead he makes occasional bows toward contemporary cultural history: the Panic of 1819 undermined male prowess, introducing "an element of sexual anxiety" (p. 63). The book focuses almost exclusively on these anxious white males, principally articulate townsmen and newspaper contributors rather than dirt farmers. The chapter on fear of slave insurrection offers little information about the slaves themselves. Women, white or black, are conspicuously absent.

Dupre's book ends abruptly in 1837. He thereby missed an opportunity to comment on J. Mills Thornton III's view that town growth and economic development threw late antebellum society into "vertigo," predisposing white Alabamians to solve all their problems through the drastic remedy of disunion (*Politics and Power in a Slave Society: Alabama, 1800–1860* [1978]). Readers of this book never learn that Madison County was laggard in joining the Confederate bandwagon. William L. Barney has attributed its deviant stance to a then-stagnant plantation economy (*The Secessionist Impulse: Alabama and Mississippi in 1860* [1974], pp. 270–79, 318).

DANIEL W. CROFTS
The College of New Jersey

ARMANDO C. ALONZO. *Tejano Legacy: Rancheros and Settlers in South Texas, 1734–1900*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 1998. Pp. xii, 357. Cloth $50.00, paper $22.50.

Society along the United States-Mexico border of Texas has always marched to its own drummer. The not always peaceful mixing of Anglo-American and Mexican influences in the region has produced a culture that is rich and distinctive, if not always appreciated by outsiders. In south Texas, two distinct periods of interaction are discernible, separated by the arrival of the railroad in Brownsville in 1901. During the earlier period, relations between majority Tejanos (Texans of Mexican heritage) and minority Anglos (United States and European English-speakers) consisted of accommodation, collaboration, and acceptance of the inherently Hispanic character of the area's culture. Increasing discrimination, segregation, and disfranchisement of Tejanos became prevalent in the later period, as an Anglo population boom tilted the balance of power in much of the region. When early twentieth-century historians got around to writing about south Texas, they did so within the context of this transformation and, consequently, portrayed the region as a wilderness into which Anglo Americans brought the blessings of civilization. Later this century, when Chicano scholars began to tell their side of the story, they took their cue from their Anglo predecessors and projected backward a racist set of relationships in which all Anglos were exploiters and all Mexicans victims. This is the underlying premise of Armando C. Alonzo's book.

Alonzo takes to task previous scholars of south Texas, Anglo and Mexican American, for not spending enough time analyzing the abundant available record. Consequently, historians have missed the fact that continuity plays a much larger role than change during the region's first fifty years under United States/Texas rule. According to the author, the relationship of people to the land is the most important way of understanding south Texas in the last half of the nineteenth century. With a well-established ranching economy at the time of incorporation into Texas in 1848, early Anglo, European, and African Americans who came into the region quickly incorporated themselves into the prevailing system. Alonzo uses tax, census, and court records to support his contention that Tejanos dominated society even as Anglos got hold of the reins of county government, an area in which Hispanics were at a disadvantage because of their lack of familiarity with American political institutions.

Alonzo constructs his case methodically. The first three chapters offer an excellent summary of the settlement and development of south Texas under Spanish and Mexican rule. Although constructed from secondary literature and printed primary sources, these chapters provide clear evidence that the region was not a wilderness but a developing and vital part of Mexico's northern frontier. Chapter four challenges commonly held preconceptions of how South Texas

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Hispanics fared under Anglo-American rule. It is here that the author begins to fashion an argument for what might be called "yeoman south Texas": The Tejano population of the region is composed not of hacienda owners and peons, but of small-property-owning families and a surprisingly mobile labor force.

The heart of the book is the next four chapters, in which Alonzo discusses how these people fared under the new Anglo-American economic and legal institutions. Alonzo's principal argument is that the decline of Tejano land ownership and status within the livestock economy cannot be explained through race-based models of interpretation. Rather, access to capital, land tenure traditions, and climatic conditions had more say in why Tejanos as a group lost land and economic status in the late nineteenth century. To make the book's thesis more broadly appealing, the last chapter attempts, not altogether successfully, to compare the land tenure experience of Mexican Americans across the Southwest.

This book is not without its problems. There is much repetition among the last five chapters, and the overlapping chronologies sometimes create confusion. Many passages needlessly explain material clearly presented in the numerous tables. What point the author is trying to make is sometimes difficult to gauge. For instance: "the Tejano *ranchero* family cherished traditional values, such as love, honor, and respect for every family member" (p. 113); and, "imbued with a strong sense of egalitarianism, *rancheros* usually left their estates to their wives and children" (p. 240). It would be strange indeed if they had not done so.

Such lapses should not detract from the study's overall value. In challenging the existing historiography on the region, both that produced by Anglo-American triumphalists and Chicano revisionists, Alonzo has set out a new agenda for students of Mexican-American history and late nineteenth-century race relations, not just for Texas but for the whole Southwest.

JESÚS F. DE LA TEJA
Southwest Texas State University

ELLIOTT WEST. *The Contested Plains: Indians, Goldseekers, and the Rush to Colorado*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1998. Pp. xxiv, 422. $34.95.

In a way, Elliott West tells a familiar tale: that of Indians, goldseekers, and ensuing conflict. But in this case, the Indians were the Cheyenne and the goldseekers were headed for Colorado. Thus, West is the first to assess the cataclysmic changes that the Colorado gold rush brought to the Great Plains. In addition, rather than casting the story in the usual terms of heartless aggressors and hapless victims, West supplies a large and insightful interpretation that at once softens and increases our understanding of the Anglo disruption of Plains Indian cultures.

Throughout, West characterizes both Indians and Anglos as peoples who made choices and paid the consequences, although they were often unanticipated and harsh. "Whites," West maintains, "did not set out, directly at least, to destroy the Indians' life." Instead, "they were simply following a script that had no Indians in it, except as exotic relics" (p. 335). Also, West argues that "the Indians' disaster could not possibly be explained simply by the sudden invasion of goldseekers and townmakers." In his view, "Indians were partly responsible for their own difficulties" (p. xvii).

To support his claims, West begins long before the Colorado Gold Rush of the late 1850s. In a broad and sweeping conceptualization of Plains history that challenges the customary pattern of beginning a story with the arrival of white explorers, West ranges back to 9500 to 10,000 B.C., the rise of the Clovis people, and the eventual emergence of the Folsom culture. He notes a significant change of climate, including a severe drought, in 5000 B.C., which marked the end of what he calls the "first period" of Plains history. The Plains Woodland cultures followed, with Anglos appearing only relatively recently in the mid-sixteenth century. Because native farming and hunting eventually had to give way to such factors as white disease, technology, and the introduction of horses, West concludes that "the years between 1700 to 1850 might be called the unsettling of mid-America" (p. 46).

It was at this point that the Cheyenne, as well as other Plains tribes, made the fateful decision to give up their village-based way of life and become horse-powered nomads. Although they hoped for independence and influence, they soon found such goals largely illusory. Had the Plains provided enough grass and water for native peoples and the huge number of horses necessary to sustain their way of life, the result might have been different. And if the Rocky Mountains had not yielded riches to gold-seeking whites, the outcome for the Indians may not have proved so disastrous.

As it was, the Cheyenne, whom West characterizes as a group of frontiering people taking their destiny into their own hands, found themselves not only limited by available resources but at war with other native groups who had made a similar decision and needed the same means to sustain them. When whites discovered gold in Colorado, they flooded into Indian land, putting additional pressure on already beleaguered Indians and redesigning the Plains with their trails, railroads, and aspirations. Much like the Cheyenne, however, they overestimated how far environmental resources could take them.

In his concluding section on "Power," West provides a masterful analysis of the ways in which native and white demands on the environment reshaped the Plains. The Cheyenne vision of life evaporated as the Plains increasingly became home to saloons, hotels, shops, and railroads. Meanwhile, thousands of white people returned to the East, disillusioned and broken, both financially and in spirit. The thousands of others who replaced them further frightened and angered the

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Indians, who fought to save vestiges of their eroding base of survival. As ranching replaced the fur trade and the Plains linked East and West, it was clear that only one vision could survive. The Indians lost out and soon a new myth dominated the region: that of a superior white people who came, conquered, and maximized what the Rocky Mountains had to offer.

West explored some of these themes in the University of New Mexico's Calvin Horn lecture series, later published as *The Way to the West: Essays on the Central Plains* (1995). Here, however, West flushes out native history and enlarges that of the Colorado rush with great profit. Most significantly, he places the pieces in a framework that opens new and unexpected vistas on the Plains experience and the area's significance to the nation. To understand where western history is now, and is likely to go in the future, one must read this book.

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LAURA GRAVES. *Thomas Varker Keam, Indian Trader.* Foreword by DAVID M. BRUGGE. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1998. Pp. xx, 342. $28.95.

I still remember my excitement a decade ago as I drove into Keams Canyon, Arizona, where Hopi Indians whose autobiographies I had read had attended schools almost a century earlier. To my shame, I thought little about the Keam (or was it Keams?) who helped to establish those schools and who apparently gave his name to the place. Laura Graves's biography convinces me that I should have further investigated the man.

Born in Comwall, England, in 1842, Thomas Varker Keam first went to sea. Then he joined the California Volunteers of the Union Army and participated in Civil War expeditions from that state to Texas and in actions against Apache Indians. Moving as an interpreter to the Fort Defiance Navajo Agency in Arizona, he embroiled himself in a long and unsuccessful struggle to obtain the position of U.S. agent. He improved his proficiency in Navajo and learned Hopi, married a Navajo woman according to tribal custom, fathered children by her, and opened two trading posts, the most important at Keams Canyon (no apostrophe!). The frustrated office-seeker would make his substantial mark as an Indian trader.

In lucid prose, Graves demonstrates how Keam became one of the most influential white men in the Southwest, and—although the author rarely employs the term—a classic example of the cultural broker. His trading post served as a gathering place for anthropologists, and Keam helped them collect information and thousands of tribal artifacts. He met or corresponded with presidents, commissioners of Indian Affairs, and "friends of the Indian" and helped prevent the possibly disastrous allotment of Hopi lands according to the stipulations of the 1887 Dawes Act. Keam revolutionized the Indian trade, deeply influencing the work of increasingly profit-conscious Hopi craftsmen and women, and helped establish a national and European market for their art. "By the turn of the century," writes Graves in an unapologetic yet troubling sentence, "there was no question about the salability [*sic*] of Hopi material culture" (p. 167). Keam thoroughly enjoyed his reputation as mediator between peoples, but by 1900 his influence among whites, at least, was declining. He returned to England and died in Cornwall in 1904.

Building on, yet also taking issue with, the work of earlier scholars of the Indian trade, Graves solidly grounds her contribution in primary sources from numerous archives (over sixty pages of notes). She employs New Social History perspectives to emphasize the active agency of Indians, who manipulated Keam as much as he did them. She insists, however, that on each side respect prevailed, and that through the relationship "both trader and Indian artist could profit" (p. 9).

Yet Graves briefly describes Keam's purchase of Hopi ceremonial artifacts and dance paraphernalia through secret negotiations as "morally incorrect" (p. 167). And she points to Indian resentment of anthropological insensitivity and of compulsory schooling of tribal children, which Keam strongly supported. His "most egregious sin was that of pride complicated by paternalism" (p. 226). Graves might, then, have more critically examined the potentially intrusive, divisive, exploitative, and dependence-producing influences of such traders, even if Keam's own conscience was clear. Further, some of her bold claims invite scepticism. Was mutual adaptation among Americans, Navajos, and Hopis really "made possible by Thomas Keam" (p. 26)? Could the trader really have "understood Navajo society and culture" (p. 64)? Also, as Keam left few personal letters, we sometimes have to take on faith Graves's judgments about his motivations. Finally, although Graves continually seeks Indian perspectives—her first chapter outlines Navajo and Hopi histories and cultures, for example, and she quotes long passages of Hopi petitions translated by Keam—this is still essentially white-centered western history. The author might have made greater use of the rich autobiographies produced by Hopis and Navajos who lived through some of these years.

My criticisms should not overly detract from a successful study of complex and changing cultural interactions in which individuals and groups emerge as intelligent, pragmatic, and humanly selfish. The book is a significant contribution to western history, to Indian history, and to the history of the sometimes dubious commercialization of "primitive" art. Yes, I should have asked more questions during my visit to Keams Canyon. For Graves is surely correct in claiming that, despite his faults, its founder played a major

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role in acquainting the outside world "with the beauty and dignity of Hopi society" (p. 226).

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ALBERT J. VON FRANK. *The Trials of Anthony Burns: Freedom and Slavery in Emerson's Boston*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1998. Pp. xix, 409. $27.95.

Albert J. Von Frank intends his account of the Anthony Burns affair to read like a novel, and it does. The story unfolds engagingly and gracefully from the arrest of Burns as a fugitive slave in Boston on May 24, 1854, to his return to slavery eight days later. Von Frank undertakes his study to inquire "how the liberal, emancipatory ideas I admired in Emerson and his associates comported with or struggled against the social and political fact of chattel slavery" (p. xiii). The inquiry is necessary, because Ralph Waldo Emerson and his associates often distanced themselves from the abolitionist movement. Nathaniel Hawthorne, for example, wrote the presidential campaign biography of his Bowdoin College friend, Franklin Pierce. While President Pierce determinedly pursued Burns, Hawthorne enjoyed diplomtic life as consul at Liverpool. Although Emerson, too, remained aloof from antislavery radicals, his Saturday Club included Richard Henry Dana, Jr., a member of the abolitionist Vigilance Committee in Boston and the leading figure of Anthony Burns's defense. And, as Von Frank ably demonstrates, the Burns affair pushed the issue of slavery to the forefront for Emerson.

Von Frank does justice to the drama of the affair. News of Burns's arrest spread quickly, and indignant abolitionists gathered in Boston to denounce fugitive slave commissioner Edward G. Loring and the federal fugitive slave law. Two young abolitionists, Thomas Wentworth Higginson and Martin Stowell (both of whom traveled to Boston from Worcester for the purpose), joined a group of Boston free blacks led by Lewis Hayden to attack the courthouse where the federal marshal held Burns captive. A pistol shot killed a guard, but the rescue effort failed. During a tense week the hearing proceeded. State militia and United States Marines arrived in Boston to maintain order as Loring delivered his decision for rendition. On the afternoon of June 2, 1854, federal troops marched Burns to the wharf for his return to slavery.

Emerson shared the sense of outrage toward the slave power and a compliant federal government that sparked the rapid rise of the Republican Party in Massachusetts. Examining the outpouring of antislavery rhetoric during the Burns affair, however, Von Frank is struck by "the apparent incapacity of even the most committed of the radicals to express a direct, authentic outrage on Burns's personal behalf" (p. 59). In antislavery rhetoric, "curtailed liberties ... are synecdoches for a generalized culture of liberty that is now uniquely Northern ... and the legacy of the revolutionary past" (p. 60). But why was Burns incidental rather than central to that culture? The answer lies in complexities of race that lie outside of Von Frank's distinction between a "vital" antislavery culture of artisans, factory workers, and shopkeepers (exemplified in Worcester) and the compromise-seeking, "effete wealthy Hunkers" of Boston, "where capital and corporations held sway" (pp. 152, 158). The distinction is misleading. Conservative Whig Amos A. Lawrence found the Burns affair every bit as radicalizing as did Emerson. And the vitality of the Worcester radicals derived in substantial measure from their sense of themselves as native New Englanders defending northern liberties against the proslavery sympathies of the Boston Irish. James Batchelder, the guard killed in the rescue attempt, was a young Irish-born Custom House worker. His death elicited no sympathy from antislavery ranks. In a particularly bitter sermon, Theodore Parker described Batchelder as one of the "ruffians" who incited the rescuers' attack. He placed the responsibility for the violence and for the Irishman's death at the feet of Judge Loring: "You fired the shot which makes his wife a widow" (quoted, p. 113).

Together with nativism, a new sense that distinctions of race determined the rate of human progress entered the northern culture of liberty. Emerson applauded Francis P. Blair, Jr.'s view that the destiny of the races linked emancipation in the United States with the colonization of African Americans in Central America. And Emerson ranked Louis Agassiz second only to Thomas Carlyle as his intellectual hero, even as Carlyle assumed darkly racist ground in the aftermath of British emancipation and Agassiz contributed his essay on the separation of the races to Josiah Nott's and George Gliddon's volume, *Types of Mankind* (1854). Von Frank convincingly locates Emerson at the center of the American Romantic movement that generated a sentimental hostility to slavery and its defenders. But the same Romantic temperament provided a fertile environment for a conception of race that left Emerson and his Bostonians without the capacity to feel a personal connection to either James Batchelder or Anthony Burns.

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TUNDE ADELEKE. *UnAfrican Americans: Nineteenth-Century Black Nationalists and the Civilizing Mission*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 1998. Pp. xv, 192. $24.95.

This book focuses on the words and actions of three nineteenth-century black nationalists—Martin Delany, Alexander Crummell, and Henry McNeal Turner—all of whom were born in the United States. Each, at different times and under varying circumstances, came to espouse an intense interest in Africa and at least some interest in encouraging African Americans to emigrate back to Africa. In the 1850s, Delany con-

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vened a National Emigration Society and made an exploratory trip to the Niger Valley looking for a suitable homeland for African Americans. During the Civil War, however, Delany accepted a commission as an army major with the responsibility to recruit black Americans, and his interest in Africa diminished. From 1853 until 1872, Crummell served as an educator and missionary in Liberia before fleeing from deadly political infighting there to return to the United States. Afterward, he evinced much interest in building up the moral character of African Americans in North America and virtually no interest in back-to-Africa movements. Turner, from 1880 a bishop in the African Methodist Episcopal Church, reacted to the disappointment of the end of Reconstruction and the brutality of Jim Crow legislation by visiting Africa and vigorously advocating African emigrationism to his flock in the American South during the 1890s.

At the height of their interest in Africa, each man demonstrated a peculiar attitude toward Africans that Tunde Adeleke designates as "the civilizing mission." All three men tended to assume that African Americans, by virtue of their exposure to Christianity and Western civilization on the North American continent, were superior to native Africans. Consequently, each in some sense was devoted to the idea of African Americans uplifting their less fortunate African brothers and sisters. However, the lack of mutuality and the condescending attitude of domination implied in this worldview significantly undermined their work when they came into actual contact with Africans. Here is a paradox to which most historians have given only a passing glance; Adeleke gives it the sustained attention that it deserves.

Adeleke's project, while promising in its conception, is uneven and somewhat disappointing in its results. His introduction, devoted to defining the term "black nationalism," is ambiguous and results in an overly broad definition that seems not to exclude any black American, even dedicated integrationists such as Frederick Douglass and Martin Luther King, Jr. For each of his subjects, Adeleke provides individual chapters designed mainly to provide an overview of their black nationalist thought at the height of their advocacy of it. These chapters are superficial and are generally based on a narrow range of sources. They do not succeed in capturing much of the differing historical dynamics that shaped the views of individuals or any of the occasionally stormy interactions among the three men.

By far the most valuable part of the book is Adeleke's concluding chapter on "Black American Nationalism and Africa: Ambivalence and Paradox." Here he provides a fascinating summary of the scholarship on nineteenth-century black Americans' civilizing mission to Africa. This material should have been placed earlier in the book. Adeleke provides a nuanced analysis of the "dual cultural space" (p. 117) that these men inhabited, syncretizing Western materialist values with African realities. He correctly observes that they ultimately seemed more interested in enhancing their own American nationality than in identifying with Africa. Furthermore, each in some sense needed a negative image of Africa in order to justify his own civilizing mission. Where Adeleke falters, in my view, is in his analysis of their motivations for African missions. Did they act primarily out of "imperialist" (political and economic) or "Zionist" (religious and millennialist) motives? Adeleke opts for the first alternative, casting them as junior imperialists to the Europeans, although markedly less successful ones. This ignores the fact that Liberia and Sierra Leone, early evidence of the civilizing mission, originated well before the European colonization frenzy of the late nineteenth century. I would also argue that a close, careful reading of a broader selection of the three men's writings would show their motivations to have been predominantly religious.

This provocative, worthwhile, but flawed book should be read carefully and considered alongside the analyses of nineteenth-century black nationalism provided by Wilson Moses, Edwin Redkey, and Theodore Draper.

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Bruce Tap. *Over Lincoln's Shoulder: The Committee on the Conduct of the War*. (Modern War Studies.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998. Pp. xii, 319. $39.95.

This is a solidly researched and informative study of Civil War politics and military strategy as seen through the activities of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, one of the few joint committees created by the United States Congress for substantive policy ends in the nineteenth century. Although the committee figures in all major accounts of the Civil War, it has not previously been the exclusive subject of a scholarly monograph. Bruce Tap's book satisfactorily meets this need. The Committee on the Conduct of the War has more often been criticized for its partisan interference with Union military appointments and strategy than praised for its contribution to boosting public morale and supporting the Union war effort. In a gesture of evenhandedness, Tap says the committee did both of these things. Yet his principal findings about the committee are preponderantly negative.

Tap states that the Republican-controlled committee was motivated by free-labor ideology, antislavery zeal, and a patriotic desire to preserve the Union. It was not a radical cabal at odds with the mainstream principles of the Republican Party. This is a benign interpretation that takes into account the positive assessment of the nature of the Republican Party in the Civil War era as established by revisionist historiography since the 1960s. The Committee on the Conduct of the War, Tap agrees, meant well. The consequences of the committee's actions, however, were largely negative.

Tap's major conclusions are that the committee's

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ideologically driven investigations of battlefield results helped politicize military appointments, incited jealousy and distrust in the officer corps, and caused deterioration of military-civilian relations. Espousing simplistic and unrealistic views about military strategy, the committee reinforced popular misconceptions about the nature of warfare that were damaging to military morale. Most important, the committee's high-handed and partisan investigations produced hostility and factionalism that undermined bipartisan support of the war. In the early stages of the conflict in particular, the committee contributed to the reemergence of political partisanship, destroying cooperation with Democrats and making conduct of the war more difficult. When the committee was not doing serious harm to the war effort, its actions were either an annoying sideshow or a waste of time, energy, and resources.

Tap's book is evidence that traditional historiography is still widely practiced in graduate education in the United States. This can be seen in a consideration of the author's methodology. Tap states his intention to evaluate "the ultimate impact of committee investigations on the war effort" and "the nature of its power and influence on military affairs" (p. 8). He has no method of empirical measurement or of theoretical analysis, however, by which to answer these questions. This circumstance is reflected in occasional uncertainty about whether the actions of the committee, as in the notorious investigation of the battles of Bull Run and Ball's Bluff, materially detracted from the war effort. An element of methodological confusion appears in Tap's statement, referring to the effort of the committee to influence military policy: "The results of their attempt, as *I will demonstrate*, speak for themselves" (p. x, italics added). This is not to say that Tap employs no method in organizing the results of his research. His method is that of historical narrative based on documentary sources. Moreover, his use of this method is guided by a theoretical assumption, which he makes explicit at the end of the book.

Tap states that his study of the committee rests "on the assumption that a united society is more capable of successfully waging war than a divided one" (p. 256). This sounds reasonable, yet the meaning and significance of the assumption remain inarticulate. Tap fails to analyze the assumption or define its key terms, such as "a united society." He seems to regard its meaning as self-evident. Yet the assumption is made to bear a great deal of interpretive weight. "If one assumes then the proposition that a united society is better-suited to wage war than one fraught with divisions," Tap concludes, "the committee had a negative impact on the war by exacerbating partisan divisions" (p. 257).

A weakness of this book is that it gives insufficient attention to the constitutional context in which the Committee on the Conduct of the War operated. Tap is aware of the constitutional import of the committee's activities. He rightly observes that much of the controversy surrounding the committee was the result of jealousy between the legislative and executive branches of the government. Yet he fails to explore this issue in any depth. According to my reading of his evidence, on only one occasion does he argue that the committee exceeded its authority by pressuring President Abraham Lincoln to remove General George B. McClellan from his command. The ground on which he bases this contention is unclear. To arrive at a just estimate of the work of the committee, it would be helpful to know how Congress in other wars accomplished the purposes of keeping tabs on the executive and being informed on military policy, functions that Tap says the Civil War committee performed. The general interpretation of Tap's account is indeed strengthened by the fact that Congress has never again, in time of war, created a joint select committee as it did during the Civil War.

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J. TRACY POWER. *Lee's Miserables: Life in the Army of Northern Virginia from the Wilderness to Appomattox.* (Civil War America.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1998. Pp. xxii, 463. $34.95.

This book by J. Tracy Power has an excellent premise. It assumes that careful study of the letters, diaries, and memoirs of the Army of Northern Virginia during the Civil War's final year would tell us something important about the sources of Confederate motivation, the waning of southern will, and other powerful issues that lie at the heart of most explanations concerning Confederate nationalism and defeat. The soldiers of Robert E. Lee—"Lee's Miserables," they called themselves, after Victor Hugo's *Les Miserables*—were the most accomplished of the Confederacy and arguably of the entire Civil War. The main heroes of the Confederate pantheon—Jeb Stuart, Stonewall Jackson, and Lee himself—came out of that army, as did Jubal Early, who devoted his postwar career to a ceaseless, astoundingly successful bid to make Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia the example *par excellence* of southern valor and values. Early did not invent this image from whole cloth. Even during the war, Gary W. Gallagher has argued, southern whites looked to the Army of Northern Virginia as the principal embodiment of Confederate nationalism and popular will. Its surrender at Appomattox, they believed, was the death of the Confederate cause.

If the premise is good, the prospect of success is excellent. Few historical subjects are so richly blessed with primary sources as the American Civil War. Between published reminiscences and official reports, abundant letter and diary collections (both published and unpublished), and contemporary news accounts, there is almost literally no question a historian can ask of the historical record that cannot be answered. Given this incredible depth and variety, it is regrettable that, by and large, Power failed to take a problem-oriented

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approach to his sources. Instead, judging by this book, he apparently sat down with stacks of evidence, distilled them into stacks of note cards, arranged the cards in chronological order, supplied connective narrative, and published the result.

I regret this failure, because the book is well-written, superbly well-researched, and, despite my reservations, a worthwhile addition to the literature. I am tempted to believe that it is another victim of the commercial market's baneful influence on good Civil War scholarship. The existence of this market is, on the whole, an enormous blessing—who truly wants to languish unread save by a few fellow specialists?—but it comes at a cost. Its siren call often drives the selection of subject and manner of presentation. In the present case, it may have led the author to pursue a narrative treatment when a different approach would have yielded a stronger scholarly contribution.

Although a chronological approach makes a degree of sense—a prominent theme of the Army of Northern Virginia's final year is the breakdown of command and morale under the strain of near-continuous operations—a thematic, analytical approach would have driven home Power's points much harder. The author tried to get the best of both methods. Following David Hackett Fischer, he calls the book a hybrid of social and military history that eschews the conventions of both in favor of "a 'braided narrative,' an interweaving of narrative and analysis" (p. xv). If so, the analytical strand is much thinner than its narrative counterpart. A typical chapter simply migrates from one topic to another—camp life, battle, hardships, gripes about officers, observations about the war—and at each stop offers a selection of quotes from Confederate soldiers. It then moves on with only the most elementary swipe at the "so what?" factor. This frequently results in missed opportunities. Crucial insights into the Confederate soldier's murderous attitude toward his African-American counterpart, for example, are diluted by being presented in several chapters rather than one sustained section, and there is virtually no attempt to explore the nature of this racial hatred rather than simply document it. And although Power uncovers some new material, much of the book essentially amplifies what previous historians have already discovered. Thus it contains few surprises, whether of fresh interpretation or new information.

The book's final chapter, by far its most effective, forms a welcome exception to the general pattern. Here Power does settle down to extended analysis. He offers some good comments on the texture of the letters and diaries he examined, and although most of his findings endorse, or at least do not challenge, the conclusions of other historians, at a few points he contributes new insights or a more nuanced perspective. For example, Power finds that alongside physical privation, the prospect of defeat, and concern for their families, some troops may have deserted from resentment at the prospect that black soldiers might join them in the ranks and distress over rumors that Lee, their beloved "Marse Robert," might leave them for larger assignments. The success of this chapter suggests what might have been achieved had the author adopted its approach for the entire book.

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CAROL REARDON. *Pickett's Charge in History and Memory*. (Civil War America.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1997. Pp. x, 285. $29.95.

Roland Barthes may have helped to explain modern Civil War buffs when he wrote, in 1957, that myth "organizes a world which is without contradictions because it is without depth, a world . . . wallowing in the evident . . . a blissful clarity: things appear to mean something by themselves" (*Mythologies* [1957], p. 143). In this book, Carol Reardon makes a compelling case that myth and popular memory triumphed over history as northerners and southerners remembered the fateful third day of the Battle of Gettysburg. Through some marvelous research, Reardon traces what became memorable to participants on both sides, as well as how George Pickett's Virginia division garnered most of the credit for the failed assault on July 3, 1863, which so many Americans came to see as *the* turning point in the war.

Reardon is especially effective in demonstrating the role of the wartime Richmond press in claiming the preeminent place for Virginians in the heroism of Gettysburg. Equally compelling are her discussions of the sense of loss among southerners after the battle, their need to assuage defeat in identifying scapegoats in their own ranks, and the remarkable level of local and state rivalry that fueled the literary war over Gettysburg's memory for decades. In reality, North Carolinians, under James Pettigrew, formed perhaps an equal, if not more important, element in the famous charge that ultimately bore only the name of a Virginia general. Reardon leaves the convincing impression that all popular memory is ultimately local.

This book is primarily about how myths are born, take root, and grow. It is also about the "awe" (pp. 20, 212) with which participants, artists, journalists, novelists, and armies of tourists have memorialized and reenacted July 3,1863. The meanings of this human yearning to comprehend, to gaze upon and relive such violence is the stuff of poets; its dark impulses, by and large, elude Reardon's grasp. Her signal contribution, though, is to show how, by the 1880s and 1890s, Gettysburg itself became a special place of national reconciliation. Reardon's coverage of the early evolution of Blue-Gray reunions, her review of how storytellers and painters fixed Pickett's Charge in popular memory, and her demonstration of how northerners bought into the myth of the Lost Cause—the victimized, noble South that struggled against insurmountable odds—illuminate how the national reunion coalesced around the growing mutuality of military memory. Reardon briefly hints at a deeper explanation

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of the reunions but backs away from analyzing them as an anxious culture's alternative to labor strife, or to some of the sordid political and business excesses of the Gilded Age. Her discussion of the extraordinary 1913 fiftieth anniversary of the battle is a missed opportunity to demonstrate the larger social and racial implications of such a festival of sectional reconciliation. Reardon seems herself to have surrendered uncritically to some of the pathos of such mystic events, brushing aside the absence of blacks at the golden anniversary, and the Jim Crow character of much of the reunion rhetoric, with a vague statement that "black leaders also criticized the gathering" (p. 188).

Over time, the myth of Pickett's Charge overcame any historian's research or sheer will to dislodge it. Such are the ways of deep myths. Reardon's fine book might have been even better if she had pursued meanings and explanations more aggressively. Why was the Pickett's Charge myth so malleable? Why was there such a deep need to give this particular episode such decisiveness not only in the war, but in American history? Why was the futile heroism of Union soldiers at Fredericksburg in 1862 so easily forgotten and Gettysburg endlessly remembered? Why was that "sacred" stone wall at Gettysburg so sacred? Why, indeed, has Gettysburg been so useful and necessary to the forces of reconciliation, and why is there so little role for the "sacred ground" in the story of emancipation and the regeneration of the republic (Lincoln's theme at Gettysburg)? Reardon mentions more than probes the problem of "symbolic meanings," or the "Christian themes of redemption" (pp. 128–29), or the depth of reverence and the sheer cascades of hyperbole through which Gettysburg was commemorated. She is quite right that the "pull of memory" (p. 130) conquered historical reality, but her analysis seldom connects with larger ideological and political contexts. What Reardon has written is a persuasive account of how deep myth in the popular imagination will almost always trump the work of historians. Where the line is to be drawn between history and memory is not easily determined, as Reardon makes clear. This book is a reminder of why we have to work both sides of the line. As we do, we need to remember that things rarely "mean something by themselves."

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Richard Morris. *Sinners, Lovers, and Heroes: An Essay on Memorializing in Three American Cultures.* (SUNY Series in Communication and the Struggle for Identity in Postmodernity.) Albany: State University of New York Press. 1997. Pp. xxi, 237. $18.95.

A title in the State University of New York series "Communication and the Struggle for Identity in Postmodernity," this book by Richard Morris is one of a number of recent cross-disciplinary studies that draw on the growing bibliography of gravestone studies that followed the founding in 1977 of *Markers*, the journal of the Association for Gravestone Studies. The volume focuses on public responses to the assassination and mourning of President Abraham Lincoln in order to explore the contrasting values surrounding the memorialization of death by three competing American "cultures" or interest-groups: those whose worldviews were dominated respectively by religion, by love of nature, and by heroic deeds. Morris premises the work on his belief that present and future human behavior is influenced by the manner in which society memorializes its dead. His principal sources for this study are the texts of sermons delivered by leading American clergymen immediately after Lincoln's death; over 500 memorial sites containing gravemarkers, epitaphs, and monuments from four centuries of American burial practices; and an existing secondary literature on American mourning practices, gravestones, and gravestone iconography.

Throughout the work, Morris maintains a passionate sense of purpose that carries the reader along an unusual journey. Each step of his argument is vigorously documented with examples, quotations, and explications; each step energetically prosecutes the groundwork for the one that follows. The work is also an American original, meaning that no other historian has previously attempted this particular blend of religious, social, and landscape history and held it out as a contemporary prescription for resolving cultural differences in an ever diversified, multi-ethnic society. The author's principal thesis is that the death of President Lincoln was a watershed event in the evolution of American cultural values, not so much because of the important historical circumstances that accompanied it but because it presented the three main "cultures" in the nation with a decisive opportunity to assert their worldview over others by means of their particular manner of remembering and mourning him. The people Morris terms Religionists held up Lincoln's death as a warning and message from the deity; Romanticists in turn saw Lincoln's death as a fulfillment of nature; and Heroists saw it as the end to an exemplary American pioneer who rose to become a savior of his nation. Each group patterned public memorials in keeping with their views. Religionists favored urban gravesites that remembered the inescapability of death, Romanticists' suburban landscapes equating death with natural processes, and Heroists' monumental memorials that validated death by celebrating action.

Although one may take issue over details, the rough outlines of this model are plausible and convincing. The memorialization of death in America probably did follow the larger chronological and ideological contours that the author suggests. What is fundamentally flawed in the work is the manner of his reaching this conclusion and the importance he gives it. Morris presents as a unified "essay" what are at least two and perhaps as many as three or four discrete studies joined awkwardly at the hip. What begins as a typology of rhetorical responses to the assassination of Presi-

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dent Lincoln is sidetracked in turn by philosophical considerations of the purposes and processes of memorialization; by excursions into cultural theory; and by iconographic and epitaphic analyses of early American burying grounds, nineteenth-century garden cemeteries, and twentieth-century lawn cemeteries and war monuments. Either or all are appropriate subjects of historical essays, but when combined in one work, the result is a forced thesis cobbled together by generalizations and a staccato collection of quotations. Contrived language ("cultural members," "non-cultural members," "gravescape," "heroists") escalates into instant history as the author develops caricature models of competing interest groups scheming to control and manage their memorials of choice. Rather than real people, the book's Religionists, Romanticists, and Heroists emerge from the pages like characters in a computer game voicing prescribed and predictable "soundbites." Lincoln's assassination followed by two hundred years a period in Boston's history when transplanted Englishmen first began erecting wooden posts, rails, and graveboards in the town's public burying grounds. At least some of these wooden markers were painted and inscribed with native and vernacular symbols. To suggest that these markers were the opening shots fired in an ideological struggle for the control of the memorialized American past (that climaxed in 1865) probably imputes motives that never really existed.

PETER BENES
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JOAN WAUGH. *Unsentimental Reformer: The Life of Josephine Shaw Lowell*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1997. Pp. 296. $39.95.

Joan Waugh's book is the first full, nuanced account of the life of Josephine Shaw Lowell, founder of the Charity Organization Society (1882). The biography ranges from Lowell's early childhood among antislavery activists and members of Brook Farm in the 1840s and 1850s to her participation, in the late 1890s, in the anti-imperialist movement. Lowell's work in the Civil War era's U.S. Sanitary Commission, the Charity Organization Society, and as the first president of the Consumers' League of the City of New York are all carefully detailed. Waugh's main objective is to highlight Lowell's importance in the scientific charity movement, in the origins of social science/social work, and in the "foundations of the modern welfare state" (p. 10). As Lowell's first major biographer, Waugh also wants to refute characterizations of Lowell and the charity organization movement as "repressive and elitist" (p. 2).

The scientific charity movement, especially the Charity Organization Society (COS), has been closely associated by other historians with "oppression of the poor" (p. 5). This is in part because the COS criticized old methods of dispensing charity and rejected simple money or food donations. Lowell herself focused on making the poor work for the aid they received in order to help "end dependency" (p. 5) and to force the poor to realize that aid is not an entitlement. Lowell's position, as Waugh points out, is similar to that of late twentieth-century politicians who aim to replace welfare checks with a program of work.

Theorists of "social control" have condemned benevolence programs as unequal power relations that allow elites to punish and control the unruly poor. Although Waugh dismisses this theory in her introduction, her own characterization of the early years of the COS as one of "repressive principles and programs" with a "harsh ideology" and an "unyielding opposition to 'pauperism'" (pp. 163–64) seems to support the more negative interpretation. Furthermore, Lowell herself described "vagabonds" as "worthless men and women" (p. 116) who should be cured or "kept at hard-labor" (p. 118).

All the emphasis has been on Lowell's harsh attitude toward the poor and not, Waugh complains, on her attempts to find a "positive" cure for poverty. To find a better balance, Waugh emphasizes that Lowell successfully fought for special houses of refuge in the late 1880s for women who would otherwise have been placed in state prisons, where they were typically subjected to abuse. Critics have complained that women were typically arrested for petty crimes but given longer sentences than men because reformers wanted time to give them moral training and to teach them to earn livings as seamstresses and domestic servants. In defense of Lowell, Waugh argues that "Undoubtedly, the young women, perhaps a majority of whom were from severely disorganized homes, benefitted from a strict regimen of discipline, domesticity and moral uplift" (p. 139). Waugh, however, does not provide any evidence from working-class women themselves that they benefited from or appreciated their stay. In passages like the one quoted above, Waugh runs the risk of being too apologetic about Lowell's prejudices and limitations.

Waugh convincingly links Lowell's Gilded Age charity work to Progressive-era social science in its emphasis on the organization, cooperation, and rationalization of charity efforts in cities such as Boston and New York. Like other progressive reformers, Lowell realized that charity would not be rationalized unless reformers fought against urban machine politics, whereby charity money was used as a form of political patronage to influence poor and/or immigrant voters. Furthermore, the COS was instrumental in turning from the use of elite male "friendly visitors" to elite women and finally to trained paid agents (mostly women) who were some of the nation's first social workers.

Waugh convincingly argues for a slow change in Lowell's attitude toward the poor. Specifically, she became more willing to see environmental and structural causes of poverty and so put less emphasis on the character of the poor. In the mid-1880s, she began to argue that the "poor had rights" and could legitimately

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defend themselves from unfair wealthy employers through labor strikes. She hoped that labor would put forth moderate demands that could be addressed by capitalists through a process of formal arbitration. Part of Lowell's new focus on the conditions of the laboring poor can be seen in her work as the first president of the Consumers' League of the City of New York in 1891. Wealthy women, she urged, should take some responsibility for the plight of working-class salesgirls by inspecting working conditions in department stores and creating "white lists" of stores that had acceptable labor policies and paid living wages.

Although sometimes too defensive about Lowell's attitudes toward the poor, Waugh's fine biography rightly highlights the career of an important figure in turn-of-the-century charity movements and reform.

ALISON M. PARKER
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VIRGINIA JEANS LAAS. *Love and Power in the Nineteenth Century: The Marriage of Violet Blair*. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press. 1998. Pp. xiv, 169. $16.00.

The manner in which love and power played out within the marriage of Violet Blair provides a case study of the adult life of a quintessential southern belle that both exemplifies and illuminates the lives of upper-class women during the transitional years of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Privy to Violet's detailed and revealing diaries and a plethora of frank and personal letters between Violet and her husband, Virginia Jeans Laas is able to weave an unusually intimate account of the drama and pathos of a marriage that should engage both the scholar and the general reader. The spotlight is firmly on Violet, who would have expected as much. Beautiful, vain, arrogant, egotistical, independent, and honest, her acerbic and trenchant observations could provide the dialogue for a melodramatic miniseries or a novel.

Violet Blair was a highly educated descendent from two of the most elite families in the political and military circles of Washington, D.C. In her first debut into society in 1864 at age 16, she became aware of her ability to flirt, a skill she honed until, well into her fifties, she could still weave a web of flirtation that drew new and former beaux inexorably into her charmed circle. She reveled in her power over men, toying with their affections and promoting their rivalries while she remained detached.

After rejecting twelve suitors, Violet married Albert Janin in 1874, primarily because "[h]e obeys me" (p. 29). She was well aware of the role and position of a traditional wife and equally determined not to relinquish her independence. Albert acquiesced, promising that "[t]he yoke of matrimony will sit lightly upon your neck" (p. 38) She did not move to his home in New Orleans but remained with her mother within the environs of Washington, where her status and repute allowed her great influence. She retained control of her property, which she augmented with such skill that she was able to support both herself and her husband. This was provident: Albert was an incompetent businessman, forever being cheated by his partners.

Early in the marriage Violet held the preponderance of power. During their long separations—sometimes over a year between visits—this balance shifted. By holding a loose rein, Albert allowed Violet to live an independent life but, in the process, became emotionally independent of her. Even as affection waned, they maintained a compatible "unwedded married life" (p. 103). In their final years, Albert finally succeeded in a respectable endeavor, which prompted Violet to come to him. In charting this shifting balance of power, Laas deftly weaves in current studies on gender and the family that allow her to place the marriage firmly within the general context of the period. Her earlier studies of the Blair family and the Washington Circle informs her subtle and sensitive portrayal of Violet's world.

Laas's extensive commentary and analysis, however, is constrained by the bounds of Violet's life. There is little notice of what her subject did not do that other women of her class did. Violet was not particularly active either in church organizations or in voluntary associations that promoted women's rights or charity for the less fortunate. Exactly how she managed her estate so that she could lend, and lose, money to her husband is not explored. This remains a very personal account based on very personal sources. But what a story it is, and told in only 123 pages of prose.

A masterful epilogue, short and succinct, sums up in three pages the reasons why Violet's marriage was "a common story writ large" (p. 121). Here, Laas provides a corrective to the myth of what a "belle" was, illuminates the role of Violet's mother, and underlines the centrality of marriage in this belle's life. A useful bibliography includes the major works on the history of women, gender, and the family. Alas, there is no index, but it probably would be so dominated by entries under "Blair" as to be superfluous.

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LAURA F. EDWARDS. *Gendered Strife and Confusion: The Political Culture of Reconstruction*. (Women in American History.) Champaign: University of Illinois Press. 1997. Pp. xvi, 378. Cloth $49.95 paper $24.95.

Whether viewed from the lens of formal political party politics or from the wider scope of the southern social order, historians have generally agreed that Reconstruction was a failure. Politicians and common citizens alike were apparently unable to resolve the conflicted and abusive legacy of slaveholding and the civil war that it created. In his masterful overview of the period, Eric Foner has taken one of the most positive positions on the era, arguing that for all its apparent failures, Reconstruction at least began an

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"unfinished revolution" of the nation's racial order, a revolution that laid the ground work for the later advances of the civil rights movement in the 1960s. Perhaps because even the civil rights movement appears to have been so little and so late, historians continue to look for reasons why, even in the face of the military defeat of the Confederacy, the political disempowerment of the slaveowners, and the emancipation of the slaves, a more equitable and just social order could not be established in the South.

In her deeply researched and carefully thought out work, Laura F. Edwards offers a new way of understanding the failures of the era, that of "gendered strife and confusion." Although previous historical study of Reconstruction has tended to focus on the level of formal political activity or on the efforts to transform southern labor relations, Edwards presents gender as a social variable which, she argues, infuses and connects them both. According to Edwards, it is the politics of the household, and particularly the politics of men as heads of households, that should rightfully stand at the center of our understanding of the accomplishments and limitations of Reconstruction. From this vantage point, the emancipation of the slaves represented the destabilization, if not the destruction, of the southern household and all the social identities it created: that of the master, the mistress, as well as the slaves. The key question then becomes: what would the new world of post-emancipation households and social identities based on them look like?

Edwards sets out to answer this question with an initial chapter on the institution of marriage. With the abolition of slavery, marriage acquired critical political significance because it was the only remaining constitutive basis for households. As such, it became one of the first issues that the postwar state legislatures took up. Unable to deny that the emancipation of the slaves had also brought into existence separate households for the freedpeople, white southern legislators were concerned that the state should acquire some means to regulate these households. Marriage, from this perspective, would force male heads of household to acknowledge and support their dependents. While white legislators viewed marriage as a way to enforce household responsibilities among the freedpeople, the freedpeople siezed upon it as a critical entering wedge in their struggle to establish their households as independent, and the heads of their households as deserving of equal public empowerment, in order to represent and defend those households.

Unfortunately, this strategy of claiming public political, economic, and legal rights in order to carry out their domestic responsibilities had its costs. It cost the freedpeople themselves as it required a jettisoning of their own cultural norms and practices around the institution of marriage. Indeed, as Edwards points out, many of the freedpeople never did legally marry. It also required the political and legal empowerment of the freedmen but not of the freedwomen. According to Edwards, while freedwomen contended with their men privately, the combination of their basic acceptance of gender hierarchy within the household and the overarching need they felt to use the empowerment of their men in the public arena to fight the race and class hierarchies of the larger social order caused them at least to acquiesce in this strategy of public male empowerment and, more often, militantly to support it.

Thus the title of this work, does not, as the reader might initially expect, refer primarily to strife between men and women, nor does it refer to confusion about the appropriate nature of gender roles between men and women. Instead the core of "gendered confusion" is located in what constituted the appropriate role of the freedmen, and "strife" is created by the freedpeople's attempt to advance their definition of that role. Nowhere is this focus on male gender roles more clear than in Edwards's discussion of the role that elite white women took in this gendered strife and confusion. Indeed, elite white women appear to have been the least confused, the most singleminded, in their postwar efforts to reconstruct their households in the face of the loss of their slaves and much of their wealth. While African-American and common white women may have had some reservations about the postwar empowerment of men as household heads (as reflected in their contentious appearances in court, which Edwards documents at some length), elite women apparently had no such scruples. With an eye clearly trained on their own definition of what constituted a viable household—that is, an imposing house filled with as many decorative touches as possible—elite white women played the role of "cheerful wives," urging their husbands on to ever greater heights of public economic and political success, which translated for them into the acquisition of the material goods that they found to be so necessary to a worthy domestic life.

So how does all this empowerment of men in their roles as protectors and providers of their households contribute to our understanding of the reasons for the failure of Reconstruction? In a nutshell, one might say that this politicization of the domestic ultimately overwhelmed even the freedpeople's own drive for equality. In a facinating concluding chapter, Edwards attributes the political triumph of the white southern Democrats to their superior ability to wrap themselves in the mantle of being the "Best Men." She argues convincingly that this superior "merit" of white conservative Democrats was grounded in the domestic politics of the household. Thus, while the freedmen had initially been able to use domesticity as an entering wedge to establish themselves as politically empowered, elite white men were ultimately able to beat them at their own game. Although apparently maintaining a formal commitment to "equality," Democrats were able to interject a politics based on "character," character that was grounded in a domesticity thoroughly saturated with race and class privilege.

The political implications of this book are deeply

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disturbing, as any worthy book concerning Reconstruction ought to be almost by definition. Perhaps what is most disturbing is the almost claustrophobic sense of "no exit" that one feels while reading it. Edwards promises the reader in the introduction that she will connect up the heretofore largely separate domains of the social and the political through her infusion of gender into our understanding of the race and class politics of Reconstruction. In so doing, she leaves us with a more complete and interlocking social whole, a social whole where women, who had the least formally constituted public power and responsibility, arguably exercised the greatest political power, precisely through the very extent of their dependent status as wives in male-headed households. The postwar South appears to have been a veritable nightmare of codependency, where no one exercised power in their own name but instead grounded their behavior in their need either to protect or to defer to the established gender hierarchy. That the intensification of the public significance of gender should accompany, answer, and ultimately squelch the drive for racial and class equity that the emancipation of the slaves began makes this book—which arguably exaggerates the extent to which gender hierarchy was naturalized at the time—a disconcertingly damning indictment of it in our own.

LeeAnn Whites
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Rebecca Edwards. *Angels in the Machinery: Gender in American Party Politics from the Civil War to the Progressive Era*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1997. Pp. xii, 232.

Historians recently have set about demonstrating the presence of women in nineteenth-century American party politics. Although they lacked the vote, women showed their fealty to parties in various ways. Some cheered passing parades; some listened to politicians' speeches. A few wrote letters to newspapers and campaign pamphlets. By the late nineteenth century, a handful of women, especially Populists and Prohibitionists, attended conventions as delegates, gave speeches, and edited newspapers. Enough work of this sort has piled up to have inspired two syntheses: Robert J. Dinkins's *Before Equal Suffrage: Women in Partisan Politics from Colonial Times to 1920* (1995) and Rebecca Edwards's new book. More strongly than Dinkins, Edwards argues that partisanship, not the nonpartisan reform and lobbying efforts that historians have considered to be the typical expression of women's political activism, characterized women's politics before they won the vote. Edwards's ambitious survey also incorporates work on the role of gender in shaping men's and women's politics and the opportunities for women's influence and power.

Edwards explains what she sees as the rise and decline of women's partisan activism by invoking changes in gender imagery in American politics and the differences among the parties in how they employed ideas about gender. Ideas about gender and family were fundamental to the parties' ideologies, Edwards asserts. First the Whigs and later the Republicans touted the virtues of middle-class domesticity, which led them to encourage women's participation in campaigns and a positive, protective role for the federal government. Democrats' working-class and southern constituencies advocated patriarchal family arrangements and viewed both women's partisan activity and government power with suspicion. The Whigs' and Republicans' success with women eventually forced the Democrats to make a place for women in their campaigns, but third parties, especially the Prohibitionists and Populists, did the most to encourage women to become participants as well as interested observers in party politics. By the late nineteenth century, Edwards claims, these parties vied for women's support, especially in the Midwest, where both the Prohibitionists and Populists were relatively strong. The pressure was sufficient for the women's suffrage and temperance movements to divide internally over partisan questions—or at least some members of those movements felt strongly enough about partisan strategies to leave. This period of opportunity for female partisans ended after the election of 1896. With the insistent use of masculine rhetoric by both major parties and the defeat of Populism, politicians relegated women partisans to ornamental status or viewed them as examples of unnatural populist radicalism. Turning scholarship that emphasizes women's reform effort on its head, Edwards sees Progressive-era nonpartisan women's activism as a tactic that flowed from the defeat of women's partisanship.

Edwards offers some interesting arguments, but they require more evidence than a short synthetic book can provide. Basic questions about women's party efforts—how many women were involved, where, and who—scarcely have been asked, much less answered. Evidence of ethnic and religious patterns in men's party loyalty always has been somewhat muddy; systematically linking voters' ideas (rather than party platforms) about proper family structure to party affiliation would be hopeless. The book lacks both a theory about how ideas about family translated into party alignments and evidence that this happened. It would have been good to know, too, about the place of claims about gender and the family in campaigns. Where did assertions about gender and the family fit in the mix of arguments party leaders offered to voters? How important were they to the parties' ideologies? Did voters notice them? Finally, the book sometimes attacks straw men. Arguments about women's nonpartisan activism, for example, never held that women avoided politicians, which would have made lobbying impossible. They generally indicated that non-voting women interested in public questions worked through public officials and agencies rather than attempting to affiliate with a party.

Fitting together women and political history is still

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at the early stages. Edwards's work will have to be considered as the project progresses.

PAULA BAKER
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ANASTATIA SIMS. *The Power of Feminity in the New South: Women's Organizations and Politics in North Carolina, 1880–1930*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 1997. Pp. xiv, 286. $29.95.

SANDRA HAARSAGER. *Organized Womanhood: Cultural Politics in the Pacific Northwest, 1840–1920*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1997. Pp. xiii, 427. $39.95.

Twenty-five years ago, Anne Firor Scott and Gerda Lerner took up Mary Beard's mantle to launch the modern study of women's clubs in history. They argued that turn-of-the-century voluntary associations offered lessons in political activism heretofore unrecognized and unappreciated by historians. Monographs, particularly of suffrage associations, mite societies, the Women's Christian Temperance Union, and General Federation of Women's Clubs, quickly followed. The topic was fueled afresh by sociologist Theda Skocpol in *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States* (1992), who succeeded in convincing many historians of the significance of women's voluntary associations in state building, most notably through the creation of mother's pensions and the modern social welfare system. Since then, a flood of valuable historical studies have documented the richness of club activity and its utility in understanding women's history, civic activism, and reform in the Progressive era. Some of these studies have explored the scene broadly, like Anne Ruggles Gere's *Intimate Practices: Literacy and Cultural Work in U.S. Women's Clubs, 1880–1920* (1997). Many more works have mined the local scene, and nowhere have these proliferated more rapidly than in the South, where new studies of specific locales such as Galveston, Memphis, New Orleans, and Alabama have been published. In addition, regional studies on southern efforts of the National Federation of Colored Women's Clubs, suffrage, and to a lesser extent, biographies of leading club women have emerged. These had left us with an increasingly complex portrait of interactions among men and women, African Americans and whites, and citizens and elected officials. The scholarship has tended to agree that organized women, prior to enfranchisement in 1920 managed to shape public policy, bring about social reform, and give women a unique voice in politics.

The newest contribution to this important literature is Anastatia Sims's book, which dissects North Caroline women's clubs during the heyday of their influence, 1880–1930. After providing some background on early nineteenth-century women's group activities, Sims focuses on the achievements and failures of four types of clubs: temperance and moral reform societies, literary and civic clubs, patriotic organizations, and groups supporting or opposing woman suffrage. She uses dazzling primary research to document the efforts of such groups as the King's Daughters, United Daughters of the Confederacy, League of Women Voters, Equal Suffrage Association, Women's Christian Temperance Unions and the North Carolina Federation of Colored Women's Clubs. Sims has an eye for lively quotations. She makes an especially strong contribution in her description of club effort in the public schools and as a force in sponsoring public monuments to commemorate war heroes. Sims also puts real faces on dry policy, so we get to know Sallie Cotton and Charlotte Hawkins Brown, not lists of resolutions by anonymous members.

Sims uses the research of other southern studies to advantage, illiminating North Carolina's uniqueness as well as its typicality. The state was slow to form women's clubs at all until the 1890s, lagging behind several other southern states. But its first legislative victory occurred in 1891, mandating scientific temperance instruction in the schools. Sims takes care throughout to compare the platforms, strategies, and motivations of African Americans as well as white women engaged in related programs in separate organizations and finds their efforts to cooperate wanting. She also observes white clubwomen's dependence on the ideology of the lady to justify public housekeeping while African Americans sought respectability in a culture that defined them as immoral.

The Pacific Northwest Women's clubs have not seen the same scrutiny that southern clubs have enjoyed, so Sandra Haarsager's effort to fill the gap is especially welcome. As the biographer of Bertha Landes, she uncovered the political clout of clubwomen sufficient to elect Seattle's first woman mayor in 1926. Her new book has set about illuminating both the histories of the clubs whose members elected Landes and other clubs similar to them. Haarsager's focus lies on Oregon, Washington, and Idaho clubs over an eighty-year period (1840–1920), although her emphasis lies on literary and civic clubs connected to the General Federation of Women's Clubs.

Haarsager is especially strong in exploring then elements of ritual in clubs, notably their symbols, colors, mottoes, use of parliamentary procedure, and a critic who tabulated members' errors in grammar and pronunciation. She also deals with club publications, a topic undervalued by other scholars of women's clubs. She does not succumb to a common temptation, that of overlooking rural clubs in favor of big-city sisters. Haarsager makes a strong case that clubs attracted the career women of the day, introducing us to a battery of women physicians, educators, writers, librarians, and activists. Haarsager also considers the activity of minority women's clubs, highlighting the work of African-American temperance advocate Emma Ray and documenting the activity of the Dorcus Charity Club of Seattle. Like Sims, Haarsager finds middle-class white

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clubwomen willing to supervise but not to cooperate with groups outside their social purview.

Haarsager's narration will be disconcerting to *AHR* readers. As a specialist in communication, she uses a format that will be unfamiliar to historians. Her ten-chapter study is subdivided into 130 short sections, providing two-and-a-half page portraits of clubs, club leaders, and themes. In addition she provides an appendix that catalogs sixty clubs in the three Northwest states and highlights the focus of their activities. Thus, we encounter brief portraits of particular organizations like the Portland Women's Union, Women's Century Club of Seattle, and Woman's Civic Club of Tacoma and biographies of famous women like Narcissa Whitman and Abigail Scott Duniway and lesser-known leaders, but we receive only a cursory analysis or comparison of them. Instead, there are numerous sections devoted to general background about urbanization, national demographic trends, labor history, men's clubs in America, and the national movement for enfranchisement. One craves more focus on the uniqueness of the clubs and region under discussion.

The publishers of both monographs should be commended for including both endnotes and bibliography. The latter, too often omitted, is invaluable to future researchers, and many of those there will be, for these studies certainly flag the plethora of material that invites investigation to facilitate a significant discussion of regional and national patterns among clubs that ignited and fueled Progressive reform.

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KENNETH C. BARNES. *Who Killed John Clayton? Political Violence and the Emergence of the New South, 1861–1893*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1998. Pp. xii, 203. Cloth $49.95, paper $16.95.

Kenneth C. Barnes's book documents historians' new interest in Reconstruction violence. In 1935, W. E. B. Du Bois identified rioting and lynching as central to white efforts to cripple Reconstruction, but Du Bois influenced few white teachers or scholars. Allen Trelease's *White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction* (1971) probably better represented the thinking of mainstream historians in its claim that the Klan did not overthrow Republican rule in a single state. As late as 1984, Michael Perman, in *The Road to Redemption: Southern Politics, 1869–1879*, warned against viewing Reconstruction as anything other than a discrete event in the normal flow of southern politics.

In the last decade, historians have begun to look at Reconstruction violence as a historical force. The same year that Perman published *Road to Redemption*, George C. Rable insisted in *But There Was No Peace: The Role of Violence in the Politics of Reconstruction* (1984) that historians had underestimated the effectiveness of southern terrorism. In 1988, Eric Foner, in *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877*, found that southern whites used violence to expose Republican state officials' incapacity to protect their own supporters without outside help. Despite these advances, historians still find it difficult to incorporate many scattered local incidents into a grand picture. In 1991, Perman complained that the significance of this violence "remains shadowy" because of the local and anonymous character of the individual incidents.

By showing that the shadows obscuring such events did not appear by accident, Barnes's book deepens our understanding of Reconstruction violence. Leading Conway County, Arkansas, Democrats murdered Republican congressional candidate John Clayton, took power, and relegated their deed to the status of a "curious mystery." According to the dominant narrative, created by the descendants of the killers, Clayton's assassins heroically ended a corrupt Reconstruction regime in 1889. The crime remained unsolved for a reason; the killers acted on behalf of all white people. The white version of Reconstruction history doubted that killing such a man as Clayton constituted deviancy. As whites hardly conceived of such a killing as truly a crime, they had no compunction about hiding the killers and their deed.

Barnes, the author of *Nazism, Liberalism, and Christianity: Protestant Social Thought in Germany and Great Britain, 1925–1937* (1991), grew up in Conway County. Leaving Arkansas to study modern European history, Barnes secured a teaching job in Chicago. When he encountered the local narrative telling of heroic whites striking down corruption by killing Clayton, he decided to investigate. Through prodigious research, Barnes discovered the reality set aside by local storytellers in favor of their own truth. They concealed not just the murderers' identities but a period of democracy and freedom. In the 1880s, Conway County voters enjoyed truly competitive elections where a vibrant and growing Republican Party used the votes of black people and white immigrants to contest Democrats' power. Thinking they could win back power no other way, white Democrats stole a box of ballots from a predominantly black precinct, defeating the Republican candidate for Congress, John Clayton. At the same time that Arkansas Democrats stole the election from Clayton, Republicans triumphed across the nation, winning control of Congress and the White House for the first time since Reconstruction. Republican control of Congress promised a vigorous investigation of the corrupt Arkansas election. Clayton went to Plumerville to collect evidence. His friends feared for his life, but Clayton took no guards to protect himself, thinking the presence of armed men might scare off potential black witnesses. As the investigation proceeded, Democrats plotted a cover-up, murdering witnesses and then going after Clayton himself. As he stood in the corner of his boarding house, someone fired a shotgun through a window, killing him. Hearing the shot, three blacks ran toward the boarding house and saw Democrat Robert L. (Bob) Pate holding the murder weapon.

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Despite the availability of such testimony, no court ever convicted Pate, or anyone else, for the crime.

Barnes has written the story of the Clayton assassination and cover-up in admirably accessible prose, brilliantly organized. He makes clear the significance of this single event and the place of violence in the Reconstruction metanarrative. Students assigned to read this book will find it riveting and come away with a clearer understanding of what happened during Reconstruction. They may see this narrative as a good opportunity to consider how people in power write the history they need to justify themselves.

CHRISTOPHER WALDREP
Eastern Illinois University

SAMUEL L. WEBB. *Two-Party Politics in the One-Party South: Alabama's Hill Country, 1874–1920*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. 1997. Pp. xi, 286. $34.95.

Samuel L. Webb has joined a growing number of historians who study political dissent in the postbellum South. Like recent historians of other non-plantation regions, Webb finds in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Alabama a complex and competitive multi-party system; he refutes the conventional interpretation that white southerners in the post-Reconstruction era either expressed fealty to the Democratic Party or divorced themselves from the political process.

Drawn to study north Alabama by the appearance of a healthy Republican Party in the years immediately after the collapse of Populism, Webb attempts to understand the political culture of the sub-region. He seeks also to explain the origins of the twentieth-century Republican Party and the collective motivation of politicians and voters who rejected the Democratic Party.

For dramatic effect, Webb begins the book at the end of his story: the presidential election of 1912, in which anti-Democrats, after nearly twenty years of starts and stops, turned the state Republican Party into a voice for reform. Only those lacking an understanding of the sub-region's political culture, Webb argues, would be confused by the turn of events in 1912. Among the confused was the leader of conservative, pro-business Republicans, Prelate Demeck Barker. Barker and other Old Guard Republicans—generally northern-born men who lived in the Black Belt or Mobile—had tried for a decade to keep the reigns of party leadership away from young reformers loyal to Theodore Roosevelt. But the roots of Bull Moose Republicanism ran deeper than Roosevelt's administration. The rise to prominence of hill country Republicans was the fruition of a thirty-five year struggle against entrenched power.

In the hill country, where farmers exalted independence above other virtues, politicians had long chastised powerful Democrats for creating courthouse cliques and offering commercial enterprises favorable treatment. No predecessor of the 1912 Republicans more forcefully denounced the Democratic Party than did James Lawrence Sheffield, who initiated his crusade in the 1870s. By the mid-1880s, as cotton prices fell and as tenancy rates rose, Sheffield and his imitators shifted the focus of their challenge from political to economic reform, and they acted on their desire for reform in a variety of ways. In some counties, anti-Democrats led by businessmen formed Republican-Greenback coalitions; in others, farmers cooperated to challenge Democratic rule.

Thus, before the Farmers' Alliance appeared in north Alabama, renegades had established a tradition of bolting from the party. In fact, Webb says, "it was not unusual, unexpected, or socially demeaning to break with the Democratic party" (p. 85). Alliance men reluctant to break with the Democratic Party found cause for fusion with the Republican Party when they observed the rough treatment of Reuben Kolb during his 1890 bid for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination. Formation of the Populist Party in 1891 offered anti-Democrats an alternative to fusion with Old Guard Republicans, although Kolb's second attempt at winning the governor's office in 1892 produced another wave of cooperation between Republicans and Democratic Party bolters.

Democratic Party machinations and Populist Party foundering eventually forced anti-Democrats to follow their leaders into a lasting union with the Republican Party. By 1910, many, if not all, old Populists had found a new home in the GOP, where they easily embraced progressive reform and came to dominate the party. Throughout the period, interest in preserving economic and political independence propelled upcountry politicians to ignore party allegiances and to unite with all like-minded white brethren.

Unlike other historians of upcountry dissent in the postbellum period, Webb casts his story as a heroic tale. For in north Alabama, the protectors of "traditional" values persisted and triumphed. The casting of Webb's story as heroic drama owes to the author's forced reliance on partisan newspapers, but the tone of the work might have been altered if Webb conducted extensive research in manuscript census returns. Only through such research might Webb have moved his study beyond political rhetoric, party machinations, and election results and into an analysis of the world of ordinary anti-Democrats.

Without explanation, Webb fails to conduct statistical analysis of election returns, a variety of analysis necessary to understand the depth of anti-Democratic sentiment. Neither does he consistently prove that Democratic dissidents were anything other than disappointed politicians out of favor with their party. Readers will question, too, Webb's refusal to discuss the role of African Americans in the Populist and Republican parties.

Those criticisms notwithstanding, Webb has produced a well-written book that deserves the attention

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of historians interested in Populism and the southern branch of the Republican Party.

BRADLEY G. BOND
University of Southern Mississippi

JEFFREY A. DROBNEY. *Lumbermen and Log Sawyers: Life, Labor, and Culture in the North Florida Timber Industry, 1830–1930*. Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press. 1997. Pp. x, 241. $39.95.

Florida is today an intensely urbanized state with a population mix that makes it unique and disassociated with southern history. Nevertheless, this book reminds readers of Florida's links with the major themes of southern history as the author describes a colorful past quite different from the multifaceted, late twentieth-century present. Jeffrey A. Drobney recreates an industry and its workers that had a major impact on the state, but which disappeared after World War II with only a lingering environmental impact: second growth pulp pine trees and often scarred swamps.

The first four chapters tell the story in chronological order, while the last three concentrate on certain aspects of the industry: its organized labor history, the convict-leasing system that exploited the turpentine production of the forests, and the social history of company towns operated by the lumber companies. Drobney describes the great yellow pine forest and the large cypress stands of far north and west Florida that attracted early settlers. In the period between 1830 and 1880, entrepreneurs created a local market for timber and used crude technology to begin an industry that would rival textiles and tobacco in value and impact on the land and its people. The depletion of the northern white pine forests by the 1880s brought significant northern lumber men to Florida's still virgin timber tracts of yellow pine and cypress. With new technology that allowed many more trees to be cut down quickly by fewer workers, the new companies created a "Bonanza Era," as Drobney terms it, from 1880 to 1930 that resulted in an oligarchical control of the timber country. Mass cutting peaked in the early 1930s and finally ended in the 1940s.

Drobney explains in vivid detail how timber workers went about their work in the forest and in the mill and in impressive clarity explains the changing technology of transportation and machinery that allowed them to cut the trees and to build and staff the mills that prepared the finished lumber for a world market. After tracing the birth of the industry to its height in the 1930s, Drobney turns his attention directly to labor-management questions of safety, wages, and unionization. He follows the heroic but little-known Knights of Labor efforts to organize timber and mill workers in the immediate hinterland regions of Pensacola, first in the late 1880s and then in the late 1890s. Although Drobney praises the workers' attempts to improve their working conditions and wages, the labor disturbances were contained by the owners and their trade organizations, and workers made almost no gains from their sporadic strikes, such as they were. The usual factors contributed to failure: low-skilled and transient workers, rivalry between black and white workers, repressive tactics by owners, and a hostile public response to the isolated timber workers. One chapter turns the spotlight on the brutal use of convict labor leased by the state to companies to extract turpentine from the pine forests. This separate industry lasted from 1880 to 1919, when public disapproval finally drove the system into extinction. The third labor chapter reconstructs the life and death of four typical lumber company towns in north Florida: Carbur, Foley, Shamrock, and Bagdad.

This well-researched and well-written book makes several contributions to southern history. It chronicles this industry in detail for the first time and as such helps to deepen our awareness of just how extensive and important the post-Civil War industrialism of the South was to the modernization of the South that recent historians have begun to emphasize, along with the agricultural decline of the Cotton South. Technology historians will appreciate Drobney's interest in the changing nature of machinery in the forest and mill and his intricate explanations of such technological change. Drobney's descriptions of the workers helps to fill out the story of southern labor. The large majority of the workers were black, but there was always a significant number of white workers. Although the workers were mostly powerless in management terms and not in control of the workplace, they did, according to Drobney, create a significant working-class identity. They sought employment in the industry despite its dangerous and isolating nature because it offered economic gains far beyond the poor farms of north Florida, south Alabama, and south Georgia. Drobney takes specific exception to those who attack company towns as degrading and destructive to workers. He argues that, in his four towns, company paternalism did create a better life for workers. As did the inhabitants of textile mill villages in the southern Piedmont, the workers and their families had a sense of "belonging" to an extended family of workers, and a sense of a community that served them well.

There is much to praise in this forthright and modestly intentioned monograph. The industry and the workers it describes have been long gone, but Drobney helps us to hear the whine of the saws and the machines and to understand the proud drudgery of the workers as they destroyed a unique and great forest. A reader, however, could hope for an epilogue that would connect the industry to today's north Florida pulpwood industry and explain similarities and differences. Drobney, of course, did not set out to write an environmental history of the forest, only an account of its destruction. But what have been the environmental consequences of the destruction of the great yellow pines and the majestic cypress stands, and what has

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been the cost of the history Drobney so clearly delineates?

JAMES A. HODGES
College of Wooster

CLYDE A. MILNER II, editor. *A New Significance: Re-envisioning the History of the American West*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1996. Pp. xiii, 318. Cloth $49.95, paper $19.95.

The essays in this collection were originally written for a 1992 conference convened to reassess the significance of the West in American history. A century had elapsed since Frederick Jackson Turner articulated his "frontier thesis," arguing that the Anglo-American worldview developed in the nineteenth-century West had a nationwide impact. Allan G. Bogue's keynote essay is the most extensive and focused treatment of Turner's contribution in the volume, rich with academic genealogies and anecdotes of department-building.

After a century of hindsight, Turner's thesis does not fare well in the collection. Yet there are some basic notions that link most of these essays and his. One is the notion that the West is an area of some sort of internal coherence that sets it apart from other regions of the nation. Another is that the West is tied to the nation and world system. A third is that it may be possible to characterize both these qualities in insightful ways that vector further research.

Excepting Bogue's, the contributions are avowedly revisionist, moving through the new history's trilogy of race/ethnicity-class-gender to ramify these topics in the context of power and geography. There are essays on the dynamics of power, by William Deverell, with commentaries by Richard Maxwell Brown and Patricia Nelson Limerick; Mexican Americans, by David G. Gutiérrez, with commentaries by Arnoldo De León and Vicki L. Ruiz; the culture-nature dialectic, by Susan Rhoades Neel, with commentary by Robert W. Righter and Dan Flores; Asian Americans, by Gail M. Nomura, with commentary by Sucheta Mazumdar and Gary Y. Okihiro; Anne F. Hyde's discussion of varying perceptions of the West among different cultures and social strata at different analytical levels, with commentary by Martha A. Sandweiss and Elliott West; Native Americans, by David Rich Lewis, with commentaries by Peter Iverson and Barre Toelken; and gender, by Susan Lee Johnson, with commentary by Albert L. Hurtado and Deena J. González. African-American history is explored in a ten-page concluding statement by Quintard Taylor, grouped together with a volume summary by Hyde and Deverell. (Taylor's essay should have been a chapter with commentary like the others.)

Listing the contents in this way grossly distorts a basic message of the essays: that a new significance emerges by tracing the dynamic interrelationship among topics as well as from an exploration of their separate dynamics and diversities. Yet there is a tension-producing paradox here—Deverell and Flores touch on it most explicitly—that grows as one works through the discussion.

For all of their internal detail and erudition, the essays and commentaries are united by several persistent themes. One of these is a profound disdain for the heroic, male-centric, Anglo-American version of "*The* West" to be found both in scholarship and in life. Turner may have helped to spin this yarn, but others have kept it going. Historians began to contest it well before 1992, countering it with two interrelated conclusions: It's not that simple; and—for sure—it's not that rosy. Here Gutiérrez and Nomura, for example, demonstrate that essentializing "minority" cultures not only hides their significance but actively prevents an appraisal of their internal diversity. Taylor notes that in 1870, twelve percent of the western population—some 284,000 people—were African Americans. Where are they in the various histories of the West? Essentializing the environment can have much the same effect: Neel argues that the concept of the "arid" West is ethnocentric, given the extreme diversity of the region. Likewise there is no monolithic perspective on the West; instead it is diversified: gendered, local, regional, national, ethnic, each version having an impact on behavior. Johnson and others wonder what kind of western myth would have grown had various women's perspectives predominated.

Less explicit is the common theme of the dimensions and dynamics of power, introduced early on by Deverell's articulate essay. "Significance" is, after all, determined by power. It is a key element in the culture-nature dialectic, for instance. Environmental diversity *per se* does not mean that all resources are of equal analytical or political-economic importance. In what Neel calls the "tragedy" of the West, the culprit is the power of corporate capitalism. Native Americans were at the bottom of the power heap until recently, partly because the omnipotent federal government paid particular attention to their best interests. Tragic and misguided as its Indian policy has been over the years, the government so far has opted not to obliterate tribes' special legal status. Lewis sketches how Native Americans have used this power of the law to sustain themselves and at least some of their remaining resources. Water and land politics continue as usual, however, while casino politics are moving into higher gear. The power contest is far from over.

A third theme is the play on the several meanings of Deverell's "Fighting Words" phrase. The meanings of "frontier," "region," "significance," "perspective," "minority," and other words are contested among the contributors, as they should be in a project of this nature. "Contribution" is a persistent target: several essays argue that to characterize various peoples' significance as "contributions" automatically condemns them to marginality.

Finally, many authors recognize the potential richness of comparative analysis between the West and other regions: studies of ethnicity, class, and gender, of

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course, but also of the dialectics of culture-nature and metropolis-satellite. This last goes straight to the tension-producing paradox mentioned earlier. I wonder whether scholars of the West can have it both ways. Can they—we—successfully capture the richness of diversity while still preserving a "regional" perspective, for "regional" comparisons and other purposes? As persuasively as these writers have argued the significance of the diverse topics, the question goes begging: if not Turner's essentialist paradigm, then what? Is not any "regional" paradigm bound to be essentialist, inevitably excising much of the rich detail these authors have called for? Perhaps "the West" as a regional paradigm may be too sweeping; it may merely offer a handy spatial boundary for a series of topically driven queries, such as power or gender or ethnic relations. (Flores suggests "bioregions" within the West may be more useful.) And yet, like Flores and Deverell, it seems to me there is a cluster of traits that makes the West different from the South or New England. What are they, and do they have any heuristic value? For those wishing to grapple with the paradox, both Lewis and Deverell suggest that a particular set of relationships within the region (such as the internal-colonial or "ward-guardian" nature of Indian-white interaction) be treated as a microcosm of the significance of the region itself. Another possible conceptual model might be anthropologist Julian Steward's "levels of sociocultural integration," suitably revamped. Steward proposed that the important culture-nature dialectic could be studied at several empirically determined analytical levels, from social segments of a local community to the encompassing nation-state. Each level is linked in detectable ways to the others. The nature and interrelationship of the social units and their "cultures" is different at each level, as are the dynamics of the dialectic. This would seem to permit the exploration of rich detail, with the added potential of linking that detail systematically to successively broader relationships. And it might help to insure a uniformity of analytical levels in comparative studies.

The collection is a valuable contribution to both "western" and American history. Editor Clyde A. Milner II's tactic of publishing commentaries with the main essays effectively conveys the spirit of scholarly debate (although the commentaries tend toward elaboration rather than confrontation). All the essays were published earlier in *Western Historical Quarterly*, giving their authors two chances to refine their work after peer reviews. It is a suitable text for advanced undergraduate or graduate courses in western history, and individual chapters should be essential reading for courses on ethnic relations, gender, or the other topics covered here.

Robert L. Bee
University of Connecticut

Robert Bunting. *The Pacific Raincoast: Environment and Culture in an American Eden, 1778–1900.* (Development of Western Resources.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1997. Pp. x, 236. $29.95.

The field of environmental history has expanded rapidly over the past decade, benefiting in particular from fruitful debates over methodology. As a result, environmental history has grown beyond its roots in political and intellectual history, yielding richer, more complex tales about the interaction between nature and culture. Robert Bunting's book represents one of these new efforts. The author provides a blend of economic, political, cultural, and ecological analysis woven into a historical narrative of the Pacific Northwest coast region in the nineteenth century. The effort is admirable, even if at times only partially successful.

Bunting defines his study area primarily in ecological terms: it is the wet, heavily forested wedge of land between the Cascade Mountains and the Pacific littoral in the western half of present-day Washington and Oregon. Bunting focuses especially on the Willamette Valley and Puget Sound regions—the "American Eden" touted by the Oregon Territory's nineteenth-century boosters and the terminus of the old Oregon Trail. After a brief introduction that presents his interpretive framework, Bunting appropriately sets the stage with a description of the physical and biological characteristics of the region, especially those important to the area's human inhabitants. Subsequent chapters are organized chronologically and cover a good deal of ground. The first half of the book discusses early native inhabitants and their subsistence systems, the arrival of Europeans and the onset of the fur trade, the rise of early farming and ranching settlements, and conflict between European-Americans and Indians that culminated in wars, treaties, and reservations. The second half of the book focuses on the period of accelerated economic development in the late nineteenth century and its social and environmental consequences. In each phase of settlement and development, Bunting examines the role of the environment: where people lived, how they perceived and used natural resources, how they altered their surroundings, and how environmental changes in turn affected people. Not surprisingly, this is largely a story of paradise lost. The final chapter appropriately discusses turn-of-the-century efforts to address the growing problems of resource depletion and pollution, efforts that culminated in the Progressive conservation movement.

In general, the book reads like a historical survey text designed for upper-division undergraduate courses. I consider this a virtue. Its language is direct and accessible, and the chapters are smoothly narrative-driven. Bunting assumes no special knowledge on the part of his readers and covers the basic outline of the region's human and environmental history to 1900. Each chapter runs fifteen to twenty pages in length, with effective introductions and conclusions.

Although Bunting attempts a mix of narrative, analysis, interpretation, and theory, the book's strength lies

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in the historical narrative. His application of theory is a grab bag, with brief and somewhat oblique references to "ecological revolutions," the "capitalist ethos," "conquest," and the "systematization" of nature. The theme of "systematizing nature," for example, is left undefined and mostly undeveloped. In chapter seven, Bunting suggests that settlers "systematized" wildlife—or at least sought to—but he does not explain how this occurred, if it did. Nor, since he is critical of this culture of systematization, does he adequately explore actual problems that resulted from the attempted systematization of wildlife. Some of the other interpretive themes broached in the introduction rarely or only briefly appear again. The narrative thus could have been strengthened by a fuller, more consistent exploration of these ideas.

One theme from the introduction that Bunting does systematically develop, especially in later chapters, is the revolutionary impact of industrial capitalism on both society and nature. Bunting's main argument, carefully elaborated and convincing, is that the physical environment of the Northwest profoundly shaped the perceptions, activities, and opportunities of northwesterners but that, among all influences on the history of the region, market forces ultimately reigned supreme. As he concludes in the last chapter, "politics and science were the handmaidens to economics" and "federal and corporate bureaucracies possessed ultimate power" (p. 157). The consequences for nature and society included resource depletion, scarred and deteriorating landscapes, boom and bust economies, the concentration of wealth, and, finally, a decline in personal freedom and local control. Bunting's narrative thus reiterates and confirms the major themes in works by Donald Worster (*Rivers of Empire: Water and Aridity in the American West* [1985]) and William Robbins (*Colony and Empire: The Capitalist Transformation of the West* [1994]), among others. While not pathbreaking, the result is a competent, reader-friendly monograph that would work well in the classroom and will certainly interest *aficionados* of the Pacific Northwest.

PAUL W. HIRT
Washington State University

RICHARD A. RAJALA. *Clearcutting the Pacific Rain Forest: Production, Science, and Regulation*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. 1998. Pp. xxiii, 286. $75.00.

This is a significant work of theoretical and archival scholarship that looks at the relationship between forest resource extraction and labor exploitation under corporate management in the Douglas fir bioregion of British Columbia, Washington, and Oregon. Integrating class and environmental analysis, Richard A. Rajala shows how corporate capitalists used changing technologies, management structures of organization, harvesting practices, and influence over government forest policies to impose a factory management system on regional forests and the lives of workers. Although important recent developments in technology and management logging practices are treated, the book's focus extends from the onset of industrialization in the late nineteenth century to 1965.

The introduction provides a sound overview. The two chapters in part one look at how technological advances and management structures aided corporate control and exploitation over both workers and nature. Rajala demonstrates how advances in extractive technologies allowed management to deskill labor, thereby reducing managerial reliance on workers' physical and conceptual skills, while subjecting laborers to a more dangerous, faster machine-paced work-time discipline. The author then turns to the ways in which management constructed a bureaucratic corporate power structure to ensure its goals of efficiency and control. To provide corporations with the needed expertise, corporate executives entered into a symbiotic relationship with university forestry schools. The forest products industry provided universities with funding. The latter turned out professional engineers and silviculturists, and helpful research projects that furthered managerial control over nature and workers.

The second section of the book explores the relationship between the forest products industry and government policy between 1880–1930, during the Depression decade of the 1930s, and from 1940 to 1965. Using clearcutting as a focal point, Rajala clarifies how the timber industry influenced government resource policy to further its factory system model in each of the three historical periods. In so doing, the author points out how scientific knowledge about clearcutting and its impact on forest renewal was used, ignored, or abused in industry's pursuit of profits and power during those years. He further elucidates government failure on both sides of the border to regulate industry, despite a real opportunity to do so in the 1930s, and how and why government policy in the post-World War II era legitimated and served corporate desires rather than the long-term community needs of people or the environment.

Like any study, this one cannot be all things to all people. Some readers will probably wish that Rajala had been more attentive to smaller timber companies and gyppo logging operations rather than focusing on corporate capitalist timber companies. Others may not appreciate the author's theoretical framework. Few persons interested in labor, political, or environmental history, however, can afford to ignore this important book. Much of Rajala's work and findings parallels other significant studies in the field of environmental history. But Rajala has done more than merely demonstrate or replicate insights scholars have shown for other industries and places. Rajala addresses hard questions forthrightly, debunking, for example, the proposition that the environment determined technological changes in west coast logging. He provides suggestive insights and further venues for research, such as how loggers greeted technological changes and

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the relationship between new technologies and labor militancy in the Industrial Workers of the World. More importantly, he makes important links between labor history and environmental studies, demonstrates the importance of comparative history, shows how neither private ownership nor state ownership of lands guarantees a sustainable environment, and makes clear the links between human and environmental exploitation.

Rajala has written a theoretically informed, well-researched, and deftly argued monograph, and an extensive bibliography and appropriate photographs further add to its richness. This challenging book ought to find a wide readership and secure a prominent place among the growing corpus of recent studies into the Pacific raincoast's past and the region's current forest crisis.

ROBERT BUNTING
Fort Lewis College

ERNEST ANDRADE, JR., *Unconquerable Rebel: Robert W. Wilcox and Hawaiian Politics, 1880–1903*. Niwot: University Press of Colorado. 1996. Pp. 299. $34.95.

Robert W. Wilcox was a half-native Hawaiian politician who enlivened Hawaiian politics during the last two decades of the nineteenth century, his last office being that of Hawaii's first territorial representative in the U.S. Congress. Along the way, Wilcox received military training in Italy, married an Italian noblewoman (who later divorced him when she discovered his rather modest social and economic status in Hawaii), and was tried twice for conspiracy and treason. The first trial concerned his role in the insurrection of 1889 against the white-dominated government, which had come to power in 1887 as the result of a revolt that had forced the king to relinquish most of his powers. In 1895, Wilcox led another revolt against a similar government that had overthrown the monarchy altogether in 1893. He was sentenced to death but was out of jail in a few months.

Ernest Andrade, Jr.'s Wilcox is a demagogic opportunist who deliberately inflamed racial animosities and hatred for his own benefit. Though very popular with native Hawaiians, he left little that was constructive and enduring. He was a "comet" rather than a "star" (p. 3). It is not an entirely convincing portrait, suggesting as it does that before Wilcox came on the scene, there was little if any racial animosity between the *haoles* (whites) and the native Hawaiians. Nor does the book attempt to explain why appeals to racial solidarity were successful, beyond suggesting that such appeals were demagogic. Andrade is generally sympathetic to *haole* politicians, whom he portrays as more reasonable and less given to emotional appeals than native Hawaiians. He has little sympathy with Hawaiian royalists, who sought to perpetuate, and then restore, the monarchy.

One of the larger problems is that the book makes little attempt to analyze race relations or racial thought in any depth. Given the importance of race as a factor in popular culture and intellectual discourse in the late nineteenth century, this is a significant shortcoming. The discussion of several specific incidents—such as the various efforts to tame or overthrow the monarchy, and the Hawaiian uprisings against *haole* rule—would have benefited from such an analysis.

The book's strength is in its straightforward account of Hawaiian politics. Indeed, Wilcox himself often disappears for pages at a time as Andrade reviews, sometimes in considerable detail, the development of political parties, the accomplishments of particular legislative sessions, and the efforts—mostly by *haoles*—to rein in the power of the monarch. Based on extensive research in newspapers, government documents, and private papers, Andrade updates previous accounts by Ralph S. Kuykendall and William A. Russ, Jr.

The book also devotes considerable attention to Hawaii's relations with the United States. In contrast to Julius W. Pratt's *Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands* (1936), Andrade is not convinced that the decision of the U.S. Consul John F. Stevens to land U.S. troops in 1893 demonstrated support for the rebels or ensured the overthrow of Queen Liliuokalani—though he acknowledges that the queen viewed the presence of the troops as indicating U.S. support for the rebellion. Rather, the queen is blamed for her own downfall, the relevant chapter being entitled significantly, "Self-Destruction of the Monarchy."

After the overthrow, the newly elected President Grover Cleveland sent James H. Blount to investigate the situation. Blount's report condemned Stevens' actions, concluded that most Hawaiians supported the monarchy, and urged that the queen be restored. Whereas Pratt considered Blount's investigation thorough and his conduct above reproach, Andrade echoes contemporaneous Republican accounts that he was biased.

In sum, this book will be of interest to specialists in Hawaiian politics and in Hawaiian relations with the United States. Its frankly revisionist interpretation is provocative and will attract attention but is unlikely to be persuasive.

KENTON CLYMER
University of Texas, El Paso

PRISCILLA MUROLO. *The Common Ground of Womanhood: Class, Gender, and Working Girls' Clubs, 1884–1928*. (Women in American History.) (The Working Class in American History.) Champaign: University of Illinois Press. 1997. Pp. xiv, 227. Cloth $29.95,, paper $14.95.

Priscilla Murolo's book presents a moment in U.S women's labor history when a cross-class alliance of primarily white, European-descent women in the Northeast was possible and briefly accomplished. The

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original impetus of the working girls' club movement was some working-class girls' desires for "respectability" at a time when all working women were suspect, as well as older and middle and upper-class matrons' desires to uplift and serve those less fortunate. During the 1890s, these groups of women wrestled with some of the fundamental questions of their age—the "woman question" and the "labor question"—in their own unique way. Sometimes they agreed (i.e. when considering housework) and sometimes they did not (i.e. regarding the best way to improve women's work life), but the interaction was dynamic and positive. Because of the range of activities (including recreation) that resulted and the full participation of the working girls themselves, the organizations prospered. This was the golden age of this cross-class activity, the "'common ground of womanhood,' where club members and sponsors constructed a new, mutual gender identity rooted in the proposition that their sex deserved the same rights and men. Democracy and sociability gave class differences new significance, too; members and sponsors both pointed to their comradeship across class lines as proof of sisterhood's power to transform the social order" (p. 149). The increasing attention of the sponsors to reform and the more scientific approaches ushered in during the Progressive era distanced the daughters of labor and privilege. Even though the suffrage campaign and the war did unite members behind important causes, economic downturns, immigrants and migrants who swelled the ranks of the female working class, changed cultural concepts of women workers, and the increasing desire of young female workers for play instead of edifying activities all took their toll on these clubs.

This is a thoughtful, well-crafted book on an important topic. At this historiographical moment in women's history, when sisterhood is often understood as "denied" or "unequal," it stands as a corrective. Understanding the forces at play when women divided by class can overcome their differences to work for change is a worthy endeavor for all who study women and the working class. It is a lesson that would be even more valuable when cast alongside similar activities of the same time period or when understood as an episode in U.S. women's labor history. I have always understood these sorts of clubs for women (regardless of the type of women organized, and they were usually class, racially, and ethnically distinct) as a particular characteristic of the period. A more thorough comparison to similar "boundary crossing" institutions would have rendered this episode even more meaningful.

Lisa M. Fine
Michigan State University

Judith Weisenfeld. *African American Women and Christian Activism: New York's Black YWCA, 1905–1945*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1997. Pp. viii, 231. $35.00.

This interesting and useful book fills several important gaps in African-American and women's history. There has been increasing interest among scholars of black religious activism in women's political agency, and among scholars of female religious activism in African-American participation. Yet few have looked at a fruitful intersection of these fields, the black Young Women's Christian Associations (YWCAs). Judith Weisenfeld's book, as one of the first such works, makes a contribution simply by highlighting this neglected area of study.

But it does more than that. It not only traces the history of the New York black YWCA and its leaders, but it also usefully places the story in a broader historical context. Weisenfeld tackles the claim that black middle-class women mimicked their white counterparts by revealing the ways New York's black YWCA leaders used their club activity to challenge limits placed on them by virtue of their race and their gender. She points to the ways these women used and controlled public space, for example, and reinterpreted traditional roles to allow them unprecedented access to political and public activities.

She considers as well the shifting geography of New York's African-American population, reminding readers that the preeminence of Harlem as a black capital was never the foregone conclusion later scholars have assumed. Rather, the move to Harlem was hotly resisted by local white residents. At the same time, Harlem was not regarded by its new African-American residents as simply a black neighborhood. Cosmopolitan in their sensibilities, many middle-class black women sought to highlight rather than erase Harlem's long and prestigious non-black history with "'authentic' Dutch dinners" (p. 91) and the like.

Weisenfeld also explores interracial relations, describing black YWCA leaders' ongoing struggle for recognition and support from the white New York YWCA (first Fifteenth Street, then the Metropolitan Board) and the complex politics around money, race, internecine rivalries, class, personality, and real estate that made that struggle so protracted and bitter. Wartime brought additional reminders of racial barriers but also further opportunities to act on behalf of the race.

Within the black community, Weisenfeld considers class differences among female leaders and between the leadership and those they sought to aid and, to some extent, gender relations in the black middle class. She explores the apparent secularizing of the YWCA's programs for girls and women and ably defends her claim that such programmatic broadening was not an abandonment of Christian commitment. Rather, it reflected a newer Social Gospel-based understanding that the broad advocacy of democratic principles was an obligation of Christians. For black women, this provided an opportunity to promote racial justice as a proper Christian endeavor. Outreach also reinforced a tradition of aiding all those in need.

Weisenfeld's framework thus nicely illuminates how

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race, gender, class, and religion combined in the experiences of these African-American women to create an institution, the African-American YWCA, which was more than simply an attempted emulation of its white counterpart. It became a vehicle for black female agency that was both shaped by and a challenge to the period's racial and gender constraints.

The book ends with the 1946 decision of the national YWCA to integrate its branches, a decision unfortunately not adequately explained here, and the attendant shift in the Harlem YWCA's programming and personnel. Integration at the YWCA, as elsewhere in the black community, brought both benefits and losses; lessened autonomy and a weakening of the African-American focus accompanied the expansion of opportunities for African-American women and girls.

Limitations of source materials led Weisenfeld to concentrate on YWCA leaders and the formal history of the organization. As she notes, while this opens the book to criticism of its elite focus, it does provide one important and useful lens through which to study these issues. In places where better documentation exists, a very different history of black YWCAs may be written. Nevertheless, Weisenfeld's careful presentation of the scholarly debates over women's political agency, African-American participation in white-dominated organizations, the process of neighborhood, institutional, and identity formation, and her thoughtful analysis of class, religion, racial politics, and urban development make this a useful and important contribution to the field.

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NAOMI ROGERS. *An Alternative Path: The Making and Remaking of Hahnemann Medical College and Hospital of Philadelphia*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 1998. Pp. xi, 348. Cloth $50.00, paper $20.00.

For many years, scholarly histories of American medical schools described the leading schools, partly in the mistaken belief that they were models for the others. Several recent histories have shown the importance of studying other medical schools; one such is Naomi Rogers's history of the Hahnemann Medical College of Philadelphia, one of the few independent sectarian schools to make a successful transition to regular medicine.

Homeopathy, the theory that minuscule doses of drugs that produce symptoms in a healthy person can cure diseases with the same symptoms in a sick person, was conceived by Samuel Hahnemann (1755–1843), a liberally educated and progressive German physician. In the 1820s and 1830s, Constantine Hering (1800–1880) and other German homeopathic physicians emigrated to Pennsylvania, which had a large German-speaking population. Homeopathy became popular in America as an alternative to heroic regular medicine among middle-class families, who insisted that homeopathic physicians adopt the newest developments in medicine.

Hering and others founded the Homeopathic Medical College of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia in 1849. The original faculty members were mostly graduates of regular medical schools who practiced homeopathy, and they adopted a curriculum similar to that of regular schools except for homeopathic therapeutics. In 1867, Hering complained that the school was teaching a rigid form of homeopathy and organized the Hahnemann Medical College, which was more liberal in its approach to homeopathy and placed greater emphasis on the medical sciences. Two years later, the older school merged into the newer one.

In the decades after the Civil War, Hahnemann became a leading homeopathic medical school and kept abreast of regular schools by adding courses in the clinical specialties and the new medical sciences. To improve clinical teaching, the school opened the Hahnemann Hospital in 1890. Most of the clinical faculty were alumni who taught a liberal version of homeopathy.

During the first half of the twentieth century, Hahnemann experienced continuing financial difficulties because of the rising costs of medical education. The school increased its class size with low admission standards, provided little clinical training, and had a very high student-faculty ratio. It deemphasized homeopathy, partly because of discrimination against its graduates and partly because most of its faculty, who were Hahnemann graduates and local practitioners, were regular physicians. The school did not admit women until 1941 and had no African-American graduates between 1912 and 1951. The obsolete pedagogical methods, the marginal qualifications of the faculty, and the high licensing examination failure rates of graduates led the Association of American Medical Colleges, which admitted Hahnemann in 1913, to place it on probation from 1945 to 1949.

Hahnemann prospered when munificent public and private medical research funding and government support for medical education and patient care became available in the 1950s and 1960s. It modernized the curriculum, reduced enrollments, discontinued the teaching of homeopathy, employed many full-time, research-oriented faculty members who were not alumni, and started new allied health and basic science degree programs. The new research orientation reduced the institution's ties to the community.

The student movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s urged a more humanistic approach to medical education, more minority students, and greater responsiveness of Hahnemann Hospital to the needs of its inner-city patients. During the 1970s, under its first non-physician president, the school established ties with historically black colleges to recruit African-American students and with colleges in towns and small cities throughout Pennsylvania to recruit students who might return to those communities to practice medicine. Medicare, Medicaid, and other

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funding enabled Hahnemann to expand its health care for the poor. The new president imposed a corporate management model that antagonized the faculty and the alumni. He was dismissed in 1977 during a financial crisis exacerbated by improprieties and reduced federal funding.

In 1993, Hahnemann merged with the Medical College of Pennsylvania (which was established in 1850), and the new school became the centerpiece of a $2 billion multi-hospital corporation. It was renamed the Allegheny University of the Health Sciences in 1996. In mid-1998, after publication of this book, the mismanaged corporation declared bankruptcy.

The history of Hahnemann Medical College was similar to that of a number of underfinanced and often independent medical schools. The book will be important to specialists but of limited interest to others. The material is not well organized and is rarely placed in the context of the history of homeopathy, medicine, or medical education. The chapter on the student movement will be valuable to those concerned with that issue.

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JOHN S. HALLER, JR.. *Kindly Medicine: Physio-Medicalism in America, 1836–1911*. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press. 1997. Pp. xv, 207. $35.00.

Reform medical practitioners of the Jacksonian era—Thomsonians, homeopaths, botanics, eclectics, physiopaths, physio-medicalists, or whatever they chose to call themselves—reminded one contemporary editor of a "squad of half-intoxicated newspaper boys arguing politics" (p. 54). And so they have appeared to historians; indeed, "competition, rancor, and confusion" (p. xiv), characterized sectarian medicine. John S. Haller, Jr.'s book confirms this chaotic environment of Jacksonian reform medicine and offers a complex analysis, especially when read in conjunction with his other works, *American Medicine in Transition: 1840–1910* (1981) and *Medical Protestants: The Eclectics in Modern Medicine, 1825–1939* (1994).

In his earlier works, Haller traced the origins and significance of homeopathy and eclecticism. Each was a system of medical therapeutics that tried to counteract the harsh mineral medicines of regular doctors by lessening dosages and by providing more palatable herbal medications for their patients. In this latest tome, Haller turns to the physio-medicalists, another group of practitioners who adopted Samuel Thomson's botanic medicines but rejected Thomson's disdain for formal education. The physios practiced what Haller calls a "highbrow formulation of Thomsonian medicine" (p. xiii) by insisting on training in their own institutions and by publishing their own literature.

Haller first traces the roots of sectarian medicine in general. He narrates the physios's break with Thomson and the founding of the new group's first medical school in Columbus, Ohio, in 1836; he describes the faction-ridden environment that marks the growth of the sect; he outlines the intellectual and therapeutic underpinnings of their system; and he sets them in a historical context that both explains their demise by 1911 and salvages them a meaningful place in the history of medicine.

The physio-medicalists and all the other medical sects arose out of the ferment of the Jacksonian era, and at least one historian, Joseph F. Kett in *The Formation of the American Medical Profession: The Role of Institutions, 1780–1860* (1968), attributes their demise to the waning of Jacksonian reform. Other historians, such as William G. Rothstein and Daniel J. Wallace (whom Haller discusses in *Medical Protestants*), suggest that each sect sacrificed its populist appeal to the encroachment of professionalism. Practitioners lost touch with the very patients who had sought them out precisely because they offered an alternative medical system. In *The Social Transformation of American Medicine* (1982), Paul Starr agrees that the regulars co-opted the sectarians, but he goes a step farther in arguing that it was modern science that really did them in. Sectarian practitioners, according to Starr, "had one foot in modern science, the other in pre-scientific mysticism" and, thus, despite appearances, by their very nature they could not make the transition to modern medicine in a world of patients who now expected the scientific approach (Starr, p. 107).

Haller is more holistic in his interpretation. He analyzes the homeopaths, the eclectics, and the physio-medicalists and recognizes nineteenth-century medicine for what it was. Diagnosis outstripped any doctor's ability to cure or to heal. But the democratic nature of the sectarian doctor's relationship with his patient (most were men, although a few sectarian medical colleges in the early years accepted women) and his ability to offer palatable and seemingly efficacious medications had wide appeal, especially in the vast rural regions of the United States. As Charles E. Rosenberg and others have argued, much of medicine in nineteenth-century America was marked by this therapeutic dilemma of the disjuncture between the lacuna of medical knowledge and the illness; the implicit trust between doctor and patient defined effective medical treatment in the nineteenth century, not the palliative nature of the medicine.

Haller contends, moreover, that the very presence of the sectarians forced regular practitioners to reform. Sectarian reproaches about blood-letting and heroic dosages of harsh medications forced regulars to explore other options of treatment, and when regulars turned increasingly to research, to university teaching, and to hospital affiliations, they "placed the patient at the center" of their study, imitating the sectarian approach (p. 134).

Haller shows that medical practitioners of the past have offered insights sometimes too easily dismissed by mainstream approaches to illness and health. Nine-

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teenth-century Americans demonstrated faith in therapeutics they observed as effective whether coming from the Shakers, Native Americans, Thomsonians, or other sectarians such as the physio-medicalists, and their practitioners served them well. Haller is meticulous, and his book is encyclopedic in its coverage of the minutes details of the history of physio-medicalism—one of those alternative approaches. He offers a timely reminder. Although often dismissive of any kind of "pre-scientific mysticism" in the past, mainstream medicine now looks increasingly to the merits of alternative medicine.

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JOEL BRASLOW. *Mental Ills and Bodily Cures: Psychiatric Treatment in the First Half of the Twentieth Century.* (Medicine and Society, number 8.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1997. Pp. xiv, 240. $40.00.

Drawing from patient records at two California state psychiatric hospitals, Joel Braslow, a psychiatrist and medical historian, finds that "the history of twentieth-century somatic therapies is a series of increasingly invasive attempts to control the psychiatric patient through his or her body" (p. 172). Focusing on hydrotherapy, sterilization, malaria fever therapy, convulsive therapies, and lobotomy, the book serves as "a critique of physical solutions to psychological distress" by revealing "the particular pernicious consequences of locating the cure of psychic and behavioral disorder in patients' bodies" (p. 4). Failing to "listen more to their patients' desires and look less at their 'biologically determined' behaviors, practitioners," writes Braslow, "have lost an opportunity to integrate biological technologies into psychological insights" (p. 175).

To prove his case, Braslow draws a distinction between how well an intervention worked (its effectiveness) and how well it performed under scientifically controlled circumstances (its efficacy). Assuming that most interventions were efficacious by their contemporary standards, Braslow focuses on effectiveness. He finds that physicians and patients viewed each intervention as effective. When physicians adopted subsequent therapeutics, they retrospectively rejected the earlier as ineffective. Braslow believes that discovering why this was so provides a key to understanding how physicians had been persuaded earlier of a treatment's effectiveness. By demonstrating that each of these biological interventions was subsequently viewed as ineffective, Braslow hopes to persuade us to remain skeptical of current psychopharmacological therapeutic claims.

A close reading of these asylum records convinces Braslow that practitioners' assumptions and activities were responsible for a treatment's effectiveness. However, he rejects claims that therapeutics were entirely culturally constructed. Rather, Braslow believes "that whatever biological consequences a particular therapy has are mediated by and interpreted through the way doctors see disease and its cure" (p. 5). Thus, the effectiveness of hydrotherapy or lobotomy resulted from a "therapeutic rationale" through which physicians and, often, their patients constructed a condition as a disease or an outcome as a cure. For instance, because a majority of physicians were persuaded that elevating a patient's temperature would kill off the bacteria responsible for the dementia that developed in syphilitics, they infected patients with malaria. The shared belief that malaria fever therapy was an effective intervention transformed the attitudes of physicians toward syphilitics from contempt to sympathy. This alteration of attitude, in turn, contributed to better care, and thus to greater effectiveness, whatever the treatment's efficacy.

Braslow also reexamines the charges made by anti-psychiatrist historians that treatment was a metaphor for restraint of nonconformist behaviors. He uncovers a complex set of assumptions through which practitioners identified resistance as part of a disease and portrayed restraint as part of treatment. Yet, Braslow also shows that management was a central concern of many practitioners. A typical example of this ambivalence between treatment and restraint was that of a "quarrelsome, unreasonable and assaultive" female patient who was given electroshock therapy "irregularly, depending on behavior" (p. 51). Similarly, lobotomy served as the ultimate reduction "of behavioral disorders into brain disease with its simultaneous negation of the individual's inner emotional life" (p. 151). Braslow reproduces similar scenarios that informed the decision to institute interventions, from hydrotherapy to chlorpromazine. In spite of that, Braslow's analysis also acknowledges that the psychiatrists themselves were uncertain where the line that separated treatment from management was. He rejects the claim that sterilization was informed by eugenic theories of social engineering: "Doctors saw sterilization not as an instrument of the state to prevent procreation of the insane but as a therapeutic intervention to avoid human suffering" (p. 55).

The reason that biological therapeutics often were instruments of social management was that physicians were "trapped in an epistemological web of seeing only a biological disease." Thus, they "acted with impunity on their patients' bodies," which, as Braslow shows "had especially disastrous consequences for women" (p. 151). Records from Stockton asylum indicate that eighty-five percent of lobotomized patients were women, "suggesting that it was the surgical procedure itself and its therapeutic rationale that led to a remarkably skewed sex distribution of lobotomy patients" (p. 154). This was no mere correlation, for, as Braslow's cases indicate, "the fact that physicians saw only 'inappropriate' female expressions of sexuality as indicating the need for surgical cure suggests that they saw the female body, rather than the male body, as more productive of psychiatric disease and hence of a more logical site for surgical intervention" (p. 165).

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Nevertheless, Braslow is not a biological Luddite. He endorses an interdisciplinary approach in which biological interventions are tempered by psychological insights. In terms of method and sources, Braslow has set a high standard for future investigators of the history of psychiatric therapeutics. This book is also essential reading for those engaged in clinical practice to remind them of the necessity and utility of historical perspective.

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MARI JO BUHLE. *Feminism and Its Discontents: A Century of Struggle with Psychoanalysis*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1998. Pp. 432. $35.00.

Mari Jo Buhle accurately describes the myriad ins and outs of the complex relationship between successive generations of American feminists and psychoanalysis. For instance, Emma Goldman cast psychoanalysis as handmaiden to women's sexual emancipation; Mabel Dodge Luhan stressed the importance of sexual well-being; and Charlotte Perkins Gilman considered the pursuit of desire "amaternal." Because both feminism and psychoanalysis arose in pursuit of the self, they were radical and threatened patriarchal traditions. For this reason, both appealed to Louis C. Fraina, America's "first communist theorist," because they promised to create a new psychology of women. Buhle begins by focusing on the political ends that feminism and psychoanalysis have served throughout our century and on the way they have influenced the forces of production and reproduction. And she demonstrates, as I did in *Freudians and Feminists* (1995), that in America psychoanalysis was furthered by freewheeling intellectuals as well as by popularizers and practicing psychoanalysts, and that they all interpreted Freud differently, and partially. She traces the shifts, shuffles, and interpretations, and the theoretical reinterpretations—some of these based on clinical material, but most of them on specifically American cultural phenomena.

By the early 1920s, Sigmund Freud's disciple Karen Horney seriously argued, among other things, that only a male chauvinist could speak of penis envy. Melanie Klein located heterosexual desires in early infancy; Helene Deutsch postulated procreation as the basis for sexual difference; and Ernest Jones implied that male analysts had underestimated the importance of female organs. Buhle then explains that Freud had avoided questions of female subjectivity but that, nevertheless, the same issues kept coming up.

By the early 1930s, popularizations of psychoanalysis had become entrenched in America, and oppositions between biology versus culture, Freudian versus neo-Freudian, and European versus American psychoanalysis were being debated. Feminists were divided along political lines—about the consequences of sexual liberation, motherhood, and birth control. Anthropologists focused on the flaws of the Oedipal paradigm, objected to Freud's evolutionism, and demonstrated that cultural conditions rather than anatomical differences shape femininity and masculinity.

By the early 1940s, Horney had published radical critiques of classical psychoanalysis, which now was leaning on Freud's later theories: the structural relations among id, ego, and superego. Her formulations, as well as Erich Fromm's Freudo-Marxism, were more accessible than the ever more esoteric hypotheses based on clinical findings. Also, in the aftermath of World War II, concerns with family and motherhood moved to the center and, together with the classical Freudians' blame of mothers for their children's problems, added to the neglect of feminism. Buhle is particularly good at explaining the twists and turns that led feminists, many of whom never had read Freud, to attribute to him the backlash in the culture and their malaise.

Beginning with Betty Friedan's *The Feminine Mystique* (1963), feminists rejected the exclusivity of marriage and motherhood and encouraged consciousness-raising groups. Now Kate Millett in *Sexual Politics* (1970), Shulamith Firestone in *The Dialectic of Sex* (1970), and Germaine Greer in *The Female Eunuch* (1971) repudiated Freud. Their attacks, however, were against men's power rather than women's sexual pleasure. They condemned Freud for the oppression of women in their search for a new paradigm to define human existence. American psychoanalysts were baffled, since by then most of them already had discarded the notion of penis envy.

By 1980, the ideas of the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan crossed the Atlantic. His concern with the language of psychoanalysis—in texts and therapy—was attuned to French structuralism and to postmodernism. His clinical practices were suspect, but French feminists adapted his radical phrases to their ends—which their American counterparts imported and embroidered on. The resulting excesses, which have no basis in therapy and remain confined to universities, in turn, led a few among them (i.e. Nancy Chodorow and Dorothy Dinnerstein) to show that Freud had offered women a revolutionary conceptual tool. These "post-Freudians" began to distinguish between "sex" and "gender" and to draw on gender identity and infancy research, such as Margaret Mahler's minute studies of human infants.

Buhle explains the ensuing rifts among feminists who split between those who focused on the essential nature of women and those who looked to their difference from men. Since the underpinnings of her approach are Marxist, as is her descriptive language, she is more favorable to the various theories by the Frankfurt scholars than, for instance, to those of Heinz Kohut and Christopher Lasch, who also were more or less on the left. In the end, Buhle summarizes the endless polemics among Lacanian feminists and the influence of specific ones on the American academy, and she perceives a surge of the cultural avant-garde amid deepening political conservatism. Ultimately,

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Buhle concludes that both Marx and Freud "deemed production the prime sphere of *Homo sapiens*, the locus of civilization" (p. 358), and ends up showing, incontrovertibly, that the theorizing by postmodern feminist scholars in Women's Studies is counterproductive to social change: they are playing an insiders' game that remains outside the realm of political thought.

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JULIA GRANT. *Raising Baby by the Book: The Education of American Mothers*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1998. Pp. ix, 309. $30.00.

Prescriptive literature offers social historians a valuable source of information about society's standards and values in the past. It illuminates aspects of ordinary life in earlier periods and suggests important questions about the direction of change in social values. Because popular periodical articles and advice manuals typically express the views of white, often male authors, however, this literature cannot be assumed to reflect the values and behavior patterns of representative middle-class readers or those of individuals in other social categories. Julia Grant's book directly addresses this author-audience disjunction through an examination of three categories of evidence: prescriptive texts, parent education programs, and American women's responses to these efforts to instruct them in proper child-rearing techniques.

Grant locates the antecedents of modern parent education in America in the theories of John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau and in manuals produced by eighteenth and nineteenth-century physicians such William Buchan, William Cadogan, and William Dewees. While published child-rearing advice was not widely available during the colonial period, by the early 1800s, increases in literacy and in the availability of printed materials made such information accessible to parents In the context of the modern, child-centered middle-class family, where the mother is clearly defined as primary caregiver, many women found the responsibilities of parenthood daunting, and they welcomed books, pamphlets, and articles on the subject.

Grant documents a series of shifts in the child-rearing techniques advocated in such sources. Nineteenth-century maternalism was followed by the rise of "scientific" child care in the 1920s and by the "family life" and child-centered approaches of the 1930s and 1940s. Subsequently, ideologies of child development, "natural" motherhood, and gendered parenthood were disseminated in widely read "baby books" authored by popular experts such as Arnold Gesell, Louise Bates Ames, Frances Ilg, and Benjamin Spock. Finally, advice about late twentieth-century issues such as the dilemmas confronted by working mothers began to be dispensed by contemporary authorities who communicate with their audiences on radio and television as well as in print. She traces these changes chronologically and examines them historically, drawing connections, for example, between early twentieth-century prescriptions for parenting and the larger reform agenda and notions of municipal housekeeping during the same period.

In addition to surveying the views of advice-givers, Grant draws creatively on a wide range of other historical sources that reveal the nature of women's responses to those views. These include the records of mothers' associations, child study groups, parent education institutes and programs, and individual women's letters to child-care "experts" whose books they used. Through a careful analysis of these materials in the context of the relevant prescriptive literature, Grant offers an intriguing interpretation of the relationship between societal standards for child-rearing, as articulated by "experts," and the actual beliefs and experiences of American mothers. She argues that while women have been receptive to such guidance both in the past and in contemporary society, they have always acted as selective and critical consumers of professional child-rearing advice. The records of their discussions in formal organizational settings and the contents of their letters to authorities such as Dr. Spock indicate that mothers have seen themselves as active contributors to the development of knowledge about childhood rather than as passive beneficiaries of information provided by outside authorities. They have consistently expressed confidence in their own common sense and in the validity of their personal observations and practical experiences, and they have respected and relied on the insights of their peers as well as on social prescriptions. Hence, Grant notes, although they may not have affected the dominant discourse on parenting, they have influenced each other's thinking and behavior.

Just as women have not accepted the opinions of "experts" uncritically, they have not necessarily agreed among themselves about child care. While the prescriptive literature suggests an effort to impose uniform styles of child-rearing on the diverse groups in American society, that effort did not succeed. Both this literature and the content of organized parent education programs articulated explicit white, middle-class assumptions about appropriate child rearing patterns and implicit judgments about the inadequacies of poor, immigrant, and African-American mothers. Women from different backgrounds shared similar anxieties about their maternal responsibilities and displayed an increasing tendency to seek expert advice, but their responses to such instruction differed. Thus, for example, poor and working-class mothers often found that the questions and concerns addressed by "experts" were irrelevant to the problems and issues they faced; they responded more positively to parent education programs initiated and developed by immigrant and African-American women. Similarly, rural mothers rejected the democratic philosophies of child-rearing espoused by middle-class authorities and fa-

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vored by many urban women at mid-century because their circumstances and responsibilities made such approaches impractical.

Grant's interesting study contributes several valuable insights to our understanding of the history of American motherhood and to women's history more generally. Her analysis of maternal responses to child care advice and parent education initiatives clearly illustrates women's purposeful exercise of personal agency in the construction of a major role assigned to them by society. Grant's evidence also suggests that the power of domestic feminism extended beyond the parameters of the home, enabling women to engage in active dialogue with putative authorities in an area in which they felt entitled to claim expertise. Moreover, by introducing the voices of poor, immigrant, and African-American mothers into the historical record as well as those of white, middle-class rural and urban women, Grant documents the diversity of experiences that comprise women's history. Finally, she bridges the author-audience gap that is implicitly present in any body of prescriptive literature and provides a model for extending the explanatory potential of this type of historical evidence.

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ANDREW L. KAUFMAN. *Cardozo*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1998. Pp. xii, 731. $55.00.

In the latter years of his life, Felix Frankfurter was absorbed with the task of choosing the biographers for many of the extraordinary men he had known during his public life. Mark DeWolfe Howe, for example, was assigned the Oliver Wendell Holmes biography, and documenting the life of Louis Brandeis became Paul Freund's responsibility. To Andrew L. Kaufman fell the difficult task of recording the life of Benjamin Cardozo. Almost forty years later, Kaufman has produced the definitive biography of the jurist who remains arguably one of America's greatest common law judges.

Kaufman devotes the first third of the book to a detailed study of Cardozo's private life, including his years as a private attorney. From 1891 through 1914, Cardozo practiced law in New York City, and Kaufman's extensive description of this practice as well as many of the cases handled by Cardozo provides a fascinating, if at times overly detailed, portrait of a successful urban law practice at the turn of the century. Cardozo's family life receives equally intense examination. His father, a Tammany Hall appointment to the State Supreme Court, was forced to resign amid charges of corruption soon after the birth of his son. Kaufman shares the view of several other scholars that the desire to redeem the family name motivated Cardozo throughout his lifetime. His mother died when he was seven, and Cardozo was raised by a sister who would be his constant companion until her death in 1929. The book's depiction of Cardozo's home and professional life is richly detailed but nevertheless somewhat unsatisfying. Learned Hand once remarked of Cardozo that "he never wanted anyone to penetrate into his inner life," and Kaufman, despite access to Cardozo's personal files and the complete cooperation of his surviving relatives, is unable to make this intensely private man accessible to the modern reader. After concluding this remarkably researched biography, the reader will find that Cardozo the man remains, in death as in life, distant and aloof.

The analysis of Cardozo's career as a jurist receives equally comprehensive treatment. Appropriately, Kaufman begins with *The Nature of the Judicial Process* (1921), Cardozo's most famous and influential work, a benchmark in the evolution of the realist approach to judicial decision making. Kaufman then turns to Cardozo's career on the New York Court of Appeals. In the twenty years he served on New York's highest court, Cardozo developed a reputation as one of the nation's most eminent jurists, and Kaufman sets about in almost encyclopedic fashion to examine his contributions to the development of American law. The judge's opinions in torts, contracts, equity, criminal law, and remedies are examined at length, and the lay reader may well find the exhaustive discussion of often obscure cases to be simply too much. Students of American common law, however, have much to gain from a careful reading of these chapters.

The book concludes with a similarly detailed discussion of Cardozo's career on the U.S. Supreme Court. One imperative for greatness on the Supreme Court has always been longevity and Cardozo's brief stint (from 1932 to 1938) precludes ranking him among its most influential justices. Kaufman's skillful use of many unpublished draft opinions and memoranda, however, nonetheless confirms that Cardozo, during the early 1930s, was an important champion of the new judicial liberalism that would ultimately emerge triumphant in the following decades.

Cardozo's impressive reputation rests on the fact that he was the first jurist to try to explain how he decided cases, how he made law, and, as Kaufman notes, by implication how others should do so. Much of the case analysis in this volume is an effort to illustrate how Cardozo's decision making faithfully followed the methods he described in *The Nature of the Judicial Process*. There Cardozo depicted the judicial process in terms of a tension between a common law system rooted in precedent and history and the inevitable demand for judicial creativity if the law was to keep pace with life. Throughout his career, he frankly acknowledged that, in the final analysis, a judge must ultimately reconcile the human desire for certainty with the inevitability of change and unpredictability in modern life. His candid admission that cases often presented a judge with the opportunity to alter the course of the law made him one of the founders of America's legal realist movement. But his legal craftsmanship and skill in employing the traditional tools of the judicial trade to reach often innovative results kept

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him anchored in the mainstream of his profession. Kaufman's portrait is of a judge who understood the enormous potential in judicial innovation while respecting the limits demanded by the rule of law. In the hands of a jurist as talented as Cardozo, that brand of progressive moderation could be the stuff of judicial greatness.

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N. E. H. HULL. *Roscoe Pound and Karl Llewellyn: Searching for an American Jurisprudence*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1997. Pp. xii, 354. $34.95.

Over the last fifteen years, N. E. H. Hull has mined scores of archives and libraries, enabling her to produce a handful of useful law review articles on twentieth-century American jurisprudence. She has now expanded on her previous work and crafted a fascinating book-length study. Hull's two subjects are an unlikely pair. Each has benefitted from a number of treatments at the hands of previous biographers, but never have they been conjoined in such an illuminating fashion.

Roscoe Pound grew up in Nebraska, attended Harvard Law School, but left without a degree. He then returned to Nebraska to earn a doctorate in botany. He later accepted an appointment as a law professor at the University of Nebraska and proceeded to work his way up the pecking order of U.S. law schools, eventually ending up back at Harvard. Pound served as the Dean of Harvard Law from the World War I era to the mid-1930s, and he continued as a law professor and legal writer until his death in the early 1960s. Pound was the acknowledged founder of "sociological jurisprudence," a strain of legal thought in the early twentieth century that held that judges should ground their decisions as much on the findings of the social sciences as on legal precedent. An omnivorous reader in several languages, Pound made himself into an encyclopedic student of the common law tradition. In addition, he served on the Wickersham Commission and advised the post-World War II government of China. A lifelong Republican, Pound was a progressive but hardly a liberal.

Karl Llewellyn, slightly younger than Pound, was born in Brooklyn and took much of his early schooling in Germany. Llewellyn served in the German Army in the early stages of World War I. He was wounded in battle and decorated. In 1916, after being mustered out of the Kaiser's army, Llewellyn returned to America and took up legal studies at Yale University. Llewellyn proved to be an outstanding law student, developing special interests in commercial law and jurisprudence. After graduation he settled in as a law professor, spending most of his career at Columbia Law School. A popular teacher and an unflinching liberal, Llewellyn was also a creative scholar. Perhaps most noted for his expertise on the law of sales, he was the senior legal advisor for the Uniform Commercial Code. He also co-authored, with anthropologist E. Adamson Hoebel, a famous study of Cheyenne Indian law. Finally, Llewellyn was an amateur poet with a romantic flair.

Pound and Llewellyn shared an inveterate passion for networking, each seeking to line up disciples and confederates in fashioning his own particular brand of jurisprudence. Hull characterizes them as legal "bricoleurs," i.e. craftsmen who took whatever tools or materials were at hand to fabricate their own intellectual constructs. This appellation is appropriate, but Hull's constant use of it is a bit tiresome.

Pound and Llewellyn were also linked by a dispute over the meaning and worth of "legal realism," a movement that yields itself to no simple definition but is well-known to students of American legal thought. The effort of Pound to attack and Llewellyn to defend the tenets of the so-called realists led to what Hull terms "the most famous controversy in the history of American jurisprudence." This dispute was waged in the pages of leading law reviews in 1930–1931. In arguing which of the legal notables of the era could be termed realists, the Pound-Llewellyn debate stimulated substantial creative thought about the role of law in society and the place of social science research in legal study.

Hull's treatment does not overlook the personal problems, pettiness, and ethical lapses of Pound and Llewellyn. Other twentieth-century legal scholars, if provided with the same body of research that Hull has unearthed and cultivated, might well have offered less sympathetic accounts of the lives and unusual friendship of these two men. This point notwithstanding, the book offers a splendid model for historians and other scholars wishing to fuse insights from private correspondence with analyses of the published writings of important intellectual figures.

JOHN W. JOHNSON
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DAVID M. RABBAN. *Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years*. (Cambridge Historical Studies in American Law and Society.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Pp. xi, 404. $34.95.

In 1924, Theodore Schroeder, leader of the Free Speech League, asked Roger Baldwin of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) for help. The producer and cast of a play about prostitution had been convicted under a New York State obscenity statute. Baldwin and the ACLU Board of Directors declined to join the appeal in the case, saying that the situation was not "significant enough to warrant an investment."

For an organization that insists that its most important client is the First Amendment, it was an incomprehensible act—at least, viewed from the perspective of the 1990s. It was entirely comprehensible in 1924, however, and the anecdote suggests most of the themes of David M. Rabban's fine work.

His major theme is that there was important free

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speech jurisprudence, as well as individuals and organizations prepared to battle for free speech, long before the ACLU was created in 1920. A second theme is that pre-World War I speech advocates like the Free Speech League adhered to a tradition of libertarian radicalism that defined constitutionally protected speech far more broadly than did the ACLU, which Rabban calls elitist and overly concerned with "respectability." Finally, as Rabban demonstrates persuasively, scholars of the First Amendment have given overly short shrift to the history of speech in the United States before such figures as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis D. Brandeis, and Baldwin appeared on the scene.

Rabban's volume sheds new light on the Progressive era as well as on the history of ideas about rights. Focusing on the period between 1870 and 1920, he reexamines Progressive theorists and their concentration on measures they insisted should be taken by government to help solve the problems posed by the rise of industrial capitalism. Believing that an emphasis on individualism had degenerated into legitimization of the selfish and unregulated acquisition of property, they advocated governmental and communal action on behalf of social reform based on shared egalitarian values. A combination of eagerness for reform and certitude about the correctness of their vision of the good society made them impatient of dissent rooted in other visions. Even John Dewey, that exemplar of freedom of inquiry, insisted that the goal of speech had to be social reconstruction and articulation of a set of values addressed to the needs of the community. Speech, he thought, would lead to social harmony. If it did not, it had little value.

Rabban traces attitudes toward speech in Dewey and Herbert Croly, Charles Cooley and Roscoe Pound, to buttress his argument that Progressives did not subscribe to the tenets of contemporary speech jurisprudence until governmental repression of speech during the World War I period and immediately thereafter made it clear that protection of dissent had to be a priority. Then, eager to rid the country of the kind of thinking about speech implicit in the bad tendency test, they seized upon Holmes's enunciation of the clear and present danger criterion and turned the justice into a twentieth-century hero. At the same time, with their predilection for new solutions, Progressive legal theorists adopted Zechariah Chafee's deliberately incorrect view of late nineteenth-century history as being unconcerned with the protection of speech.

The Free Speech League was organized in 1902, in part as a reaction to the repression of speech by anarchists, freethinkers, and advocates of birth control. Its goal was to defend speech for all viewpoints and it meticulously supported the claims of those opposed to libertarian radicalism as well as those who favored it. Emma Goldman, Margaret Sanger, and the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) were among its clients. Many of the IWW speech fights became debates over the boundaries of constitutionally protected speech, and Rabban traces the reaction of courts to the League's—and various legal scholars'—attempts to jettison the bad tendency test. The ACLU differed from the League, according to Rabban, in the way the former initially defined protected speech as politically useful rather than a matter of individual autonomy.

Rabban has not written a book about the legal/political impact of interest groups. One question raised by it, however, concerns the role of interest groups in the development of public policy. Would the United States' particularistic approach to speech jurisprudence have been more in keeping with that of the rest of the world in the absence of the Free Speech League and the ACLU?

That, of course, is a question for another volume. Rabban's contribution is in his uncovering of a neglected chapter of history and in the potential work of scholars who will build upon it.

PHILIPPA STRUM
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BRIAN LLOYD. *Left Out: Pragmatism, Exceptionalism, and the Poverty of American Marxism, 1890–1922.* (New Studies in American Intellectual and Cultural History.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1997. Pp. x, 472. $45.00.

Brian Lloyd joins generations of scholars who have tried to account for the weakness of socialism in the United States. Time-honored explanations have ranged from the nation's material abundance to its multi-ethnic, multiracial working class to its commitment to two-party politics. Lloyd, however, believes that attributing socialism's failings to such environmental causes misses a more fundamental problem. American conditions did not defeat radicals as much as radicals defeated themselves by failing to develop strong commitments to anti-capitalist ideology.

Lloyd takes his cue from V. I. Lenin's dictum that "without revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement." American socialist intellectuals in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries so misunderstood or distorted proper revolutionary theory, he argues, that they were incapable of transforming their society. Proper theory, for Lloyd, is defined as a literal reading of Karl Marx: "the explanatory apparatus of *Capital* and the definitions of *capitalism*, *socialism*, *class*, [and] *revolution* . . . that those concepts prescribe" (p. 14).

The wrong ideas that undermined erstwhile radicals centered around two errors central to the thought of the turn-of-the-century generation. The first was a set of propositions about human behavior drawn from biological theories of evolution. Social theorists who put their faith in evolutionary processes were only prepared for piecemeal change and could not act upon Marx's projected revolution. Socialists including Rob-

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ert Rives La Monte, Austin Lewis, and Ernest Untermann qualify as such "revolutionary Darwinians," Lloyd believes. The second error involved a dedication to positivist rather than Marxist materialism. Thorstein Veblen and E. R. A. Seligman were the primary proponents, attempting to create synthetic social theories directly from empirical evidence rather than using Marx's method of generating philosophical analyses to guide the understanding of the tangible world.

These errors in American radicals' theories led them to mistake changes in the economy or working-class behavior for harbingers of a new socialist order. They looked to socialism to evolve naturally, without revolution, as a response to the development of corporate capitalism. The physical conditions of work alone, without the catalyst of consciousness would, they believed, produce a socialist ideology in workers. Following European Marxist revisionists, they trusted in trade unionism as a lever for overturning capitalism.

Lloyd's practical measure of the woeful state of Americans' revolutionary thought is its distance from Lenin's philosophy. The Bolshevik leader, credited with a superior understanding of socialist practice, is shown to have flatly rejected each of the Americans' chief conceptions on theoretical grounds. This distance between Lenin's orthodox Marxism and American socialist thought highlights the latter's fundamental liberalism, Lloyd argues. He characterizes American radicals' essentially non-Marxist socialist ideology as some shade of philosophical pragmatism. The chronological development of the book traces the ideological failings from the turn of the century through the peak strength of the American Socialist movement immediately preceding World War I. The ultimate cost of ideological weakness was that American radicals were ill-equipped to understand, much less benefit from, the Bolshevik Revolution.

This is a dense, difficult book, and my summation only scratches its surface. Unfortunately, the author's presentation may prevent all but the most committed specialist from getting any deeper. Lloyd is obviously an accomplished student both of Marx and modern philosophy and, as his argument demonstrates, a champion of ideological discussion. This sophistication, though, too often translates into abstract concepts piled one upon another. General readers will likely struggle with Lloyd's philosophical shorthand terms such as "evolutionary positivism" and "monist materialism" and will find precious few definitions to bring the discussion down out of the clouds. All will hope that a stronger editorial hand prevails in Lloyd's future work.

PAUL R. GORMAN
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MARY MURPHY. *Mining Cultures: Men, Women, and Leisure in Butte, 1914–1941.* (Women in American History.) Champaign: University of Illinois Press. 1997. Pp. xviii, 279. Cloth $39.95, paper $18.95.

Building on works by Roy Rosenzweig, Kathy Peiss, Lizabeth Cohen, Joanne Meyerowitz, and David Nasaw, Mary Murphy's book sees leisure as a way of understanding how people constructed their lives away from work. Instead of focusing on a major metropolitan area, as many of the aforementioned scholars do, Murphy looks at the mining town of Butte, Montana, and examines leisure through the lenses of class, gender, and ethnicity. "The experiences of Butte women—living in a metropolitan area of sixty thousand," she explains, "more likely reflected the lives of the majority of American urban women than did the experiences of those residing in Chicago, New York City, or Philadelphia" (p. 92).

Alternately known as "the richest hill on earth" and the "Gibraltar of Unionism," Butte was, before World War I, one of the wealthiest and most ethnically diverse mining communities in the nation (p. xiii). Murphy's book focuses on the interwar period, when the once strong "labor movement suffered crippling defeats, decline and depression dampened the city's cocky sense of itself, and residents sought to recreate the city's social life in the wake of tremendous economic, political, and demographic upheavals caused by World War I" (p. xiv). Butte residents did so by embracing "the advent of mass consumerism and the commercialization of leisure, but always within the constraints of working-class life" (p. xv).

The interwar period, Murphy argues, proved central to changes in gender roles as women "claimed for themselves new rights in the workplace, on the streets, and in the arenas of commercial leisure" (p. 74). She astutely reveals how Prohibition created an underground bootlegging economy that generated enough profits to spark the opening of speakeasies, nightclubs, and restaurants, many of which were owned by women (the city's bootleggers also included a number of female toughs). These new social spaces, in turn, "allowed a redefinition of sex roles in one of the most gender-segregated arenas of leisure—getting together for a drink" and provided women with "greater choices of public leisure, and a last chance to broaden the definition of reputable behavior" (p. 64).

Murphy surveys male and female involvement in nightclubs, prostitution, cosmetics, fashion, dancing, jazz dives, window shopping, gambling, and sports. She shows how participation in these Americanized activities helped free Butte's young men and women from the ethnic, class, and even racial ties of their parents. Immigrant and middle-class parents fought against Americanized youth culture by using ethnic and middling-class voluntary organizations "to pass on to their children the values and standards of behavior they wished them to have" (p. 151). But parents waged a losing battle. By the 1930s, movie houses and dance halls "attracted nearly everyone" (p. 162). Greater participation in heterosocial activities during these years prompted new models of masculinity that superseded the manly, tough culture of the nineteenth century. "Increasingly, public attention was devoted to

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men's role as father and husband, to notions of marriage based on companionship, and to the idea that fathers and sons should be 'pals'" (p. 108).

In an excellent chapter on KGIR, Butte's first radio station, Murphy analyzes the medium's dual impact. Radio helped to nationalize culture by presenting listeners with opera performances from New York, string band music from the South, and breaking news from throughout the United States. The station also forged links among Butte's varied residents by airing "programs that spotlighted local talent, extolled the unique virtues of the Montana landscape, and caused listeners to feel an allegiance to KGIR, not only gratitude to national sponsors" (p. 192).

Murphy's final chapter explores the ways in which New Dealers mixed leisure and politics by creating "good" recreational activities that sought to elevate the individual, the community, and society as a whole. Although many local residents participated in programs created by the Works Progress Administration, they did so grudgingly. Butte's workers did not want to be told by the state or by their employers how to spend their free time. Once prosperity returned, people "resurrected established patterns of commercial entertainment and reliance upon voluntary associations, and abandoned nascent forms of publicly funded play" (p. 201).

Although this book succeeds in illuminating the changing contours of leisure and gender, it falls curiously short in analyzing why they evolved differently in Butte than in New York or Chicago (one of the author's original aims). How did being a mining city in Montana effect the growth of social life? Likewise, I found Murphy's discussion of radio a bit too celebratory of the power of audiences and not sufficiently critical of the political impact of commercialized radio on working-class life—something Nathan Godfried does quite well in his study of Chicago's WCFL. Nevertheless, Murphy's book is a welcome addition to the growing literature on the intersection of class, gender, and mass culture in twentieth-century America.

STEVEN J. ROSS
University of Southern California

LINDA K. SCHOTT. *Reconstructing Women's Thoughts: The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom before World War II.* (Modern America.) Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1997. Pp. ix, 211.

FRANCES H. EARLY. *A World without War: How U.S. Feminists and Pacifists Resisted World War I.* (Syracuse Studies on Peace and Conflict Resolution.) Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press. 1997. Pp. xxi, 265. Cloth $44.95, paper $22.95.

RACHEL WALTNER GOOSSEN. *Women against the Good War: Conscientious Objection and Gender on the American Home Front, 1941–1947.* (Gender and American Culture.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1997. Pp. xii, 180. Cloth $39.95, paper $15.95.

These three books are part of a welcome wave of research on an understudied topic: women and the peace movement in the United States. Although one is an intellectual history, one an organizational study, and one an exploration of a small group of women, all make attempts to reach beyond a depiction of what women thought or did to a consideration of how gendering the study of the peace movement challenges what we thought we knew about it.

Linda K. Schott's intellectual history of the U.S. section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) makes the most ambitious attempt to revise the traditional narrative of American history. By insisting that we see the thought of women pacifists as an alternative tradition, Schott hopes to expand our understanding of U.S. intellectual history. She characterizes the ideas of Jane Addams, Emily Greene Balch, Jeannette Rankin, and Dorothy Detzer, among many others, as challenging the easy division, based on the work of male intellectuals, into "Victorian" and "modern" ideas. Furthermore, Schott argues for the importance of expanding the canon by analyzing organizational documents and personal correspondence, where female peace activists, busily trying to bring to life a peaceful world, worked out their ideas. Although Addams and Balch, the most prominent (and the two Nobel Prize-winning) leaders of WILPF formulated their ideas in books, the traditional source for intellectual historians, much of the alternative thinking that Schott scrutinizes must be ferreted out of less accessible sources.

On the basis of actions, speeches, and private as well as public writings, Schott identifies three central themes in the corpus of women peace activists that deserve our attention: the need for separatist organizing, based on social rather than biological differences between women and men, as a means to the full integration of women into society; a commitment to "unity within diversity," a kind of cultural pluralism that emerged out of conflict over suffrage, pacifism, and politics; and a belief in nurturing and nonviolence, a combination sorely tried by the looming threat of fascism in the 1930s.

Schott deftly traces these themes through the troubled years between the two world wars. This is both a history of women peace activists and a history of gendered thought, although the latter thread dominates. A stronger sense of these women as people would have been nice: when Schott details the struggle between Mary Church Terrell and Emily Greene Balch over the question of race, for example, we see how social history can enrich intellectual history.

Schott links her work to the mainstream of intellectual history in her final chapter, "The Implications of Reconstructing Women's Thoughts." Here she argues that the women of WILPF enacted what male modernists called for: the integration of emotion and reason. Furthermore, she suggests that the philosophical tradition developed within WILPF may characterize other disadvantaged groups as well. The attempt to

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reach out to those working in other fields of history enhances Schott's contribution in this volume.

Frances H. Early's book is a very different kind of study, but it, too, enlightens us about what women were doing while also considering the ways that the peace movement was profoundly gendered. Early pieces together the story of the Bureau of Legal Advice (BLA), a small and short-lived organization, run by women, that was part of the left/pacifist movement during World War I. In contrast to Schott's book, this one teems with people. Early begins with Fannie May Witherspoon, the driving force behind the BLA, and she pauses along the way to tell the story of Witherspoon's life partnership with Tracy Mygatt, her collaboration with lawyer Charles Recht, her difficult working relationship with Civil Liberties Bureau head Roger Baldwin, and her possibly romantic, at least on his side, relationship with conscientious objector Bruno Grunzig. The strength of Early's book lies, in part, in the personal interactions that she has dug out of the BLA files: we see not only the personalities involved in the radical peace movement, but we get a sense of the gender dynamics at work. At the same time, the admittedly fascinating stories of conscientious objectors, the wives of deported aliens, and other victims of wartime and postwar hysteria are not always as well integrated into the larger narrative as one might have hoped.

Early argues that we must understand not only women's contributions to the peace movement, but the ways that gender shaped the movement. Women, she suggests, because they were not so powerful in the left movement, were not swept up in the political infighting after World War I and thus succeeded, in contrast to their male colleagues, in working across class and political differences. Her conclusion emphasizes the significance of the BLA as a precursor to the War Resisters' League, but even more important is her linking of the BLA to the process of "creating a peace culture." I wanted Early to generalize more about the gendered dynamics of this process, but I applaud her linking of one small organization to broad themes in the history of U.S. society. Early makes the story of what could have been a minor organization central to the history of political activism.

Rachel Waltner Goossen's volume is the slightest offering, but it, too, connects a previously ignored topic in women's history to the gender arrangements that permeated pacifism. The book is the answer to an intention articulated by Fannie May Witherspoon and reported by Early: "Some day I mean to see to it that the story of the feminine Conscientious Objectors is told also" (p. 110). Witherspoon was talking about World War I, of course, while Goossen, in this well-researched book, has uncovered the tale of women who thought of themselves as conscientious objectors, especially those connected with the Civilian Public Service, during World War II. In some ways it is an odd women's history, because its subjects, by virtue of their non-conscriptability, were not technically conscientious objectors and only thought of themselves in that way because of the men in their lives. (Sixty percent of the women who filled out questionnaires or provided oral histories were the wives, fiancées, or girlfriends of men in the Civilian Public Service). Most of these women were Mennonites, Brethren, or Friends; Goossen's history is particularly heavy on the Mennonites (sixty-one percent of the group described above), in part because they ran so many of the public service camps and in part because the Mennonite Library and Archives provided much of her source material. Goossen details the commitment, hardships, and occasional joys of life in the Civilian Public Service camps, in mental hospitals where conscientious objectors often worked, and on college campuses.

Goossen, like Schott and Early, turns her attention to the difference that gender made in the world of conscientious objectors. Although the women themselves deemphasized the impact of gender, privileging religious and humanitarian ideals as the basis of their pacifism, Goossen compares male and female conscientious objectors in a way that allows us to see the workings of gender. At the most basic level, of course, women could only act on their principles through men. In addition, they found themselves in traditional nurturing roles—as surrogate mothers or sisters—within the Public Service camps. Yet Goossen does not fully explore the contours of a gendered "culture of nonconformity" among conscientious objectors during World War II, although she is certainly attentive to the impact of gender.

These three books advance the agenda of those of us who believe that, until we have a history of peace—and a gendered history of peace—that is as extensive as our histories of war, we will be hampered in our efforts to create a less violent future.

LEILA J. RUPP
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MOLLY MERRYMAN. *Clipped Wings: The Rise and Fall of the Women Airforce Service Pilots (WASPs) of World War II*. New York: New York University Press. 1998. Pp. xi, 239. $29.95.

Molly Merryman has written an excellent study of a group of women who, without official military affiliation but with the blessing of the Army Air Forces, performed flying duties (primarily ferrying aircraft) during World War II. Merryman's focus is on the origins of the organization; its expansion and proposed militarization; the change in the attitudes of the media toward the group; the congressional investigation that alleged, among other things, that the WASPs were taking jobs away from male pilots; the disbandment of the organization; and, finally, the fight by the surviving WASPs and their supporters in the 1970s to give its members official veteran status.

Unlike its numerous predecessors, which are mostly popular or personal, Merryman's book is one of a few scholarly works on the subject. Its emphasis on the

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broader cultural underpinnings of the WASPs' failure to be accepted and its grounding in feminist history and methodology are timely and welcome. Merryman's contention is that gender discrimination underlay the demise of the WASP program. The WASPs, she says, were resented because they assumed "one of the most desired military roles among men, one that was strongly associated with the development of masculinity and male sexual prowess—that of piloting military planes" (p. 173). The program's disbandment "was not caused by military request or necessity, but was instead a reflection of larger cultural fears during a period when gender roles were being contested in America" (p. 173).

Although Merryman deserves applause for placing the story of the WASPs in a larger context, one wishes she had provided better source documentation for her claim that a "powerful lobby assembled by the male civilian pilots" (p. 75) and "supported by several civilian aviation organizations and veterans' associations" (p. 82) was responsible for the adverse publicity surrounding the WASPs and denial of their request for militarization. This publicity focused on claims that the WASPs got preferential treatment, deprived male pilots of work, and wasted millions of taxpayer dollars. Merryman's contention is probably true. Deborah G. Douglas (*United States Women in Aviation, 1940–1985* [1991]), for example, points out that during the congressional investigation into the WASP program conducted by Congressman Robert Ramspeck, General William H. Tunner (head of the Ferrying Division of Air Transport Command) submitted a memorandum to the investigating committee that "showed that the stereotypes about women pilots were incorrect and unfair . . . if resentment existed among male pilots, it was confined to a limited (but vocal) minority whose primary interest appeared [to be] . . . the preservation of an all-male environment" (p. 55). Tunner's memo was ignored. The WASPs were denied military status and were soon disbanded.

One also wishes that Merryman had introduced her methodology at the beginning of the book or had assimilated it into the narrative instead of placing it in a separate chapter at the end. In the final analysis, however, this is a minor objection. By every measure, this stands as the definitive book on the WASPs. In a previously published work on women in aviation (*Heroes Without Legacy: American Airwomen, 1912–1944* [1993]), Dean Jaros asks why the WASPs and other women in aviation during the period in question did not make more of their legacy. He characterizes their fate—seeming obscurity—as a failure to persuade anyone that they had made a valuable contribution. Merryman puts this question to rest by isolating the true villain: gender discrimination. As accomplished as they were (and they were extremely so, having flown virtually every military aircraft in the inventory), the WASPs, like other women who tried to enter traditional male strongholds, simply could not overcome the organized prejudice that confronted them. Yet the WASPs did leave a lasting legacy. As Merryman points out, "they continued to fight for recognition, for benefits that were rightfully theirs, and for the place they had earned in history to be publicly acknowledged" (pp. 182–83).

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FRANKLIN D. MITCHELL. *Harry S. Truman and the News Media: Contentious Relations, Belated Respect*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 1998. Pp. xv, 277. $34.95.

W. DALE NELSON. *Who Speaks for the President? The White House Press Secretary from Cleveland to Clinton*. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press. 1998. Pp. xiii, 325. $29.95.

For all of Harry S. Truman's problems with the press, there is still something refreshing in being reminded of how press relations worked during his presidency. For almost eight years, reporters railed against him as an incompetent, hopelessly out of his league in the White House. He, in turn, railed against them as hirelings of a one-party press, distorting the news and, when necessary, lying in an attempt to keep the achievements of his administration from the American people. But despite the harsh words back and forth and despite the sometimes dirty deeds, the confrontation still occurred in the context of certain givens that we might envy in the modern era. It was never an issue, for example, whether the once-a-week press conferences would continue. Presidents simply did not seclude themselves from reporters. (Of course, part of the reason is that television had not yet come of age to provide an alternative outlet for presidential publicity.) Nor did reporters expect anything other than what they got from this president at their weekly encounters: blunt words in response to questions asked, policies based on conviction rather than polling results, occasional evasiveness but never downright lying.

Franklin D. Mitchell's book, relatively little of which is new, recalls that era. Although Mitchell did considerable research in primary as well as secondary sources, the bulk of his material is a retelling of familiar anecdotes and a recycling of interpretations from historians who preceded him. Mitchell's account is also colored by his unabashed admiration of Truman. At one point, he criticizes the press for its slowness "in discerning the greatness of [Truman's] presidency" (p. 29), as if the role of the press is ever to trumpet the greatness of people in public life, including the president. In issuing this book, the University of Missouri Press can hardly be criticized for showing disrespect to a native son.

But having said that, the further fact is that there is a lot to admire in the book. Mitchell writes well, and he moves along briskly and sensibly in describing how Truman's stormy relationship with the press came to

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be. Sometimes the issues bordered on farce, as when the president reacted to an unflattering review in the *Washington Post* of his daughter's singing ability by writing a letter to the critic (which, needless to say, immediately became public) promising the offender that he would "need a new nose, a lot of beefsteak for black eyes, and perhaps a supporter for down below" if ever they chanced to meet (p. 199). Most of the time, however, there was nothing funny about the run-ins. Truman had every reason to be enraged by press coverage that often made no pretense at objectivity, as seen in the way the Luce magazines and the *Chicago Tribune* handled the 1948 campaign. If the president knew he could not expect fairness in the press, or at least large segments of the press, he in turn provided his enemies with abundant ammunition to use against him. Blunt speech often came out as too blunt, causing problems. The stalemated war in Korea took a heavy publicity toll. So did the mounting allegations of corruption in the administration, which Republicans exploited in 1952 with their slogan about "mink coats, deep freezers and five percenters." So did the hysteria about Communist infiltration of the executive branch. All of this is a story worth retelling, and Mitchell does it well.

To be sure, a case can be made that by focusing so intently on the adversarial aspect of the relationship, the author overlooks the considerable extent to which Truman and the press cooperated as well as quarreled. (It is perhaps significant in this regard that journalists like Walter Lippmann and James Reston, figures of towering influence at the time, play no role at all in his account.) For example, some of the proudest achievements of his presidency—the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—were accomplished not despite the press but with the conscious assistance of the press. Truman and his advisers actively solicited the support of such papers as the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* for help in educating the Congress and the country to the critical importance of those measures, and the importance also of the United States assuming a role of world leadership. The support was asked for and freely given, which is to say, there was plenty of room for cooperation within the adversarial relationship of that era. Whether that is still the case is another matter.

Truman's press secretary, Charles Ross, who had been a boyhood friend back in Independence and had gone on to a distinguished career on the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, had his own problems with the press in his more than five years of service (before being stricken by a fatal heart attack in late 1950 while working at his desk). Stephen Early had pretty well defined—at least in the eyes of the press—how the job should be handled during the twelve years he served as press secretary for Franklin D. Roosevelt, and for all that reporters liked and respected Ross, he never quite measured up. The office of the presidential press secretary, and the almost impossible demands made upon those who filled it, is the theme of W. Dale Nelson's book.

Nelson picks up the story with Grover Cleveland (which is fair, although not until Herbert Hoover did such a position formally exist) and carries it through to the present. Unfortunately, his treatment is long on anecdote—rather stale anecdote at that—and strikingly short on substance or interpretation. All sorts of questions come to mind that the author fails to address. Or at best, he addresses them only in passing. Nelson notes in his epilogue that "By the time Clinton took office, the press had changed greatly from the days of Cleveland and Wilson, or even Roosevelt and Kennedy." And he adds, "As reporters changed, so did the technology with which they worked" (p. 253). One would have thought that the changes he cites would have been a central theme of the book. How did coverage of the presidency evolve over the years? What impact did technology have? How did the White House respond? How did all of this affect the office of the press secretary? What trends do we see in the backgrounds of the people appointed to the position? What trends, if any, do we see in the influence press secretaries wielded? Who were the successful press secretaries? What made them so? Who were the failures? Why? Questions like these should carry the narrative; instead, we get a rehashing of stories told many times before. In fairness to Nelson, he has taken on a big subject with relatively little prior work to build upon. But the good book about presidential press secretaries remains to be written.

GEORGE JUERGENS
Indiana University

KEVIN K. GAINES. *Uplifting the Race: Black Leadership, Politics, and Culture in the Twentieth Century*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1996. Pp. xxvii, 312. Cloth $45.00, paper $17.95.

In this book, Kevin K. Gaines argues that the post-civil rights era has witnessed the advocacy of a neoliberal ideology on race, stressing "color blindness" and the "culture of poverty" doctrine to explain black inequality. At the same time, the author notes, there has been little stress on political mobilization against growing social disparities. Instead of adhering to an agenda that challenges structural inequality, black conservative voices have turned to resegregation and self-help as solutions to the social deterioration of the black working poor. Gaines traces this self-help prescribed remedy for social disparity back to the turn of the century.

Gaines's book offers a critical and thoughtful analysis of uplift theory, adopted by a black elite during the nadir of race relations when the larger white society disfranchised black males, depicted people of African origins as less than human, and subjugated them to racial terror. Gaines, who details the concerted effort of a diverse black elite to convince black America to accept social and moral uplift, raises serious doubts

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about this theory because it invoked patriarchal, class, and racial hierarchies while attempting to challenge biological notions of black inferiority and minstrel images. According to the author, instead of embracing a more democratic notion of uplift that emphasized class and gender unity and a broad civil rights agenda, black elites became self-absorbed with moral self-help, which reinforced racist and sexist notions. Their embrace of uplift theory with its stress on black cultural depravities, Victorian gender roles, and anti-labor sentiment put them at odds with the masses of black working people by accommodating power relations structured by race and racism.

Uplift theory did not go unchallenged. Ongoing racial discrimination, the Depression, and the movement of thousands of blacks from the South to the urban centers of the North all led to cultural radicalism. Moreover, the rise of the "New Negro" militant consciousness among black intellectuals, the decline of the Garvey movement, and increased support in black communities for the Communist Party and other left organizations led to an emphasis on race and class struggle. The challenge to self-help ideology is told, in part, through a critical examination of the life of Hubert Harrison, an immigrant from the West Indies who became an international, diasporic, progressive thinker and socialist. However, it was not the radical voices that triumphed after the postwar years. Liberal social science discourse linking pathology to matriarchal family structure prevailed. Instead of the emergence of a more democratic theme embracing economic rights, an accent on psychic damage and social disorganization of the black community became prevalent.

Gaines's methodology is sound because he does not limit his examination of black middle-class leadership to the W. E. B. Du Bois versus Booker T. Washington paradigm or to a few writings of black intellectuals, as has been the custom of some scholars. Instead he presents the writings and ideas of a wide range of black intellectuals, including such notables as Anna Julia Cooper, Ida B. Wells, and Paul Lawrence Dunbar and lesser-known writers such as William Ferris and James D. Corrothers. Moreover, his analysis is not limited to voices of one ideological position. Advocates of Black Nationalism and its proponents who endorsed "Victorianism" and racial authenticity as well as proponents of integration come under scrutiny in this work. Especially rewarding in this book is Gaines's analysis of the impact of uplift on black women and how it led to their marginalization.

I wish that the author had examined the 1960s in more detail. His discussion on the most important social protest movement in the twentieth century only encompasses a few lines. Moreover, this book is not an easy text to decipher. Gaines's arguments are complex and at times dense. This is because of the author's reliance on ideas and language from the field of cultural studies. But his ability to connect race, class, and gender in a coherent analysis makes this a probing and engaging work. The use of biographical data and the interrogation of writings by black intellectuals make the book interesting and important for anyone interested in black cultural politics in the twentieth century. Moreover, Gaines's definition of black leadership goes beyond the black intelligentsia. The author uses a broader category of leadership that includes members of the black business elite and clergy as well as others.

A notable goal of the historian is to provide a clearer comprehension of the contemporary world by inquiring about the past. Gaines has reached this objective.

CLARENCE TAYLOR
Florida International University

CLARENCE TAYLOR. *Knocking at Our Own Door: Milton A. Galamison and the Struggle to Integrate New York City Schools*. (The Columbia History of Urban Life.) New York: Columbia University Press. 1997. Pp. xii, 261. $29.50.

The story of the modern civil rights movement found in works by Aldon Morris, Harvard Sitkoff, Harry Hampton, Robert Weisbrot, and others is that of a southern-based campaign utilizing non-violent direct action protests to end legal segregation and racial discrimination in all aspects of public life. It was only when Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference moved to Chicago in 1965 and 1966 and began to work with civil rights organizations on public school segregation and housing discrimination that the story traveled outside the South. Clarence Taylor seeks "to challenge the southern paradigm" by examining a significant school integration campaign in the North that was clearly "part of a national struggle for civil rights" (p. 7).

Taylor focuses on Reverend Milton A. Galamison, the undisputed leader of the school integration campaign in New York City, and argues that to a very great extent the successes and failures of the protests can be traced to the personality and leadership style of the fiery Presbyterian minister. Born in Philadelphia in 1923, Milton and his older brother Joseph grew up in poverty following the abandonment of the family by their father, Gladstone Galamison, in the early 1930s. Raised by his mother, Dorothy, maternal grandmother, and aunt, Milton received paternal guidance from his pastor, the Reverend Thomas Logan of St. Michael's Episcopal Church, who encouraged him to enroll in St. Augustine College in Raleigh, North Carolina, after graduation from high school in 1940. After only one year, Galamison left the strict, religious school and enrolled at Lincoln University in Pennsylvania, where he excelled, receiving his B.A. with honors in 1945. That year he married Gladys Hunt, a teacher from Chester, Pennsylvania, and made the decision to enroll in Lincoln's divinity school to train for the Presbyterian ministry.

Appointed briefly to the Witherspoon Presbyterian Church in Princeton, New Jersey, upon ordination in

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1947, Galamison got the call the following year to Siloam Presbyterian Church, one of the most prestigious black congregations in Brooklyn. From the pulpit at Siloam, Galamison spoke out against social injustice and racial bigotry and became prominently involved in many liberal and left-wing causes. With the help of Annie Stein, a former Communist and labor organizer, Galamison became involved in the struggle to improve public education for minority children.

Working through the Brooklyn National Association for the Advancement of Colored People's (NAACP) Schools Workshop and the Parent's Workshop for Equality in New York City Schools, a grassroots organization founded in 1960, Galamison, Stein, and hundreds of African-American and Puerto Rican parents, mostly women, challenged school board policies that fostered racial segregation. The successful school boycott by over 450,000 students on February 4, 1964, was the culminating event in Galamison's long struggle for "quality integrated education."

Unfortunately, the coalition of civil rights organizations that came together for the school boycott quickly unraveled, mainly because of conservative leaders' objections to Galamison's militant stance and his failure to consult them when making decisions about future protests. After the school board failed to address the coalition's demands, Galamison called for a second boycott on March 16, 1964, but it was much less successful and was supported by only a few militant groups and activists, including Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., and Malcolm X. "Operation Shutdown" in 1965, which sought to close 600 inadequate and segregated public schools, and the creation of an "Ad Hoc People's Board of Education" also proved ineffective due to parents' growing demoralization and divisions among civil rights activists.

In 1968, during the crisis over "community control" and the right of the Oceanhill-Brownsville school board to hire and fire teachers and principals, Galamison became a central figure as he attempted to mediate the struggle between the United Federation of Teachers and African-American school and community leaders. Appointed to the city school board in 1968, Galamison offered plans to protect the positions of teachers and the empowerment of the black community. When his plans were rejected and he was not appointed to the reorganized school board in 1969, Galamison left the political arena, disappointed over his inability to obtain equal educational opportunities for all children in the New York public schools.

Taylor has used school board and organizational records, personal correspondence, interviews, and newspaper and magazine articles to tell the story of Galamison's contributions to New York City's school integration and community control movement. However, other civil rights campaigns that took place in the 1950s and 1960s to end racial discrimination in employment, housing, health care, and other areas of city life are barely mentioned. Despite the absence of a comprehensive examination of civil rights campaigns in New York City, this book broadens our understanding of the full range of protest activities that took place during the civil rights era in the United States.

V. P. Franklin
Drexel University

Michael Friedland. *Lift Your Voice Like a Trumpet: White Clergy and the Civil Rights and Antiwar Movements, 1954–1973.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1998. Pp. x, 326. Cloth $49.95, paper $18.95.

Civil rights activism and protest against American involvement in Vietnam grew largely out of the efforts of white ministers, priests, and rabbis who refused to separate spirituality from politics and social transformation. Their stories are carefully told in Michael Friedland's book on white clergy and their roles in the civil rights and antiwar crusades that occurred from the early 1950s to the early 1970s.

Friedland's basic argument is that a considerable number of white clergymen functioned "within the broader context of religious social activism as it developed through different stages in both the civil rights and antiwar movements" (p. 10). Drawing on the insights of Harvey Cox, Friedland identifies three general camps of clergy: the pietists, who preached a gospel of personal salvation while refusing to participate in protests they considered secular and political; the theological and political conservatives, who felt that religion, like politics, should sanction the status quo; and the liberals, who were personally involved in civil rights and antiwar demonstrations. While clergymen in all of these categories contributed to the intellectual climate in which protests occurred, Friedland is particularly interested in the last group.

Friedland reminds us that calls for the white churches to act more decisively in the racial struggle mounted after the Supreme Court ruled against school desegregation in 1954. His extensive treatment of the responses of southern white clergy to this challenge is his most original and creative contribution. The author tells us that such responses covered the spectrum, from W. A. Criswell, the Southern Baptist pastor who denounced the challenge, to Billy Graham, who was often constrained by southern mores, to figures like Will D. Campbell, Thomas P. Thrasher, Robert E. Hughes, and Robert S. Graetz, Jr., who protested against segregation. But Friedland could have been more emphatic in his discussion of the racist attitudes held by southern white clergy, a problem that led some to sympathize with and even join groups like the Ku Klux Klan and the White Citizens' Council.

The involvement of northern white clergymen in nonviolent direct action campaigns in the South in the 1960s is explored at length by Friedland. He focuses especially on important and well-known religious leaders such as Philip Berrigan, William Sloane Coffin, Jr., Malcolm Boyd, Eugene Carson Blake, and Abraham

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Joshua Heschel. Friedland is right in saying that these men acted out of a sense of religious commitment and moral obligation, but he should have said much more about the extent to which their activities resulted from the moral challenge presented by the African-American community and particularly Martin Luther King, Jr. After all, African Americans, by taking to the streets and giving practical lessons in the defaults and limitations of democracy, forced whites to reexamine their values and practices as they related to other members of the human family.

Slightly less than half of the book is devoted to white clergy participation in protests against the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1973. Triggered by President Lyndon B. Johnson's decision to escalate U.S. military involvement in 1965, and by the growing perception that Vietnam could not logically be separated from the quest for civil rights, white ministers, priests, and rabbis joined King in the American peace movement. Friedland highlights the activities of leaders like Coffin and John Bennett; Episcopal bishops Daniel Corrigan, James A. Pike, and Paul Moore, Jr.; Catholic priests Thomas Merton and Philip and Daniel Berrigan; and Rabbi Heschel. He also affords rich insights into the direction of antiwar protests after the assassination of King in 1968.

Much of the strength of Friedland's book rests in his examination of the ecumenical character of civil rights and antiwar activism. He says essentially nothing, however, about how the ecumenical nature of the protests, and their influence on subsequent developments in the gay rights and women's movements, might provide a model for religious institutions that are addressing contemporary problems relative to human freedom and inclusiveness.

Even so, Friedland's book is a vital part of the mounting effort to take scholarship on the civil rights and antiwar activities of the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s to a new level. Friedland does not give the final word on the subject, but his work fills significant gaps and raises concerns that will continue to attract the attention of scholars.

LEWIS V. BALDWIN
Vanderbilt University

JAMES E. WESTHEIDER. *Fighting on Two Fronts: African Americans and the Vietnam War*. New York: New York University Press. 1997. Pp. x, 238. $24.95.

This book provides a well-researched and generally fairminded consideration of the difficulties experienced by African-American military personnel during the Vietnam War era. Moving chronologically, James E. Westheider begins his account by devoting a full chapter each to the early optimism of blacks serving in the first war fought by a fully integrated American military, to the inequities created by the draft and its complicated deferment system, and to the ways in which military structures and practices, however unintentionally, favored whites over blacks. He then turns to the growing militancy among black soldiers, the outbreak of racial violence during the late 1960s, and the ultimate response of the armed forces when they could no longer ignore the evidence of a serious racial problem.

Within each chapter, Westheider draws on interviews, both those conducted by the Army among its officers, the vast majority of whom were white, and those by the author himself among African-American veterans. He successfully uses these oral history materials to "put a human face on a complex and often confusing historical process and allow the participants to tell their own, unique experiences during one of the more important but volatile eras in American history" (p. 7). A great strength of Westheider's book is his dispassionate acknowledgment of the feelings, efforts, and faults on all sides. The many voices vividly illustrate the passions and confusions of individuals in a situation that brought to the surface long-running injustices, inequities, and misunderstandings.

Throughout the book, Westheider details what he finds to be the "failure of the armed forces to admit to and deal with the issue of racism" during the Vietnam War era (p. 4). He identifies "institutional" racism (generally unintentional), "personal" racism among whites, and "perceived" racism (mistaken interpretations) among blacks as the chief forms of racism affecting African-American service personnel. Westheider uses government studies, statistics, and other authoritative sources to ground these issues. His inclusion of statistics on such issues as the percentage of blacks in American combat forces at different points in the war, along with his identification of the factors behind those statistics, helps keep the book from becoming a mere exchange of opinions and experiences.

Westheider is quite critical of the military for not having recognized and responded earlier to its own shortcomings in the area of race. No doubt he is correct, but his book suggests the scope of the larger social problem that the military confronted. And his final chapter makes it clear that this story has a happy ending. Leaders eventually recognized the necessity for change and made reforms that have brought the military a remarkably long way toward true equality. Westheider credits black solidarity and militancy as the agent of this progress. As he phrases it, the two million black Vietnam War veterans "have left a permanent legacy—that of a more racially egalitarian military establishment." Westheider thus concludes that "Vietnam may have been a lost cause," but those black Americans who gave up their lives in the war "did not die in vain" (pp. 175–76).

The invocation of the Gettysburg Address to find some redemptive meaning in black veterans' sacrifices offers us a mythic understanding of this historical event, yet another addition to the many attempts by former combatants, filmmakers, and historians to render Vietnam a meaningful and ultimately worthwhile episode in the American story. Westheider's is one of

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the more plausible; as an awful reflection of the more disturbing legacies of American history, the Vietnam War did help catalyze changes in consciousness, forcing virtually all American institutions to recognize pressures for change by those who had not fully participated in American progress. This book offers a look at how the war led one particular institution to make itself much closer to a mirror-image of American ideals.

JOHN HELLMANN
Ohio State University, Lima

JOHN W. JOHNSON. *The Struggle for Student Rights: Tinker v. Des Moines and the 1960s.* (Landmark Law Cases and American Society.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1997. Pp. xiii, 250. Cloth $35.00, paper $12.95.

The 1969 Supreme Court decision in *Tinker v. Des Moines* stands as one of the classic cases of the Warren Court. Arising out of student protests against the Vietnam War, the decision not only broadened the right of free speech but opened a new area of constitutional law with respect to the rights of public school students. Justice Abe Fortas declared that neither students nor teachers "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Public schools, moreover, "may not be enclaves of totalitarianism." In its willingness to extend the protections of the Bill of Rights into such "enclaves," the *Tinker* decision was part of the court's initiatives with respect to prisons, mental hospitals, and welfare system bureaucracies.

Given the broad implications of the *Tinker* decision, John W. Johnson's book is somewhat disappointing. Johnson offers a detailed narrative of the Tinker case. There is a wealth of detail about the students and their families, the circumstances of the protests that led to case, and the path of the case through the courts. The primary contribution of the book lies in its portraits of the protesters: Christopher Eckhardt, Mary Beth Tinker, and her brother John Tinker. Although Mary Beth Tinker is now famous as the lead plaintiff, the honor should have gone to Christopher Eckhardt. The descriptions of their lives following the case, although rather brief, are particularly moving. One begins to wish that this aspect of the story had been the primary focus of the entire book.

Historians with an interest in constitutional law and the impact of the Warren Court on American life will find this book quite disappointing. The treatment of the case in the courts is extremely elementary, for the most part restating what a particular lawyer argued or a judge ruled. Legal scholars will find several of the explanations of legal terminology of court procedures elementary almost to the point of insult. There is little analysis either of the intellectual origins of the majority opinion or of the impact of the decision on the development of constitutional law or American society. The section subtitled "The Tinker Precedent: The Seventies and Eighties" consists of exactly twelve pages.

This book is part of the Landmark Law Cases and American Society series published by the University of Kansas Press. Three other books in the series are listed. This particular contribution appears to have been intended to fall within the genre established by Anthony Lewis's classic *Gideon's Trumpet* (1964). Given its content, Johnson's book will be most useful for undergraduate courses. With concrete detail, it successfully evokes the circumstances through which a few ordinary people, with no ambitions for fame, became involved in a landmark Supreme Court case. Undergraduates will also benefit from the narrative tracing the process of a case from initial action to Supreme Court ruling. Legal scholars will have to look elsewhere for an analysis of the impact of the case.

SAMUEL WALKER
University of Nebraska at Omaha

RODNEY P. CARLISLE and JOAN M. ZENZEN. *Supplying the Nuclear Arsenal: American Production Reactors, 1942–1992.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1996. Pp. xiv, 275. $48.00.

For the fifty years between 1942 and 1992, the United States centered its national security policy on nuclear weapons. They ended World War II, contributed to the origins of the Cold War, and played a major role in bringing about détente between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the history of commercial-power nuclear reactors is well known, the story of the government reactors that produced weapons-grade uranium, plutonium, and tritium usually has been shrouded by a veil of secrecy.

Rodney P. Carlisle and Joan M. Zenzen have helped to lift that veil by writing the first detailed, and highly readable, history of the origin, development, and demise of production reactors, industrial-scale machines—eventually fourteen in number—that upgraded or improved on the first atomic "pile" produced in 1942 under the direction of Enrico Fermi.

Their well-researched work—which is based in part on the voluminous records of the Manhattan Engineer District, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Energy Research and Development Administration, and the Department of Energy—adds significantly to our understanding of the forces, events, and personalities that propelled the nuclear arms race.

Carlisle and Zenzen describe how the reactors were designed, built, and managed and how they were modified to keep up with the demands of the growing nuclear arsenal. In so doing, they also portray the often contentious relationship between civilian officials, the military, the scientific community, industry, and politicians whose districts received the economic benefits of the reactors, all of whom made up the nuclear establishment.

The first three production reactors, built at Hanford,

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Washington, by Du Pont, produced the fissionable material used in the atomic bombs dropped on Japan. Two more reactors were added in the early years of the Cold War. After the Soviets exploded their first nuclear bomb in 1949, the United States initiated the development of a fusion weapon, the hydrogen bomb, and built three more reactors at Hanford and five at Savannah River (South Carolina). These reactors, most of which were built by General Electric, produced plutonium as well as tritium, a hydrogen isotope used to boost the explosive power of fusion weapons.

In the 1950s, the last of the production reactors were built, all of which provided the United States with more plutonium than it could use. As a result, all but the four newest reactors were closed in the 1970s. However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the nuclear arms buildup of the Reagan administration in the early 1980s prompted the Energy Department to begin planning the construction of new reactors to replenish the nation's supply of tritium, which is rapidly (5.5 percent per year) being depleted due to its short (twelve-year) half-life. But before the new reactors could be built, the Cold War came to an end. Today, no U.S. production reactors are operating.

Yet while nuclear weapons may have played a major role in preventing World War III, there is a significant downside to their legacy. Carlisle and Zenzen show how aging production reactors increased the risk of radioactive contamination of the atmosphere and water table. Cleaning up the closed production reactors at Hanford and Savannah River, they observe, will cost far more than it did to build these facilities.

Still another ominous legacy of the production reactors was the technology itself, which was readily imitated by nations seeking nuclear weapons of their own, including so-called rogue states like North Korea, Iraq, and Iran.

Yet, in spite of the risks involved in producing nuclear weapons, Carlisle and Zenzen feel it is vital to maintain America's nuclear arsenal, if only to deter the use of nuclear weapons by rogue states. To this end, and despite the view of those who believe that the natural disarmament brought by tritium decay should be allowed to proceed, Carlisle and Zenzen believe it is vital to replenish the diminishing supply of tritium.

If tritium production is ever resumed, however, Carlisle and Zenzen recommend the introduction of new procedures that will allow for the selection of facilities and their personnel on the basis of "technical merit, rather than on the basis of political influence" and permit "the general public and interested parties to participate through the open methods developed since the days of World War II."

This book is a valuable addition to our knowledge of the nuclear arms race. It belongs on the shelf of anyone who is seriously interested in the history of U.S. national security policy.

RONALD E. POWASKI
Cleveland State University

TERENCE KEHOE. *Cleaning Up the Great Lakes: From Cooperation to Confrontation*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. 1997. Pp. 250. $32.00.

Terence Kehoe provides a clearly written, well-documented case study demonstrating the important role that states have played in shaping environmental policy in the post-World War II era. Focusing on the 1960s and early 1970s, he examines the evolution of water pollution control policy in the eight states of the Great Lakes region: Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York. Kehoe chose to limit his study to the United States, and, as a result, this book does not treat Canadian policy except as it intersects with U. S. policy, particularly through the activities of the International Joint Commission established by the Boundary Waters Treaty (1909). Although this limitation may disappoint some readers because it does not address environmental policy for the entire region, the study of intergovernmental relations is intricate work, and the resulting narrative set forth in this book is complex enough. Moreover, Kehoe's reason for limiting his study is convincing. He notes that, by the early 1960s, the states of the Great Lakes basin contained five of the top fifteen industrial areas in the United States and produced one-half of the nation's "value added" by manufacturing, making the Great Lakes basin the "industrial heartland of the United States"—with "extreme" water pollution problems (p. 4).

Chapter one describes the systems of "cooperative pragmatism" that evolved during the Progressive era and became standard operating procedure for state administrators. "[B]ased on the principles of voluntarism and informal cooperation, administrative expertise, and localism" (p. 5), these systems not only held sway until the 1960s but, as Kehoe shows in subsequent chapters, continued to influence policy implementation as policy formation shifted from the state to the federal level during the 1960s and 1970s. State officials did so, Kehoe argues, by negotiating with federal program administrators and with industry representatives in the process of balancing environmental concerns with economic concerns and specific local needs. One of the strengths of this study is that the author provides insight into the personal dynamics of the process by highlighting the careers of three long-term "engineer-administrators" who "outlasted the appointed citizens and department heads" (p. 31). Clarence Klassen served as the technical secretary of the Illinois Sanitary Water Board (later Stream Pollution Control Board) from 1935 to 1970, when Governor Richard Ogilvie appointed him as the first director of the Illinois EPA. Blucher Poole served as secretary of the Indiana Stream Pollution Control Board from 1945 until 1970. Loring Oeming, who served as chief engineer and then executive secretary of the Michigan Water Resources Commission, had a similarly long career. Such men were little known outside their

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profession, but their influence on policy implementation was unmistakable.

Kehoe also details the role of environmental activists and public interest groups in shaping the regulatory process during the 1960s and early 1970s. Another strength of the book is the author's ability to capture "the paradox of the Public Interest Movement: reformers wanted strong government to check private interests, but activists deeply distrusted the ability of the state to act in the broad public interest" (p. 180). The activities and demands of such groups are a critical element of this complex history, which Kehoe tells without embellishment or bias.

The history of conflict over water supply, a major theme in the history of the West, has received considerable scholarly attention, while the history of water quality issues has been largely overlooked, possibly because water quality often tends to be an issue where water resources also are abundant. Without question, conflict that is tied to resource abundance lacks the necessary drama to create powerful narratives. Water quality issues are increasingly important throughout much of the nation, however, and Kehoe's study of water pollution control policy in the Great Lakes region provides a well-crafted regional study that scholars of environmental and policy history will want to consult.

REBECCA CONARD
Middle Tennessee State University

DAVID E. NYE. *Consuming Power: A Social History of American Energies*. Cambridge: MIT Press. 1998. Pp. xii, 331. $25.00.

This is an interesting although frustrating book. It is a history of consumption, primarily energy consumption, in the United States since the early nineteenth century. Organized chronologically and by energy source—wood, water, steam, coal, and oil—it argues that Americans are enmeshed in systems of energy production and distribution. Moreover, much of their economic activity and development, from farming to railroads to manufacturing and urbanization, is culturally, not technologically, driven. It seems to me that David E. Nye is on the edge of some significant interpretative thoughts about American economic and business history—but he never quite gets there.

The book, in nine chapters, is organized by early expansion of energy systems, concentration of energy (steam, then coal, then oil) in the late nineteenth century, and then dispersion in the twentieth century, through more intensive consumption and transportation mobility. In each of these chapters, Nye writes about energy sources and consumption patterns: the supply side and the demand side, respectively, of the economy. He relies on an extraordinary (although incomplete) body of secondary sources and a diverse body of primary sources to derive a rich and interesting set of facts about economic consumption.

Chapter six, "Consumption and Dispersion," is one of the best in this study. Here, Nye deals extensively with world fairs and consumption patterns in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The reader is convinced that something special is happening: as the supply side of the economy is being revolutionized by heavy industry, by oil, steel, chemicals, electricity, and then automobiles, the demand side really does change fundamentally. Americans begin doing things and going places, with incomes and technology that support these new activities.

Chapter eight, on "Energy Crisis and Transition," is weaker. It tends to refocus on the supply side of the oil/gas economy in the 1970s but does not do justice either to the industries involved or to the public policy. This is a complex story, but Nye cannot seem to find the demand side where he could make a contribution.

In neither his introduction nor his conclusion does the author succeed in placing the American economy of energy-intensive consumption into a coherent intellectual framework. He knows there is something fundamental about energy that slops over from supply to demand, and he clearly dismisses "technological determinism" (which should be dismissed). Nye tries, but does not really succeed, in dismissing Alfred Chandler's managerial determinism as well. Above all, he gets the reader to focus on the consumption side of American economic history. But at this point, the conceptual progress seems to halt, leaving to some other historian—or to Nye's next book—the task of offering a coherent explanation of the demand side revolution.

RICHARD VIETOR
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GARY M. FINK and HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, editors. *The Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in the Post-New Deal Era*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1998. Pp. ix, 310. $39.95.

The 1970s, every bit as much as the 1930s, marked a crucial point of discontinuity in twentieth-century American history. The presidency of Jimmy Carter stands at the heart of many of the complexities of this decade. In this volume edited by Gary M. Fink and Hugh Davis Graham, a group of talented historians, aided by the considerable archival resources of the Carter Library, attempt to make sense of Carter's four years in office. They find a president who exerted a definite influence over the nation's public policy but who foundered on the problems of combating inflation.

As Vice President Walter Mondale (quoted by William Leuchtenberg in an essay that opens the volume and marks a nice transition from the historiography of the 1930s to the historiography of the 1970s) put it in 1978, if the Democrats did not bring down inflation, "we will be driven by office just as we were by the Vietnam War" (p. 20). The trouble was that, just as few people knew how to cope with deflation in the 1930s, so few advisors had a cogent

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remedy for inflation in the 1970s. Whatever was tried was bound to conflict with the desires of at least part of the coalition that had elected Carter in 1976. Andrew Young, as Graham notes in an analytically compelling essay on civil rights, considered a balanced budget to be a code expression for "anti-black, anti-poor, anti-city" (pp. 208–09). When Carter tried to appease the feminists who had supported him in 1976, he found, according to Susan Hartmann, that "his promise to do for women's rights what Johnson did for civil rights conflicted with his core principles of limited government and a balanced budget" (p. 226). In the end, many feminists bailed out on Carter and supported Edward Kennedy's bid for the Democratic nomination in 1980. Union leaders, as Melvyn Dubofsky explains, enjoyed similarly chilly relations with Carter, as one might expect in an administration in which inflation czar Alfred Kahn claimed that "unemployed auto workers are being screwed by the employed auto workers" (p. 99).

Even beyond these matters related to interest-group politics, inflation heightened the difficulty of solving policy problems. As John C. Barrow details, Carter lavished a great deal of attention on energy policy (just as he did on environmental policy, as Jeffrey Stine notes). The energy issue was one regarding which the president believed it his duty to lead the American people, overcome narrow self-interest, and obey an "unyielding moral conviction that the nation should act with greater prudence as stewards of the earth's resources" (p. 161). At base, however, his National Energy Plan would have the effect of raising the price of energy, thus putting it in direct conflict with the battle over inflation. Not surprisingly, then, the plan ran into considerable difficulty. Ultimately, the second major oil shock of the decade in 1979 sent the economy over the edge and almost guaranteed that Carter would be a one-term president.

Since economic constraints are so central to an analysis of the Carter presidency, the volume's essay on economic policy assumes a special importance. In an impressive effort, Bruce Shulman shows how the president's initial preoccupation with unemployment turned into an obsession with inflation. He identifies Carter's October 25, 1978, Oval Office speech as a turning point in the process. To show how serious Carter was about fiscal stringency, he followed up the speech by vetoing four pieces of legislation, and in the process he offended Democratic liberals, who could always turn to Kennedy for political solace.

President Carter learned just how hard it was to effect social reform on the cheap. "Are you telling me that there is no way to improve the present welfare system except by spending billions of dollars?" he asked Health, Education, and Welfare Secretary Joseph Califano in 1978. "In that case, to hell with it! We're wasting our time" (quoted by James Patterson in an essay about welfare reform, p. 125). In the end, Carter got only a little of what he asked for: no welfare reform, no national health insurance, but only organizational changes, such as the creation of the Department of Education or the creation of the Health Care Financing Agency.

Not only do the essays in the volume explain the conflicts over inflation well; they also nicely illustrate some of the intellectual conflicts between traditional liberal and emerging neo-conservative thinkers within the administration. Thomas Sugrue's piece on urban policy uncovers the battle for Carter's soul over whether to direct federal aid at places or at people. Should the government attempt to rebuild the rusting cities of the Northeast or encourage the mobility of people to the warmer climates and hotter labor markets of the sunbelt? This dilemma, like so many others, was debated but not really resolved. Sugrue concludes that "aid to the cities fell victim to the administration's concern about inflation" (p. 151). The issue received prominent mention from a presidential commission that was to provide a blueprint for Carter's second term (the subject of an essay by Robert Zieger). This commission, boldly advocating an urban policy that aided people rather than places, succeeded only in stirring up more controversy. By the time the commission's report appeared, Ronald Reagan had already been elected.

Fink and Graham, the volume's editors, deserve to be commended for their unremitting focus on domestic policy and for their desire to stay away from what one of the contributors calls "score card" history: the obsession, as Graham puts it, "with passing and flunking presidents" (p. 202). An essay on foreign policy and one on Carter's post-presidency both seem a little out of place. For the most part, though, the essays succeed in illuminating the inner policy workings of the Carter presidency without playing the blame game. One might have wished for a little more placement of Carter in the electoral cycle. Should we think of him as an accidental president, like Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat in a Republican age, or perhaps as a president at the end of a policy regime, like fellow engineer Herbert Hoover? Before we can answer such questions, however, we need to know more about what happened during Carter's presidency. Toward that end, this book supplies some much-needed data and shows just how much can be done with policy history and with the materials in the Carter Library. One can confidently predict that this volume will come to occupy a prominent place in the historiography of a crucial decade—the 1970s—even if the big biography that integrates Carter's personality and his policies still awaits us.

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DAVID THELEN. *Becoming Citizens in the Age of Television: How Americans Challenged the Media and Seized Political Initiative during the Iran-Contra Debate*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1996. Pp. x, 247. Cloth $55.00, paper $14.95.

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David Thelen has written a provocative study of the public response to the congressional hearings on the Iran-Contra scandal, which were held from April to August 1987. Using a data base of 5,000 letters, postcards, telegrams, and other communications that Americans sent to Democratic Representative Lee Hamilton, chairman of the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, Thelen argues that fundamental dilemmas of democracy in the television age were revealed during this period. The author stresses that, as democracy has evolved and expanded, the problem of politicians' hearing the true voice of the public, as opposed to the artificially contrived polls of opinion managers, has become more difficult. In Thelen's words, "This book tells a story of declining democratic practice in which politicians and journalists have come to treat citizens and even themselves as abstractions to be aggregated, but it also tells a story of resurgent participatory democracy in which citizens project what healthy democratic practice looks like" (p. 149).

Thelen's book both benefits from and is hindered by his intellectual and ideological involvement with the subject. The author's personal commitment energizes his prose, making this book an exciting one to read—a rarity for university press publications. However, since Thelen appears to be a leftist populist reflecting a 1960s sensibility, he is overstimulated by his belief that he has discovered the true voice of the American public. His enthusiasm allows him to break free of normal scholarly constraints and to construct broader arguments than his data can support. Thelen illustrates his overreach when he writes, "As I stepped back, I came to see this rebellion by Americans against the fruits of opinion management as part of a worldwide revolt against the modern political systems that try to manage and claim to provide legitimacy for their rulers on the basis of the 'voice of the people' " (p. 8).

What particularly disturbs Thelen is how opinion managers (pollsters, journalists, politicians, and campaign managers) allegedly distort the needs of citizens. From the author's perspective, the pseudoscience of opinion management was originally inspired by the selling of war by government propagandists and the marketing of consumer products and is essentially a craft of manipulation. His principal charge is that opinion managers artificially create mass opinion and non-existent (in terms of self-identification) segments of the public, such as yuppies, baby boomers, and soccer moms, because they think in terms of aggregation, typicality, averages, sound bites, and lowest common denominators. The humanist in Thelen is appalled that pollsters do not listen to individuals, who, when treated as abstractions, become invisible to policy makers—and therefore alienated from the political system.

The chief claim of Thelen's book is that, in these television viewers' communications, he uncovered the authentic voice of the American people. He argues that, in 1987, thousands of Americans, outraged that the media was misrepresenting their feelings toward Oliver North (Olliemania), transformed the public forum from an arena structured by the perspectives of opinion management to one influenced by their experiences in primary relationships. For Thelen, this was a revolt of the manipulated; passive television spectators became active citizens. He writes, "They hoped by these letters and phone calls to create a more participatory democracy in which citizens and politicians talked among themselves without intervention and distortion by intermediaries . . . To answer pundits' outrageous interpretations of what viewers were—or should be—thinking, Americans had spontaneously mobilized themselves into a reserve army of citizens, called forth by American folklore to save the republic in times of peril. American democracy, I learned, was incredibly healthy at the grass roots" (p. 8).

Thelen ends his book by advocating the creation of new mechanisms through which citizens can turn their grassroots conversations in primary groups into public policy. He briefly discusses changing the United States political system into a parliamentary democracy, encouraging more televised congressional hearings, setting up jury trials on issues such as health care, instigating voter initiatives and referenda, legitimating talk radio as a political forum, and promoting more citizen interactions with local newspapers. None of these devices seem promising to me.

Thelen's book cannot overcome a paradox of public opinion in a democracy: since each of us is the center of his or her own universe, and since we live in a democracy that extols the value of the individual, we each want the political system to respond to our specific needs. Under such circumstances, the potential for alienation is great. For the truth is that, in a large republican democracy, individual preferences have to be counted and aggregated before being interpreted. In a number of tables, Thelen assumes the role of an opinion manager by aggregating and interpreting communications to Congressman Hamilton in ways that may serve *his* purposes more than those of the letter-writers. In brief, Thelen's quest to hear the American people may have resulted in his hearing echoes of his own ideology.

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MARK NATHAN COHEN. *Culture of Intolerance: Chauvinism, Class, and Racism in the United States*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1998. Pp. xiii, 325. $27.50.

Mark Nathan Cohen was prompted to write this book, he tells us, because he thinks that this nation's resolve to improve the lot and the opportunities of ethnic minorities and of women has faltered. As he sees our present situation, the idealism of the 1960s has given way to an attitude of complacency. Important authorities now argue, he points out, not merely that things are well enough as they are but that they are what they

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must be. Nearly all the rewards go to members of the upper and middle classes and their children, and there is a widespread conviction that status is determined by one's innate intelligence or by the lack of it. More and more, Cohen believes (and he has a great deal of evidence to back up this belief), the bottom line is money. If you have it, you're okay; if you don't, you're not.

Aside from these general considerations, Cohen is especially disturbed by two books because he thinks they strongly represent the tendencies in society which he deplores. One of them is Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray's *The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life* (1994). This book sees innate intelligence as largely a matter of inheritance. If you are not born with it, there is little that can be done to improve your status in society. The other book to which Cohen takes special objection is Allan Bloom's *The Closing of the American Mind* (1987). He dislikes it, he says, because it asserts that "the knowledge of the mainstream Euro-American tradition is all that we need to know" (p. 4). Bloom does not admit that multicultural experience is important in America or anywhere else.

Many readers, certainly this one, would wish to see Cohen succeed in nearly all of his purposes, especially the one in which he argues that ethnic minorities and women ought to receive greater opportunities, especially in education and employment. He discusses in detail the unfairness of intelligence tests. Some authorities, while admitting that some questions on intelligence tests are unfair, have maintained that many of them are not and that it is possible to devise tests that would be roughly fair to all groups. Cohen argues, to the contrary, that it is impossible through any tests to compare the innate ability of one group with that of another. Comparisons must deal with matters of culture and education, and these are too complex to make any just comparisons possible. He does not argue that all people are equally innately intelligent, but he does argue that there is no means of determining whether any large group of people, including a "race" or a social class, is innately superior inferior in intelligence to another.

Cohen's belief in the innate equality of large groups of people—including non-Caucasian ethnic groups and women of all groups—leads him into the position of being a strong advocate of affirmative action, especially in admissions to colleges and universities and in opportunities for employment. Unlike some people who advocate affirmative action, Cohen has no objection to quotas. He sees them as necessary in bringing about a fairer distribution of the rewards of society.

Although he does not believe that any tests can determine the innate intelligence of people who are members of any large group, Cohen does have a suggestion to administrators and teachers on how to interpret such tests. They should assume, he says, that "white male scores" on intelligence tests will be high because of "the very nature of such tests." Accordingly, these scores should be "corrected" downward. "This isn't giving preference to others," he says; "it is removing a preference that is built into the tests" (p. 246). This is affirmative action with a vengeance. Cohen's solution to this problem is open to serious objections. He says nothing about whether an attempt should be made to determine whether some of the white males who made high scores might not have had any special "advantages." Would it not have been better to give preference to some members of ethnic minorities and to women for reasons other than their scores on intelligence tests?

Cohen has much less to say about the other book he objects to, Bloom's *Closing of the American Mind*. It is Bloom's objection, or at least indifference, to multicultural education rather than his emphasis on great works of philosophy and literature that troubles Cohen. He does not, it is true, think much of William Shakespeare, one of Bloom's favorites. He says of Shakespeare that his importance is "only so so" (p. 232).

As long as Cohen is arguing against the narrow interpretation that innate intelligence is almost wholly a matter of one's genes, I can enthusiastically agree with him. On the other hand, some of his remedies for our failures to recognize ability seem, at least to this reviewer, extreme.

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CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA

RONN PINEO and JAMES A. BAER, editors. *Cities of Hope: People, Protests, and Progress in Urbanizing Latin America, 1870–1930*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview of HarperCollins. 1998. Pp. xiv, 285. $74.00.

This anthology examines socioeconomic trends, popular protest, and social reform in ten Latin American cities during a period not only of urban growth but also of urban ascendancy. If the breakdown of the city-centered Spanish imperial apparatus had ruralized politics during the first half of the nineteenth century, the expansion of the commercial economy and the consolidation of central governments during the last third of the century restored cities to the preeminence they had enjoyed during colonial times. By 1900, Latin America was already the most urbanized region in the world outside Western Europe and the United States.

In the first chapter of the book, David Sowell argues that economic growth in Bogota during the period led not to the proletarianization and deskilling of the labor force but to an increase in the number of artisans, cottage industrialists, and wage laborers—a plausible claim, although the tables meant to support it are poorly designed or deal with dates outside the period in question. These changes, in turn, intensified formal and informal political participation particularly among the first two groups, something that preceded, and

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heralded, the populism of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. Though Sowell does not provide any figures about labor union or political party membership, it seems that one of Colombia's particularities lies precisely in the degree to which partisan popular mobilization surpassed, in quantity and intensity, autonomous working-class organization. It is impossible not to wonder how this may be related to the endemic violence of Colombian political culture. The author concludes by exculpating popular mobilization and blaming "the insistence by institutionalized leaders that nonelite interest be subordinated to their own" (p. 27), a generous but disingenuous dismissal of the masses' political impact in a chapter that had sustained the opposite until then.

Anton Rosenthal examines the impact of the electric trolley on Montevideo, a city that today is only one third as populous as Bogota but that in 1900 had almost three times as many inhabitants (267,000). The streetcar facilitated the creation of new public spaces and activities, from upper-class suburbs and beaches to soccer stadiums, tram stations, and the trolleys themselves. It increased class intermingling, the geographical mobility of the working class, and perhaps even their militancy; the first general strike in the city in 1911 and some of the main labor clashes that followed World War I began as trolley workers' strikes. José Batlle y Ordóñez's government, the first welfare state in the Western Hemisphere, often sided with the workers in these disputes with the two British and German-owned companies and prohibited any fare increase during the first thirty years of the tram. In general, Rosenthal convincingly argues, the streetcar acted as "a democratizing agent by extending the public space accessible to the lower class" (p. 41) and by fostering its political participation.

In his chapter on Mexico City, John Lear first describes a dichotomous workforce made up of a skilled and organized minority toiling in modern factories, urban transportation and utilities, and enlarged artisan workshops and a mass of casual laborers and domestics tied to an economy that retained, unlike that of industrial Monterrey, its commercial and service orientation. He then examines the elements that abetted alliances between these two groups: increased residential segregation, which presumably undermined traditional deference toward the wealthy and bolstered solidarity among the poor; nationalist resentment against foreign owners and managers; the increased organizational freedom brought forth by the Mexican Revolution; and mobilization around consumer issues, such as food and housing costs, that bridged the skilled/unskilled divide. To illustrate his general arguments, Lear adds—with mixed results—a narrative of the organization of the anarchist Casa del Pueblo Mundial, the first general strike in 1916, and the rent strike of 1922.

Rent strikes are the subject of the next two chapters. Andrew Grant Wood tells the fascinating story of how what began as a small group of prostitutes refusing to pay rent in a seedy waterfront neighborhood spread into a strike affecting half of Veracruz's population in 1922 and led to the first significant housing reform in Mexico. Wood attributes the success to the junction of tenants' grievances and the political opportunities offered by a sympathetic regional government similar to what Rosenthal views as the rather unusual case of a pro-worker state in Uruguay. Although the author does not deal with the issue, xenophobia may have been a cohesive element similar to that argued by Lear for Mexico City. Among the slogans shouted by protesters was "death to the Spanish landlords."

Buenos Aires, also a port city but twenty-five times more populous than Veracruz, provides the stage for James Baer's study of how pressure from groups as disparate as anarchist unions, Catholic reformers, the Socialist Party, and vote-seeking politicians of all stripes led to the passage of a law in 1921 that gave the federal government the right to limit rents. Though little noticed by historians, this law, Baer convincingly argues, represents a watershed in the transition from the municipal or private charity of the liberal regime to the social interventionism of the Peronist state. This chapter dovetails with the author's seminal work on the anarchist-inspired rent strike of 1907, perhaps the first of its kind in Latin America.

Compared to Buenos Aires and other dynamic cities of the Atlantic seaboard, fin-de-siècle Lima seemed a model of absolute stagnation and relative decline. The city was then about the same size as it had been in 1650, but it had descended from its position as the center of the Spanish empire in South America to eighth place in the region's urban rank. David Parker's chapter on the efforts of public officials to modernize the Peruvian capital is, thus, a story about failure. He describes this "civilizing" project as a mixture of pragmatic endeavors to improve sanitary and housing conditions for the poor and racist attempts to "Europeanize" or control them. Working-class responses were an equally ambiguous mix of rejection and acceptance of upper-class notions of hygiene, urbanity, and progress. Indeed, one of the most interesting sections of the chapter deals with anti-Chinese riots and the overlap of elite and popular Sinophobia.

By contrast to Lima, public health in Valparaiso, Ronn Pineo argues, should have been a success. The city was set in a salubrious temperate climate and in a country with the highest per capita income in Latin America in the late nineteenth century. Yet mortality in this prosperous Chilean port was two to three times higher than in Buenos Aires or São Paulo. Pineo finds a clear culprit for this unexpected failure: the local elite's lack of political will and its class and racial prejudices. His own description shows, however, that despite its name and climate, the city was far from a natural paradise. Escarpments restricted settlement to a narrow coastal zone, leading to one of the highest population densities in the world. The aridity of the area made the supply of potable water a difficult and expensive enterprise. But Pineo's argument does high-

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light the fact that improvements in public health depend not only on economic resources but also on the political process of allocating them. In this respect, the ruling groups in Valparaiso and Chile proved less responsive to popular needs than their counterparts in Montevideo, Veracruz, or Buenos Aires.

The same could be said for Rio de Janeiro, which Sam Adamo claims was "the deadliest city in the world," a distinction he unambiguously attributes to the class selfishness and racial prejudices of the Carioca elite. Yet, even if officials spent money combating diseases only to protect the well-to-do, as Adamo maintains, the fact remains that mortality declined and life expectancy increased dramatically during the period, something that can only occur if reforms affect the masses. Overall improvement, however, was accompanied by increased inequality. Up to 1920, death rates for blacks and whites had been equivalent, but as European immigrants improved their economic conditions while structural racism hindered Afro-Brazilians' advancement, the gap between them increased significantly.

Sharon Phillipps Collazos describes a different sort of racial gap: that between mestizo, Catholic natives and black, Protestant immigrants from the Anglophone Caribbean in Panama City and Colón. Beside these racial, religious, and linguistic differences, unequal access to employment widened the divide within the working class and hindered its organization. North American managers, despite their anti-black racism, preferred to hire West Indians instead of native Panamanians in the Canal Zone, where wages were higher than in the rest of the country. All of this led not so much to open conflict between the two groups as to hidden animosities and separation.

In the last chapter of the book, editors Pineo and Baer examine the factors that could explain the success or failure of urban social reform. Summarized, their conclusion may sound like a truism. Richer cities, with more democratic class (and racial) structures, better organized working classes, more responsive governments, and set in more salubrious areas fared much better. But a summary does not do justice to their rich and meaty analysis. As most anthologies, this one is uneven. But even the weakest essays offer valuable empirical details or analytic insights, and together they present a welcome mix of social and political history and a panorama of the region's urban working classes that goes beyond the workshop to deal with wider consumer issues.

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JOHN D. FRENCH and DANIEL JAMES, editors. *The Gendered Worlds of Latin American Women Workers: From Household and Factory to the Union Hall and Ballot Box*. (Comparative and International Working-Class History.) Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1997. Pp. viii, 320. Cloth $54.95, paper $17.95.

John D. French and Daniel James have edited a volume that removes all doubt, if there remain any doubters, of the poverty of *a priori* assumptions about working-class identity. This book represents a major contribution, even a milestone of sorts, for the new Latin American labor history that the editors have promoted and practiced, and it is certain to be widely read. All the essays highlight, albeit in different ways, the importance of culture in understanding the meaning of Latin American women workers' experience (just as it is important for understanding that of all groups and social classes) and add to it the gendered dimension of working-class life, the focus of the volume's concerns. The essays cover a broad range of Latin American nations (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, and Colombia) and diverse themes (domestic violence, feminism, workplace cultures, political behavior, and industrialists' gendered strategies of labor control and women's responses to them). In all the chapters, women's agency in Latin American working-class life and labor struggles has been restored, often movingly so. Cultures of patriarchy and women's struggles to overcome them are perhaps the volume's leitmotif, and the authors employ a wealth of documentation and fresh perspectives to demolish long-standing misconceptions about working-class identity in Latin America.

The book's power resides in its ability to weave into a coherent whole the diverse experiences of women from a part of the world characterized by great social, political, racial, and ethnic diversity and to persuade us of the inextricable dynamic of gender and class. The penetrating introduction reviews the scholarship of the last decade and persuasively argues that gender should occupy a prominent place in histories of Latin American labor. Subsequent essays, including excellent ones by James and French themselves, all explore gender "as a social process of construction in which meaning is ascribed to sexual difference, which is reproduced by and within institutions (such as the family, factory, or polity) that generate and sustain gender hierarchies and patriarchal ideologies." The emphasis on oral history, memory, and the discursive construction of identity offers original insights on Latin American working-class experience that will broaden this book's appeal to those whose scholarship lies outside the Latin American field. All of the chapters are extremely interesting, and each represents an important advance for Latin American labor history. In addition to those of James and French, the volume contains chapters by Mirta Lobato, Barbara Weinstein, Theresa R. Veccia, Ann Farnsworth-Alvear, Mary Lynn Pedersen Cluff, Deborah Levenson-Estrada, Thomas M. Klubock, and Heidi Tinsman.

Indeed, the quality of the scholarship is such that collectively the essays may even help to restore vitality to what is currently a rather uninspired field within the academy. The last decade and a half have not been good for labor history and labor historians. Although once a vibrant area of research that attracted some of

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the best minds, where was to be found some of the most interesting scholarship among professional historians, labor history has seemed to lose its way in the ideological and political upheavals at the end of the twentieth century. Latin Americanists were latecomers to the field, with little work of quality being done before the mid-1980s, a fact that might explain its current popularity among a younger generation of Latin Americanists in the United States. Although Latin Americanist labor historians have yet to produce a large body of scholarship and their work initially tended to be derivative of the theoretical orientations and historiographic traditions of the dominant European and North American regions, they have of late managed to produce studies of interest and originality. This is such a book. Few volumes so powerfully convey the complexities of working-class life and so convincingly expose the poverty of deterministic theories of working identity.

The quality of the essays, however, is not necessarily an endorsement for the faintly prescriptive aspirations that the editors express in their introduction. They begin by noting John Womack's 1979 bibliographic essay of Mexican labor and the agenda he suggested for the research and writing of Latin American labor and working-class history. The priority that Womack gave to questions of production, they argue correctly, did not turn out to be the concern of the next two decades of scholarship on Latin American labor history. It remains to be seen whether this will continue to hold true. For one thing, the editors fail to recognize (are themselves unaware?) that many of the preoccupations of the new Latin American labor history reflect the concerns of North American academic culture, subsumed in those of the broader national culture. The neglected state of gendered Latin American labor studies simply reflects the relatively small numbers of scholars working in the Latin American field and the usual delay before new concerns are taken up. Moreover, it is hardly a neglected field now. A more important point is what we lose with an emphasis on identity rather than production. Among historians in Latin America, it should be noted, there is considerably less enthusiasm for the explanatory powers of gender as a category of analysis than there is among North American historians (the volume, revealingly, has only one Latin American contributor, the Argentine historian Mirta Lobato). That sentiment, of course, could simply reflect Latin American cultural biases, but I suspect that there is a real intellectual dilemma here, a choice about what better helps us to explain the tremendous social inequalities, horrific violence, and political instability of so much of twentieth-century Latin America. The agenda Womack raised twenty years ago of labor processes, technology, markets, business, and, to use an old-fashioned but still useful term, industrial relations still poses vital and unexplored questions in that respect. Such questions may attract the interest of an emerging generation of Latin American labor historians, both here in the United States and especially in Latin America, since they are essential to identifying and explaining the issue of power, which this volume is less satisfying in addressing. In that respect, this admirable collection of essays might be considered one approach to Latin American labor history and a retrospective one, a first wave of scholarship rather than the paradigm for researching and writing working-class history that its editors seem to suggest that it is.

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SAMUEL O. REGALADO. *Viva Baseball! Latin Major Leaguers and Their Special Hunger.* (Sport and Society.) Champaign: University of Illinois Press. 1998. Pp. xvi, 224. Cloth $39.95, paper $16.95.

Samuel O. Regalado has written a passionate analysis of the history of the more than 500 Latin Americans who have played in the major leagues since 1871 and the countless others who made the journey but never made the big leagues. This is a very timely book, particularly given the recent outstanding performance of Dominican Sammy Sosa, who hit sixty-six home runs in 1998. Regalado is himself of Mexican-American ancestry, and his uncle Rudy played in the majors in the early 1950s. This revised doctoral dissertation is a lively and anecdotal history of the struggles of Latin American ballplayers to succeed in *El Norte*.

Nearly all the Latin ballplayers grew up in poverty and turned to baseball as a means to get ahead. This required them to travel and work in a foreign land where virtually no one spoke their language, and where they could not communicate in English. They struggled with loneliness. Many could not read menus to order food. They came without contracts and with, for those who came from Cuba after the revolution, the likelihood of never returning home. Latin players before 1947 were often barred by the color line. Then after that barrier was lifted, recruits encountered American racism.

The first Latin American ballplayer was Esteben Bellan (reportedly of African descent), who played in the National Association from 1871 to 1873. The next was Colombian Luis Castro, who was recruited off the campus of Manhattan College. A turning point came in 1911, when the Cincinnati Reds brought in two Cubans, ostensibly of Castilian heritage, and thereafter light-skinned players, particularly Cubans, were regularly recruited. Regalado gives insufficient credit to Clark Griffith, manager of Cincinnati, and later owner of the Washington Senators, who was more active in recruiting Latins than anyone else, a tradition continued by his son Calvin.

Regalado empathizes with the hunger for success that drove Latin American athletes seeking to escape poverty and the struggles they encountered in a foreign country. It would be interesting to examine how their experience compared to that of American-born Latin

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players. He does an outstanding job of examining acculturation problems, player-management relations, and discrimination. Regalado found that black Latin players could receive better treatment than black Americans simply by speaking Spanish. He discovered considerable prejudice among the major league teams. In the mid-1950s, when the Yankees still had no African-American players, they refused to promote Vic Power, a star prospect from Cuba, because they questioned his private life. Considerable attention is devoted to men like Minnie Minoso and Tony Oliva, who carried the double burden of race and nationality, and to proud stars Roberto Clemente and Orlando Cepeda, who were often misunderstood by contemporary journalists. Perhaps the highlight of the book is an illuminating analysis of Fernandomania.

Regalado examined various archival sources including the National Baseball Hall of Fame Library in Cooperstown and the *Sporting News* in St. Louis. In addition, he interviewed about twenty-five prominent Latin American baseball stars. The book includes a brief survey of Latin American baseball history that probably should have been expanded. Louis Perez's important *Journal of American History* article of the influence of baseball on Cuban revolutionaries is not cited, nor Alan M. Klein's recently published, *Baseball on the Border: A Tale of Two Laredos* (1997), an ethnographic study with a lot on the history of Mexican baseball. There are only a couple of minor errors, but I question the author's judgment that Jackie Robinson's entrance into organized baseball did not immediately change the status of African Americans in baseball (although teams admittedly integrated slowly). I hope this fine book gets the broad readership it richly deserves.

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DONALD HARMAN AKENSON. *If the Irish Ran the World: Montserrat, 1630–1730.* (The Joanne Goodman Lectures.) Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. 1997. Pp. x, 273. Cloth $55.00, paper $22.95.

If the Irish ran the world, things (that is, history "done" to them by England) would have turned out differently. Donald Harman Akenson investigates this saying, heard in many a Dublin pub, by putting under the microscope a small Caribbean island, Montserrat. The majority of that island's white inhabitants were Irish; indeed, Akenson rather grandly describes Montserrat as "Ireland's only seventeenth- and eighteenth-century colony" (p. 42).

The professor's laboratory findings make compelling reading. More than a history of just another Caribbean island, Akenson's book is presented as a piece-by-puzzle-piece detective story. Akenson recounts Montserrat's colonial history from those sources that have not been lost to hurricanes, earthquakes, piracy, French invasions, or administrative ineptitude. He leads his readers through the historian's craft of induction, extrapolation, and speculation with the skill of a master detective. The writing style is at once sharply incisive and pleasantly conversational (reflecting the book's origins as the 1997 Joanne Goodman Lectures at the University of Western Ontario). The book's playful title disguises a wealth of scholarship. Akenson blends colorful narrative with persistent analysis and argumentation throughout a 187-page text, two appendixes that examine the island's censuses of 1678 and 1729, and forty-nine pages of endnotes as interesting and valuable as the text. This book could profitably be used as assigned reading in an undergraduate or graduate class on the historian's craft.

Akenson's primary purpose is to reconstruct and interpret the first century (1630–1730) of the settler history of this small island in the Leewards, northwest of Barbados. Montserrat's growing majority, the African slaves, play a key role in his story, but Akenson purposely brings them only intermittently into the foreground. As the island's diversified (mostly tobacco) economy shifted to one of sugar and slaves, the population changed from a majority of free Europeans to a large majority of African slaves. In 1678, three-fifths of the island's 4,500 inhabitants were white, two-thirds of them Irish Catholics; by 1729, only one-fifth of the 7,200 population was white, half of them Irish. (By 1850, only two percent of the total population was white: 150 of 7,100 persons.)

It is within this shifting demographic context that Akenson offers us many important new findings about the mostly Irish settler community. The initial immigrants were refugees from Ireland's turbulent seventeenth century, displaced persons of various economic and ethnic (Gaelic, Old English, New English) strata. Diversity is stressed: contrary to stereotype, Montserrat's Irish were not slaves in white skins; rather, indentured servitude represented upward mobility, new hope in a new world. Those Irish who did not prosper tended to move on to elsewhere in the Caribbean or to British North America. Many of those who stayed proved in politics and religion to be "very adaptable men" (p. 96), going along to get ahead. Forging a new life on this tiny, largely Irish Catholic island in an English Protestant sea of empire, especially after 1688, required considerable pragmatism and flexibility. Intra-Irish tensions between rich and poor surfaced occasionally, but Montserrat's Irish, like the British, found common cause in the extermination of the native Caribs and the brutalization of the slaves on the increasingly Africanized island. Many Irish families were slaveowning and earned a reputation for treating their human property harshly; indeed, in the early nineteenth century, more so than Montserrat's slaveowning British, they resisted the trend toward humanitarianism and emancipation. Throughout, the Catholic Church had little doctrinal or cultural influence (the island had no priest till 1756), and the Church of England was noticeably more active in lobbying for improved treatment of the enslaved majority. In sum, on Britain's most Irish Caribbean island,

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the Irish, long "imperialized" (Akenson's word) in Ireland, themselves evolved into strong imperialists, "choosing to do unto others what others [England] had already done unto them" (p. 175).

This remarkable book is appealing on many levels. A primer on the historian's craft and a colonial history of a Caribbean island, it also offers insights in other areas. Akenson notes repeatedly that we cannot understand the empire's periphery without knowing as well the events in the metropole (London and Ireland). Thus, the author makes valuable excursions into Irish history, where he stakes a claim in its revisionist historiographical debates. Arguing against the theory of Ireland's "exceptionalism" (that its people are special, saintly, passive victims), Akenson finds the Montserrat Irish involved in much proactive behavior for good or ill. The author's anti-victimhood stance echoes trends in American Indian history and also fits the lines of argument one encounters in Keith Jeffrey's recent edited book, *'An Irish Empire'? Aspects of Ireland and the British Empire* (1996). Akenson's book also offers American colonial historians suggestive lines of inquiry. For example, what happened to those Irish, notoriously difficult to track, who left Montserrat for the North American mainland? Surely some of these Montserrat emigrants, or their descendants, must have trekked across the Appalachians, subduing Native Americans, in defiance of the king's proclamation of 1763. These new American Irish, who carried the family legacy of taming Caribs and Africans, were now moving well beyond the reach of London's political control and policies of humanitarianism.

In conclusion, from the evidence in this book, the answer to Akenson's question, "If the Irish ran the world," is that the Irish could be as swashbucklingly imperialist and racially oppressive as any other European people. Neither special nor saintly, these Caribbean Irish were simply a part of that expansionist, globalizing capitalism that earlier had swallowed up their homeland and now extended its reach into even such tiny crevices as a tropical island called Montserrat.

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RODERICK A. MCDONALD, editor. *West Indies Accounts: Essays on the History of the British Caribbean and the Atlantic Economy in Honour of Richard Sheridan*. Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies. 1996. Pp. xvi, 388.

For the most part, this collection is a valuable contribution to Caribbean historiography. The authors are drawn from the Caribbean, the United States, Canada, and Britain, and their disciplines embrace history, economics, and economic history. The majority of these essays reflect the breadth of Richard Sheridan's interest in the Caribbean as scholar, writer, and teacher throughout his academic career. Initially, Sheridan's focus was on the economic history of the British Caribbean and the Atlantic slave trade, and this saw its most mature expression in *Sugar and Slavery: An Economic History of the British West Indies, 1623–1775* (1974). This is a work of profound scholarship and reflection, treating largely the then prevailing discourse on the profitability of the sugar colonies to the British. In this and other publications, Sheridan corroborated and buttressed the major conclusions in Eric Williams's *Capitalism and Slavery* (1944). Walter Minchinton's essay in this volume, "Abolition and Emancipation: Williams, Drescher and the Continuing Debate" (pp. 253–73), is most welcome in bringing us up to date on the discourse that Williams's work has continued to generate.

But Sheridan soon widened his focus from the predominantly external, export-oriented dimensions of the sugar industry to include also its internal features involving the participation of the slave population in the domestic economy. This is a subject that is now being recognized, and it is gratifying to note that most of the contributors of this volume have come to realize the importance of this aspect of Caribbean history.

It seems fitting that we give the editor of these essays, Roderick A. McDonald, at least a passing glance. In reading his excellent pioneer work, *The Economy And Material Culture of Slaves: Goods and Chattels on the Sugar Plantations of Jamaica and Louisiana* (1993), I wondered not only how a North American scholar came to choose such a topic but also at his sympathetic understanding and mastery of the subject matter. McDonald supplies the answer in this book when he declares his intellectual debts to Sheridan, who was his tutor and mentor as a graduate student at the University of Kansas (p. lx). McDonald's book is a reflection of the influence that a good teacher can have on a student, and although the gracious Sheridan might not quite agree with Henry Adams when he exclaimed that "a teacher affects eternity," he might, however, acknowledge that he "can never tell where his influence stops." I hope that Sheridan's indefatigable scholarship, balanced judgement, and sympathetic understanding will continue to influence Caribbean historiography into "eternity."

MAVIS C. CAMPBELL
Amherst College

BONHAM C. RICHARDSON. *Economy and Environment in the Caribbean: Barbados and the Windwards in the late 1800s*. Foreword by DAVID LOWENTHAL. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 1998. Pp. xvii, 294. $49.95.

I have been away from Caribbean studies for more than a decade, but I recall well Bonham C. Richardson's earlier work, *Panama Money in Barbados, 1900–1920* (1985), which combined oral history with more conventional sources. The idea was to capture participants' perspectives on the great labor migration to build the Panama Canal. The approach was novel, but if the book had a theoretical point, I cannot remember

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it. I doubt, however, that such will be the case when I think about this book some years from now. Here the way the facts are framed and interpreted makes a very forceful impression.

The story begins in the 1880s and unfolds in the first decade of this century. Britain's Caribbean colonies found themselves under great stress because of falling sugar prices. Richardson studies the effects across four islands—Barbados, Grenada, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent—the latter three members of the Windward group. Several key differences allow for something approximating controlled comparisons.

Richardson uses his comparative method to good effect. Central to his success is the report of the 1897 West India Royal Commission. Its members, sent out on a fact-finding mission and charged with recommending new economic policies, returned home with a rich collection of testimony about conditions on each of the islands. Answers to the commission's questions provide evidence of diverse strategies for coping with the economic depression. In addition, they enable Richardson to put a human face on the period's grim statistics.

Richardson's theoretical framework is ecological. A human ecology, whether current or historic, centers on issues of adaptability. These tend to reveal themselves most clearly in instances of stress. Appropriately, then, Richardson's account begins with a description of the economic depression that struck the Eastern Caribbean in 1884 when European beet sugar began flooding the London market. The result in the islands included steep declines in income, massive unemployment, and sporadic outbreaks of violence. Richardson attributes the neglect that allowed conditions to deteriorate so far in part to British "socioclimatology." The idea, longstanding throughout Europe, was that the peoples of the tropics had fewer needs and more ample means of subsistence than those residing in temperate regions. His chapter on climate contrasts this folk belief with the stark realities, including the hurricane of 1898, which compounded economic distress with physical destruction.

Contrasts are central to Richardson's book. He compares how communities responded to their plight on the high islands and lowlands. He looks at groups situated on intensely cultivated landscapes as opposed to those in forested areas and compares agro-industrial workers to small holders farming mainly on their own account. This is not simply a matter of counterposing Barbados and the Windwards. The discussion, which leads from physical environment through demographics and social attitudes, documents how the islands' inhabitants of generations gone by wrought environments profoundly affecting communities later in unintended ways. The system Richardson describes is at once global, local, physical, social, and ideological.

Richardson's exploration of seasonality, nutrition, morbidity, and mortality points to continuities with the islands' past. At the same time, the author stresses discontinuities and most prominently the increased economic and cultural diversification that came with emancipation and accelerated with economic distress. Richardson, a geographer, amply represents the understandings of the human-land relationship current in his profession. The tensions between global and local influences work out in various economic strategies that alter the physical environment and thus the very platform from which the next generation must cope. The landscape itself is cultural and dynamic, as much so as technology or any other aspect of human life.

There are some things not to like about the book. The tables are not always well constructed. The book contains eleven period photographs, but several of them are too murky to be very instructive. Richardson's repeated assertion that poor blacks were active agents in the islands' history is by now an orthodoxy and thus comes across as somewhat patronizing.

The virtues of this book render its faults trivial, however. Richardson illuminates a dim chapter of West Indian history using oral testimonies, strategic comparisons, and well-crafted narrative all to good effect. There is in addition a rich theoretical perspective that deserves study quite apart from the story of the islands and their problems. One can learn a great deal from this book about how to write ecological history.

Robert Dirks
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Robin D. Moore. *Nationalizing Blackness:* Afrocubanismo *and Artistic Revolution in Havana, 1920–1940.* (Pitt Latin American Series.) Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1997. Pp. xii, 320. Cloth $45.00, paper $19.95.

A major contribution to Cuban Studies and, more broadly, to the historiography of American popular culture, this book examines transculturated "images of Afrohispanic fusion" from a time when Euro-American modernisms encouraged many Cuban intellectuals to reimagine their country's national identity in relation to race. Although Robin D. Moore frequently refers to Cuban poetry and painting, his primary interest is in the music of modern presocialist Cuba. Deploying an interdisciplinary methodology that links musicology with oral history, cultural anthropology, and postcolonial theory, Moore compellingly narrates Afrocuban music's circuitous journey from the cultural margins of an intensely negrophobic society that repeatedly banned African-derived musical forms to the national (and international) mass media. With its detailed bibliography, its appendixes, and its glossary, the book is a wellspring of information about an under-researched period in Cuban history. Moore's claim that early twentieth-century Cuban nationalism was not the exclusive province of a small cultural elite is convincingly substantiated in seven hefty, but very readable, chapters. We encounter the art music of conservatory-trained, avant-garde composers along-

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side the work of famed black middle-class musicians, such as Rita Montaner, and testimony from underclass Afrocubans who performed music and dance in the religious rituals of Santería and in carnival bands. Because of the difficulties of conducting research in today's Cuba, first-hand accounts from the interviews Moore conducted in Havana with surviving black performers are unfortunately more limited than either reader or author would have wished. But the results of Moore's work in Cuba's National Archive, the José Martí National Library, and a number of Havana museums and research centers compensates amply. Poring over reams of Cuban newspapers and magazines, from the conservative *El Diario de la Marina* to the Afrocuban publication *Adelante*, also yielded fascinating visual material. The reproduced images, thirty-seven in all, range from nineteenth-century sketches of Havana street life and later paintings of rumba-dancing mulatas to photographs of singers in blackface and portraits of early twentieth-century Cuban bands. One only wishes that Moore had devoted more analytical time to these period pieces.

Moore's discussions of early twentieth-century debates over musical and other Africanisms are ever careful to incorporate earlier historical phenomena, for instance in chapter one, which charts the social "progress" of the Cuban *danzón*, a mid-nineteenth-century ballroom dance genre. A particularly interesting aspect of these controversial debates is the role of the emergent black professional classes, whose cultural conservatism often outstripped that of their white counterparts. The members of exclusive black clubs in Havana were positively horrified at the thought of listening to *sones* and of dancing rumbas, and even after African-derived musical forms had gained wider acceptance, many upper-class Afrocubans continued to regard them as "degenerate." European-derived musical genres, such as the waltz and the fox trot, dominated the scene, from Cuban parlors to the popular theater shows on which chapter two concentrates. Moore's comments on Cuba's *teatro vernáculo*, or comic theater, a poorly documented tradition in music and dance that dates back to the 1860s, seem indebted to Eric Lott's work on blackface minstrelsy and the American working class, even though the bibliography does not list *Love and Theft: Blackface Minstrelsy and the American Working Class* (1993). Theorizing popular Cuban theater as "a forum of symbolic negotiation, a bounded artistic space in which concepts of cubanidad . . . were slowly defined in the national consciousness" (pp. 41–42), Moore concludes that these performances disseminated mixed messages of nationalist sentiment *and* racial bias. Similar dualities emerge from chapter three's discussion of "Comparsas and Carnival in the New Republic," which intervenes in ongoing controversies about carnival's subversive qualities by striking a cautionary note. Instead of following theories of Caribbean carnival's counter-discursive rebelliousness, Moore portrays the *Día de Reyes* (Kings' Day) carnival as an uneasy combination of resistance and accommodation whose oppositional potential has been systematically coopted in twentieth-century Cuba.

The last three chapters highlight the *son* and the rumba as each investigates, from different angles, how and why syncretic cultural forms developed in Cuban music and art. According to official rhetoric, the *son* was Cuba's antidote to American jazz. It also, Moore informs us, had the distinction of being among the first working-class musics to benefit from modern forms of communication. But if phonograph records and the radio, which, in the 1920s, made Afrocuban *sones* available to all Cubans and enabled black and mulatto singers to enter elite homes over the airwaves, these technologies also facilitated the music industry's exploitation of the same musicians. Although a relatively short-lived phenomenon, the "rumba craze" of the 1930s, which followed in the footsteps of the popularization of the *son*, consolidated Afrocuban music's position of international commercial fame.

This book is, overall, a nuanced study of processes of *transculturación* (in Fernando Ortiz's coinage) within a historical framework of racial inequality and class struggle. In addition to encouraging (ethno)musicologists to venture into cultural history, Moore makes a generous offering to postcolonial studies of hybridity by discussing cultural change in ways attentive to race and class issues. Beyond Cuba, Moore's study serves as a sobering corrective to Alain Locke's hope, in *The New Negro* (1925), that the nationalistic "acceptance" and symbolic privileging of black culture, in music and elsewhere in the arts, would go a long way toward remedying racial injustice.

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JORGE G. CASTAÑEDA. *Compañero: The Life and Death of Che Guevara*. Translated by MARINA CASTAÑEDA. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1997. Pp. xvii, 457. $30.00.

A generation of students in Europe and North and South America made Ernesto Che Guevara a cultural and political symbol of their struggle against the Vietnam War and their search for justice and equality during the 1960s and early 1970s. Today, he remains the inspiration of Latin American youth seeking social justice. In a biographical *tour de force*, Jorge G. Castañeda intricately weaves together sources from four continents and produces an analysis of the political and social landscape that surrounded Che, details his actions, provides alternative explanations, and subtly hints at his psychology without going beyond the evidence. In doing so, Castañeda captures the essence of how Che became a political force and why his legacy continues to grow. Che's popularity came with the victory of the Cuban revolution; his immortality began with his death in Bolivia.

Castañeda painstakingly details Che's childhood, providing new insights via his sensitive interviews with

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family members and friends. He notes the young Che's own high level of sensitivity and the early departures from the conventional choices made by his less idealistic upper middle-class counterparts. At first, he expressed that propensity through rebellious slovenly clothing. Partly as a reaction to the death of his paternal grandmother, Ana Lynch, and because he wanted to lessen the suffering experienced by victims of asthma (a disease from which he too suffered), Che entered medical school. He soon shocked his relatively conservative fellow students by delivering a prolonged and passionate protest against the inequality of urban versus rural medical services. Meanwhile, a desire to escape the constraining influences of Buenos Aires grew within him. Throughout his youth, Che had exhibited a high level of curiosity about the world, "a thirst for adventure, for new knowledge" (p. 43). Now he acted on it. He went to Bolivia, where he encountered the realities of a poverty beyond the imaginings derived from reading, and his interests turned toward revolutionary politics.

From the beginning and throughout his career, the values and inspiration that drove Che were obvious to his compatriots and became his legacy to those who came later; "the future belongs to all countries who struggle . . . for peace in the world and for justice, distributed among all human beings" (p. 186). The Guatemalan episode is covered with a synthesis of information that lends itself to the author's insights regarding Che's state of mind when he met Fidel Castro. Each realized that the other was something out of the ordinary. While training in Mexico for guerrilla warfare in Cuba, Che challenged his asthma in repeated unsuccessful efforts to climb Popocatepetl. His bravery and self-discipline continually impressed those around him, and Castro gave him command of a guerrilla column in time for the dramatic victory over the army of Fulgencia Batista, which received inadequate backing from the U.S.

Che's tenure as the director of the national bank is told with new insight. He played a central role in reorganizing the economy. Together, Che and Castro shared long nights planning agrarian reform. During the early phase, it was Che who saw the socialist bloc as the preferred model for Cuban development, but, by 1963, as he became disenchanted with centralized administration and the "failed" industrialization program, Castro moved ever closer to the Soviet Union. By now, Che was at the high point of his worldwide popularity. Visits with famous revolutionaries like Ahmed Ben Bella and Mao Zedong and with progressive nationalists like Gamal Abdel Nasser, combined with his confrontations with American leaders at international conferences, caused the world press to follow him. His charismatic speeches in Havana and those delivered as a guest in new countries born of revolution earned him even more fame and popularity. By the mid-1960s, his calls for worldwide uprisings, "many Vietnams," in order to defeat colonialism and the American empire gave him legendary status.

In 1965, unhappy with developments in Cuba but never breaking with Castro, Che went to Congo to assist in the struggle against the Belgians. The incapacities of Laurent Kabila and of the Cuban and rebel troops resulted in a fiasco. The fateful Bolivian campaign followed. Castañeda explains the decision to enter Bolivia in terms of options, but he also goes back to Che's depth of feeling about one of his most profound experiences and his resolution to die on the battlefield: "We must overcome the fatalism that is so widespread among the peoples of Latin American countries, in the sense that it is impossible to fight against American imperialism" (p. 190).

Che ended up on T-shirts, wall posters, in bookstores, and in the graffiti of the slums of Latin America's big cities. But he is also in the small towns. I have seen him on the walls of rooms in rural Mexico. As Castañeda points out, he is found almost everywhere, as are his ideas and ideals. Castañeda explains how the myth of Che Guevara replaced the man. That he does so with depth, passion, and eloquence make this book among the very best that I have read. To use a contemporary phrase, it is "as good as it gets."

JOHN MASON HART
University of Houston

TERRY RUGELEY. *Yucatán's Maya Peasantry and the Origins of the Caste War*. Austin: University of Texas Press. 1996. Pp. xix, 242. Cloth $40.00, paper $19.95.

This is a very fine example of "bottom up" history wherein indigenous beliefs, attitudes, and problems surface by means of Terry Rugeley's compelling narrative. Anyone interested in Yucatecan history or Mexico's early republic should read this excellent study.

Rugeley's book contains a wealth of detail concerning socioeconomic development. Particularly well researched are religious institutions. There is also a very thorough discussion of administrative and fiscal matters. Here one understands how the church became involved with land and labor systems. There is little doubt that the Maya peasants resented taxes and labored under miserable conditions; this motivated many of them to oppose privileges.

This study illuminates the realities of the Maya world. Particularly useful is the analysis of the local *batab* leaders, whom the author portrays masterfully. Rugeley illustrates his points with compelling descriptions of local incidents as well as individuals. He succeeds in describing the Maya as aggressive and able to mobilize when conditions allowed them to resist further injustices. An unusual feature of this work is its emphasis upon critical villages that provided the spawning grounds for the caste war. The previously shadowy backgrounds of Cecilio Chi and Jacinto Pat are clarified within the context of local history.

In assigning causes for the caste war, Rugeley traces its root causes back to the colonial era. One can summarize his overall thesis as being that the decline

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of colonial institutions such as the church enabled insurrectionaries to revolt. Rugeley's study provides a novel insight into the independence-era convulsions. It can be seen, for example, that the 1812 Spanish constitution inspired many indigenous communities to demand equality and lighter taxes. Once the church could not collect the hated obvention taxes, its ability to pay a large staff of gravediggers and others became seriously threatened. Landowners immediately challenged the church's land and labor assets so that new sugar plantations could participate in the regional economy. Rugeley argues that in seeking autonomy, the local elites invited catastrophe by arming Maya villagers and promising to end traditional taxes. When whites fought among themselves and forgot their earlier offers to the Maya, who had backed them during several conflicts after 1839, the caste war erupted.

Rugeley's thesis of continuity rather than sudden violence is grounded in very thorough archival research. Most of the primary sources utilized emanate from the Archivo General del Estado. There Rugeley mined the Fondo Colonial, Poder Ejecutivo, and clerical records. Anyone who sifts through notarial data deserves acknowledgement.

Inevitably, this book invites comparison to Nelson Reed's legendary 1964 study. Although not all students who have taken my Mexico course shared my enthusiasm for Reed, most appreciated his wonderful insights. Certainly Rugeley has dug deeper into the Yucatecan past and provides more lucid explanations instead of Reed's constant machete chops. Reed is more readable but not necessarily more satisfying.

In spite of its many wonderful offerings, Rugeley's book contains a few problems. Although he strives to clarify the role of the indigenous community, the religious aspect of Maya culture receives little attention. Rugeley does not mention the 1843 *convenios* between the Yucatecan elite and the national government which provide the key explanation for the subsequent Yucatecan declaration of independence. The book does not tie Yucatecans very well into national or international issues, markets, and conflicts. Very little about the nearby British or Cuban presence emerges. The bibliography indicates that several key secondary sources are overlooked.

And there are minor irritants. The constant use of the term "we" is irritating. I still remember very traditional professors declaring "we know this" or "we have just discovered" and feeling as though a crass professionalism had reared its head. Rugeley refers to "Hispanic resentment" of the briefly described U.S. invasion of Mexico. Of course, Hispania is a Roman term that refers to Spain, not Mexico. Finally, Domingo Barrett can hardly be considered a "revolutionary governor." One would think a John Hart student would understand completely the real meaning of revolutionary as opposed to rebel.

In sum, this is an excellent addition to the social and regional history of nineteenth-century Mexico. Solidly written and researched thoroughly on the basis of hard work in Yucatecan archives, it is also a book that interested students will enjoy.

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PAUL VANDERWOOD. *The Power of God against the Guns of Government: Religious Upheaval in Mexico at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1998. Pp. xi, 409. Cloth $65.00, paper $24.95.

General Porfirio Díaz ruled Mexico unchallenged for over three decades (1876–1911), until a revolution led by Francisco I. Madero overthrew him in 1911. The most difficult years for Díaz occurred between 1890 and 1895, when the combination of an economic depression, brought on by an international financial crisis, and a severe drought caused widespread rural discontent and gave rise to a series of short-lived rebellions in the countryside. One of these upheavals took place in Tomochic, a village in the sierras of western Chihuahua in the northernmost reaches of the nation. There, in the waning days of 1891 and most of 1892, calling upon the blessings of folk saint Teresa Urrea, known also as Teresa de Cabora, a small contingent of *tomochitecos* (residents of Tomochic) ambushed, humiliated, held off, and eventually succumbed to the Mexican Army. The army mercilessly besieged the village and massacred its entire population.

Tomochic and Santa Teresa took on mythical status. Much like the contemporary Canudos incident in northeast Brazil (which spawned Euclides da Cunha's classic *Rebellion in the Backlands* [1944]), the tragic event has had its novelists, chroniclers, and historians. Paul Vanderwood strips away the myth and puts Tomochic in historical context. To him, the events that led to violence and tragedy were part of a larger struggle. The story of Tomochic is the "chronicle of a people trying to make sense of a rapidly changing world that both seduces and repels them, forcing them to weigh their time proven customary ways of life and belief against . . . dynamic . . . forces labeled 'modern'" (p. 15). But Vanderwood does not discount the myth of Tomochic or the obvious drama surrounding its participants, a teenage folk saint, heroic country people, evil petty tyrants, and a ruthless dictator. He thus examines both how "a small group of religiously inspired but otherwise quite ordinary farmers . . . embarked upon a death struggle with the Mexican government" and "how that story is remembered and has seeped into the public consciousness" (p. 15).

Vanderwood provides us with glimpses and insights into the everyday world of the sierrans, so as to have us understand why they rose in protest. *Tomochitecos* mulled over, accepted, and resisted transformations wrought by the liberal reform of mid-century (most importantly, the end of collective landholding and the

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secularization of many formerly religious functions, such as marriage and education) and the "order and progress" of the Díaz era (the commercialization of agriculture and the regimentation of work). The religion of the Catholic Church provided little solace or direction for these tormented struggles. *Tomochitecos* understood and believed Christian doctrine but clung also to their faith in magic, witches, saints, and nature's occult. Sierrans in times of stress turned to their folkways and, thus, to Santa Teresa.

Tomochitecos subsisted mostly on small plots of an acre or two. Mining provided additional work to supplement their incomes; by mid-century, about half the young men toiled at least part of the year in the mines. Women were often left at home to manage their families and property, while the men were away at the mining camps. Although residents were not separated by large variations in wealth, there were differences in status and influence. Tomochic was hardly idyllic, for "complaining and backbiting, threats and reprisals were all part of daily life" (p. 94). There were political cliques, which contested nastily for control over tax monies and local law and order.

Vanderwood's reconstruction of the military actions and subsequent negotiations, told mostly from official documents, is compelling. He also leads us through the lives of the protagonists—Santa Teresa, the extraordinary healer, and Cruz Chávez, who led the faithful in rebellion—and the antagonists—Joaquín Chávez, the petty tyrant, entrepreneur-policeman, and Lauro Carrillo, the ineffective governor—with terse, vivid descriptions.

The research for the book is unparalleled. Vanderwood has carefully examined the state and local archives of northern Mexico, especially in Chihuahua. He has also traveled widely in the region, absorbing the attitudes and perceptions of the people. Vanderwood has a reporter's eye, not an anthropologist's. It is quite clear that he has spent considerable time among the sierrans and has enormous empathy for their world view. Unlike the anthropologists who have studied the western sierras of Chihuahua, Vanderwood reveals his "feel" for the people in his writing. The book is a good read.

To his credit, Vanderwood does not center his narrative or analysis of Tomochic as a precursor of the revolution of 1910. He is interested in a larger phenomenon, country people struggling to adapt to a changing world that they neither made nor welcomed. The *Tomochitecos* vowed in life and in death that they would obey "None but the justice of God." They sacrificed themselves to the inevitability of progress.

MARK WASSERMAN
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ADRIAN A. BANTJES. *As If Jesus Walked on Earth: Cardenismo, Sonora, and the Mexican Revolution*. (Latin American Silhouettes: Studies in History and Culture.) Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources. 1998. Pp. xix, 320. $50.00.

Readers will learn little about Lázaro Cárdenas's religious proclivities from this book by Adrian A. Bantjes, but they will find a cogent analysis of the encounter of twentieth-century Mexico's most remarkable progressive political movement, Cardenismo, with popular and not-so-popular forces in a regional setting. Despite its suggestive title and the author's purposeful evocation of "multivocality" and "agency," in its methodology and presentation the book is a thoroughly conventional political history of the interaction between the Cárdenas regime and its friends and foes in Sonora: the church and popular religion, conservative landed and military elements, indigenous groups like the Maya and the Yaqui, political ins and outs, and organized (and disorganized) workers and peasants. Some readers will no doubt be disappointed that this work is devoid of the linguistic mystification, jargonism, subjectivity, and theoretical abstraction that it otherwise might have had. Instead, Bantjes has written an objective, accessible, well-documented regional history that will find a broad and receptive audience among students and specialists alike.

Cárdenas's purge of Callistas from the state government in 1935 and 1936 had the unintended effect of facilitating General Ramón Yocupicio's rise to power. Supported by a diverse coalition of political outs, Catholics, and Maya Indians, and with the backing of the Sonora's wealthiest agro-business interests, Yocupicio and his conservative allies easily defeated their Cardenista rivals and captured control of the governorship as well as most municipal governments in a successful electoral campaign in 1936. Subsequently, Cárdenas attempted to cultivate popular political support for himself and for his supporters in Sonora and to undermine Yocupicio by implementing urban labor and agrarian reforms supported by the state's largest worker and peasant organizations, the regional affiliates of the Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM) and the Confederación Nacional de Campesinos (CNC). Yocupicio responded to the perceived political threat by violently repressing CTM attempts to organize in Sonora while also orchestrating a conservative counter-mobilization. The governor funded the creation of rival state labor and peasant organizations headed by political cronies (often ex-police chiefs). Like Porfirian labor politics in the prerevolutionary era, the manipulation of labor and peasant organizations in Sonora during the mid-1930s allowed a conservative regime to minimize disruptive class conflict by controlling labor and peasant demands, while also mobilizing crucial popular electoral support for the Yocupicio political machine.

Seeking to create a large political constituency in the Sonoran countryside, Cárdenas's agrarian reforms distributed more than a million acres of land to campesinos in government-organized, communally owned *ejidos*. This did not assure the triumph of Cardenismo in Sonora any more than urban labor reforms had, but it did provoke a powerful reaction that would have national repercussions. Weakened

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and vulnerable because of his inability to convert labor and agrarian reforms in regional settings like Sonora into immediate and decisive political support, Cárdenas bowed to pressure from conservative elements to retreat from his crusade for social justice and surrendered control of the national political apparatus to a moderate political successor in 1940. Soon afterwards, conservatives converted the party machine created by Cárdenas, now stripped of its idealism, into an instrument to foment a program of capitalist modernization that benefitted the wealthy few in Mexico at the expense of the impoverished many.

Revising the revisionists, Bantjes concludes that far from representing the triumph of a "Leviathan State" or Machiavellian populism in Sonora, "in practical terms, Cardenismo was largely a failure . . . Its most enduring legacy was undoubtably the Cardenista myth" (p. 225). Bantjes's findings suggest that Mexican workers and peasants in Sonora were just as likely to organize around traditional arrangements like patronage politics as around class issues or ideologically based politics. More generally, his study demonstrates that the corporatization of Mexican politics and the subsequent bureaucratic subordination of mass organizations to the Mexican state—so often identified as one of the principal and most original legacies of Cardenismo—had diverse regional origins and mixed ideological antecedents.

This book reveals a great deal about the dynamic and interactive relationship between regional and local political actors and constituencies and the evolving Mexican nation-state during the Cárdenas era and afterward, but other important questions remain unanswered. Why, for example, could Cardenismo be such a tangible failure in a setting like Sonora yet still be capable of generating a powerful and enduring popular mythology? If Bantjes is correct in his assertion that Sonoran workers and peasants were "major political players who shaped the future of their nation" (p. 217) and that "worker and peasant agency was a major factor in Cardenista reform" (p. xiv), given the immediate outcome in Sonora during the 1930s as well as the more general negative qualities of post-Cárdenas Mexico after 1940, what does this suggest about the nature or efficacy of popular "agency" in Mexico?

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Michigan State University

María Emilia Paz. *Strategy, Security, and Spies: Mexico and the U.S. as Allies in World War II*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 1997. Pp. xii, 264. Cloth $55.00, paper $19.95.

During World War II, Mexico cast its lot with the United States and thus frustrated Axis attempts to keep the country out of the war. Mexico's leadership cooperated with the U.S. government in many ways: it declared war on the Axis powers; it reined in German and Japanese spies; it seized "enemy property" designated as such in the Allied black lists; and it even permitted the sporadic presence of U.S. forces on Mexican soil. This attitude contrasted so strongly with the country's adamant neutrality in World War I that it appeared to sound the death knell of Mexican revolutionary nationalism and the beginning of a new era of U.S.-Mexican friendship.

María Emilia Paz's book, however, questions the prevailing notion that the 1940s were an era of harmony in U.S.-Mexican relations. Using diplomatic and military sources from the United States, Mexico, and Germany, Paz successfully argues that underlying tensions made cooperation more difficult than it appeared on the surface. For its part, the U. S. government viewed the Mexican leadership as undemocratic and unreliable. U.S. officials decried the relative freedom that Axis nationals enjoyed in Mexico, and they criticized the snail's pace with which the Mexican government carried out joint decisions. Mexicans, on the other hand, worried that U.S. desires for cooperation masked the imperialist designs that had characterized the policy of earlier U.S. governments (p. 8). The author suggests that President Manuel Avila Camacho—who had taken office among much acrimony in 1940—might well have been overthrown if he had not protected Mexican national sovereignty and limited Mexican military cooperation with the Allies. Thus, the U.S.-Mexican alliance remained limited and flexible, which permitted the accommodation of U.S. strategic goals and Mexican nationalism in contradictory fashion.

Paz analyzes differences in the policy-making process in both countries as a further reason for the lukewarm nature of the U.S.-Mexican partnership. In the United States, a pluralist model of competition between various government agencies and interest groups best describes the formulation of policy. Therefore, the Commerce Department found itself at odds with the War Department and the FBI, and State Department officials remained divided over their agency's role in securing Mexican cooperation. The policy that emerged pressed for a U. S. military presence in Mexico yet grudgingly tolerated Mexican nationalist jitters. In Mexico, on the other hand, power remained concentrated in the hands of Avila Camacho. Nevertheless, public opinion and political opposition figured prominently in the formulation of policy. When critics worried that the defense agreements might mean U.S. troops on Mexican soil, Avila Camacho appointed prominent nationalists such as ex-President Lázaro Cárdenas to oversee the joint defense effort.

A few flaws mar this otherwise interesting work. Most importantly, the focus of the book is quite narrow. While Stephen Niblo's *War, Diplomacy, and Development: The United States and Mexico, 1938–1954* (1995) correctly emphasizes the hope for U.S. economic assistance as one of the main forces driving Mexican policy, Paz hardly discusses this issue in her analysis of the decision to support the Allies. Hence, she misses an opportunity to evaluate Mexican policy

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as a delicate balancing act between economic development and political stability. In addition, Paz unfortunately puts too much trust into some of her sources, particularly in regard to FBI and army intelligence documents on Axis espionage activities in Mexico. For instance, she describes (pp. 167–68) the career of this reviewer's grandfather, Franz Buchenau, a businessman who—contrary to the claims of the FBI—did not live in the United States for ten years and never made intelligence his main occupation. In this regard, Paz would have benefited from interviews with surviving eyewitnesses. Lastly, the book suffers from an abundance of detail and an absence of transitions and summary paragraphs that occasionally makes it difficult to discern the author's interpretation.

Despite these limitations, however, this is an important addition to a significant emerging scholarly literature that portrays Latin American governments as actors rather than victims in international politics. Specialists in the history of intelligence, World War II, and inter-American relations will find the book useful and interesting.

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JOHN LYNCH. *Massacre in the Pampas, 1872: Britain and Argentina in the Age of Migration*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1998. Pp. xiii, 237. $28.95.

Argentina was one of the largest destinations for European migrants from 1850 to 1930. By the 1940s, the country was caught in a nationalist undertow, turning against its long heritage of openness to foreign capital, goods, and people. John Lynch, author of a number of important monographs on Argentine history, tackles one of the legendary episodes in native-immigrant confrontation: a slaughter of almost forty Europeans (mainly Spaniards, Italians, French, and British settlers and merchants) in 1872, just as the great waves of migrants began to arrive on the shores of the River Plate.

Lynch offers the best single study of this episode to date. The early chapters present little that is new to readers of Argentine history. Lynch summarizes the standard view that valuable Pampean land fell under the control of a relatively small group of wealthy landlords and that the state actively appealed to European settlers to break the sod. He concludes that while immigrants were welcome, few enjoyed the incredible spoils of the agrarian boom. At the same time, however, many of the poorer native-born rural population, especially Indians and gauchos, were downright victims of patrician enrichment. The result was an especially explosive mixture of a disgruntled plebeian population and an exposed and identifiable frontier population speaking foreign tongues. Absent were the distant landlords.

Lynch's real contribution is in the fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters, where he describes in depth the clash between an armed band of gauchos (mostly *mestizos* from interior provinces working as ranch peons) and Europeans near the old frontier fort of Tandil. Led by the charismatic folk doctor, Gerónimo de Solané (later called Tata Dios), raiders blazed a trail of destruction, arson, and murder. They discriminated clearly between native-born creoles and immigrants, carving up the latter with knives and lances (throat-cutting seems to have been the preferred method). In the carnage were a few Argentines whose nationalities got confused with those of the newcomers. The death toll from this messianic massacre was thirty-six persons. In the end, National Guardsmen chased down the band. The courts condemned three to death sentences and ten others to jail terms. The judicial process, however, did much to cloud the motives and mechanisms of the assaults, leaving then plenty of room for speculation and mystery. The narrative is gruesome and vivid. Lynch tells a good tale.

What made the backlash against the rural settlement model a nativist one? Here Lynch walks on shiftier ground. The author attributes the bloodshed in part to a Pampean popular culture steeped in violence: "Death on the pampas was a serial, not a singular outrage" (p. 75), and "Gaucho morality was *sui generis* and gaucho violence a way of life" (p. 91). This book is filled with such assertions. Many rural historians will find these claims troublesome, originating from romantic tropes of men in the wild. But native culture was also predisposed to accept millenarian appeals of a divine purpose to cleanse the region of Masonic, liberal infidels. Nineteenth-century liberals advanced an elitist, secular, somewhat ruthless project of reform, thereby inviting a popular backlash. Here, too, Lynch presents some eyebrow-raising claims. "Argentina was living disproof that Latin American liberalism was a tolerant creed" (p. 108). Gauchos flocked to Catholic mysticism. Excluded and downtrodden, they lashed back with religious fervor. The Pampas, according to Lynch, was a setting for a stark clash of sacred and profane cultures. This is also a claim worth querying.

The final section of the book deals with the British diplomatic response: outrage and protest against the lack of civility and protection on the frontier. To this the Argentine government replied with inscrutable indifference, partly because they disliked foreign meddling. The aftertaste of the massacre was British resentment and formal warnings to potential settlers of the perils of the Pampas. Lynch cites the episode and legacy as part of a long series of cultural misunderstandings that probably diminished English interest in the region as a destination for resettlement.

If Lynch's book relies on some conventional—and contested in recent historiography—cultural portrayals, he nonetheless captures an important point. Argentina underwent an enormous transformation in a few decades. In the process, many people were dislocated and marginalized. The Tandil massacre was perhaps the most violent expression of this combination of enrichment for some and misfortune for others.

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But it should also be said that Argentina was remarkably free of such episodes: they were exceptions that proved a general rule about cultural pluralism, not exclusion. Nativism was never a popular force and became the banner for only a few somewhat hysterical writers in the twentieth century, once the last true gauchos were long gone. At least until Juan Perón, when nationalism adopted a fundamentally different pose than that of nineteenth-century nativism, Argentina may be said to have been at least as cosmopolitan as other regions of recent settlement. Perhaps more.

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EUROPE: ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL

MICHEL LAUWERS. *La mémoire des ancêtres, le souci des morts: Morts, rites et société au moyen âge (Diocèse de Liège, XI^{e}–XIII^{e} siècles)*. Foreword by JACQUES LE GOFF. (Théologie historique, number 103) Paris: Beauchesne. 1997. Pp. xx, 537. 300 fr.

In the past twenty years, French, German, and American scholars have focused interest in the social construction of death and the dead in medieval society. Michel Lauwers takes the models developed by these several traditions and examines them within a specific region—the diocese of Liège—from late antiquity to the end of the thirteenth century. The result is a careful and fruitful blending of German *Memoriaforschung* with French *histoire régionale* and the new American social history that chronicles with great precision the implantation, development, and transformation of memorial practice within the context of kinship, lordship, community, and ecclesiastical practice and control.

Lauwers divides his subject into three broad chronological periods. The first, ending in the ninth century, deals with the Christianization or absorption into the Christian tradition of customary funerary and commemorative practice. Central to this process was the Carolingian institutionalization, under the triple influences of pastoral concerns, monastic reform, and imperial politics, of liturgical commemorative practices, as well as the adoption of less formal memorial traditions introduced by Anglo-Saxon and Irish monks and missionaries. Such commemorations were, with the exception of kings, essentially communal. Commemoration of the departed was the responsibility of a community and conducted within the context of the memorialization of all the departed. At the same time, burial normally meant that the body was consigned to communal cemeteries in which little or nothing distinguished the graves of any but kings or saints.

The second period, covering the eleventh and twelfth centuries, saw increasing specialization of monastic communities in the commemoration of the dead, both of their own and that of lay society. Central to Lauwers's analysis is the notion of complex exchange mechanisms between the living and the dead, in which the clergy became the intermediaries through whom material gifts could be transferred into spiritual ones for the benefit of ancestors. These complex exchanges, which Lauwers details from regional sources, served to articulate the structure of seigniorial society, transforming the dead into "ancestors" in two senses. First and most common were collective ancestors, the *antecessores* of kindreds and religious communities to which the mass of the dead are quickly assimilated. The second category were the founding ancestors, distant, symbolic figures distinguished in their individual burial and commemoration from the norm. In the elaboration of both, the church took on the central role, just as it did in the domain of marriage, thus ensuring its centrality in the reproduction of society. Both Gregorian reform and "heretical" movements threatened to destroy this complex exchange system and to weaken the pivotal role of the church in the reproduction of lay society, and both were rigorously opposed in the diocese.

The final section of the book treats new attitudes toward death and the dead from the thirteenth century. The pivotal role of the church in the reproduction of social order through the creation and commemoration of ancestors disappeared in the face of new, more diffuse powers and forms of social structure. Increasingly, individual testaments provided opportunities for a more fragmented society to ensure individual commemoration through testamentary foundations and for increasingly elaborate and individualized funerary rites and monuments. At the same time, the obligation of commemoration became increasingly individual for both clergy (in the form of the office of the dead and memorial masses) and laity (through private devotions, confraternities, and foundations). The latter threatened to displace or to dispute the centrality of the clergy in controlling the dead.

In general, Lauwers confirms, at the micro level, the broad chronological outlines depicted by Philippe Ariès and Jacques Le Goff while presenting local manifestations of the generalized image of monastic memoria and the centrality of gift-exchange in monastic memorial practice. This effort deserves praise, particularly since the validity of these broad syntheses has been hotly disputed. One might wish that the author had presented the local context and internal development of these phenomena; as it is, a wealth of detail from his region is brought in by way of examples of an international phenomenon. When, for example, Duke Henry II of Brabant decided to abandon his family necropolis in Louvain for the Cistercian monastery of Villers, Lauwers correctly reads this as an example of the shift toward individual concern for his commemoration. However, one would want to know more about Henry, his family, and the circumstances that might have led him to this decision to break with his ancestors. Similarly, one might wish for more linear and thickly contextualized accounts of change in memorial practice within specific monastic communities of the diocese. Such contextualization might have gone

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beyond local confirmation to provide an explanatory model for the broad changes Lauwers chronicles so well.

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JUDITH A. GREEN. *The Aristocracy of Norman England*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Pp. xv, 497. $69.95.

In 1066, William of Normandy led the last successful invasion of England and rapidly divided its land among the noble members of his army, creating an almost complete change in the kingdom's ruling elite. One of the most influential studies of the consequences of the Conquest was F. M. Stenton's series of lectures, published as *The First Century of English Feudalism, 1066–1166* (1932), in which he established the Norman Conquest and Henry II's last great survey of English feudal landholdings in 1166 as parameters for studying the nobility. Since then, many historians on both sides of the Atlantic have studied the nobles during this period. We have come to understand their role in the professional, bureaucratic government and changes in their behavior, social mobility, and stratification due to royal initiatives and intermarriage. We have histories of individual families, and, most recently, work on women, family, linguistic skills, and noble patronage of culture. It would seem an appropriate time to revisit the nobles as a "class" during the period 1066–1166.

This is a daunting task. Having examined just one generation of this period (in *The Nobility in the Reign of Henry I* [1988]), I know how much more needs to be synthesized in order to extend a study to the whole century, and I looked forward to Judith A. Green's book. She is an excellent candidate to update Stenton's work. Her earlier books examined the nobles who worked in Henry I's court and the sheriffs during the century after the Conquest, demonstrating her mastery of the range of sources. Green wants to go beyond Stenton, "reconstructing the lives of the ruling elite in the round" (p. xi). The excellent, comprehensive thirty-three-page bibliography of primary and secondary works creates the expection that Green will integrate the more specialized work and bring out new insights. Disappointingly, the book fulfills neither Green's goals nor the reader's expectations. Too much is missing. There are no new insights, and even much of the analysis done by others is ignored or mentioned only in the notes.

The book is clearly organized but the detail awkwardly presented. The first section creates a detailed tenurial geography of 1086 organized by region. The regional emphasis prevents readers from seeing what these patterns meant to nobles, most of whom held land in various regions. Moreover, Green spends the first 125 pages on the Norman Conquest and only fifteen on the subsequent eighty years, when many changes occurred.

Green's conclusions are textbook: great families locally dominated lesser nobles and the kings allowed it; the nobles remained a military elite; the Conquest division of land set the relationship between vassal and king; extended family remained politically important; political society involved the king, the upper clergy, and the locally powerful nobles; and England differed from the continent in that there were no unfree knights, few armed disputes between nobles, and a strong monarchy (pp. 438–441). If these are the only conclusions to draw from a study of the nobles in this period, then a new study was unnecessary. If there are no changes to the group as a whole, then this time period is a false device.

Yet the works that Green cites speak of new identities based on land, heritage, and language, new written and artistic culture mixing English, various French, and Scandinavian traditions: changes that are missing here. Indeed, beyond short historiographic statements at the beginning of chapters, Green ignores the analyses, themes, and conclusions presented by other authors. Instead, she redoes their primary work, though as to be expected, she can do so only in a limited way. Thus she does not synthesize recent scholarship nor convey its excitement.

Furthermore, we rarely get a sense of who the people were, what a life was like. Names and detail of evidence crowd the text, only occasionally creating an effective mosaic of people (most notably the Conquest army). More often they fail to generate a picture of these people as individuals or even subgroups. The book would have been enhanced by using some of the noble families as examples, following them through generations. There is little sense that a century of generations passes. Indeed, Green is reluctant to push sources to find the people. A description of what was involved in travel among these scattered holdings, castle and town, would have helped Green to meet her goal of writing about noble lives, but she omits it because the sources are not explicit. Only twice does the text live, where Green nicely describes a few contemporary castles (pp. 187–193) and in the chapter about women (pp. 361–390). Unfortunately, the latter serves to raise the reader's awareness that women are all but missing from the previous 300 pages. Current scholarship should provide a better integration of men and women.

Beyond the introduction, which nicely summarizes the state of the historiography, Green constantly assumes that the reader knows the events and the arguments about them, so the book will not be of full use to a medievalist who is not a Norman specialist. Unfortunately, the specialist who knows the historiography will be disappointed by the failure to synthesize the current scholarship and to give us new insight into this exciting time.

CHARLOTTE NEWMAN GOLDY
Miami University

MARILYN OLIVA. *The Convent and the Community in Late Medieval England: Female Monasteries in the*

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Diocese of Norwich, 1350–1540. (Studies in the History of Medieval Religion, number 12.) Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell. 1998. Pp. viii, 271. $90.00.

Recent years have seen the appearance of several works that have begun to make up for the neglect of the part played by women in the monastic and religious life of medieval England. It is true to say, however, that most of these have dealt with the founding era of the English nunneries and that the later Middle Ages have not yet been considered as fully as the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Marilyn Oliva's book is therefore greatly to be welcomed. Taking as her subject the eleven female monasteries in the two counties, Norfolk and Suffolk, which were coterminous with the diocese of Norwich. Oliva explores a variety of documentation (far richer than historians have been willing to allow) to investigate the role, and perceptions, of women religious between 1350 and 1540.

As Oliva explains in her introduction, there were factors that, from the very foundation of these nunneries, affected them throughout their history, the status of the founder and geographical location among them. Yet the possession of a wealthy, even aristocratic founder did not guarantee a generous initial endowment, and Oliva sets out one of the theses of the book: that poverty was an essential attribute of female monasticism in this area. The source material is rich enough to allow for a prosopographical study of the Norwich nuns (the methodology of which is explained in an appendix), and this, along with Oliva's study of the patrons and benefactors of the women, challenges assumptions about the class of women who became nuns in the Middle Ages. In the diocese of Norwich, the majority of identified nuns and patrons were drawn from the class of the parish gentry rather than the upper gentry and aristocracy.

Oliva's very thorough treatment of patterns of office holding demonstrates not only that women were (again, in contrast to all but recent historiography) able to govern their own communities but that they did so effectively and efficiently. There was a "career pathway" for the medieval nuns of Norwich. The picture that emerges makes two important statements. One is that nunneries were not pale copies of monasteries. They were communities that, in many ways, enjoyed distinctive patterns of patronage and a distinctive role in society: they were, in Oliva's words, "an integral part of the local social landscape" (p. 139). The second is a much more positive view of women in the medieval church. Generally Oliva's study demonstrates the value of regional study, which can throw so much light on questions of wider concern.

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MARTHA C. HOWELL. *The Marriage Exchange: Property, Social Place, and Gender in Cities of the Low Countries, 1300–1500.* (Women in Culture and Society.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1998. Pp. xv, 278. Cloth $52.00, paper $19.00.

Solidly basing this work on thorough archival research, Martha C. Howell effectively traces how residents of Douai, formerly of the Low Countries and today a French city, gradually moved from a regime of marital property and inheritance based on unwritten customs to one based on written contracts. According to medieval Douaisien customary law, husband and wife were viewed as the common owners of all conjugal property, and each was the heir of the other, if they had produced offspring. As long as he lived, the husband had absolute rights to property ownership and management. If the couple had children and the husband died, however, these rights devolved entirely to the widow. Husbands or widows could manage and alienate property as they saw fit, regardless of the wishes of their children or other kin. If a widowed spouse died intestate, children were treated as equal heirs, regardless of whether they were male or female or born of first or subsequent marriages.

From the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries, Douaisiens of both elite and artisanal classes increasingly used written contracts—most notably marriage contracts and wills—that modified customary law in important ways. The contract system prescribed the separation of the property that husbands and wives brought into marriage, defended the property rights of children and outside kin, and reduced women's rights to manage property. Upon the death of her husband, a widow generally received the property she had brought to the marriage plus a previously agreed upon "increase." If she chose, the widow could decline this payment of goods or property, "stay" in her late husband's estate, and enjoy the usufruct of it; no longer, however, could a widow claim ownership of marital property. This new regime thus provided unprecedented protection for the property that women brought into marriage at the same time that it eliminated widows' succession rights.

Howell convincingly shows that these legal changes mirrored important transformations in attitudes toward gender. Customary law revealed that women were deemed fully capable of managing and creating property. By contrast, contract law implied that women were incapable of being fully in charge of property: as wives and widows, they could manage property only under the supervision of their husbands, fathers, sons, or some other males. Nonetheless, Howell is rightly reluctant to describe the new regime as detrimental to women: while some no doubt resented restraints imposed on them by children and male kin, others surely appreciated the protection of their assets from irresponsible and reckless husbands.

Howell also makes a strong case that these legal alterations reflected important changes in marriage and the family. Although the nuclear family was the norm throughout these two and a half centuries, toward the end of this period, the household was

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viewed less and less as a unit of production, a concept which had been the principal reason for upholding the conjugal emphasis of customary law. As contract law increased the property rights of outside kin, goods and property were viewed less as the means of production for the household. Howell is somewhat less persuasive in arguing that, by the sixteenth century, Douaisiens sought greater emotional fulfillment through marriage at the same time that its productive importance declined. Although the largely formulaic legal documents contain expressions of affection and conjugal love, the crucial role played by property in choosing mates shows that emotion was still subordinate to mundane concerns in the formation of marriages.

Wisely eschewing monocausal explanations, Howell successfully demonstrates that socioeconomic developments were largely responsible for these changes. Traditionally Douai's most important industry, the manufacture of drapery endured a serious crisis in the late Middle Ages. Its decline caused many Douaisiens, both merchants and artisans, to emphasize preserving the wealth and social standing they already enjoyed rather than pursuing the accumulation of new wealth. Viewed broadly, the new matrimonial regime was part of a major reordering of society: marriages were arranged within trades, as men passed their professions on to their sons and sons-in-law; contract law not only ensured the property rights of children but also limited the degree of social mobility, be it upward or downward. Referring to marriage and inheritance patterns elsewhere, Howell effectively shows that these changes in the matrimonial regime were not unique to Douai.

All told, this is a fine work that effectively examines the evolution of marriage, property, and gender in a period of significant socioeconomic change.

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JAMES B. GIVEN. *Inquisition in Medieval Society: Power, Discipline, and Resistance in Languedoc*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1997. Pp. xiii, 255. $39.95.

One of the most serious defects of the majority of recent studies on the medieval and early modern Inquisitions is that they base themselves squarely on the available documentation. It is true that the documents are often of enormous interest and offer us fascinating insight into the past. But it is difficult to understand why discerning scholars, well aware that preindustrial societies relied much more on the spoken word than the written, should treat written Inquisition records as though they were a unique guide to the situations they purport to describe. The documentation is of course crucial, as James B. Given recognizes in the excellent fifty-page survey he gives of the sources that relate to his theme. But his book goes much further: it is no exaggeration to say that this is the first serious attempt ever made by a historian to get behind the documents and study the sociopolitical context within which the Inquisition operated. Given brings to bear not only his own deep knowledge of medieval history but also extensive reading in modern social history and sociology. With these insights, he has produced a highly sophisticated and convincing analysis of the role of the medieval Inquisition within its social context.

Given approaches the Inquisition in fourteenth-century Languedoc as a problem in the exercise of power, "power" being seen as the entire range of ways in which people interact with each other. In the first three chapters, he gives proper attention, based on the judicial documents, to the activity and procedure of the inquisitors. He emphasizes their possibly unprecedented efficiency in squeezing information out of their prisoners. Given then moves, in the second section of the book, to an analysis of how people reacted to the pressures placed on their society by the heresy-hunters. In order to do this, he has to penetrate into the shadowy (and undocumented) world of the non-elite classes. One chapter is devoted to forms of individual resistance, a topic relatively easy to investigate since it can be pursued through case histories of individuals such as Bernard Clergue, the famous official of Montaillou. Given devotes another chapter to the theme of collective resistance, in which the problem is to identify not the act of resistance so much as the group that is backing it. He offers much original evidence of the way in which collectives such as kinfolk, villages, and towns made common cause against the intrusion of the inquisitors, without thereby implying sympathy for heresy.

In a final section, Given surveys the broader social factors that aggravated both the incidence of heresy and its investigation. Using sociological categories, he presents sociopolitical relationships in Languedoc in terms of "stress and strain," which "helped the inquisitors to pry apart social organizations that might otherwise have resisted" (p. 189). He then moves on to look at the "structural constraints" that impeded collaboration between the various power structures (such as the church and the crown) that exercised authority in the region. In his conclusion, he expresses admiration for the efficiency of the mechanism used by the inquisitors to discover information and stresses that these techniques "allowed them to create their own, tailor-made truth" (p. 213). Through a careful manipulation of the forces within society, they succeeded in imposing a form of discipline congenial to the power structure of the day.

This study is brilliant; it is superbly researched, carefully constructed and lucidly written. Thanks to Given, religious persecution ought no longer to be seen as a simple scenario of hunted heretics on one hand and vengeful inquisitors on the other. Here the whole of Languedoc society has an integral part to play in the drama, and the passions that haunted the village

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of Montaillou can be seen stalking the whole countryside of southern France.

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DONALD OSTROWSKI. *Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier, 1304–1589.* New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998. Pp. xvi, 329. $59.95.

Donald Ostrowski's bold, wide-ranging, argumentative book examines the competing influences that shaped Muscovy in its formative centuries and how Muscovites reconciled, incorporated, or adapted those influences and made them their own. Identifying Mongol (Qipchaq) and Byzantine influences as the key rival forces that contributed to Muscovite political development, Ostrowski concludes that "the secular administration was heavily Mongol influenced and the ecclesiastical administration was heavily Byzantine influenced. The two influences clashed, to a certain degree, both with each other and with the indigenous East Slavic culture in Muscovy" (p. 246). Mongol influence predominated in the fourteenth century, particularly in the administrative and military spheres. Byzantine influence reasserted itself forcefully through the rising power of the church in the sixteenth century.

The turning point, according to Ostrowski, came in 1448. The moment marked not a dramatic shift in geopolitical relations with the steppe but rather a radical change in relations with Byzantium. Until the Greek Orthodox Church disgraced itself in Russian eyes at the Council of Florence, Muscovy followed the Byzantine lead in a policy of accommodation with the khanates of the steppe. Only after the break with Byzantium in 1448 does Ostrowski detect the rise of anti-Tatar propaganda in Muscovy, and then only from ecclesiastical pens. Until the end of the sixteenth century, he argues, secular forces continued to orient themselves toward the steppe, both practically and ideologically. Meanwhile, ecclesiastical writers strove to create a "virtual past" in which the Rus' land had suffered under and struggled against a mythical "Tatar Yoke."

Ostrowski works this argument out in rich detail in the second half of the book. Part one runs through a more familiar list of features commonly attributed to Mongol influence: administrative practice, the seclusion of women, oriental despotism, and economic oppression. Here not all of the arguments prove convincing (particularly the section on the origins of the *pomest'e* system), and the overall conclusions are predictable. Ostrowski finds that Mongol administrative and military practices influenced Muscovite practices, but Mongols were not responsible for the rest. As Mongol government was not despotically structured, it could not have served as the model for any putative Muscovite despotism. On the contrary, the "steppe principle" in Muscovite politics dictated the active participation of a boyar council and of wise advisers. Ostrowski effectively recasts the Mongols' so-called "economic oppression" of Rus' as economic integration into the lucrative trade routes protected by the *Pax Mongolica*.

Part two of the book breaks new ground and reaches new heights. The contention that anti-Tatar rhetoric appeared in texts only after 1448 provides Ostrowski with a basis for reconsidering many long-disputed questions of source analysis and dating. Moreover, his vision of two competing orientations—of the secular elite with a Qipchaq orientation and the ecclesiastical hierarchy with a Byzantine orientation—allows him to reopen and develop Edward Keenan's intriguing "two cultures" theory about the sharp divide between church and secular cultures. Ostrowski uses this bifurcated vision to analyze the puzzling behavior of Ivan the Terrible. "The discrepancy between the secular administration's Mongol-based political practice and the Church's Byzantine-based theoretical outlook helps provide a rational understanding of the seemingly irrational and 'crazy' actions that Ivan IV is described as having taken" (p. 189). The two-cultures theory explains the meaning of the *zemskii sobor*, the consultative "assembly of the land," and the reason that it appeared when it did. The assembly, Ostrowski argues, was modeled on the Mongol *quriltai*, a council of notables that advised the khan and met to select new khans, precisely the functions of the Muscovite *sobor*. Although most administrative borrowing from the Mongols occurred in the fourteenth century, the *quriltai* made no sense as a Muscovite institution until the grand prince assumed tsar or khan-like status in 1547, after which the assembly made its appearance. Comparative assessments of the Muscovite assemblies as pallid, powerless versions of western parliaments "view a Muscovite institution through the wrong lens" (p. 186).

A superb chapter in part two addresses the "Third Rome" theory. So much has been written on the topic that it seems there could be little left to say, yet Ostrowski's discussion brings together the on-going debate in a revealing way and fits it convincingly into his theory of the triumph of Byzantine-oriented church culture in the second half of the seventeenth century.

The book contributes to a historiography sharply divided between those who pay no attention to external influences and those who consider all of Russian culture an import. Ostrowski's presentation of competing external influences, combined sometimes happily, sometimes conflictually, in an indigenous Muscovite variant, advances the field greatly. If at times the distinctions between Mongol and Byzantine principles seem too stark and the struggle between khan and basileus too clearcut, and if occasionally the connections between points are difficult to follow, the book is nonetheless an extraordinary feat, daring in its scope, its ambitions, and its successes.

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EUROPE: EARLY MODERN AND MODERN

WILLIAM G. NAPHY and PENNY ROBERTS, editors. *Fear in Early Modern Society*. (Studies in Early Modern European History.) New York: Manchester University Press; distributed by St. Martin's Press, New York. 1997. Pp. x, 245. Cloth $69.95, paper $24.95.

Twenty years after Jean Delumeau published the first general synthesis on fear in early modern Europe, William G. Naphy and Penny Roberts have edited a British-made collection of twelve essays ostensibly organized around the same theme. There is, however, a great difference between Delumeau's still-untranslated masterpiece, *La peur en Occident (XIV^e^–XVIII^e^ siècles): Une cité assiégée* (1978), and this collection. In their introduction, after making the customary distinction between fear and anxiety, Roberts and Naphy insist that "it is very much fear, in its more specific and varied forms, that will be discussed . . . and in particular the strategies used to reduce or overcome it" (p. 2). But whereas Delumeau's culturally induced patterns of fear—and especially the remedies for overcoming them—were often driven by religious concerns, both the fears and the countering strategies discussed here seem overwhelmingly secular. "Europe" has replaced "Christendom," and religious problems receive minor attention. For example, although the Devil was active everywhere in these centuries, one finds only a few references to him in this collection, mostly in discussions of Catholic miracles or witchcraft in chapters eleven and twelve.

Even Delumeau recognized that the worst fears of early modern Europeans were entirely non-religious: sea voyages, bubonic plague, nighttime perils in an unlit world; perhaps the only type of fear they did not share with Asians, Africans, or Americans was danger from man-eating animals. But, Delumeau insisted, Christianity (particularly Catholicism) offered various coping strategies against these natural risks and their consequences. In this new collection, however, the coping strategies are generally as secular as the objects of people's fears. Even the two exceptions dealing with death and the afterlife (chapters nine and ten) are exclusively Protestant in focus and therefore ritually impoverished, while the essay on Scottish witchcraft (chapter twelve) discusses it in essentially political contexts. The concerns of the editors, who contributed the first two essays, privilege secular tactics against fire (chapter one), plague (chapters two and three), floods (chapter four), and Muslim pirates (chapter five).

These coping strategies seem more "early" than "modern," however. Roberts devotes more effort to discussing largely unprovable charges of arson than to describing fire-fighting techniques in French cities. Naphy's Genevan magistrates could torture and hang poor immigrants for deliberately spreading bubonic plague (and revise my statistics about Genevan "witchcraft" in the process), but they could accomplish little more to limit future ravages of this awful pestilence than could Mark Jenner's British civic authorities by killing large numbers of dogs and cats (chapter three), while making no effort to eradicate rats. Civic processions with holy relics (forbidden, of course, in such Protestant places) might not have done more good against the plague, but they would surely have done less harm. Rather than genuine coping strategies against terrifying problems, these reactions of urban governments in Western Europe simply displayed ruling-class paranoia at its nastiest. At least the not-yet-Protestant Dutch authorities confronted by a disastrous flood in 1570 seem more rational; when the Rhine dike threatened to break, "all church bells were rung day and night to prevent a catastrophe, and eventually the water fell" (p. 64).

After the first four chapters, the reader escapes from natural disasters into man-made problems. The coping mechanisms described in chapters five through eight seem on the whole more successful, or at least far less damaging, than those discussed previously. However, it requires a considerable stretch of the imagination to consider such issues as rival civic factions (chapter six), intervention by a central government (chapter seven), or uneducated children (chapter eight) as legitimate objects of "fear."

Ultimately, a patient reader will reach the outstanding contribution to this collection: David Gentilcore's microhistory of the "fear of disease and the disease of fear," studied through a specific miracle history associated with a rediscovered image of the Virgin in early seventeenth-century Bologna (chapter eleven). This case study enables us to approach the topic of fear and reactions to it from something other than a collective and elitist perspective. Moreover, as Gentilcore reminds us, his female protagonist's "experience is an example of fear tamed" (p. 204). His title is far more than a play on words; his handling of the interface between psychology and Italian cultural history is unfailingly deft, and one of the essay's merits is to remind us that "linked to the fear of illness was the fear of medical treatment" (p. 193). A miraculous image offered relief that was almost painless and cost nothing.

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EILEEN REEVES. *Painting the Heavens: Art and Science in the Age of Galileo*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1997. Pp. x, 310. $45.00.

This engagingly written book makes a case, writ large, for an "increasingly close association between the tasks of the artist and the astronomer" in the early seventeenth century (pp. 57–58). A scholar of comparative literature, Eileen Reeves studies specifically the responses of four artists to astronomical and theological issues in the years surrounding Galileo's telescopic discoveries. Arguing at the intersections of art, science, and religion, her study adds texture and breadth to our understanding of the period and Galileo's context: every reader will encounter new insights,

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suggestive connections, and new literature. For Galileo scholars, Reeves extends Frances Huemer's case for a brief neo-Stoic phase in Galileo's life around 1604–1605, before the telescope made him famous. This topic eventually intertwines with, among many others, the nova of 1604, the aurora borealis, a recently identified Peter Paul Rubens portrait of Galileo in Mantua, the "secondary light" of the moon, the Madonna, and the interaction of painting and Marian theology in seventeenth-century Seville.

Although scholars have broached such issues singly before, Reeves brings them to bear on each other. Even when they are not compelling, her suggestive juxtapositions of iconographic and textual materials will give historians of post-Tridentine culture much food for thought.

The book's intricate argument is difficult to summarize and to evaluate concisely. Reeves studies seven works (by Lodovico Cigoli, Rubens, Diego Velázquez, and his father-in-law Francisco Pacheco) in which she sees traces of disputes about the nova of 1604 and the moon's substance before and soon after Galileo's telescopic discoveries. Was the moon transparent? self-luminous? opaque? For Counter-Reformation piety, such questions had metaphysical significance, for the moon was also a frequent, if contested, symbol of the Madonna and her Immaculate Conception. Especially controversial, according to Reeves, was Galileo's attention to the moon's "secondary light"—the faint glow we now call "earthshine"—which she sees (too readily) as a symptom of Copernicanism in others. Reeves shows how such debates engaged not only astronomers trained in art and acquainted with perspectival treatises but also painters who observed the heavens and pondered theology, and theologians who discussed representations of the moon and even drew analogies between themselves and Nicholas Copernicus.

Her book also argues for a major link in the intellectual developments of Cigoli and his close friend Galileo. Cigoli is perhaps best known for his *Immaculate Conception* (1610–1612) in Santa Maria Maggiore, Rome, which depicts a pock-marked lunar crescent reminiscent of Galileo's *Sidereal Messenger* (1610). Since three of Cigoli's pretelescopic works also depict the moon, a diachronic study of his work holds for Reeves the prospect of parallel insights into Galileo's thinking during an obscure period of his life. Reeves's project of historicizing paintings is a worthy one, and her questions are apt.

But her answer—that Cigoli's paintings "incorporated the astronomer's [Galileo's] arguments" (p. 121)—goes too far. Historians of science and art will pine for more compelling evidence or more modest claims. For example, Reeves overinterprets the changes in Cigoli's pretelescopic depictions of the moon in his two *Adorations of the Shepherds* (1599, 1602). In the first, she finds "a naive presentation" of the moon that embodies not Cigoli's understanding, nor that of his patrons, but—curiously—that of the shepherds in the painting. In the second, by contrast, she sees the old "Chaldean" theory of the moon (one hemisphere is opaque and dark blue, the other self-luminous and heliotropic). Although she contends that this theory was still in vogue, no one—not even St. Augustine, *pace* Reeves—seems to have held it since Vitruvius first reported and dismissed it in Roman antiquity. But is there an identifiable astronomical theory behind each of Cigoli's moons? Even if there were, how can the representation of a prosaic phenomenon—the one *all* theories are trying to explain—identify which theory, of the many available, informed it?

In the *Deposition* (1607), Reeves sees "a supremely realistic depiction of the evening of Christ's death" (p. 128). Although she describes the sun in an "evening" position, it is, like the moon, high above the picture's very low horizon. Unless Cigoli meant to set the scene near the Arctic Circle, the moon bears a curious relation to the sun, while its horns—the presence of which Reeves denies (p. 129)—face in the wrong direction. Nevertheless, according to Reeves, the secondary light of the moon here makes a pro-Copernican argument and the painting itself offers a "serene overlay of pious and scientific belief" (p. 138)—a turning-point from the separation to the harmony of science and religion in Cigoli's thinking. But do the putative changes in his moons adequately document such a shift? Once again, the iconography is seriously underdetermined.

These and other problems of description and interpretation notwithstanding, Reeves raises excellent questions, proposes many hypotheses, forges several convincing links, and brings disparate earlier scholarship into fruitful interaction. This stimulating book deserves close reading and wide discussion.

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PETER GAY. *Pleasure Wars: The Bourgeois Experience; Victoria to Freud*; Volume 5. New York: W. W. Norton. 1998. Pp. 324. $29.95.

With this volume, Peter Gay concludes his massive project to come to terms with "the bourgeois experience," the life and self-awareness of the Victorian middle classes. Readers of the earlier volumes (this is the fifth) will find an approach already familiar to them. One of its great merits is its concreteness. Gay's range and erudition are enormous, extending over many countries, reaching down into the histories of many regions, cities, and occupations, and enlivened by attention to a rich variety of individual cases, some of them brought to light from hitherto unused archival sources. A second merit is the project's even-handedness. Although undertaken as a defense of the nineteenth-century European and American middle classes, Gay's project is far from any kind of encomium, acknowledging that many bourgeois lived and thought as their enemies complained they did, that the

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"heroism of modern life" was inseparable from much villainy.

This last volume focuses on the relationship of the bourgeoisie to culture, meaning the high culture of literature, art, music, and architecture, and especially to the modernist currents and movements that transformed cultural life from around the middle of the nineteenth century. The general conclusion will surprise few readers. It is that bourgeois taste was never so conventional or so vulgar as a vocal and influential group of intellectuals and artists claimed, and that the bourgeois contribution to modernism was positive and important, *pace* what such great bourgeoisophobes as Gustave Flaubert, Georg Brandes, Karl Marx (despite his celebration of bourgeois achievements) or, in some of their moods, Emile Zola and Guy de Maupassant all said. There were limits to bourgeois support of innovation and imagination, to be sure, rooted partly in a common human preference for the known and the familiar (for the world of our parents, in the Freudian terms Gay employs sometimes), partly in the bounds imposed on middle-class consumption of the arts by incomes that remained generally low throughout most of the century, and partly in the power and influence still exercised by traditional authorities. We learn that the middle-class citizens of Manchester invested much more money, time, and interest in the arts (music above all), and to much better effect, than critics who saw merchants and manufacturers as philistines were willing to admit; but the spirit of independent cultural activity palpable there and in similar places remained constricted and confined where princely officials kept the reins of culture in their hands, as in the Munich of the Wittelsbachs.

Gay's accounts of the economy and geography of nineteenth-century bourgeois cultural life, accompanied by informative discussions of the role of critics, collectors, and the founders of museums and orchestras, make this volume, like the others in the series, a treasure trove for students of the nineteenth century. Why does one come away, then, feeling a certain dissatisfaction, a worry that we have not arrived at the better understanding of bourgeois life that such a project, in the hands of such a historian, promises?

To my mind the answer is that Gay has not wanted to tackle the big, hard question about his subject: what was bourgeois about "the bourgeois experience"? What made it the experience of a socially definable group of people rather than an example of human experience in general or of some indefinite number of those who lived in a certain time and place? Those against whom he writes—Marx, Flaubert, the avant-garde—all had their answers to this question, their ways of saying what was historically or culturally significant about the modern bourgeoisie, how it was related to the meaning-giving values or aspirations its representatives claimed either to nurture or to supplant. Other thinkers, less hostile to bourgeois life, have offered other answers—John Stuart Mill, Émile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, and Max Weber. Gay refuses, on principle, to espouse one. In the general introduction to his first volume, he showed very well how many and deep were the inner divisions that worked against bourgeois class unity and how particular ways of imagining that unity suppress powerful realities on behalf of partisan programs. Reading this discussion one might almost expect him to adopt the position he defines when he says that "strictly speaking, of course, there was no bourgeois experience in the nineteenth century or any other; there were only bourgeois experiences" (*The Education of the Senses* [1984], p. 15). The loving detail with which stories are told and situations described sometimes makes one suspect that the author does take this line, but to hew to it would leave "the bourgeois experience" in bits and pieces. Gay seeks his solution in "the term 'middle classes,' which deftly exhibits the invincible plurality within bourgeois culture coexisting with a measure of underlying unity" (*Ibid.*, p. 44). But something tugs him away even from this in-between formulation, making him write, in his new book, "There was one bourgeoisie in the nineteenth century, but it showed a dozen faces and took diverse paths to taste" (p. 75). To proclaim such unity, after all, puts the issue of what constituted it back on the agenda; but the question is never called.

One sees at certain places how Gay might pose it. Here as in other volumes, he speaks about the bourgeoisie as beset with a series of socio-moral dilemmas, between sponsoring change and drawing back from it, between social mobility and resistance to it, between willfulness and restraint. This is a promising and potentially revealing approach, but it is never systematically pursued; above all, it does not lead to an inquiry into how such dilemmas arose from specifically bourgeois activities or attitudes, from the everyday concerns of business or state service or science or law. Nor is bourgeois life considered—whether through these dilemmas or otherwise—in a way that suggests its inner relations to particular cultural projects or programs: to rationalism, romanticism, symbolist interiority, avant-garde self-assertion or subversion, even to such psycho-cultural alternatives as aggression, compliance, or withdrawal. As a result, what might be qualitative questions about the cultural implications of particular bourgeois values or practices become merely quantitative. How bad was bourgeois taste? How little or how much did the bourgeoisie support cultural innovation? The answers provided by many of Gay's cases and examples can be interesting indeed; but at a broader social level, the measure appears on a rough scale: better/more than you may have thought, but not so good/so much as one might like or hope.

What this result owes to the large place occupied by Sigmund Freud in the project's original conceptualization is a question there is no room to discuss here. In the end we are left with a fine compendium of bour-

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geois experiences. I wish I thought they told us more about the bourgeois experience.

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JENNIFER WOODWARD. *The Theatre of Death: The Ritual Management of Royal Funerals in Renaissance England, 1570–1625*. Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell Press. 1997. Pp. xii, 250.

Studies of the rituals of early modern kingship have been pursued most energetically by historians of France, notably Ralph Giesey, Sarah Hanley, Richard Jackson, and Lawrence Bryant. This useful book sets out to undertake a similar investigation within an English context. Jennifer Woodward argues that royal funerals were not static vehicles "for ideological propaganda" but "performance processes" shaped by spectators as well as participants, which continuously adapted to shifting social, political, and ideological contexts (p. 5). She perplexingly adopts a much more monolithic view of the fundamental purpose of these rites, however, as "the reintegration of the community and the smooth transfer of power" (p. 6) after a ruler's death created opportunities for "factional activity" (p. 9).

This formulation securely fits only one of the five funerals investigated in detail, that of Elizabeth I in 1603. Woodward makes a convincing case that Robert Cecil and James Stuart managed this event with an eye to legitimating the latter's succession. The reburial of Mary Stuart next to Elizabeth in the Henry VII chapel of Westminster Abbey in 1612 is also convincingly read as an attempt by James to assert his rights as successor to both Tudor and Stuart dynasties. But the remaining funerals—of Mary Stuart in 1586, Prince Henry, Queen Anne, and James himself—do not seem well chosen to demonstrate the book's ostensible thesis, since only James was a reigning monarch, and his son's right to succeed was effectively beyond challenge.

Fortunately, Woodward's discussion soon broadens out to incorporate other emphases, especially the complications introduced into the funeral ritual by Protestantism. An interesting chapter examines the impact of the Reformation on funerary rites generally. Overtly Catholic symbols and practices—banners depicting saints, intercessory prayers, and the use of candles—were all eliminated, but ritual gestures like the ringing of bells and offering of a "mass penny" for the deceased survived, despite protests by more rigorous reformers. These practices were sufficiently ambiguous to be reinterpreted in ways that made them acceptable, despite their Catholic overtones.

Woodward argues that this kind of ambiguity allowed royal funerals to go on conveying a sense of the sacredness of the monarch's person without overtly subverting Protestant doctrine. The most striking examples involved the lifelike effigies carried in funeral processions and, at least in the seventeenth century, subsequently displayed in Westminster Abbey. Protestants associated three dimensional representations with idolatry, but the official church distinguished between religious images and those intended as secular monuments. Tomb sculptures and funeral effigies were placed in the latter category and given further justification, from the late sixteenth century, by ancient Roman precedents.

Despite these rationalizations, however, the royal effigy and its associated paraphernalia, especially the canopy carried over it, retained strong liturgical associations that must have continued to operate at least on a subliminal level. During the early Stuart period, a growing interest in European visual culture at court, along with the ceremonialism and revival of religious imagery by Arminian clergy, gradually reinforced these connotations. This trend culminated in the funeral of James I, which Woodward interprets as enacting a *réligion royale* in which the king's image became a sacred object.

This analysis seems persuasive with respect to the attitude of the Laudians and Charles I. Woodward is on less solid ground in arguing that Calvinists must inevitably have reacted against the Catholic associations of funeral effigies and related practices. Although this is a plausible conjecture, she provides little supporting evidence, and two counter examples raise doubts. Effigies were employed in the funerals of Parliament's general, the Earl of Essex, in 1646, and of Oliver Cromwell in 1658. It may be that the trauma of civil war led even Puritans to covet the psychological security provided by essentially Catholic symbols when coping with the deaths of their leaders. It also seems possible, however, that for some people funerary images had simply lost their religious connotations. Only a more extensive and systematic survey of gentry and aristocratic funerary practices might allow us to determine whether Calvinists were significantly more resistant to images and elaborate ceremonies than less stalwart Protestants.

If some of Woodward's conclusions are debatable, however, her book opens up an important subject that historians of England have too long neglected.

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W. B. PATTERSON. *King James VI and I and the Reunion of Christendom*. (Cambridge Studies in Early Modern British History.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998. Pp. xv, 409. $59.95.

W. B. Patterson's erudite, interesting, and valuable book contributes to two waves of current historiographical activity. The first is the reconsideration of the theology and practice of the early Stuart Church of England, undertaken by Patrick Collinson, Kenneth Fincham, Anthony Milton, Nicholas Tyacke, and others. Here the key question is whether there were already serious divisions and disputes within the Jacobean church, or whether problems were later intro-

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duced by Charles I in 1625 or by the Covenanters in 1640. The second wave is the reassessment of the aims and competence of King James I, carried forward by Keith Brown, Neil Cuddy, Maurice Lee, Jenny Wormald, and others. Here the key question seems to be whether a Scot could rule England well. Patterson has more to offer on the second question than the first, and he joins the now fashionable scotophile chorus of praise for James, the wisest king in Christendom.

After an initial chapter on James VI, the Kirk, and the Scottish Catholics, Patterson explores various eirenic and ecumenical initiatives that he attributes to James I's astute statesmanship and Christian vision. Through proposals for an ecumenical council, the Hampton Court conference in 1604, the Oath of Allegiance and the controversy it caused, the French Synod of Tonneins in 1614, the Synod of Dort in 1618, and the negotiations for a Spanish marriage for Prince Charles, James consistently sought Christian unity and peace, and his dealings with Isaac Casaubon, Cyril Lukaris, Pierre du Moulin, and Marco Antonio de Dominis had the same idealistic motivations. James was a tolerant ecumenist, a true European, and an inveterate peacemaker, but he was also a political realist and a skillful negotiator. He recognized that religious tensions were a threat to European peace and sought to improve relations between Calvinists, Lutherans, Roman Catholics, the Greek Orthodox, and the Church of England. Unfortunately, other people got in the way of his good intentions and nothing much was achieved. But James's personal prestige and grasp of affairs made him a pivotal figure in the religious politics of Europe.

Sections of this argument have already been published in essays and articles elsewhere, but the whole case is now presented with awesome thoroughness. It is based on more than twenty years of work in archives in Rome, Paris, Montpellier, Geneva, Edinburgh, London, Oxford, and Washington, and it is advanced in fluent, meticulous, and scholarly fashion. It is also, however, unremitting and somewhat repetitive. Patterson conscientiously guides his readers through the bibliography of every issue he encounters, describes his key texts in great detail and gives full accounts of the political and diplomatic backgrounds to the Thirty Years' War and the Spanish match. The range of research and learning and the careful exposition of a plausible case are impressive. A skeptic might ask four questions. First, was James himself responsible for or involved in all the ecumenical efforts and publications, or were du Moulin, de Dominis, and the rest claiming his sponsorship to strengthen their own positions? Second, were the ecumenical and peacemaking slogans always sincere, or were they sometimes the conventional cant of international relations or convenient cloaks for baser motives? Third, was ecumenism ever a realistic political strategy, or was James out of touch and out of his depth? Fourth, was James VI and I truly consistent in aim and approach through forty years, or do we need more attention to development, contingency, and the exigencies of politics? Perhaps the cool, far-sighted, sagacious new James, always right, is no more convincing than the slobbering, selfish, and pedantic old James, always wrong. Good King James standing above politics is no better than bad King James mired in politics. Or are the Americans and the Scots right, and it is only the fastidious English who cannot be brought to love James VI and I?

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JUDITH MALTBY. *Prayer Book and People in Elizabethan and Early Stuart England*. (Cambridge Studies in Early Modern British History.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998. Pp. xvii, 310. $64.95.

Judith Maltby is a historian who knows how to pray as well as how to write, and this is a valuable trait. Plenty of current experts in the Reformation have the hang of theology; indeed, the importance of this has been reinforced by the new reverence for ideological constructs as forces in their own right. Many fewer have shown an appreciation of the experience of liturgy, and to date all have been Catholics, concerned with medieval or Counter-Reformation Christianity. Maltby is the first to extend such an appreciation to the early history of the Church of England.

Her concern is with those members of the church who have variously been described as "parish Anglicans" or "conformists," the latter being the tag used by Maltby herself. It is something of a misnomer, because the real significance of these people is that they did not merely conform to the requirements of the reformed church but enthusiastically supported its episcopal government and its liturgy, not least because the former gave them a court of appeal through which they could control their parish clergy and the latter allowed them some active participation in services. This book succeeds in proving that there were plenty of these people around in early Stuart England, and that they distinguished themselves from the "godly" who disliked both bishops and prayer book and from the Laudian innovations of the 1630s. They were found in all ranks of society, and those in the lower ranks expressed their views with the same force as their social superiors and without needing coercion or incitement by the latter.

Maltby's achievement is therefore a valuable one but severely circumscribed. The scope of her book is limited in time. Despite the title, Elizabethans really feature only as authors of printed works which provide useful quotations. Of the four long chapters that are the meat of the book, one (on the evidence of church courts) is effectively confined to the years 1603 to 1639, while the other three concentrate upon those from 1640 to 1642, when the religious tensions that were to escalate into civil war forced the defenders of episcopacy and liturgy to stand up and (literally) be counted. Fully half the book's contents are concerned with Cheshire, which provides excellent records, and a

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whole chapter is devoted to a single individual, the county's leading "conformist," Sir Thomas Aston.

These restrictions carry certain penalties. The near-absence of the Elizabethans robs us of any sense of how "conformity" developed after the Reformation. It would have been helpful to have a study of *any* other gentleman of the same views with whom to compare Aston. Most interesting and tantalizing, "conformists" emerge as minorities in four out of the five Cheshire communities studied by Maltby. As the "godly" have usually been regarded as self-conscious minority groups, does this mean that the residue of parishioners who did not fit into either camp were the apathetic or godless multitude imagined by more secular-minded historians? Or was enthusiasm for the established church in exceptionally short supply in 1641? It is possible that as historians we still think too much in terms of parties, models, and constructs, when the reality consisted more of currents, moments, and emotional reactions; but that such questions can be raised in this context is a further tribute to Maltby's work.

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TOM WEBSTER. *Godly Clergy in Early Stuart England: The Caroline Puritan Movement, c. 1620–1643*. (Cambridge Studies in Early Modern British History.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Pp. xv, 350. $64.95.

The thesis of this book is not surprising or even particularly new: sixty years ago, William Haller told us that Puritan clergy formed cohesive social as well as theological networks—intermarrying, advising each other, forming household seminaries (*The Rise of Puritanism*, [1938]). Patrick Collinson's *The Elizabethan Puritan Movement* (1967) described the Elizabethan precursors of Webster's godly exercises, fasts, and lectures by combination, and Paul Seaver continued the story into the seventeenth century (*The Puritan Lectureships* [1970]). What Webster offers, though, is the first really thorough, detailed examination of precisely how the post-1620 networks of clerical sociability operated, based on an impressive array of archival as well as printed sources and contextualized by a clear understanding of the broad place that the godly occupied on the Protestant spectrum. Appropriately absent is an earlier historiographical generation's sharp dichotomy between monolithic Puritans and equally stylized conformists. That, more than his dependence on the terms of cultural anthropologists and sociologists—*de rigueur* in current religious historiography—makes this an up-to-date and useful analysis of an old and worthy theme.

Webster begins by describing Caroline Puritans' household seminaries and conferences, fasts and days of humiliation, and other voluntary exercises of piety and sociability. Such exercises, offering comfort, encouragement, counsel, and admonition, as well as continuing education and placement of young clergy, exhibit "the social dynamic of puritan spirituality" (p. 283). They functioned, in Daniel Rogers's words, for "mutual information and quickening" and fostered, Webster adds, "an extremely tight consensus on the minutiae of soteriological theology," (pp. 130, 111) as well as communal self-identification as a people set apart from the unregenerate masses. The author treats Puritan exercise of the sacraments as well as sermons, redressing the usual imbalance of historians who see baptism and communion rendered peripheral by the godly emphasis on preaching.

Webster then proceeds to examine in great detail the accelerating conflict beween the godly ministry and the Laudian establishment. Here his great contribution is to analyze the various trajectories that Puritan opposition could take, from grudging and partial conformity in the interests of maintaining a preaching ministry in the church, through sundry compromise positions and resort to a multitude of evasion strategies, to outright refusal to conform even at the cost of prosecution, deprivation, and exile to the Netherlands or New England. With the Laudians' rise to power, what Jeremiah Burroughs distinguished as the "old conformity" (p. 210)—occasional use of the surplice or partial use of the liturgy—no longer satisfied; the new bishops strictly and effectively enforced both the old rubrics and a new altar policy with no room for compromise or accommodation. Webster sensibly delineates Puritans' more hostile, aggressive stance and resort to more desperate measures as a result of these changed circumstances. The clerical "diaspora" following 1631, and the ensuing fragmentation of the godly community over ecclesiological issues, bring his story to conclusion.

There are some curious historiographical omissions, the most striking of which is any reference at all in the chapters on Laudian harrassment to Julian Davies's *Caroline Captivity of the Church* (1992), which treats this subject at great length and illustrates many of Webster's themes (e.g., the ineffectiveness of William Juxon's administration). The author might at least tell us whether he took this course in mistrust of Davies's data or for some other reason; the omission may be perfectly legitimate, but it needs explanation. The book also could have used an editor. The text is marred by infelicities of prose and occasional grammatical gaffes and in places is overburdened by repeated detail. There are also too many incidents of generalizations unsupported by, and even unrelated to, the quotes that purport to substantiate them: for example, the bold assertion that English Puritans were a "notable exception" to the rule that ministers reconciled parochial conflicts is followed by quotes that show only that preaching was important to Puritans, not that reconciliation was not (p. 98). Preaching could admittedly be divisive, but it divided godly from ungodly, not quarreling parishioners from each other. The book is also marred by Webster's anxiety to bring currently fashionable discussions of gender reversal

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into his subject by pointing out clerical application of male and female imagery to themselves; in fact, all they were doing was lifting precisely the same biblical references that their ancient and medieval counterparts had. Preachers' use of standard literary images does not mean that "clerical masculinity was ambivalent" (p. 105). Aside from these little annoyances, however, the book merits a careful read and rewards the effort with a stimulating and comprehensive understanding of the Stuart Puritan ministry.

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LESLEY B. CORMACK. *Charting an Empire: Geography at the English Universities, 1580–1620*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1997. Pp. xvi, 281. Cloth $68.00, paper $23.95.

The history of geography as an academic and public subject is currently proving very fruitful. Most of the work has been devoted to the period of nineteenth-century European imperialism, however, resulting in valuable studies such as M. Bell, R. Butlin, and M. Heffernan, eds., *Geography and Imperialism* (1995). Lesley B. Cormack focuses on an earlier period of the intersection of empire and geography in the West, although her subject is in fact wider, for she covers the full range of geography in her period and uses the topic as a means to approach English intellectual life. Her book nicely complements in its approach another recent scholarly and well-written study on a related topic, Jerry Brotton's *Trading Territories: Mapping the Early Modern World* (1997).

Cormack shows that geography and the study of the natural world in general were an important part of the university curriculum long before the changes introduced in the mid-seventeenth century. Interest in the subject expanded and flourished in her period, and geography grew from a relatively undifferentiated field into three separate subdisciplines, each with its own literature, practitioners, and particular contribution to the ideology and practice of empire. These aspects are studied, and Cormack makes particularly good use of book ownership. Mathematical geography enabled scholars to conceptualize the world as a controllable system. Their research was practical, focusing on questions of longitude determination, navigation in northern waters, and map projection. All had obvious commercial aspects. Descriptive geography provided useful information, while chorography, or local history, Cormack argues, helped to encourage a sense of England as unique and superior.

Knowledge as power is part of Cormack's theme and method. Although the search for structures and practices of authority and authorization behind apparent scientific impartiality has been of great value, however, it suffers from a number of weaknesses, including a simplification and failure to understand the nature of power systems. For example, the notion that mapmaking was or is integral to hegemony requires careful analysis, and, indeed, the very notion of hegemony is not always helpful to the understanding of a frequently more complex and diffuse situation. Brian Harley was very influential in this field, but he was overly inclined to adopt an approach centered on the issue of power.

Yet a measure of skepticism about the presentation of geography, particularly in the early modern period, does not extend to any criticism of Cormack's scholarship. She has made excellent use of her wide reading in manuscript and primary material and has a subtle understanding of the nature, structure, and ramifications of university geography in her period. Descriptive geography interested more students than its mathematical counterpart. They were different in approach and impact. Both originated from classical roots, but descriptive geography was less rigorous and theoretical and attracted more casual investigators, so that undergraduate interest and serious scholarly concern were not nearly as closely linked as in the study of mathematical geography. Cormack suggests that it was descriptive rather than mathematical geography that encouraged its English students to develop a sense of superiority and an interest in the exploitation of the rest of the world. She studies the patronage, publication, and purchase of geography and directs particular attention to the court of Prince Henry. At least thirty-seven men who were connected with his court had an interest in some aspect of geography. Both Edward Wright and Thomas Harriot were connected with the prince. Cormack argues that the men joining the princely court as geographers were demonstrating that they had internalized the imperial message of geography. They were eager to use their knowledge for the good of the state. Henry and the geographers shared a substantial interest in the settlement of the New World.

Cormack suggests that this active community of court geographers was able to establish a geographical network and to launch a research program "that was rigorous and innovative, drawing for its methodology on notions of practicality and the importance of personal experience that were to suffuse much of late-seventeenth-century scientific thought." Her utilitarian account of knowledge commands respect, not simply because it is "located" in a specific "juncture" that she has "mastered." This important book deserves to be widely read, and the publishers are to be congratulated on its simultaneous appearance in paperback.

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DAVID UNDERDOWN. *A Freeborn People: Politics and the Nation in Seventeenth-Century England*. New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1996. Pp. xi, 174. $29.95.

This fine book provides an excellent brief summary of the thinking of David Underdown, one of the foremost living scholars of early modern English history. Underdown gave the Ford Lectures at Oxford in 1992. They

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are printed here in revised form. In elegant and lucid prose, he presents compelling arguments against fashionable modern views about central questions in seventeenth-century English history and outlines his own interesting interpretation.

In recent years, an influential group of so-called "revisionist" historians has formulated an interpretation of the causes of the English Civil War that stresses the unrevolutionary nature of political and social life before the war. These writers argue that consensus and deference were the keynotes of English politics. The upper classes, we are told, shared a single broad political outlook, at least until the 1640s, and the lower orders deferred to their superiors. So the Civil War was not a result of social tensions between rich and poor, nor of divisions within the elite on political or constitutional questions. Revisionists adopt an essentially Namierite account of early Stuart politics. Sometimes they place so much emphasis on consensus that they have difficulty in explaining how the war began. Underdown calls their interpretation "the big bang theory of the civil war" (p. 6) and rejects it, claiming that high political life in the decades before 1642 was dominated by contention rather than consensus. In support, he cites much evidence that, long before the war, the elite was dividing on court-country lines. A particularly interesting aspect of Underdown's discussion at this point is his argument that gendered language was central to criticism of the early Stuart court. Such criticism, he says, associated the court with the linked concepts of femininity, witchcraft, and popery.

Revisionists commonly deny that the Civil War had much to do with social conflict and pay little attention to popular politics. Underdown, by contrast, stresses that people far below the gentry level were actively interested and engaged in political debate long before the war. Usually, they sided against the court. The House of Commons was aware of this and therefore broadened the franchise in many places, since the larger the number of voters, the greater the prospect that they would return an anti-court member to Parliament. Underdown argues that, before the Civil War, a single political culture united the people and the elite. They both defended old rights and customs and Protestant nationalism. Popular culture, however, placed greater weight than did its elite counterpart upon issues of gender and role inversion (such as the ritual of the "skimmington," in which the roles of husband and wife were inverted).

The Civil War, says Underdown, ended the political union between the country elite and people further down the social scale. The growth of popular political and religious radicalism in the 1640s persuaded many of the gentry that their social inferiors should be excluded from power. Not all popular politics of the Civil War period were radical, however. We are frequently told that the lower orders were apathetic about politics. Another notion is that, although they were silent, they in fact shared the radically populist ideas of the Levellers. Underdown shows that there was a third strand in popular politics during the 1640s and 1650s, namely anti-puritan royalism. He suggests that this conservative outlook had just as strong popular roots as the radicalism of the Levellers and the sects. Popular conservatism survived the Restoration, but the dominant trend after 1660 was toward an increasing rift between the elite and the populace, and Monmouth's rebellion of 1685 was "a genuinely popular rising" (p. 125). "This division between the élite and the populace," concludes Underdown, "is surely the most striking change in the political nation during the seventeenth century" (p. 128).

Another change that occurred in the later seventeenth century, Underdown argues, is that familial and gendered analogies came to be used less frequently in political discussion. People were ceasing to be worried about the political implications of familial disorder, and John Locke only took this process to its logical conclusion when he uncoupled "the public and private spheres completely" (p. 117). This is an interesting idea, although it is arguable that Locke's account of the relationship between states and families was not particularly novel and that it did little more than revive old Aristotelian and Thomist notions.

"Revisionists" will reject a considerable portion of Underdown's interpretation of seventeenth-century politics, but others will find it largely convincing. This is an excellent brief analysis of Stuart political life and its links with the social, cultural, and regional history of the period.

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A. R. WARMINGTON. *Civil War, Interregnum and Restoration in Gloucestershire, 1640–1672*. (Royal Historical Society Studies in History, New Series.) Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell for the Royal Historical Society. 1997. Pp. 232.

This book by A. R. Warmington, based chiefly on extensive research in local archives, adds another seventeenth-century English county to the long list of those that have been studied in depth. It differs in a number of respects from many others in the same stable. It is not simply about the gentry, nor does it focus exclusively on the civil wars. Both socially and chronologically, it aims more widely in its coverage—a strategy that turns out to be both an advantage and, at times, a problem. Events, trends, and issues are certainly placed in perspective here in a way that would be impossible in a study devoted solely to the fighting of the 1640s and its immediate outcomes. On the negative side, however, the pace occasionally becomes somewhat breathless and the reader struggles to come to terms with a vast range of topics as diverse as electioneering, the levying of the Hearth Tax, the rise of the Quakers, unsuccessful shipbuilding, and embargoed tobacco-growing. Warmington probably crams

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too much into a book of this length. There are some built-in tensions, too, in Warmington's chosen structure and methods of presenting his material. A useful introduction briefly examines the historiography of this genre of writing and sets the economic, social, and political scene. Three chapters follow offering a predominantly political narrative and cover the years 1640 to 1659. Then comes a chapter—stimulated by David Underdown's *Revel, Riot and Rebellion* (1985)—analyzing social patterns and popular allegiances. The final chapter reverts to the narrative mode and covers the politics of the period from 1660 to 1672.

Nonetheless, there is much here that is successful and memorable. Warmington brings out the complex relations and contrasts between the city of Gloucester and the county it headed and carefully ponders whether a case can be made for the existence of a "county community" in this period. The 1630s and 1640s, he concludes, largely pointed to its absence; on the other hand, "between 1660 and 1672 Gloucestershire probably became more of a county community than it had been before the Civil War" (p. 208). The changing pattern of central government involvement in the county (including the Interregnum purges and the post-1660 remodeling of town charters) is explored. Soldier/civilian relations are scrutinized. The chaotic, improvised finances of both sides in the civil wars are examined. Popular activism, including that of "malcontented tobacco planters" (p. 155), is charted, although, like Underdown before him, Warmington finds it harder to pursue popular Royalists than grass-roots Parliamentarians. Many of Underdown's findings relating to the differing allegiances of "cheese" and "chalk" regions find significant echoes in Warmington's Gloucestershire. When it comes to the Restoration, however, this author has a different story to tell. Underdown's study of Dorset, Wiltshire, and Somerset showed a clear correlation between the most strongly Royalist areas of 1642 and the distribution of active support for the monarchy in 1660. In Gloucestershire, by contrast, in 1659–1660 "most of the political activity of all shades originated in the areas where the people had been actively parliamentarian in the Civil War" (p. 170).

Interestingly, in view of the crowded, diverse agenda of Warmington's book, what emerges most clearly here is the portrait of a bizarre single individual, Edward Massey, professional soldier, Civil War governor of Gloucester, and later leader of the county's abortive Royalist rising in 1659. "Massey was above all a man who provoked division and trouble" (p. 71). "He must have been a perfectly insufferable man" (p. 65). "His letters show a deeply paranoid capacity to find links between unconnected events" (p. 65). "Slightly deranged" (p. 67), "bitter and vindictive" (p. 69), he had "a peculiar talent for alienating people" (p. 69) and "making new enemies" (p. 67). Wearing a different political hat in 1659, Massey "had clearly not changed a bit" and "sank into broody pessimism and shrill complaints" about almost everyone and everything (pp. 156–57). Outflanked on this occasion and arrested without much difficulty, he escaped in the midst of a thunderstorm with great theatrical bravado. He returned to cause more embarrassment after 1660. According to Warmington, Massey's adventures provide light relief. They do more than that, of course. His curious career highlights many of the cross-currents and tensions of this troubled, complex period and stubbornly independent county, opened up in this book with a reasonable degree of a success by an author hard pressed in little more than 200 pages to deliver all he has ambitiously promised his readers.

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Sean Kelsey. *Inventing a Republic: The Political Culture of the English Commonwealth, 1649–1653*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1997. Pp. x, 254. $49.50.

In the past two decades, our knowledge of the politics and culture of the sixteenth and seventeenth-century English court has expanded impressively. Thanks to the work of David Starkey, Neil Cuddy, John Adamson, Linda Levy Peck, R. Malcolm Smuts, J. Pauline Croft, Kevin Sharpe, and others, we now know far more about the hierarchies, iconography, and ceremonial and internal politics of the court than ever before. An unexpected addition to court studies is Sean Kelsey's examination of the regime of the purged Long Parliament, commonly known as the Rump.

Kelsey's stated purpose in writing the book is to repair the reputation of the parliamentary republic. Unabashedly partisan, he argues that the rulers of the commonwealth, far from being ashamed of the regicide or of the new constitution they had erected on the ashes of the ruined monarchy, held their heads high. They took pride not only in the republic's military exploits but also in the invigorating experiment in gentry self-rule. Their demise was not brought about by corruption or by unwillingness to yield up power but by their laudable attempt to establish a civilian regime and to curb the power of the army.

To advance his argument, Kelsey marshals an impressive array of evidence and corrects a number of misconceptions. For example, he shows that the conventional view of the republic wantonly selling off the precious royal art collection is wrong. In truth, many works by Titian, Raphael, and others, as well as most of the royal tapestries, were saved.

In the spectacles it staged and the icons it fabricated, the new regime displayed a self-confidence that contradicts the conventional image of hesitancy and shame over its origins. Many portraits were painted and medals struck to honor the heroes of the hour and their victories on land and sea. The commonwealth's new coat of arms incorporated the cross of St. George and the Irish harp, graphic witness to the rulers' ambition to assimilate Ireland to the polity of England.

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No opportunity was lost to proclaim that this was a commonwealth of free, self-governing men. Thus, the new great seal of 1649 depicted the House of Commons in session, with the motto "In the First Year of Freedom by God's blessing Restored 1648" around the border.

The iconographic symbols favored by the regime—the cross of St. George, the oak motif, the map of the commonwealth—together with the use of the English language in all public documents, witness to this proud, vernacular republicanism. Unclassical in its inspiration, it celebrated "the veneration of traditional English civic government . . . English parliamentarism . . . patriotic nationalism, corporate decision-making and representative government" (p. 106).

The new republic was also very sensitive to honor, dignity, and title because of its concern to compel respect from the other nations of Europe. It staged grandiloquent state entries into London—after the battle of Worcester, for example—and lavish state funerals—such as Admiral Richard Deane's, following his victory against the Dutch fleet at Gabbard Sands.

Yet such overt expressions of pride in the achievements of human agency, when many believed the credit should go to God, became a source of tension. Colonel John Jones and Major-General Thomas Harrison were not the only ones who were repelled by "stollen titles," while the writer of the radical newsbook the *Moderate* warned in April 1649 that "those that climbe the steps of Honour may catch a fall at last" (pp. 141–42, 143).

The longest chapter in the book, that on politics, covers ground familiar to those who know Blair Worden's close-grained, authoritative analysis (see *The Rump Parliament* [1974]). However, Kelsey's interpretation of the expulsion of the Rump is not as sure-footed as one would wish. His statement that "there were no great manifestoes [from the army] prior to the dissolution" (p. 185) overlooks the widely publicized petition to Parliament of August 1652, in which the Council of War outlined a wide-ranging program of reform. Parliament's dilatory response to this petition was arguably a factor in the military coup of April 1653. When it comes to understanding why the Rump was kicked out, Kelsey does not carry us far beyond the cogent speculations of Worden and Austin Woolrych. Nor does he do adequate justice to the army's conviction that the Rump's Bill for a New Representative would have fired Oliver Cromwell as commander-in-chief and banned army officers from any role in running the country, at the same time that it failed to prevent the election of professed royalists to Parliament. These are surely the principal reasons why Cromwell was so determined, on April 20, 1653, to prevent Parliament from holding new elections.

These reservations apart, Kelsey is persuasive in his argument that the English republicans were proud of their creation: a common-law regime embodying the ideal of virtuous self-government by the gentry and fortified by a providential nationalism. He is remiss, however, in downplaying the regime's unpopularity, which was mordantly expressed in the graffito scrawled on the door of the House of Commons the day after Cromwell's coup: "This house to let, now unfurnished" (quoted on p. 173).

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JOHN COFFEY. *Politics, Religion, and the British Revolutions: The Mind of Samuel Rutherford*. (Cambridge Studies in Early Modern British History.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Pp. xii, 304. $59.95.

Samuel Rutherford (c. 1600–1661) is not among the best-known political thinkers to emerge from Britain's seventeenth-century civil wars. A highly anglocentric history of political thought has paid considerably greater attention to his contemporaries, Philip Hunton, Henry Parker, the great John Milton (defending the execution of Charles I), and, of course, Thomas Hobbes than it has to the several Scottish polemicists who contributed to debates on issues ranging from episcopal government, to the divine right of kings, to individual religious liberty. And even Rutherford's friends have proved false: a one-sided picture of this multifaceted reformer and scholar has emerged from the many editions of his sermons and letters, which reveal a pietist Puritan akin to later Methodists (John Wesley quoted him favorably) and American evangelicals. There has even been a resurgence of interest in Rutherford among the Christian New Right, which has appropriated Rutherford as one of its spiritual founders. A handful of modern doctoral dissertations concentrates overwhelmingly on his theological thought or on a narrow understanding of supposedly "democratic" elements in his political thought, but these largely ignore the connections between the two, the historical contexts within which they evolved, and even the very events in which the living, breathing Rutherford, a firebrand activist of the first order, participated on both sides of the Anglo-Scottish frontier.

John Coffey's new book is an attempt to put the whole Rutherford back together again. It is something less than a complete biography—a detailed narrative of his upbringing, education, and career is kept to one chapter—but more than a mere exposition of Rutherford's intellectual positions. Based on a thorough and close reading of all Rutherford's extant works and on select manuscript sources, placed alongside the writings of his Scottish and some English contemporaries, Coffey's work now stands as the most authoritative study of its subject. Previous scholars, such as Arthur Williamson, have correctly identified the potency of apocalyptic thought (and especially the notion of a national covenant inherited directly from the Israelites) when combined with a slightly older ancient constitutionalism; the latter is most often associated with George Buchanan's *De jure regni apud Scotos*

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(1579) but in fact reaches much further back to the Anglo-Scottish wars of the early fourteenth century.

This volatile brew, rather than modern concerns with liberty, fueled the fury against Arminianism in particular and bishops in general that was but the beginning of Scotland's and eventually England's troubles after 1637. In the case of Rutherford, it was also overlaid with a strict scripturalism and a devotion to scholastic pedagogy acquired early in life. University scholasticism marks most of his political and theological writings, of which *Lex, Rex* (1644) is the most famous example; Hobbes was probably right to have seen the colleges as nurseries of sedition. Indeed, scholasticism of both style and substance has obscured the complexities of Rutherford's thought on such issues as the nature of divine grace and the freedom of the Christian to resist tyranny. Although it places him in a long and respectable tradition, it has done little to help Rutherford's posthumous reputation (at least among political theorists) when compared with the greater clarity and directness of Hobbes himself or—superficially closer to Rutherford's side of the political spectrum—that of John Locke. This book does justice to the finer points and distinctions of Rutherford's thought: the support of Rutherford for the deposition of the king but not for regicide, for example, is explicable given his view that Charles I was not a tyrant, removed from all law, but a legitimate prince who had slipped into ruling tyrannically.

Rutherford's subtleties were often lost on many of his contemporaries, and the latter cannot be blamed for this, as his views were not entirely self-consistent. He revised his judgments on a number of matters depending upon both his audience and the needs of the moment (Coffey is firmly entrenched in the Skinnerian-Pocockian historical method of assessing past political theory). In the late 1630s, the "auld inimie," spiritually speaking, was incarnated as episcopal rule over the kirk with its obvious betrayal of the Reformation principles of John Knox and Andrew Melville. In the early 1640s, it became imperative for Rutherford, himself resident in London as a delegate to the Westminster Assembly of Divines, to see that the covenant embraced by his people was exported and taken up by the benighted English—many of whom, as things turned out, had rather different ideas of the relation between clergy and laity—and the need for a national church structure. In the late 1640s and during the Interregnum (with Scotland, the former ally, now turned into a subject state), he turned his attention to the grossest impieties wrought by religious liberty, Independency, and the sects. This was doubly ironic, since Rutherford's own writings show a vestigial sympathy to the motives of moderate Independency and since he had by then alienated himself from the Presbyterian elite of the kirk that he had devoted his life to purifying. By the end of his career, in the wake of Oliver Cromwell and Quakerism and the shadow of restored episcopacy, Rutherford had also largely repudiated the natural law constitutionalism he had espoused two decades earlier. Along the way, in chapters devoted to Rutherford as apocalyptic prophet, spiritual shepherd, ecclesiological architect, and, of course, political thinker, it becomes clear that Rutherford possessed the range and fervor but not the clarity and simplicity of the century's major thinkers. In discussing his subject's much-deprecated literary style, for example, Coffey verges on special pleading for perhaps the only time in this study. Although the conclusion ably reinforces the argument that a variety of intellectual streams fed into this turbulent pool, one cannot escape the impression that the "mind" denoted in the subtitle ought to have been plural.

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M. E. Turner, J. V. Beckett, and B. Afton. *Agricultural Rent in England, 1690–1914*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Pp. xix, 356. $69.95.

This monograph by M. E. Turner, J. V. Beckett, and B. Afton describes a timely and well-devised research project conducted by three of Britain's leading agrarian historians. Its origins lie in work carried out for the forthcoming *Agrarian History of England and Wales*, (Volume 7, ed. E. J. T. Collins), and it seeks to fill a gap evident in two earlier and otherwise comprehensive volumes in the same series (Volume 5, *1640–1750*, ed. J. Thirsk [1984 and 1985], and Volume 6, *1750–1850*, ed. G. E. Mingay [1989]).

An opening chapter discusses the problems in identifying what is to be understood by rent, in theory and in practice; the second evaluates the views of contemporaries such as Arthur Young and James Caird; and the third summarizes the current state of knowledge with particular reference to the works of J. D. Chambers and Mingay and, more recently, R. C. Allen. Chapters four through seven trace the steps by which the authors set out—without adopting an arrogant posture—"to do the job properly" (p. 70). Their methods are set out simply and clearly; indeed, they achieve a level of transparency rarely encountered in historical studies with a substantial statistical content. The major components of the new index are estate records, sifted for quality and usefulness; data deriving from the Royal Commission on Agriculture, which sat in the 1890s; and studies of individual estates written by others. The mix of these sources varies over time and, not surprisingly, the closer we approach to 1914, the more comprehensive the coverage becomes. As the authors candidly admit, their index is slim for the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, due to the low survival rates of appropriate records. What emerges from this "amalgam" (p. 150) is an index of rent assessed and—equally important—rent received from 1690 to 1914 (chapters eight and nine, and appendixes one and two).

Finally, in chapters ten and eleven, the authors seek to match the new index to prevailing notions about the course of English agrarian history, pointing to areas

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where the fit is good and suggesting some revision of current orthodoxies. This is the part of the book most likely to attract the attention of non-specialists. In chapter ten, an attempt is made to assess the landlords' share of agrarian income. On the face of things, it is plausible to conclude that rents grew disproportionately in the early eighteenth century; that farmers rather than landlords took a larger share during the second half; that rents gained ground in the first half of the nineteenth century; and that landlords suffered a greater fall in revenue than did tenants during the "Great Depression" of the late nineteenth century, while at that period a diminishing number of laborers took a larger slice of the now shrinking agricultural cake. Such calculations, which should be of great interest to social historians, necessarily depend on the accuracy of estimates made (by others) of agricultural output and price movements, which—particularly the former—must be to some extent conjectural, at least for the eighteenth century.

More convincing, in some respects, is chapter eleven, where the rent index is set against successive phases of agricultural prosperity and depression, as conventionally understood. The effect is to confirm 1750–1815 as a time of prosperity for tenants and landlords alike and to suggest that, during the French wars, increases in rent levels were even greater than is usually assumed. Not surprisingly, the impact of the "Great Depression" is faithfully reflected in the new index as is the fact that it was widespread, while rents showed few signs of recovery before 1914. Much of this accords neatly with the established historiography, which, however, is challenged by the new rent figures at two points. It is suggested that the agricultural depression following the French wars has been exaggerated in the light of the rent evidence: historians have placed too much faith in the testimony of various parliamentary inquiries into the state of agriculture in the 1830s. Most strikingly, the new index appears to call into question the presumption that there occurred in the early eighteenth century a deep agricultural depression—a view associated especially with Mingay and one that is deeply embedded in orthodox thinking on the subject. It may be premature to discard this notion, however, because (as already indicated) the new rent index is, to say the least, thin in its coverage at any time before 1750.

Of one thing we can be sure: no one is likely to repeat this ambitious venture for many years to come, and scholars whose research lies in agrarian developments or in the history of landed society owe a debt of gratitude to Turner, Beckett, and Afton. Within the limitations of the data available, they have succeeded magnificently in their endeavors.

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Boyd Stanley Schlenther. *Queen of the Methodists: The Countess of Huntingdon and the Eighteenth-Century Crisis of Faith and Society*. Durham, U.K.: Durham Academic Press; distributed by Pentland Press, Raleigh, N.C. 1997. Pp. xiv, 208. $39.50.

Edged out by John Wesley and George Whitefield, Selina Hastings, the Countess of Huntingdon (1707–1791), has not been remembered as the key figure she was in the Evangelical Revival. In this new biography, Boyd Stanley Schlenther has reconstructed her story to show the unique role she played in religion in the eighteenth century as a woman, a layperson, and an aristocrat. The theme of Schlenther's book is that the countess's life was one of unresolved tension. Despite her active promotion of evangelical preaching, her path was tragically "littered with broken relationships" (p. 160).

Lady Huntingdon began life in a troubled home. Early on, her mother abandoned the family, having contracted syphilis from her husband. When she herself married the ninth earl of Huntingdon, her devotion to him was at first passionate, even amorous. Yet already her life showed signs of turbulence with health problems, legal wrangles with her mother over her late father's estate, and the social pressures of high society. Soon her relationship with the earl began to deteriorate, as would her relationship with her children later.

Contact with her husband's sisters in Yorkshire brought the countess into the orbit of Methodism in 1739, and evidence points to this as the period of her evangelical conversion. One of the astonishing details Schlenther pieces together is the likelihood that the countess and her husband were sympathetic with the Stuart cause in the 1740s. If true, this certainly makes the common claim that Methodists were Jacobites in disguise something more than an empty accusation.

Coming under the influence of Benjamin Ingham, the countess was initially well-disposed to Moravianism, but this came to an abrupt halt when the low-born Ingham married her sister-in-law. This also began a pattern in the unsteady 1740s in which Lady Huntingdon repudiated one spiritual guide for another almost like serial lovers. She was a Moravian under Ingham in 1739, a perfectionist under Wesley in 1741. She abandoned John Wesley for Charles, then became a predestinarian under Howell Harris in 1742. Whitefield became her favorite in 1748.

Her position in eighteenth-century society meant that many Methodists looked to Lady Huntingdon for favors and sometimes competed for her attentions. When Whitefield became her chaplain, this "cut John Wesley deeply," since he knew "Whitefield had poached Lady Huntingdon from him" (p. 39). In the 1750s, she emerged as a leader of the Calvinistic wing of Methodism and initially focused her evangelistic ardor on the higher ranks of society, although with little success. In the 1760s, she sought to gather evangelically minded Anglican clergy under her wing and to induce bishops to ordain more of the same. She began a program of chapel building as an extension of her prerogative as nobility. Then, when Oxford ex-

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pelled several Calvinistic Methodist students from St. Edmund Hall in 1768, she turned her attention to establishing her own theological college at Trevecca in Wales. It was from her students at Trevecca that she endeavored to staff romantic but ultimately disastrous overseas mission projects. These students also acted as her traveling preachers, building up her Connexion, but Schlenther finds many examples of their own moral and spiritual instability.

As Lady Huntingdon's Calvinism hardened in the 1770s, she exercised her personal authority more emphatically over her preachers and chapels. Her path was narrowing and led inevitably to secession. By 1783, the Countess of Huntingdon's Connexion was ordaining its own ministers, but by this time very few of her friends remained with her. Compared with the growth of Wesleyan Methodism and New Dissent after her death, the Connexion would atrophy. For Schlenther, this was only the final symbol of the lack of stability in her own life and labors.

Although not a sophisticated exposition of evangelical theology and spirituality, Schlenther's interpretative biography makes an important contribution to our understanding of eighteenth-century religion and society and provides a remarkably lucid narrative, constructed from detailed archival research. It comes on the heels of Edwin Welch's labor of many years organizing the Countess of Huntingdon's archives and his book, *Spiritual Pilgrim: A Reassessment of the Life of the Countess of Huntingdon* (1995). The countess's place in the eighteenth-century revival has been restored, and we are all the richer for being able to see the century from the perspective of her life, however tragic that life now appears in retrospect.

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Marilyn Morris. *The British Monarchy and the French Revolution*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1998. Pp. viii, 229. $28.50.

The British monarchy has been endowed for over a century with mystical powers of fascination, uniting the contradictory attributes of divinity and humanity in a government at once royal and republican. These paradoxes lie at the heart of a study that chronicles the reinvention of the British monarchy during the reign of King George III, a process that culminated, according to Marilyn Morris, in the emergence of a crown embodying the virtues of domesticity and accessibility long before the reign of Queen Victoria.

Despite more than a decade's work on court culture and varieties of conservatism in early modern Britain, much remains unknown about the political culture of the eighteenth-century monarchy. In an examination of selected newspapers, periodicals, cartoons, sermons, and pamphlets, Morris examines the legal, theological, intellectual, and cultural routes through which the theory of monarchy was modified during the French Revolutionary Wars. George III successfully cast the royal family in a bourgeois drama exemplifying domestic virtue and paternal benevolence, attributes of monarchy with which an eighteenth-century audience had become familiar by 1790, thanks to their constant assertion in the contemporary press. So pervasive was the paradigm of monarchy that even popular radicals found it difficult to repudiate. By 1800, radical critics of the constitution and loyalist defenders of the establishment subscribed to similar models of constitutional monarchy in which responsible and accessible government was supervised by a custodial crown.

The monarchist vs. republican pamphlet debate of the 1790s is perceptively described by Morris as an intellectual contest owing little direct inspiration to the writings of Edmund Burke and Thomas Paine. Morris deals sympathetically with the struggles of British "popular" radicals to downplay their republican sympathies in a hostile intellectual and political climate, but she fails to address the contributions of moderate non-democrats and their rhetoric of "Old Corruption" to the reform debates of the 1790s. She attributes the success of loyalist monarchism to the assertion of traditional values "while conceding points to egalitarian argument" (p. 64). This analysis does not reflect the modifications undergone by Tory and Court Whig political theory over the eighteenth century nor the sophistication of utilitarian and contractarian appeals to history, expediency, and natural law during the 1790s. Morris's treatment of these concepts conveys little sense of radical-loyalist engagement in common modes of discourse. Having said this, she successfully proves that loyalist political theorists constructed an ideologically flexible and historically constructed monarchy that could be subscribed to by all defenders of the status quo from Filmerian divine right theorists to constitutional monarchists.

The British government of the day emerges as a staunch defender of monarchy and the conservative social values it embodied. Morris's examination of prosecutions for sedition and treason suggests that the law courts became a forum for advertising the sanctity and authority of the monarchy, a public relations function that may have interested the ministry more than the securing of convictions in the 1794 state trials. The government's interest in sponsoring the production of pro-monarchical propaganda is much more difficult to document. In the absence of Secret Service press accounts for the 1790s, it is difficult to ascertain which metropolitan journalists were subsidized by the Pitt ministry, much less the ways in which the forty-six loyalist responses to Paine studied by Morris represent a blend of "government directives and personal initiative" (p. 59). Loyalists did not take instructions from the government, nor did the established church, although its clergymen played a much more active role in the defense of a crown and constitution sanctified by divine origins and providence. One of this book's strengths lies in its analysis of sermons to elucidate different yet compatible perspectives on monarchy

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upheld by Anglicans, Evangelicals, Methodists, and rational Dissenters.

This text represents a useful synthesis of recent research in seventeenth and eighteenth-century British cultural, political, and religious history that traces the evolution of the monarchy's ideology and image from 1604 to 1800. Morris raises thought-provoking questions about the past and future of a British monarchy now forced to look beyond bourgeois domesticity to reinvent itself once more.

JENNIFER MORI
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J. E. COOKSON. *The British Armed Nation, 1793–1815.* New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1997. Pp. vi, 286. $87.00.

This is a distinguished contribution to the contemporary historiography on the British wars against the French Revolution and Napoleon. Until recently, historians took the attitude—epitomized in the index entry in Sir William Napier's *History of the Peninsular War*: "Ministers, English: their imbecility shown by extracts from correspondence"—that dedicated field commanders were hampered by incompetent governments of a rich country that could have done far more to bring the conflict to a decisive conclusion much earlier.

This paradigm has been revised partly by research into newly opened archives but at least as much by reconsidering the constraints on even very wealthy states. Both Christopher D. Hall's *British Strategy in the Napoleonic War 1803–1815* (1992) and Rory Muir's *Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon* (1996) are far more sympathetic than earlier works to the problems of mobilizing the resources of the country. There were limits to taxes that could be imposed, loans that could be raised, and men who could be recruited, to say nothing of food that could be produced in years of bad harvests and specie that could be provided in a period of uncertainty, hoarding, and speculation. Allocating resources directly to the military effort, moreover, meant diverting them from agriculture, manufacturing, and trade, which generated the income to continue the war and furnish allies with subsidies. There were also hesitations about arming a population that might turn its weapons against the country's rulers. And even the Peninsular War, which later seemed the obvious theater for success, looked like a risky enterprise after the disappointment of the heady hopes of 1808.

J. E. Cookson's book concentrates on the domestic difficulties of mobilization. He points out that Britain was as much a nation in arms as France, with more than one in ten of the eligible males being in the army or navy (over one in five if volunteer units are included) in 1805, compared to only one in fourteen for France (p. 95). But this level of participation was difficult to achieve within the libertarian and voluntary traditions of Britain with its old institutions, hierarchical society, and three-kingdom state. It could only be accomplished by the cooperation of local governments with the central administration. This involved accommodating a delicate balance of interests, particularly since there was much resistance to volunteerism and local militias refused to serve outside their counties. But the needs of war also provided urban leaders with an opportunity to demonstrate their patriotism and increase their standing with the traditionally more prestigious county elites. The implications of this central-local connection obviously extend far beyond the bounds of the present study.

Apart from this important insight into town government, the most important result of this truly United Kingdom study is to distinguish and integrate the distinct roles of Scotland and Ireland. Both made disproportionately large contributions to the war effort and the experience had great significance for their individual identities. But whereas Scottish regiments expressed the national character and helped the army and society to form a closer relationship, religious division in Ireland prevented any such celebration of their collective achievement. Protestants did not want to encourage Catholic claims by drawing attention to their military participation, while the Catholics had to bear the memories of rebellion, defeat, and humiliation. But Cookson usefully reminds his readers that until the middle of the nineteenth century, even the nationalism of Irish Catholics was very British, essentially a species of colonial nationalism. They had no interest in a French alliance and realized their dependence on British protection, but they did want a better deal within the British system. Cookson concludes that "The Napoleonic mobilization for national defence was undoubtedly the greatest 'national project' in Britain's experience" (p. 261). But the price of local cooperation and increased opportunities for service for a wider social group in all three kingdoms ultimately changed the political order by making the issue of parliamentary representation unavoidable.

This book packs a great deal of information into a small space. The impressive research (particularly in local archives), careful thought, analysis, and suggestive comments make it invaluable for understanding the wars, the nature and operation of British government, state formation, and nationality within the United Kingdom.

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THOMAS R. TRAUTMANN. *Aryans and British India.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1997. Pp. xiv, 260. $35.00.

In this erudite study, Thomas R. Trautmann excavates a series of underexamined intellectual debates that help to account for the emergence of ethnology as one of the chief explanatory modes for understanding culture in nineteenth-century Britain. More specifically, the book examines the impact of Orientalist scholarship by focusing on two generations of British

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Sanskritists whose work promoted the idea that Britons and Indians were long-lost kin who shared an Aryan linguistic heritage. These men—from Sir William Jones in the eighteenth century to Friedrich Max Müller in the Victorian period—used philology as a way of proving that the so-called "Aryan love story" had deep historical roots. Although they were empire loyalists, defense of the Raj was not their chief aim. Rather, they were ideologues of a less crude sort whose embrace of language classification as the motor force behind global cultural development was superseded by "the racial theory of Indian civilization" as articulated by ethnologists like J. C. Prichard, R. G. Latham, and John Crawfurd. Despite the fact that they lost the battle over which science could best explain world history, the Orientalists' quarrel with race scientists is arguably an important dimension of the larger narrative of British colonialism, in part because it suggests the ways in which the politics of knowledge was at work in various quarters of metropolitan thought, in part because it illuminates how such ideas had very real outcomes for national and international history.

As with so many scholars who work in and around the history of colonialism, Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978) is not merely Trautmann's point of departure but also the very ground of his analytical interventions. Happily Trautmann does not profess to rescue the Orientalists from the condescension of postcolonial history. He undertakes instead to detail the technical content of Orientalist scholarship, underscoring the way it privileged Sanskrit as a language on a par with Latin and Greek and arguing that it was symptomatic of an Indomania that ran parallel with a number of other intellectual fashions (like Egyptology) of the time. This enthusiasm was short-lived, however, as early nineteenth-century Evangelical fervor and Utilitarian commitments together discredited the claims for Indian civilization that characterized the work of Jones, for whom India was unquestionably the most civilized postdiluvian "nation." In the first instance, then, Trautmann's book offers new insight into the Indophobia articulated by James Mill's *History of India* (1817) by fleshing out the proto-disciplinary contexts in which Mill's contempt for Indian society and culture was not only imagined but gained intellectual credibility.

And yet, as important as Mill's reactionary response was to become for the history of British India, this is not the ultimate significance of Orientalist production. Of far greater moment is the disaggregation of ethnology from philology that occurred around 1870 at the hands of younger scholars determined to advance claims about race, about physiognomy, and especially about whiteness over those of language in their attempt to provide an explanatory framework for human development. And, most crucially for the history of the twentieth century, these mid-Victorian thinkers increasingly narrowed the Aryan concept to the idea of an original white race which had spread the Indo-European languages throughout the ancient world. Although Müller, whom Trautmann calls "the creator of the notion of the Aryan race" (p. 172), later retreated from his arguments that language was properly a test of race, his decoupling was belated and finally inconsequential in the face of the popularity, one might even say the hegemony, of race science in most intellectual circles of the post-Darwinian era. Some discussion of how events in the metropole and the colonies contributed to this rigidification of opinion might have made this argument even more persuasive, if only by making connections between the world of ideas and the world of colonial politics and ideologies more explicit. For example, Crawfurd gave his paper, "On the Physical and Mental Characteristics of the European and Asiatic Races of Man," to the London Ethnological Society in 1866, when rebellion in Jamaica and discussions about the electoral reforms of 1867 were both in the news, debates in which discourses of race were not just prominent but constituent of English notions of democracy and imperial policy, as Catherine Hall has demonstrated ("Rethinking Imperial Histories," *New Left Review*, 1994).

Trautmann's overarching purpose is, admittedly, to unearth the insular British history of the Aryan idea in order to put to rest, once and for all, the idea that Orientalism in its original incarnation is somehow responsible for the myth of Aryan identity which the Nazi regime capitalized on with such devastating consequences. This may seem like hair-splitting to some. In any case, his audience is not limited to British historians or critics of empire, though his conclusions are eminently useful to both.

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JOHN R. DAVIS. *Britain and the German Zollverein, 1848–66*. New York: St. Martin's. 1997. Pp. x, 238. $69.95.

In the 1840s, Britain embarked on a program of trade liberalization. The adoption of free trade policies is usually associated with the year 1846, when the Corn Laws were repealed. Some have argued that the move to free trade was in large part the result of the self-interested behavior of business groups in Manchester, whose members saw the benefits to themselves of free trade and were sufficiently influential to help bring it about. Of course, alongside this economists had been propagating free trade ideas for the previous half century and these had been gaining increasing acceptance. At about the same time as this was happening in Britain, the German states had been bringing themselves together in closer formation, particularly in the *Zollverein* or customs union that was established in 1834. This was the early stage of what was ultimately (in 1871) German unification.

The subject of this book by John R. Davis is the relationship, particularly the trade relationship, between Britain and the German states. Davis argues

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that this is a subject that British historians have neglected. The reasons he gives for the neglect are twofold. First, it was a relatively quiet period, with issues of commercial policy apparently settled; and second, political historians have tended to avoid the subject of commercial policy. German historians, by contrast, have devoted a good deal of time to the subject; we thus have as a consequence a German view of the period. This view is one that reflected badly, at least initially, on Britain: Britain acting to promote its own superior position at the time and suppress that of the *Zollverein*. Furthermore, the early view in the German states was that of Friedrich List and other similarly minded economists, that German industrialization was in opposition to British interests. That view has since been revised on the German side. Davis sets out to analyze how British policy was received at the time, to show how the British regarded their own policy, and to see what reconciliation there can be between the two positions.

After presenting the issues clearly, Davis provides an overview of the trading relationships between the two territories and follows that with a systematic treatment, almost year by year, of British commercial policies as they related to, or appeared to impinge directly on, the *Zollverein*. At the center of all this was John Ward, the British consul general stationed at Leipzig from 1845 to 1860 and thereafter in Hamburg. Ward's job was to monitor the trade and tariff policy of the whole *Zollverein*, and he was in a unique position midway between the consular and the diplomatic. Davis describes him as "possibly the most important figure in the commercial information-gathering system in the Zollverein" (p. 29).

What has to be remembered, of course, and Davis is perfectly conscious of this, is that as the truly supreme world power in the mid-nineteenth century, and having adopted a universalist and unilateralist free trade position, Britain was not particularly interested in any detail of commercial policy. Even the preferential treatment the *Zollverein* gave to France in the 1860s was no more than a minor irritant. Britain was not against the *Zollverein*. In fact, as far as the customs union could be seen to be a simplification of the complex tariff system of the previous component states, Britain was well disposed toward it. But where it is fair to say that Britain's policy was essentially neutral, it was not seen as such on the German side. This study is at its most valuable in demonstrating how policy, such as it was, and even at times political rhetoric and actual trading outcomes, were all interpreted in the *Zollverein* as reflections of actual policy actions. Davis's biggest job will lie in persuading people of the significance of these events. But his is a well-constructed thesis, and it will be useful to several different types of historians.

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DAGMAR KIFT. *The Victorian Music Hall: Culture, Class and Conflict*. Translated by ROY KIFT. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1996. Pp. x, 244. $54.95.

In the past twenty-five years, we have seen a welcome broadening of working-class studies, which for too long focused entirely on trade unionism and the birth of the Labour Party. Historians of popular culture and leisure have convincingly demonstrated the importance of working-class life outside the workplace. No nineteenth-century institution has received more attention than the music hall, which attracted thousands of patrons night after night. As Dagmar Kift says, the music hall "has come to be regarded as significant in the formation not only of modern British working-class culture but of the culture of the nation as a whole" (p. 175). From its origins in the 1840s and 1850s it was controversial; reformers from all social classes feared that drink combined with song and dance led to alcoholism, domestic abuse, and delinquency. Competing pressure groups, combined with the economic and cultural impact of the halls, tested the powers of the new local governments. Who would control how and where the people spent their hard-earned money? In this dense, effectively argued book, Kift provides an excellent overview of recent work on the music hall as well as groundbreaking analyses of the provincial halls and their legal troubles.

Nothing is more difficult to capture than past performances, whether it be political speech-making, sermons, or theatrical production. The earliest critics of the halls nostalgically recreated the experience of seeing stars such as Marie Lloyd, Dan Leno, Little Tich, and Gus Elen, famous for their subtle interpretive skills. In the 1970s and 1980s, the focus shifted to the question of whether the music halls represented working-class culture or deflected working-class radicalism into patriotism and sentiment. In addition, historians of leisure examined the proprietors and entrepreneurs of this burgeoning capitalist industry; more than one critic noted that live entertainment was the single largest employer in London. The massive profits and close connections with the brewing industry, as well as the turn-of-the-century shift to nationwide syndicates, have also been studied. Kift summarizes this work and concludes, with Peter Bailey, that the music halls were "a mixture of spontaneous and oppositional people's culture 'from below' and commercialised mass culture 'from above' " (p. 7).

Kift's particular contribution to the historiography of the music halls is her focus on the different controversies found in provincial cities such as Liverpool, Bolton, Sheffield, Glasgow, Leeds, Bradford, and Manchester. She has made effective use of police records; for example, she examines those of persons injured in fires and panics to unravel the age, occupations, and sex of music-hall audiences. Kift deftly unravels the varied impact of a complicated set of local government acts on the licensing and policing of live entertainment. The "social control" model, which ar-

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gued that puritanical temperance or social purity organizations successfully destroyed the demotic vigor of the halls, proves to be wrong. Instead, organized anti-music hall pressure often came from theater associations who feared competition from an entertainment that could serve drink. Even in cities where the temperance movement was especially strong, few inroads were made in halting either the licensing of song saloons or of halls. Kift sees a shift, after 1875, away from unsuccessful battles against drink to attacks on individual numbers within a music-hall program. Reminiscent of recent attacks on NEA funding, reformers pulled out a few atypical acts (all of which showed women's legs) and argued that the halls encouraged immorality among impressionable youths. But everywhere the success of pressure groups remained limited unless they had their own members elected to town councils or appointed to key committees. Even then, laws were enforced capriciously. Elaborate building and fire regulations turned out to be more effective in killing the small, largely unregulated song saloons than individual campaigns against immorality.

Kift's case histories provide important revisionary documentation, as well as demonstrating the class complexities of reform. Music-hall entertainers and entrepreneurs were masters at rallying "the people" for their cause, but the working class did not always support unpopular or dishonest proprietors. Unfortunately, Kift does not apply the same subtlety of analysis to the middle class, which is rarely differentiated from minority pressure groups. Very different kinds of reformers are lumped together with a growing middle class that was often indifferent rather than hostile to the music halls. Like her predecessors, Kift does not entirely escape from over-identification with the energetic and powerful halls against a middle class composed wholly of killjoys. Her acknowledgment of working-class alcohol abuse is lost in the richer and more attractive descriptions of the struggle against social purity activists. But this is a minor criticism of an important book that brings fresh evidence and sophisticated interpretation to the complex interelations of popular entertainment, audiences, local government, and pressure groups.

MARTHA VICINUS
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M. H. PORT. *Imperial London: Civil Government Building in London, 1851–1915*. New Haven: Yale University Press, for the Paul Mellon Center for Studies in British Art. 1995. Pp. 344. $60.00.

No visitor to London can miss its imperial presence. The city has its Roman history and medieval traditions, bank, guilds, exchange, and many eponymous streets. But it is principally west from the Tower that the architectural story of London, the imperial capital, begins to unfold. From Holborn to the south rise the Patent and Public Records Offices, the Land Registry, the Royal Courts of Justice, while from Aldwych down the Strand, through Trafalgar Square and into Whitehall, emerge the buildings at the historic heart of the world's greatest city. Today, these grand offices, survivors of both world wars, proudly convey an essence of permanence. But, as M. H. Port shows, they owe their existence far less to bold planning or palladian ambition than to the politics of the parish pump. London's public buildings grew in response to the increasing demands of urban, national, and imperial life, with their insistent requirements for improved communication and larger infrastructure.

The result—by routes not always obvious to the passing visitor—took quintessentially English form, embodied in buildings with histories marked by contention, compromise, and budget-paring. London was unplanned, and until this century, in many ways ungoverned, lacking even an overall authority until the creation of the Metropolitan Board of Works in 1855 and the London County Council at the turn of the century. But these creations did not have jurisdiction over new public buildings, which required a host of new procedures and special legislation. To place the establishment of Britain's expanding government, with revenues voted by the imperial Parliament, in an urban space that for much of its history had uncertain and untidy boundaries—whose administration was a product of its recent origins in a mosaic of vestries and landholdings—becomes, in Port's phrase, a study in the bogs and marshes of administrative history. In the telling, its tale is plagued by a thousand bureaucratic and political irritations. But to those who love London, these irritations produced a pearl; and for them, this book will have special meaning.

It is particularly fitting that Port, already well known for his excellent work on Westminster, should now turn his attention to Whitehall and beyond. He brings to a wider public a mastery of the subject that is probably unequalled in England and largely unavailable outside the Survey of London. In eight magisterial chapters, he surveys the case for public buildings, the inner workings of the Office of Works, the sites debated and chosen for public art, science, and justice, and the endless inevitable controversies and costs. For the rivalry between Gothic and Classicism and its manifest outcome, his chapter on the battle of the styles is required reading. He gives special attention to the wars of attrition that accompanied the Admiralty extension (proposed in 1850, but not completed until 1914) and the new War Office (demanded by reformers during the Crimean War in 1856 but not in place until 1906). Similar tales, of varying length, accompanied the genesis of the Foreign Office (proposed 1836, finished 1868); the India Office (proposed, following the Mutiny, in 1858, and built between 1863–1868); the New Public Offices, which incorporated the largest departments of the home government (built between 1897–1914); and the magnificent, hotly debated, and towering Gothic of the Royal Courts of Justice on

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Carey Street (twice relocated, and completed between 1873 and 1882). The book is a work of art, with rarely seen contemporary illustrations, architectural plans, and modern photographs, it is also a marvelous text on Alfred Waterhouse and George Edmund Street, Gilbert Scott, Charles Barry, and the less-known winners of the Foreign Office competition, Coe and Hofland.

No doubt, as Port carefully shows, the buildings of contemporary Paris and Vienna were visually more exhilarating and set standards to which British architects might aspire. London's choices were ultimately made by "practical men, on practical grounds. Architecture as metaphor was a game for the intellectuals" (p. 199). For all its grandeur, the actual practice of public building in London was a rough and ready affair. Parliamentary procedure, with its limited time and unlimited intrigue, was a messy way of doing business, and ministerial changes could set back the best laid plans by decades. In an era of low taxation and balanced budgets, the temptation not to build new accommodation for civil servants—for whose increased comfort there was little pubic sympathy—could be almost overwhelming. Not until the third Salisbury administration—when competitive contracting was modified, open competition was ended, architects were selected by government, and builders were paid from new revenues (organized by a more professional Office of Works, whose history receives due mention)—was there hope of continuity and completion. The same spirit, coupled with growing popular awareness of London's status as the metropolitan center of a world empire, lent symbolic value to design and substance and produced the city we know today.

Looking back, the decade before the Great War was the highwater mark of imperial architecture, not only in England but throughout Europe. Wartime necessity could not wait upon stylistic debate but demanded speedy construction, multiple function, and portability. For the same reason, the war marked the beginning of what became the long decline of the idea of symbolic and purpose-designed public offices in Britain. Port leaves us to decide for ourselves whether the "English system" of public building was successful between 1850–1915. His conclusion that London has "a range of handsome buildings" that "stand comparison with Continental rivals" is modest praise. "Viewed as townscape, Whitehall is at least respectable" (p. 274). From this, few could dissent, although one may suggest the author protests too much. There is both flair and style, and more important, surprise, in London's urban composition, which, for all its evident lack of uniformity, still affords an inexhaustible capacity to excite the inquiring mind. In post-imperial times, devolution would become increasingly the order of the day. For reasons that Port could not explore, the same was not yet to be true of federal Washington. But perhaps in his choice of the frontispiece for this elegant book—a colored photograph, showing the American flag flying among the banners of the United Kingdom above lower Whitehall—he recognizes the advent of a new direction in public building and in imperial architecture: one combining classical form and democratic dress.

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NEIL PARSONS. *King Khama, Emperor Joe, and the Great White Queen: Victorian Britain through African Eyes*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1998. Pp. xviii, 322. Cloth $50.00, paper $18.95.

In the spring of 1895, Cecil Rhodes was at the height of his power. Prime minister of the Cape Colony, chairman of the British South Africa Company and the Kimberley diamond monopoly (with a large stake in the Rand gold reef), he had just added Rhodesia to his dominion and put down a revolt by the Ndebele. South African shares (the so-called "Kaffir circus") were booming and Queen Victoria had made him a privy councilor. He was scheming, with the acquiescence of the British Colonial Office, to help himself to Bechuanaland (Botswana) as springboard for the planned Jameson Raid, which was intended to spark an uprising against Boer rule in the Transvaal.

In September 1895, three Tswana chiefs arrived in Britain to protest against Rhodes's plans for their territory. They were Sebele of the baKwena, Bathoen of the BaNgwaketse, and Khama III of the BaNgwato. Their paymaster was the Reverend W. C. Willougby, a London Missionary Society missionary who doubled as Khama's political secretary. Over the next eleven weeks, they addressed public meetings in Scotland, Lancashire, Yorkshire, the Midlands, and the South, visited manufacturing industries and agricultural shows, were wined and dined by the highest in the land, and maintained a love affair with the British press. Ostensibly, given their temperance movement constituency, the chiefs' campaign was about the dangers of alcohol. Increasingly, however, Rhodes's territorial ambitions emerged as their real theme. By late November, on the very day of their departure, Rhodes complained about having been "beaten by three canting natives." By New Year's day, with the Jameson Raid's failure, his grand design was in ruins.

As the title indicates, together with handsome period illustrations, this is intended to be popular, accessible history. The trick, though, is to know how to do it, and this is a good example of a book that would be much more readable if Neil Parsons were not straining so hard to make it so. His principal source is two collections of newspaper cuttings originally assembled for Bathoen and Sebele, and his own journalese reflects them all too accurately. He has no eye for significant details but piles everything on, as though sheer accumulation will persuade the reader that this is a vivid tale. Even when he has nothing to report, Parsons speculates relentlessly ("alternately, if they had sandwich boxes packed at Armfield's, they might have made a whole day of their outing by crossing

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Regent's Park to the London Zoological Gardens" [p. 83]).

Worse, Parsons breaks the chronology of his account. The narrative of the chiefs' public appearances is described separately from that of their negotiations with the government. Thus, a brief outbreak of "bad blood" between Sebele and Khama is explained, following the newspaper cuttings, as a case of jealousy over the attention paid the charismatic Khama in the form of gifts (some porcelain with his portrait, an album of photographs). Only afterward do we learn that, the week before, the two chiefs had adopted different strategies of negotiation with the Colonial Office, Sebele having already "sold out" to Rhodes while Khama, in Rochfort Maguire's words, preferred "tuppence from Mr. Chamberlain" to "half a crown from the Company" (p. 197). Was this the real cause of the bad blood? The point is probably beyond proof, but by preferring the newspaper's speculations about "green-eyed monsters" to the archival information deployed subsequently, Parsons undermines his book's argument that the chiefs were serious historical actors.

Did their campaigning have any effect? It was, after all, the fiasco of the raid that put an end to Rhodes' schemes and left Bechuanaland a British protectorate. Joseph Chamberlain's imposed settlement of November 6 had secured the three chiefs' territories as Bechuana islands in a Rhodesia sea, with little prospect of long-term survival. Yet had the chiefs not travelled to England to put their case, a settlement handing everything to Rhodes might have been imposed two months earlier. The chiefs' achievement was to keep options open long enough for Jameson's failure to be decisive. Subsequently, their popularity made the proclamation of a protectorate a politically astute way for Chamberlain to extricate himself from disaster.

Otherwise, their tale belongs to social rather than political history. Sebele especially proved himself a sardonic commentator on much of what he saw in Britain (he was surprised to find Queen Victoria "short and stout" [p. 229]). An appendix reprints a number of ballads dealing with the visit that make entertaining reading.

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A. SUSAN WILLIAMS. *Women and Childbirth in the Twentieth Century: A History of the National Birthday Trust Fund 1928–93*. Stroud, U.K.: Sutton. 1997. Pp. xviii, 331. £19.99.

This is an official history of a prominent London-based charity, the National Birthday Trust. Founded in 1928 by a group of Conservative and titled socialites, mainly women, its unspoken agenda was to use a vision of healthy national motherhood as a way of muffling class tensions. The organization ended its formal existence in 1993. Historian A. Susan Williams was financed by the trust's successor organization, WellBeing, given access to its extensive and revealing archives, and obviously not censored in any way. Commissioned histories of this kind are often honest and useful, but they seldom open new interpretative routes. In this case, though, despite some plodding efforts to cover who/what/and when for posterity, Williams has made this study of a single association simultaneously a history of childbirth, a study in reproductive politics, and a survey of medical research on birth and infancy in the twentieth century. She has made thorough and imaginative use of the trust's archive (for instance, documenting the wealthy Trust directors' egregious treatment of their own office employees) and also skillfully interviewed scores of people associated with the trust not only as members but also as beneficiaries. She has maintained a critical stance on the trust, its policies, and its social and medical luminaries.

The Birthday Trust's changing concerns and alliances themselves are partly responsible for the wide scope of this history of its activities. In its first years, its crusade was to lower Britain's extremely high maternal deathrates—almost five per thousand live births in 1929. On the advice of Dame Janet Campbell of the Ministry of Health, the trust took the position that more and better trained midwives, who were the attendants at about sixty percent of births in the 1930s, offered one solution and worked to improve the status of midwifery in Britain. Next the trust got involved in offering extra food to pregnant women in the "special areas" most badly effected by the Great Depression and, by the late 1930s, had committed itself to carrying out research on childbirth methods and sites. In the 1940s, when maternal mortality rates had plummeted, the trust turned to infant health and developed a more formal relationship with experts like obstetricians, epidemiologists, and statisticians. It carried out six enormous nationwide surveys in 1946, 1958, 1970, 1984, 1990, and 1994, some of which investigated every birth in England, Wales, and Scotland taking place in a specific week. A number of these studies generated results of major importance. The 1958 survey, for example, provided conclusive evidence on the relationship between a mother's smoking during pregnancy and the baby's birth weight. The 1946 and 1958 babies were the subjects of longitudinal studies that have yielded a wealth of health, sociological, and educational data, from stunning material on the significance of a baby's social class on its life chances to findings on the prevalence of bed-wetting among young children.

Scholars interested in women's health and welfare during the interwar period have generally looked at such left and/or feminist-leaning organizations as the Women's Cooperative Guild, the Labour Party Women's Organization (which generated the Maternal Mortality Committee, whose tireless Gertrude Tuckwell became quite detested by the Conservative Minister of Health), the Family Endowment Society, the Fabian Women's Group, and the National Union of Societies for Equal Citizenship. Although sharing

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many of the same aims and interests (more local provision for mothers and infants, the passage of the 1936 Midwives Act), the Birthday Trust had relatively little to do with these groups. The trust was Conservative rather than Labour-dominated; opposed to birth control, which might undermine Britain's imperial might; definitely against legalizing abortion; and demonstrated little interest in the opinions of working-class women themselves.

The low point, I would say, in the organization's history, was its grotesque fundraising reception at the Guildhall in London on March 28, 1939, attended by the queen and by dignitaries from many countries. Two hundred of the Birthday Trust's working-class beneficiaries were also invited, their dark "best dresses" standing out from the light gowns of the throng of begowned ladies. The Lyons lunch packets they had been given were literally a tasteless contrast with the elegant supper offered the paying guests, among whom was Adolf Hitler's ambassador to Britain—two weeks after German troops had occupied Prague.

Some Birthday Trust projects were better conceived and even bold. In the 1930s, the trust promoted anaesthesia for women in labor, while continuing its allegiance to midwife-attended home births. The trust sold packets of special chloroform masks at cost, many of which were used by midwives in homebirths, and later offered portable nitrous oxide machines, also administered by midwives in women's homes. In the 1940s, it opened a Human Milk Bureau, based at Queen Charlotte's Hospital, for "sick or delicate babies" whose mothers were unable to breastfeed them. The milk was collected by midwives on motorcycles from volunteers and delivered to homes where it was needed, an enterprise that has continued into the present (now run by Hammersmith Hospitals NHS Trust). After the war, with its physicians and demographers more independent and influential, the trust devoted more money to medical research, funding studies of the RH factor, toxemia in pregnancy, the causes of cerebral palsy and Down's Syndrome, and the remarkable massive longitudinal studies for which it is so famous.

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TOM BUCHANAN. *Britain and the Spanish Civil War*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Pp. xii, 241. Cloth $64.95, paper $24.95.

On November 1, 1940, the British War Cabinet discussed a matter arising from Britain's relations with Francisco Franco's Spain, and the debate proved rancorous enough to puzzle one of the more dispassionate figures present. Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Sir Alexander Cadogan recorded his perplexity thus: "Any Spanish topic makes the politicians go all hay-wire and Attlee [the Labour party leader and Lord Privy Seal], otherwise a dormouse, becomes like a rabid rabbit. Why?"

The purpose of Tom Buchanan's book, in effect, is to answer Cadogan's question: to explain why "of all the foreign conflicts of the twentieth century in which Britain was not directly involved, the war in Spain made by far the greatest impact on British political, social, and cultural life" (p. 1). His answer is twofold: that, in one of his most felicitous phrases, the Spanish Civil War "not only represented a world war in miniature, but ... also represented a New World in miniature" (p. 33). That is to say, Spain attracted British attention not only as a cockpit for contending versions of the present—democracy versus dictatorship—but also as a crucible for rival visions of the future—socialist utopianism versus social Christianity. Buchanan acknowledges that these two explanations of the mesmeric power of Spain's struggle are complementary, but these facets of its fascination, the real and the ideal, may have been even more symbiotically connected in historical reality. This so because British hearts, as well as minds, were inevitably engaged in a struggle over the very issues of power, property, and privilege that also constituted the stuff of political competition inside Britain. With the mainstream left-right divide reemerging in later 1930s Britain and in the face of the continued hold on power of the Conservative-dominated National Government, Spain served not only to incite more intense political controversies but also to imbue them with a greater sense of ideological purpose. Indeed, it is not too fanciful, as Buchanan notes, to see the political education received by Britain's center and left in the fight for Spanish democracy (with its emphasis on both the seriousness of the fascist menace and on the need for trans-class and cross-party unity to resist it) as a significant source of the "people's war" consensus in World War II Britain (p. 191). Of course, this unity of popular purpose both sustained Winston Churchill in office while he confronted Adolf Hitler and drove him from office when peace came, with its opportunity to turn Labour's vision of a homeland fit for heroes into reality.

For all his interest in the longer-term implications of Britain's obsession with the Spanish Civil War, however, Buchanan mainly concentrates upon the reactions of contemporary individuals and institutions. In a series of chapter-essays on the attitudes adopted by Britain's government, its political system, its humanitarian organizations, its political militants, its politicized intellectuals, and its churches toward Spain's fratricidal conflict, Buchanan compiles a systematic account of British responses. He discerns differences and diversities but also a common denominator: an aversion on the part of all but the most principled or partisan to become too heavily entangled in the Spanish imbroglio. This is a sophisticated conclusion in a work devoted to analyzing the appeal of Spain's convulsion to Britons at the time.

Equally subtle is the author's treatment (drawing on his previous monograph on the subject) of the British Labour Party's response to the Spanish Civil War. He

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attributes Labour's lukewarm espousal of the Republican cause to the preponderant influence of trade union leaders over party policy: their bureaucratic priorities and institutional authority prevailed over the enthusiasm of radical elements within the rank and file.

The only real shortcoming of Buchanan's work is its short measure. The book's overly concise character robs it of the room to include all key issues and to elucidate them in adequate depth and detail. Thus, a lightning tour of British policy toward the Civil War omits assessment of the single most critical step taken by London during the entire conflict: the pressure it exerted on France to reseal its Pyrenean frontier with Spain in June 1938, an event that doomed the republic. Still, even in its summary form, Buchanan's book is a useful addition to the voluminous historiography on the Spanish Civil War.

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MARTIN CHICK. *Industrial Policy in Britain, 1945–1951: Economic Planning, Nationalisation and the Labour Government*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998. Pp. xvi, 221. $59.95.

This is a thoughtful book on economic planning under the Labour governments in Britain between 1945 and 1951. The first four chapters examine the establishment of the main mechanisms of control, focusing on investment controls and nationalization. In chapter one, the establishment of the Central Economic Planning Staff (CEPS) and the Investment Programmes Committee (IPC), together with the shift toward viewing excess demand in terms of national income and expenditure, are seen as significantly transforming the collection of wartime controls that had been inherited in 1945. Chapter two then examines the operation of investment controls through the IPC and the CEPS, asking if industrial investment was sacrificed to "New Jerusalem" spending on welfare? In fact, Chick argues, the IPC and the CEPS tried to protect industrial investment and successfully held back spending on health, but then could not resist the pressures of the housing and education programs. Chapter three provides a detailed look at allocation across sectors, again focusing on investment. The IPC is seen as emphasizing production for export and relief of bottlenecks and adopting a policy of "patch-and-mend," which was bad for long-run productivity but understandable given the pressures to increase output. Chapter four examines the nationalization program, arguing that in most cases nationalization could be justified in terms of networks, externalities, and price and availability of output. In the cases of coal and steel, however, he argues that the interwar and wartime experiences of government intervention were crucial.

The second part of the book examines the experience of planning and controls, primarily in the nationalized industries but also in private industries where there were exhortations to rationalize. Chick sees this as "leading the discussion beyond the confines of central government, and out into the myriad of boardrooms and construction sites where economic planning and the market met" (p. xii). The story of monopoly pricing is particularly well told in chapter five, covering the debates among economists over average cost and marginal cost pricing as well as the political economy of the interaction among economic advisers, politicians, and civil servants. Chick argues that the economic advisers might have been more successful in introducing some rationality into price setting if they had adopted a less academic approach, but it is hard not to sympathize with the complaint noted by James Meade, Director of the Economic Section of the Cabinet Office, in his diary that the man chiefly responsible for internal and external financial policy Wilfrid Eady, Joint Second Secretary at the Treasury, had written to him saying that "he had no training in economics but was trying to master the subject" (p. 126). Chapter six, on investment appraisal, examines choice of technology during crucial investment decisions after nationalization of electricity and the railways. Chick argues that the conservative technological choices were made largely because of the political and market demand for rapid increases in output, which favored a patch-and-mend approach rather than a radical break with the past. He also sees economic planning as exacerbating the problem, however, because the unrealistic pricing structures that resulted led to further increases in excess demand. The chapter ends with a "brief cameo of a British 'production economy' characterised by excess demand, price controls, public exhortations to maximise output, a dollar-deficient balance of payments, and producing increased output, but at the expense of long-term productivity" (p. 165). The comparison with Eastern Europe springs easily to mind, although Chick prefers to leave any wider lessons for "fireside rumination." Chapter seven examines planning for rationalization in the cotton and steel industries. Again, the results were disappointing, with pressures for increased output leading to a patch-and-mend policy.

The tone of the first seven chapters is critical of the attempt to reconstruct and modernize the British economy on the basis of planning and nationalization as an alternative to the free market. In chapter eight, however, Chick notes that Britain's poor productivity performance continued after 1951, when the system of planning was abandoned. However, it was not until the 1980s that the major nationalized industries were privatized and interventionist industrial policies were abandoned. This may not have solved all the problems of the British economy, but it has had some dramatic effects on productivity performance in the former nationalized industries.

This is a scholarly work and will be essential reading for anyone interested in the Attlee governments. It would have been more accessible with an introduction and conclusion, rather than the two-page preface,

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which can do no more than sketch in the background. The author is cautious and has generally eschewed bold claims, but this need not have precluded a summary statement of key arguments and points for and against.

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ANNE ORDE. *The Eclipse of Great Britain: The United States and British Imperial Decline, 1895–1956.* New York: St. Martin's. 1996. Pp. viii, 262. Cloth $49.95, paper $18.95.

The closing of the Cold War opened room to reinterpret the international history of the twentieth century. Many scholars have seized this opportunity and changed the shape of the scholarship. From the older perspective focusing on Europe, the Cold War, and the "short' twentieth century, issues like relations between the USSR and Germany seemed fundamental and those between Britain and the United States tangential. Yet when one looks at the matters that shaped a "long" twentieth century of world history, British power and Anglo-American relations rank high on the list. Indeed, what phenomena in international relations over the past two centuries match in significance the rise of western hegemony in the world, Britain's dominance in that hegemony, its loss of status to the United States, and the waning of the West? A celebrated work by Paul Kennedy even stretched the "long" twentieth century to cover the entire period between 1500–2000 A.D. and used the British experience of power as a template to explain every power relation the world had ever known. That book has been widely criticized because of its empty analytical categories and inadequate research; at the same time, that there is something to it is widely conceded.

Anne Orde has produced the sort of book Kennedy needed to write in order to make his case. Her work has major strengths and subtle weaknesses. Orde has a fine grasp of international relations, a strong hold on the British documents, and a good knowledge of the American archives and of the secondary literature (although she has missed the recent work on a key issue, the maritime power of and naval relationships between these two states). Her account of Anglo-American relations is intelligent, although more original about American attitudes and policies than British ones. This is in large part because she does not belong to any of the sects that dominate writing on American foreign relations. Orde offers excellent accounts of such key issues as the confusion in American intentions during the Venezuelan crisis, Woodrow Wilson's willingness to wreck vital British interests in 1917–1919, and how the mere existence of superior American power eroded Britain's position in the Middle East after 1945 even when Washington wished to use it in Britain's favor. Once she hits her stride, which is really 1916, Orde's narrative has much drive, guided by grace in style and a masterful ability to use detail without drowning in it.

This work, however, is more successful as narrative than analysis; indeed, there are serious flaws in the analytical framework that underpins her narrative. In particular, Orde conflates the diplomatic relationship between Britain and the United States with their power and place in world affairs. In fact, these two were not synonymous until 1940. The unquestioned assumption that the two are one will make unwary students think that Britain sacrificed much to the United States and gained little in return between 1902–1939—and that this significantly affected the power of these two states—and so will lead readers to exaggerate the rate of British decline and the impact of American actions on it. These failings occur because Orde discusses Anglo-American diplomatic relations in isolation from the contexts of strategy, power, and the world. From the British perspective, the central points about the United States are simple ones: the latter posed the greatest potential threat to Britain's position in the world but did not act on that possibility and, at two key moments, 1914–1918 and 1940–1945, lent Britain much of that power to suit British ends. On most issues important to Britain, the United States was irrelevant; on many others, it made sacrifices to the United Kingdom. Only rarely did its actions weaken Britain or lead Britain to weaken itself.

In order to determine how far Anglo-American relations affected British power and imperial decline, one must make many fine calculations. If Britain abandoned a given policy aim against the United States, how far did that matter? How far was it normal—how far did Britain normally sacrifice interests to foreign powers? how far did the United States abandon policy aims to the United Kingdom? That Britain did so in any one instance does not necessarily prove a great deal. Between 1919–1939, Britain abandoned more of its policy aims due to the opposition and power of Turkey than the United States, while American authorities abandoned many things which they regarded as important due to British opposition. Again, Orde's focus on the correlation among the United States, the United Kingdom, and British decline necessarily implies that the United States significantly sapped British power, which weakened the British Empire. In fact, the United States was but a tertiary cause in this process. A fundamental one—central, for example, to Adolf Hitler's analysis of British power as recorded in the Hossbach memorandum—was the foreign perception that Britain's waning hold over the Dominions and India indicated a decline in British power, which encouraged others to challenge it. That is, British imperial decline preceded and caused Britain's decline as a world power. Orde's narrative assumes that Britain walked down a slow and continuous slope from primacy to irrelevance: in fact, it lost power not by sliding down a slope but by falling off a precipice. She has produced one of the best studies extant of Anglo-American relations, but it

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explains little new about power, strategy, or imperial decline.

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JOHN MCGURK. *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: The 1590s Crisis*. New York: Manchester University Press; distributed by St. Martin's Press, New York. 1997. Pp. xii, 290. $69.95.

After reading this book, an extraneous thought occurred to me: when William Shakespeare first put on *King Richard II* in about 1597, did anyone in the audience break out in hollow mirth after John of Gaunt boasted that Nature had protected "this scepter'd isle . . . against . . . the hand of war"? As John McGurk's fine monograph shows, during the 1590s, in both England and Ireland, "society was virtually on a continual war footing" (p. ix). Ireland was the most complicated and destabilizing problem the English government faced during Elizabeth's reign, being a nigh fatal legacy she inherited from her father, Henry VIII. The English government consistently underestimated the seriousness of the Irish problem during the sixteenth century—as they have ever since—and it nearly drove them to bankruptcy. As a result of the English conquest of Ireland, McGurk astutely observes, "The Gaelic Irish emerged as a nation without a state" (p. 11) and thus sowed the seeds of the troubles that have bedeviled Anglo-Irish relations ever since.

The strength of this monograph lies in the area of logistics, and it is based on an impressive mining of local archives. After a brief background to the Nine Years' War in Ireland, it examines the demands that raising troops imposed on various counties. England drafted 31,312 soldiers to fight in Ireland, while another 6,661 came from Wales. This represented 0.79 percent and 2.9 percent, respectively, of their total populations. Since at least as many troops fought on the continent or at sea, the hand of war placed a very heavy burden on late Elizabethan government and society. Proportionately about as many people served overseas in the last decade of the queen's reign as did during World War II. McGurk describes this burden in his detailed analysis of recruiting in Kent, Lancashire, and Cheshire, before showing how some 42,558 men were shipped through English ports (mainly Chester and Bristol) to serve in Ireland. The process was a pretty chaotic one, with draftees mutinying, deserting, robbing householders and molesting their wives and daughters, and getting drunk. Such events naturally figure prominently in local and national archives, but, as any one familiar with the U.S. Army's acronym "SNAFU" will recognize, such is the norm in most military endeavors. In fact, few Tudor draftees were hanged for their crimes, most of those the village constables called up went, and the late Elizabethan state demonstrated that remarkable ability to wage war that was the foundation for subsequent British world power.

The last third of this book, which describes the nature of the Irish wars, shows what war was like for the Elizabethan soldier, and tries to estimate casualties, is perhaps the least satisfying part. To be sure, estimating casualties in any war is difficult enough, and for one fought four hundred years ago it is next to impossible. For every English man who died in combat in Ireland, at least two, if not more, surely perished from war-related diseases. McGurk's conclusion that only 2,631 English (and Welsh) lost their lives in Ireland is unbelievably low. For instance, Table 17, from which it was drawn, lists only forty-four killed at Kinsale, yet in the text McGurk states that "hundreds, if not thousands, died of cold, disease and hostilities." Sir George Carew (who was there) thought "we lost above 6,000 men" (p. 246).

Even if the title promises more than the book actually delivers, this monograph is based on exhaustive research and unrivalled knowledge. It is a fitting culmination of a career that has produced numerous useful articles. By demonstrating that the Elizabethans were prepared to bear any burden, pay any price in what they regarded as a titanic struggle with Catholic Spain, McGurk has made an important contribution to early modern military history. In sum, "this England" was far less a "demi-paradise" than it was a "seat of Mars."

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RONALD D. CASSELL. *Medical Charities, Medical Politics: The Irish Dispensary System and the Poor Law, 1836–1872*. (Royal Historical Society Studies in History, New Series.) Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell for the Royal Historical Society. 1997. Pp. x, 181.

In undertaking to reveal the structure, successes, failures, and influence of the nineteenth-century Irish medical charities, the impact of the New Poor Law on them, and the development of a comprehensive health care system, Ronald D. Cassell set himself a formidable task. It was complicated by the destruction of the [Irish] Poor Law Commission and Local Government Board records in 1921, when the Customs House in Dublin (where they were stored) was ravaged by fire. Many a capable historian would have ruefully concluded that the undertaking was impossible, but Cassell has attacked the problem from the other end. By meticulously sifting through the records of those sectors that would have dealt with the charities, the Commission, and the Board, been affected by their policies, or contributed to the making of those policies, Cassell has assembled a picture of the development of nineteenth-century Irish medical care of the poor and its influence on England.

Why are nineteenth-century Irish medical charities and the personalities and conflicts among the medical establishment, bureaucracy, and government worthy of

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such labor, aside from adding to historical knowledge? Cassell shows that the Irish system was a little-known but crucial foundation stone in the British health system, arguing that "the English welfare administration came to acquire in 1871 the structure built up in Ireland in the previous twenty years" (p. 162). A few historians have touched on the Irish system, particularly Oliver MacDonagh, who asserted that its policies and structure were among "the most advanced health services in Europe" (p. vii), but none have made the linkages Cassell has done.

The Irish dispensary system began in the mid-eighteenth century with the recognition that the country, with its vast hordes of poor rural laborers and sparse, thinly spread gentry and middle classes outside of the large towns, could neither attract nor support adequate numbers of physicians and surgeons. Few of the poor would be able to pay for care even if it were available. Under the Infirmaries Act (1765), the counties were allowed to establish infirmaries under the management of a corporation of ranking citizens whose subscription contributed to their support. Each infirmary received £100 annually from the Treasury, plus funding established by the grand jury presentments. Irish grand juries were the principal organs of country administration, setting local tax rates and having sweeping powers to enforce them. The success of the infirmary system, for all the charges of corruption—subscribers giving tickets to their own families and servants, for example—led to a second-tier expansion into local dispensaries by 1805 and the separation of the two governing bodies in 1818. Head-on conflict erupted when the medical charities were confronted by the Poor Law Commission installed in Ireland in 1838. The medical establishment fought Commission control, as it was notorious for its treatment of English doctors, while the grand juries, perennially threatened by government reform, were equally recalcitrant. Cassell leads the reader through the labyrinth of maneuvering in the working-out of solutions, which produced a system of local dispensaries, isolation hospitals for fever, and a level of medical care for between eleven and sixteen percent of the population and culminated in the 1851 Medical Charities (Ireland) Act, which put the dispensaries under the Poor Law Commission. Cassell contends that the act influenced English reforms in the 1860s and 1870s. Much more cogent was the Irish rejection of the English Poor Law criterion of less eligibility, which restricted medical assistance to the destitute unemployed. Care was given to the working poor outside of the workhouse, and when, in many cases, the infirmaries were incorporated into workhouses, medical care remained non-pauperizing.

This is not a book rich in narrative accounts of the workings of the dispensaries, since records either no longer exist or were not uniformly kept. Acknowledging that he cannot document who really used the dispensaries, Cassell concentrates on the political struggles around policy. He records an engrossing cast of characters and organizations, Irish and English, and of medical, media, bureaucratic, government, church, and local officials who clashed and confronted, argued, dug in their heels, protected their ground, and pursued their interests with all the fervor and idiosyncrasy that characterizes Irish politics. In the process of conflict, the system expanded into effective, centralized public health measures at a time when England pursued decentralized policies. Significant successes were achieved, especially in smallpox vaccination and the control of cholera, which struck the United Kingdom in four great epidemics between 1831 and 1866. Particularly in 1853–1854, the numbers of cases and deaths were substantially less than in England and Scotland. By 1870, mortality rates from such infectious diseases as smallpox, scarlet fever, and diphtheria were one in 308 in Ireland, but one in 190 in England. Moreover, in substantial contrast to England in 1871, the creation of the Irish Local Government Board required only superficial changes to the Irish Poor Law Commission, which already controlled the registration of births and deaths as well as the public health, medical, and poor relief system.

In showing Irish influence on England, Cassell skirts the Scylla and Charybdis of reducing English public health development to one chapter by outlining clearly the direct connections between the Irish experience and the men influencing English policy. He is aware that English conditions were not Irish, but he shows the impact of the successes in the Irish system on Sir John Lambert of the Poor Law Board, who drafted Gathorne Hardy's Metropolitan Poor Act of 1867 (which separated medical relief from poor relief). Lambert went on to advise both W. E. Gladstone and Benjamin Disraeli in sanitary measures well beyond the Poor Law.

There are a few brief caveats. Occasionally Cassell relegates to a footnote material that really should be in his text. In discussing the cholera toll in 1854–1855, he gives a figure of 2,306 deaths in Ireland, compared with 14,000 in England, but then addresses these figures proportionally, which surely is crucial, in the footnote (p. 118). Cassell is not as successful as he is with Sir John Lambert in drawing so convincingly the connection between the Irish system and the mighty Sir John Simon, Medical Officer of Health to the Privy Council from 1858. Americanized spellings grate (diptheria, professionalisation), but that is a small quibble. Nevertheless, this concise book is valuable to those interested in public health, not least because Cassell underlines the dichotomy between Irish and English thinking. In Ireland from the period of the medical charities through their incorporation into the Poor Law Commission and onward, the focus was on the creation of a national, non-pauperizing system of uniform standards in distribution, funding, medicines, salaries, and medical qualifications, not decentralization and less eligibility. While the reformers battled government and each other, the end result was the professionalization of the Irish medical community

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and a health service that had a long-term impact on British health care.

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TIMOTHY W. GUINNANE. *The Vanishing Irish: Households, Migration, and the Rural Economy in Ireland, 1850–1914*. (The Princeton Economic History of the Western World.) Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1997. Pp. xvii, 335. $49.50.

Scholars interested in the origins of declining birthrates in Europe will find Timothy W. Guinnane's book apt and timely. Guinnane looks at the rural economy of Ireland between the Potato Famine and World War I to analyze how and why a demographic regime of population loss developed under circumstances of economic growth and rising incomes. The issue of what motivates demographic choices is at the center of the study, and even if its subjects lived in a world far different from the urbanized, high-consumption economy of the 1990s, the questions posed and the methods used are illuminating. Guinnane is an economic historian and demographer who uses rational choice models of individual behavior to develop an explanation for Irish fertility decisions. Yet history plays a major role in his story by creating a set of "opportunities and constraints," "attitudes and desires" that molded individual choices (p. 286). Although he argues against the familiar recourse to Irish exceptionalism as an explanation, his use of "path dependence" as a model makes every historical example unique. The trick is to specify similarities and differences while explaining both, which Guinnane does intelligently and systematically. He portrays the Irish demographic regime as an extreme case of common West European patterns, unique only in the particular combination and distribution of choices. Limited marriage, high emigration, and large families were in no sense limited to Ireland in the later nineteenth century. The comparative framing of the analysis is well done and persuasive.

Guinnane builds his argument on a wide-ranging synthesis of recent scholarship on Irish economic and demographic history, which has debunked both Malthusian and nationalist accounts. Instead of a story of "excess" population fleeing poverty or aging patriarchs restricting access to the family farm or the Catholic Church successfully repressing sexuality, Guinnane focuses on decisions by the young to marry and to migrate, exploring their options through a careful analysis of costs and benefits deduced from secondary literature and from manuscript census schedules. He uses gender as a category of analysis, and teases out differences between male and female behavior from recalcitrant evidence. The book is resolutely revisionist in relation to the early giants of Irish social history as well as the scholars of the European Fertility Project. Building on the work of Cormac O'Grada and Joel Mokyr, Guinnane constructs an alternative reading of Irish demographic development. He argues that the Irish had a fertility transition, that large groups had begun to contracept by the early twentieth century, that Catholics and Protestants differed relatively little in their fertility behavior, and that local, rather than specifically Irish, conditions had strong effects on demographic decisions. In his account, celibacy was a conscious choice by a large minority who found that the economic importance of marriage had declined and who developed alternative ways to secure companionship, farm labor, and help in old age. Depopulation resulted from "the Irish people's evaluations of their best options under the circumstances" (p. 18).

This is a skillful work of social science history, based on quantitative data, demographic and economic models, statistical analyses, and careful weighing of hypotheses. As such, it has the strengths, as well as the weaknesses, of the genre and of its sources. To the questions "why and how depopulation?" Guinnane provides quantitative and geographically specific answers. He can differentiate limited sorts of demographic patterns according to sex, to farm valuation, and to time period. But two censuses taken on single days ten years apart in 1901 and 1911 have to bear a great deal of analytical weight, and they relate only indirectly to the calculations made by individual men and women about marriage and migration. Sometimes Guinnane brings in literature to bridge the gap, but the reader often wishes for individual voices and evidence that gets closer to his subjects. Guinnane is inventive in his use of demographic sources, which for Ireland are limited in extent, and he is careful in his explanations. His book raises many large issues, such as the impact of Roman Catholicism on Irish demographic behavior, about which his sources have relatively little to say. Guinnane says a lot, however, and makes a strong case for including the Irish within Western European demographic models.

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THOMAS BRENNAN. *Burgundy to Champagne: The Wine Trade in Early Modern France*. (The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, 115th series, number 1.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1997. Pp. xxi, 350. $39.95.

To an economist, a market is an abstract representation of the forces of supply and demand; to market participants, however, it normally consists in the agents who connect them with buyers or sellers. This excellent monograph by Thomas Brennan describes the intermediaries who linked wine growers in Burgundy and Champagne with wine buyers in Paris during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As preindustrial Europe's most commercialized crop, wine supported Europe's most numerous class of specialized farmers. Yet, although grapes were raised wherever climate permitted, only a few regions exhib-

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ited significant specialization. This is because the preindustrial market for wine was segmented by high transport costs. There was a significant local market for wine near the larger towns, but everywhere else the market for plonk was too narrow to support much local specialization. As a result, specialized wine growing came to depend mainly on the growth of export markets in which the wine was marketed indirectly by specialized intermediaries.

The exogenous event that sets the present history in motion was the growth in demand at Paris, a market accessible to winegrowers in lower Burgundy and Champagne by navigable rivers. Although these regions had long sent a small quantity of fine wine to the capital, it was only after 1650 that demand for more ordinary qualities grew to the point where it could no longer be met from nearby vineyards. The growth in demand was thus a golden opportunity for local brokers in these provinces engaged in the older trade. Brokers were originally petty officials appointed by local authorities to witness transactions between growers and "foreign" merchants and to certify both the quality of wine sold and the solvency of the purchasers. Their singular intelligence of local wines and merchants' creditworthiness made them natural agents for the merchants, who confided to them the onerous tasks of selecting growers, buying wine on account, and arranging payment of taxes, tolls, and transport. Thus, while brokers originally served the interest of growers, they inevitably came to serve that of merchants and in time assumed the role of principals in the wine trade. In this latter capacity, they not only bought wine and financed its shipment but also lent growers provisions and winemaking vessels in exchange for the exclusive rights to purchase the wine.

Brennan treats the evolution of brokers from local officials to independent merchants trading on their own account as an incident of the emergence of capitalism. The substance of this history is extracted from private accounts, notarial records, estate inventories, court cases, and documents generated by attempts by the monarchy to extort some of the profits of wine-trading. Much is made of brokers' exploitation of growers' dependence on them for access to distant markets. At first, the number of provincial brokers was small because the volume of trade was small. As a result, when the trade began to expand, brokers enjoyed market power vis-à-vis growers and exploited it to pocket most of the difference between the demand and supply price of the wine they handled. Brennan views this as an example of how the market infected the rural world with its individualistic ethos. This is doubtful, since growers were as capitalistically motivated as traders. They protested the monopoly profits extracted by traders who handled their wine, but there is no evidence that they quit making it because the returns were too low. To the contrary, the volume of output rose, which indicates that winegrowing profits were positive and probably rising. Moreover, in time the high returns to trading wine attracted newcomers whose competition reduced the spread between sellers' and buyers' prices, and by 1750 growers could ship wine on consignment to Paris, where competition among brokers for growers' custom was intense. The history of the provincial wine trade is thus not so much a history of conflicting value systems as the account of market growth from which all parties benefitted, although some more than others.

The strength of this book is its focus on the crucial role played by specialized intermediaries in the evolution of early modern agriculture. It thus serves as a useful pendant to studies of the organization of the grain trade. Unlike the latter, however, the wine trade required a lot of credit, and although the book gives much useful information about the costs of handling wine, it tells us little about how and where brokers obtained the funds they needed to trade with. This is a crucial omission, because brokers belonged to the small class of intermediaries who linked the local payments systems of the rural economy with the financial institutions of the metropolitan economy. The details of this connection constitute the true history of the spread of capitalism in the early modern era.

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MICHAEL WOLFE, editor. *Changing Identities in Early Modern France*. Foreword by NATALIE ZEMON DAVIS. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1996. Pp. x, 410. Cloth $59.95, paper $19.95.

One of the less-mourned victims of the ongoing crisis in academic publishing has been the *Festschrift*, and, in a way, it is a pity. At its best (which, admittedly, it reached only occasionally), this minor genre helped make academia a more civilized place. The volumes were memorable less for the collective themes the essays addressed (usually there wasn't one) than for the snapshot they provided of particular fields of study and the role of particular scholars in shaping them.

Today, where all but a very few scholars are concerned, *Festschrifts* either never make it to publication or must disguise themselves as something else. In early modern French history, this was the case with the recent *Visions and Revisions of Eighteenth-Century France* (eds. Christine Adams, Jack R. Censer, and Lisa Jane Graham [1997]), which was, in all but name, a *Festschrift* for Robert Forster. The same is true for the volume under review. It is, frankly, something of a grab bag, whose unity derives not from its vague theme of "changing identities" but from the obvious respect and affection that the contributors have for Nancy Lyman Roelker, an important scholar, beloved teacher, and pioneering figure for women in the American university, in whose honor it was published.

Editor Michael Wolfe has done his valiant best to introduce notes of thematic unity in an introduction that lucidly, if briefly, discusses the difficult question of "national identity" in the early modern period. Yet

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there is little he can do to fit Donald Kelley's beautifully written essay on the Spanish historiography of New World exploration into a book on France, or Sarah Hanley's stimulating look at controversies over the Salic Law in the early fifteenth century into a book on the "early modern" period. He seems to do a bit better with John Salmon's insightful and enjoyable contribution on the way the French Romantics saw the Renaissance ("our vision of the past passes through many other filters besides those of the present"), but the essay itself has more to say about views of Renaissance Italy than Renaissance France. In fact, only Mack Holt's fine essay on "Burgundians into Frenchmen" directly addresses the theme of French identity.

But readers should accept Wolfe's regrettably necessary piece of intelligent subterfuge with a smile and proceed to a *dégustation* of the essays themselves, which are, for the most part, sparkling and original. And they do, in fact, have a unity of sorts. They all address themes dear to Roelker: rulership, the place of women in early modern society, the nobility, Paris, the *parlements*, Protestantism and confessional conflict, and the relations between France and the Americas. Moreover, since Roelker *was* a pioneer and had such an influence on so many of the scholars who now dominate sixteenth-century French history (as Natalie Zemon Davis makes clear in her affectionate preface), the book in fact gives a very good snapshot of what this field has to offer in the 1990s. The contributions range from Robert Descimon's subtle and important reconsideration of the origins of the *noblesse de robe*, to William Bouwsma's erudite discussion of Michel de Montaigne's conception of the ordinary, to Sylvia Shannon's intriguing account of religious tensions in the abortive French attempt to colonize Brazil. Wolfe himself contributes a significant essay that portrays the Edict of Nantes as a far less stable and workable solution to France's confessional strife than has generally been thought.

What the overall snapshot reveals, however, also raises some concern. Despite the high quality of the individual essays, together they give the impression of a field that has fully assimilated the historical advances of the last generation and needs a push in a new direction. To take just one example, consider the various essays that address issues of gender. Charmarie Blaisdell shows how religious communities "empowered" Catholic women. Kristen B. Neuschel and Barbara B. Diefendorf demonstrate how women contributed to the prosecution of warfare, in the first case, and to the transformation of the religious zeal generated by the Catholic League into the intense spirituality of seventeenth-century Catholicism, in the second. Hanley's essay on the Salic Law seeks to expose the gendered foundations of the early modern French state itself. Each of these pieces succeeds in its purpose and advances our knowledge about the history of women, the place of women in French society and culture, and the gendered foundations of that society and culture. But although there is important work left to be done in these areas, it is work that, for the moment, is building on foundations that are solidly established. The shape of the emerging overall construction is already clearly visible (in part thanks to these authors themselves). Thinking of what historians of gender in related fields are currently doing, it would have been interesting to see, alongside these essays, an article or two on the history of notions of sex and gender themselves and the interplay between them and notions of social order, of national identity, or of religion.

Similar points could be made about the overall treatment of other themes in this volume. And it is perhaps no surprise, then, that the two most memorable essays are those that adopt the techniques of microhistory and examine the fates of particular individuals in extraordinary circumstances: in both cases, young women. Denis Crouzet, in "A Woman and the Devil," gives a spellbinding account of the alleged demonic possession of Nicole Obry (or "Nicole de Vervins") and convincingly relates it to the overall development of religious conflict in France in a manner that readers of his *Les guerriers de dieu* (1990) will find familiar. And Alfred Soman, in "Anatomy of an Infanticide," which chronicles the arrest and trial of a woman for the alleged murder of her newborn infant, draws on the wealth of the Parisian police archives to produce that rarity, a scholarly essay that is a shocking, gripping page-turner as well as an illuminating look at the operations of justice in eighteenth-century Paris. It is to be hoped that historians of early modern France will find many more such vivid and illuminating case studies to explore, as they begin to develop new perspectives on this ever-fascinating period in French history.

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Adrianna E. Bakos. *Images of Kingship in Early Modern France: Louis XI in Political Thought, 1560–1789.* New York: Routledge. 1997. Pp. x, 249. $69.95.

The figure of Louis XI (r. 1461–1483) usually conjures up one image: the Spider King. Beyond that, all most historians know of Louis XI is that he is vaguely associated with the idea of "new monarchies." If Louis is a shadowy figure in modern times, this certainly was not the case in earlier centuries, as Adrianna E. Bakos so meticulously details in this monograph.

This is not a biography but a study in historiography and political theory that traces the manipulation of the historical reputation of one king between the outbreak of the Religious Wars and the beginning of the French Revolution. Bakos noted early in her research the frequency with which the Spider King appeared in early modern political discourse and became intrigued at how the historical and legendary Louis was used to justify and legitimize opposing political views. The time period chosen for this study is critical, for it was during the Religious Wars that resistance theorists and

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politique absolutists first posited divergent models of French kingship. Bakos has chosen representative works from the different time periods to trace the evolution of this image.

Why Louis XI? Louis's reign was marred by struggles with *les grands*, especially during the War of the Public Weal, and with the sovereign courts. At the end of the fifteenth century, both positive and negative portrayals began to emerge, with the latter dominant. Negative representations concentrated on Louis as tyrant, a king who oppressed his people mercilessly. Philippe de Commynes's *Mémoires* (1524) is the only important source to depict Louis as a wise and capable monarch whose political acumen allowed him to rule effectively over a newly enlarged state. Commynes argued that "[a]t a time when over-mighty nobles were threatening to devastate France, one needed the type of strong monarchy which could contain these rebellious subjects" (p. 18).

Part one examines Louis as a tyrant with no concern for France's representative institutions, a view that became common after the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre. Earlier, a more balanced view dominated the writings, but this consensus was shattered by the religious killings: "limitation and authority could never again fit comfortably together" (p. 29). A radical literature emerged that centered on institutional checks on monarchical power. Combined with the behavior of Henri III, who seemed to many a modern incarnation of the Spider, Louis became the stereotype of a tyrant. The situation became more complicated in the second half of the seventeenth century. With the domestication of the nobility by Louis XIV, many voices contrasted the humble and penitent Spider with the overmighty Sun King. Still, most writers linked the two, seeing Louis XI as the political progenitor of Louis XIV. The only admirers of the Spider at this time were those who fully supported a king whose image was reflected in Versailles. This view altered perceptibly in the eighteenth century, as writers such as Voltaire, arguing against feudal chaos, expressed the idea that sometimes harsh medicine was necessary to cure a nation's ills. The over-powerful nobles, whose privileges came at the expense of the Third Estate, needed to be curbed. What is striking is the ubiquity of Louis XI as an image capable of manipulation by constitutionalists and absolutists alike.

Part two concentrates on Louis the wise king, "a strong monarch who unified and expanded his kingdom, confirmed the superiority of state over church, and left the kingdom at peace when he died" (p. 105). Louis the man is distinct from Louis the king. In the first half of the seventeenth century, in a France wearied by religious war and not yet under the yoke of the Sun King, an almost universal approbation of Louis XI prevailed. This coincided with a new orientation toward realpolitik.

For *parlementaire* writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Louis was both hero and villain. Throughout, his importance in political discourse remained. Theorists could find in Louis whatever they were seeking. Indeed, it could hardly be otherwise. As Bakos concludes, "[t]he tortuous path of Louis XI's historical reputation between 1560 and 1789 mirrors the twists and turns in French political thought during the same period" (p. 178).

Why did the image of Louis XI, however malleable, prove so enduring? The answer must be sought in Louis's own time, for his reign marked a transition to a new and more powerful French monarchy. Although the nobility would occasionally reassert its pretensions to power during periods of royal weakness, never again would it have the power it held during the feudal era. This is an important book for all students of political theory and suggests new ways of reading political discourse.

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SARA E. MELZER and KATHRYN NORBERG, editors. *From the Royal to the Republican Body: Incorporating the Political in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century France*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1998. Pp. vii, 267. Cloth $50.00, paper $18.00.

There is a close link between the ways in which we think of our own bodies and the myriad representations of them, which are fed back to us, as it were, in a backward loop. The body in Foucauldian terms—the terms adopted by nearly all the contributors to this volume, which is expertly edited by Sara E. Melzer and Kathryn Norberg—exists only through language. And it is thus not surprising that some of the essayists in this volume strongly believe that changes in language may serve as a guide to and determine the way in which we think about bodies and how, indeed, we look at human nature. There is much verbal play in these essays around the center and margins of the grill of authority, force, power, and order; how they help to shape the realities and symbols that are used to normalize the body; and how it may be punished, sacrificed, and executed. Each essay presents a thin though firm slice of French culture, and all of them nearly add up to what may be said to fall into the category of cultural studies but may also justifiably be called studies in historical ethnology. As well as Michel Foucault, Ernst Kantorowicz is made to play his part, as are Norbert Elias and Louis Marin, Clifford Geertz and Julia Kristeva. The authors approach the body, as it was rhetorized for political purposes, in its theatrical, sexualized, and gendered poses to make the point that its multiple expressions could also be and were seen as manifestations of the body politic. There are a few allusions to, but little use is made of, the rich contemporary medical and anatomical sources and the literature on the body in its sculpted and painted forms.

Jeffrey Merrick takes us into the confusing realms of body configuration, when apologists sought to free the

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young Louis XIV from the sexual and, by projection, financial and political disorder associated with Cardinal Mazarin and the Spanish queen mother, who became subjects of pornographic assault during the Fronde. The tropes exploited to describe the physical and political body were not stabilized in one register. Jean Bodin, J. B. Bossuet and J. N. Moreau, and lesser jurists and scandal-mongering pamphleteers used them variously from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. Still one of the themes, if not a dominant theme, remains constant throughout the entire period: there was no question of crossing boundaries from private to public, leaving the first immune from the gaze of the second. The king's sexuality and masculinity, and his paternalism as well, had to be unambiguous and uncorrupted in the personal in order to be safely exhibited and popularly acclaimed in the political sphere. Abby Zanger studies some of these problems in her close scrutiny of the popular images in almanacs where the king's limbs are supposedly seen either properly (sexually powerful) displayed and therefore publicly approved or liminally and thus dangerously exposed, inviting public disrespect. The object was to project for public approval the notion of the king's total virile authority, looming over the future persons of the consort (who was still to be chosen), and towering as well over the members of his family, his royal advisors, and courtiers. Mark Franko argues that in court ballets, especially in his role as Apollo, the androgynous, cross-dressed Louis XIV displayed his self-sufficiency, playing off the ironic and the burlesque against the official and legitimate. It is hard, however, to concede that the king in showing him/herself in this ambiguous way understood all the ramifications of risking "the stability of his power." It raises the question of how we can know what he thought about his participation in performances that, we are told, deconstructed the system of flattery. Zanger's reference to the king's "absolute, onanistic masculinity" (p. 60) accords with Franko's interpretation of androgyny but does not, as is shown by the wealth of detail in these essays, fit easily with the overarching state requirements of a proper sexual partner in a stable marriage. In the next century, the danger to the image of Louis XV's power from excessive sexual promiscuity, as Thomas Kaiser shows, was constantly, almost hysterically evoked to send a cautionary note to the king to exercise control and avoid wasting his sexual power so as to safeguard his political authority. Not only was womanly usurpation of kingly power seen to pose a threat, but the need to cater to the public's belief that its love relationship with Louis could not survive such pollution was thought equally urgent.

Susan McClary introduces the fascinating ways in which, through dance, the body's positions were choreographed to create unambiguous power relationships between king and people. The positions changed from the geometric, self-contained steps in the seventeenth-century baroque style that created a pattern and a plan, akin to a military strategy, to the more abandoned steps of the eighteenth-century action ballets, which transcended class by placing all bodies on the same footing. A parallel movement occurred in the productions at the popular fair theaters, where egalitarian forms critiqued and satirized the prevailing conventions of the court as theater and the theatrical representations at the Comédie Française and Comédie Italienne. In musical composition and performance, the restraints placed on the voice gave way only slightly in the seventeenth century, as Susan Foster believes, to a more emotionally charged range of vocalizations, although the need to police the "personal freedom and potential excess in the Italian style," was kept in mind, and efforts were made to preserve the appropriate ornamentations "to signify the joy of submitting to authority" (pp. 103–04). But the pleasures of submission were not to last. Through her study of trial briefs, Sarah Maza reveals how, by borrowing the gestures of pantomime and what was to become *drame bourgeois* (which more closely captured, so Denis Diderot thought, the realities of everyday life) lawyers helped to lay the foundations for a reformed if not ideal courtroom. Here, a spectatorial public could participate, as if democratically, in the steps leading to punishment of vice or reward for virtue and, at the same time, challenge monarchical authority.

Whom to include within the boundaries of the political body is taken up in two essays on the black population, one by Joseph Roach, who examines the Code Noir of 1685 and its revised 1724 version, and the other by Elizabeth Colwill, who shows how the Code broke down in the wake of 1789 and the black revolution in Saint-Domingue. The Code appears to be inclusive/exclusive in the sense not of granting citizenship as we might today conceive it, as much as to ensure, through racial language, the superiority of white subjects and the legality of black subjection. The Code was tortuously interpreted, in the course of which its coherence was put in doubt. How could black bodies be only partially incorporated in the sovereign body without raising questions? The institutional and legal contradictions became even more attenuated with the advent of the French Revolution, when distinctions were made on a number of grounds, including presumed physiological inferiority, but more often on an unequal distribution of human faculties. The fancy footwork of members of the Revolutionary Assemblies as they sought but failed to recognize some but not all features of humanity and citizenship (for individuals of mixed race and free blacks, yet barely none for the great majority of former slaves) is a classic example of two steps forward and one step back. We are taken from the color of skin to another kind of covering in Lynn Hunt's study of the debates on proper dress for a revolutionized *citoyen* and *citoyenne*. Like the essays by Roach and Colwill, hers, which touches the tension "between dressing for difference and dressing for equality" (p. 229), moves from absolutist and republican representations of the physical

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and political body to some of the reasons for the ways in which aristocratic and democratic societies tolerated difference.

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NINA RATTNER GELBART. *The King's Midwife: A History and Mystery of Madame du Coudray*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1998. Pp. xi, 347. $35.00.

Madame du Coudray is one of those minor historical characters who would have been consigned to oblivion, had she not been resurrected by a sympathetic biographer two hundred years after her death. And when that biographer is deeply smitten by her subject and unusually gifted as a researcher and writer, the resulting resurrection is in itself something of a miracle.

Angélique Marguerite Le Boursier du Coudray was a Parisian midwife who traveled throughout France for over a quarter century teaching her art to provincial novices. She was the first to undertake such a mission, and, aside from the adopted niece who followed in her footsteps, probably the last. Certified in 1740 as a "mistress matron midwife of the city and *fauxbourgs* of Paris" (p. 25), by 1760 she had been granted a *brevet* (certificate) from Louis XV that permitted her to teach throughout the realm. That *brevet* was ultimately supplemented by a royal pension, which, although irregularly distributed, made her life less precarious than before.

But what primarily motivated Madame du Coudray was neither the money nor the royal blessing, however treasured: it was the conviction that she, and she alone, could bring "relief for humanity" (p. 16) in the form of dedicated teaching to a countryside shrouded in ignorance. She, and she alone, would create a corps of knowledgeable midwives, who would prevent the calamaties too often associated with childbirth and inaugurate a new era of healthy infants in France.

Madame du Coudray's initiative partakes of that Enlightenment idealism which seems naively optimistic to us today, except that she did, to an amazing extent, carry out her mission. During her lifetime, she and her disciples trained an estimated 10,000 women, and along with other factors, such as "the abating of plague, improved agricultural production, progress in . . . public health" (p. 277), she is credited by Nina Rattner Gelbart with contributing to a rise in life expectancy among infants and an increase in the French population from 20 million to 27 million, which began around 1750.

Gelbart's ten years of detective work in following Madame du Coudray's itineraries throughout France constitute an impressive feat. From provincial archive to provincial archive, Gelbart worked her way through a thousand documents and letters written to local administrators, parish priests, country matrons, and even the ministers P.-R.-J. Turgot and Jacques Necker and Necker's wife. From Bourges to Bordeaux, Rouen to Clermont, Lille to Grenoble, Madame du Coudray had crisscrossed France—and so did Gelbart. Her complex map tracing Madame du Coudray's teaching from 1760 to 1783 provides a useful reference point for the entire book.

There are also a number of evocative illustrations: the portrait of Madame du Coudray that appeared on the frontispiece of her textbook on midwifery; that of her friend and mentor, Frère Côme, the medical monk, who assisted her mission in numerous ways; and especially the photos of her obstetrical "machine" preserved in the Musée Flaubert in Rouen. This latter object was a unique teaching tool, made of fabric, leather, wicker, stuffing, and sponges. It reproduced the anatomy of the female pelvis with the emerging infant and provided midwives-in-training the opportunity of practicing their skills on a mannequin. Of the hundreds of models which Madame du Coudray made and sold to the various parishes from which her students were selected, the one at Rouen is the sole survivor.

Her work was carried out in a context that was often hostile to midwives. Male surgeons and physicians, eager to take over a traditionally female occupation, spoke of midwives contemptuously and of Madame du Coudray as nothing short of dangerous. The feud between midwives and their male counterparts came to a head in the 1770s when a senior midwife was brought to trial by the Rouen corporation of surgeons for incompetence and insubordination; she in turn sued them for defamation and ultimately won. Long a scholar of French women's history, Gelbart embeds Madame du Couray's story within the growing struggle of women to validate their occupational claims against male encroachment and denigration.

This book is pieced together almost exclusively from documents dating from and pertaining to Madame du Coudray's public mission. Gelbart found very little that shed light on her earlier existence or on her private affairs. Nevertheless, by ferreting out every last scrap of information, by analyzing what she had with discernment and imagination, and by writing her book in a vivid present tense, Gelbart has managed to recreate the sinew of this unique, energetic, self-appointed savior of humanity.

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JACQUES ROGER. *The Life Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Thought*. Edited by KEITH R. BENSON. Translated by ROBERT ELLRICH. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1998. Pp. xliv, 760. $75.00.

A translation of Jacques Roger's classic work *Les Sciences de la vie dans la pensée française du XVIII* (1963) is long overdue. When the book first appeared, it won wide acclaim by classicists, intellectual historians, and historians of science. I had the privilege of

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reviewing the original text over thirty years ago. It has remained the outstanding model for me of a particular genre in the history of science, and although recent works that have examined Roger's particular subjects and message may have deepened the analysis of certain episodes, they have in no way replaced the scope and grandeur of Roger's original vision. The editor, Keith Benson, is to be congratulated for persevering through many years of consultations with Roger, until the latter's untimely death in 1990, and for securing funding to support the monumental task of translating such a large volume.

The subtitle of the French version, *La génération des animaux de Descartes à l'Encyclopédie*, not included in this translation, defines the ostensible target of Roger's discussion. It is the author's genius to take what might seem a narrow topic and to broaden its implications to embrace the core of classical biology and medicine, the ambiguities of medieval and Renaissance treatises, and the investigations and cogitations of early modern scientists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The generation of animals indeed touches some very basic issues in natural philosophy and scientific method. It is a problem that plumbs to unspoken assumptions about God's creation, matter and spirit, the different functions of the two sexes, and theory and experience. Above all, Roger's intent is to expose the philosophical assumptions about the origin of animal form. He partitions his analysis into three parts. Part one covers the period between 1600 and 1660, when the Aristotelian four causes and Galenic faculties faded as viable modes of explanation. In their stead, a variety of vitalistic and mechanistic theories arose culminating in the rationalistic mechanism offered by René Descartes and with the resurrection of atomism at the hands of Pierre Gassendi. Part two, dealing with the triumph of the new sciences between 1670 and 1745, including advances in microscopy, describes the limits to mechanistic biology and exposes the deep concern among front-line scientists from Robert Boyle to René-Antoine Réaumur, about endowing matter with creative capacities that might directly compete with the creator. In this setting, a philosophical resignation swept the intellectual world and various theories of preformation and preexistence of organisms came into vogue. Part three, advancing to 1745–1770, deals with a reaction to the fear of preempting God's creative powers. Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon emerges as the central figure who found a way to re-endow nature with the capacity to produce animal form in all its variety and complexity. During the same period, an advanced, atomistic mode of preexistence pushed by first-rate naturalists and laboratory scientists, such as Albrecht von Haller and Lazzaro Spallanzani, rose to confront these radical philosophical and theological alternatives. Although the editor had reasons for doing so, it is unfortunate that he chose not to include Roger's lengthy chapter on Denis Diderot, who commented frequently and perceptively on the issues of generation and whose writings tied the original narrative directly to the encyclopedist tradition. Hence the necessary deletion of the French subtitle.

Roger's account is far richer than this brief outline can convey. The author deals with dozens of naturalists and philosophers; he explains the subtle differences between positions promoted by philosophical wiggling, theoretical innovations, and factual discoveries. Only a careful inspection of the range of the over seven hundred pages of text, notes, and index can do justice to the story Roger has identified and expertly analyzed. Missing from this translation is the detailed table of contents, so commonly found in French scholarly works, which allows for a full overview of the contents and an easier mastery of the author's argument. The English index, however, is superior to the French, but why not include the best of both worlds?

It is worth asking how this outstanding work of thirty-five years has withstood the changing styles of the history of science. One might question Roger's unremitting focus on the intellectual aspects of science, which in recent decades has been crowded and often replaced by institutional and social dimensions. Roger's analysis of snippet-like quotations seems somewhat archaic given the more recent interest in cultural history and the material culture of texts. Despite these shortcomings, Roger's study fares well. A second reading reveals an uncanny awareness on Roger's part of many of the French academic and medical institutional rivalries during the centuries covered, and although Roger has focused almost exclusively on high culture, he is aware of the demands of religion and popular superstition on scientific discourse. Nevertheless, this classic work remains first and foremost an exemplar of intellectual history tied to a close and sophisticated reading of the printed texts. In my opinion, it is difficult to render such an achievement obsolete. The editor has wisely included Roger's preface to the 1993 French edition, which responds to current movements in the history of science.

The translation by Robert Ellrich captures the wit and grace found in Roger's original work. One choice of words, however, poses real difficulties for English-speaking historians of science who continue to cast about for appropriate expressions for unspoken yet collective intellectual beliefs. Throughout his work, Roger employs the common eighteenth-century expression *l'esprit*, as in "*l'esprit de l'âge*." This has generally been imperfectly translated as "spirit of the age" and lacks the necessary precision for modern analysis. The translator instead has chosen a late nineteenth-century term, "mentality, mentalities," found commonly in ethnological literature. Since Roger did not use the French cognate in his original, this might seem a questionable solution, and the plural jars on the English-speaking ear. Nevertheless, twenty years after writing this work Roger discussed the merits of using "mentalities" in the history of science

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(*Revue de Synthèse* 109 [1983]:269–275), so Ellrich's solution may be the best of a translator's dilemma.

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JOHNSON KENT WRIGHT. *A Classical Republican in Eighteenth-Century France: The Political Thought of Mably*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1997. Pp. vii, 261.

When Gabriel Bonnot de Mably is mentioned in general histories of eighteenth-century France, he is usually placed on the left wing of the Enlightenment, among those philosophes who advocated a communist utopia. Therefore he has been considered a minor figure. In this book, Johnson Kent Wright shows how wrong this neglect has been. Mably was one of the most prolific writers of his time and one of the most influential. Wright ranks him with Jean-Jacques Rousseau for his influence on the French revolutionaries, although, like Rousseau, he died some years before the revolution.

Mably wrote some thirty books, most of which have been printed in a fifteen-volume set of his complete works. Wright leads his readers on a tour of the most important. He begins by mentioning that there has been quite a resurgence of interest in Mably among continental scholars over the past forty years, most importantly Italians and Germans. But there has been wide disagreement about his beliefs. He is seen as a conservative Catholic, a moderate reformer interested only in a constitutional monarchy for France on the English model, or as a utopian communist. Wright shows that there is no evidence in his writings to indicate that Mably was a confirmed Catholic. His religion seems to have been a form of deism. He was a confirmed socialist, as fervent an apostle of equality as Rousseau. But he was also a realist who knew that the abolition of private property was not feasible in his time. He advocated the next best thing, a "mixed government" that would not be dominated by the wealthy but would represent all classes and thereby make possible a social welfare state. His political thought was radical. He believed that a revolution was necessary to end the absolute monarchy, and he looked to the opposition of the *parlements* during the 1750s and 1760s to bring about such a revolution by calling for the Estates-General. The crushing of this opposition by Chancellor René Nicolas Maupeou in 1770 came as a great disappointment to Mably. He thought the French were incapable of carrying out such a revolution as the English had done during the previous century. He died in 1785, not knowing that the revolution would come, and very much as he had predicted in an essay written in 1758.

There is no doubt that Wright has successfully rehabilitated Mably to his rightful place as a major figure of French political thought in the eighteenth century. But his book has a wider purpose. He describes Mably as a "classical republican." The term seems to be interchangeable with "civic humanism." Wright is strongly influenced by J. G. A. Pocock's *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (1975), which describes how the Florentines were inspired by the ancient world, chiefly the Roman Republic and Sparta, in their struggle for independence. Like an infectious virus, this "civic humanism" was passed on north to the Dutch in their struggle against Spain. From there it passed across the channel to England, where it was important in the Commonwealth's struggle against the Stuarts, and then across the Atlantic, where it inspired the rebellion or the Engilsh colonies. Wright believes that this "classical republicanism" was also important in France during the eighteenth century. It strongly influenced the intellectual development of both Mably and Rousseau and, later on, Maximilien Robespierre. This interpretation of the revolutions of early modern Europe restores the importance of ideas in explaining history, which had been largely abolished by the Marxists in their insistence on the preeminence of material factors. Wright offers an exciting new thesis, but it probably will not go unchallenged.

ROBERT D. HARRIS
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ORVILLE T. MURPHY. *The Diplomatic Retreat of France and Public Opinion on the Eve of the French Revolution, 1783–1789*. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press. 1998. Pp. viii, 193. $59.95.

In a recent survey of *The French Revolutionary Wars* (1996), T.C.W. Blanning advanced the characteristically paradoxical suggestion that these began two years before the revolution itself. It is an idea that receives important support from this book, in which the biographer of C. Gravier de Vergennes demonstrates how, within four years of the latter's apparent triumph in the American War of Independence, Louis XVI had been reduced to a diplomatic nullity. The monarch who, under Vergennes's tutelage, had smashed the first British Empire and brokered peace between the rival warlords of north and south Germany was forced to look on helpless as new wars engulfed the Baltic and the Balkans and Great Britain and Prussia came together after a generation of estrangement to squash the francophile patriots of the Dutch Republic. The reasons for French weakness were clear enough, and Orville T. Murphy adds little to our understanding of them. Overwhelmed by the financial legacy of previous wars and institutionally impeded from raising the extra revenues required to sustain the forces of a great power, France could no longer afford its traditional international pretensions. Murphy commends the realism of Louis XVI and the advisers who succeeded Vergennes after his sudden death early in 1787. In recognizing the constraints on their power, they saved France from potentially catastrophic conflicts on land and sea. But this recognition helped to precipitate a

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different catastrophe through the disappointment and shame felt by a wide range of the king's subjects at their ruler's failure to live up to the martial traditions of his ancestors. Embracing the fashionable idea that the French monarchy became "desacralised" over the course of the eighteenth century, Murphy argues that the same can be said of its diplomacy. The king and his ministers forfeited the confidence of his subjects by failing to recognize that their policies needed the backing of public opinion and that affairs of state could no longer be decided in secrecy, however well-informed.

Not all of this is convincing. Murphy's own evidence, much of which surveys long series of planted reports about the Dutch crisis in the *Gazette de Leyde*, suggests that the ministry was well aware of how important it was to cultivate public opinion. It was merely that on this occasion, the ploy backfired. The introduction of the deeply unpersuasive notion of desacralization merely blurs an already confused argument. Public interest in diplomatic questions had been intense in France at least since the great reversal of alliances of 1756. And was the public as wrong, as Murphy maintains, to blame the industrial crisis of the late 1780s on the commercial treaty of 1786 with Great Britain? Economic historians are now coming to believe that the impact of unrestricted British competition was indeed substantial. This book, then, offers a handy, brief, and straightforward guide to French diplomatic preoccupations during the old regime's closing years. It is much less successful in integrating them into new interpretations of the origins of the subsequent revolution.

William Doyle
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Nicholas Atkin and Frank Tallett, editors. *The Right in France, 1789–1997.* (International Library of Historical Studies.) London: I. B. Tauris; distributed by St. Martin's Press, New York. 1998. Pp. xiv, 306. $59.50.

The essays in this volume, edited by Nicholas Atkin and Frank Tallett, were originally presented at a conference at the University of Reading in 1996. Inevitably, the essays are uneven in quality, but most make important, at times even provocative, contributions to the subject. One theme central to many of the essays is the question of just who belongs on the right and which "right" they should be identified with. More than forty years ago, René Rémond (*La droite en France* [1954]) identified the three classic families of the French right: Orleanism, Bonapartism and Legitimism. In their respective essays, Pamela Pilbeam and Michael Broers challenge Rémond's taxonomy. The First Empire and the July Monarchy were inspired as much by the left as the right. Napoleon I's thoroughly "Voltairian" regime, argues Broers, anticipated Jules Ferry's Third Republic rather than the regime of Napoleon III. A monarchy headed by an ex-Jacobin and son of a regicide, insists Pilbeam, had an impeccably revolutionary pedigree, a point obscured only because many Orleanists were reluctant to claim it and fewer republicans were prepared to grant it. Of course, amalgams of left and right are common enough in French history: Boulangism was notoriously "both right and left," and Colonel de la Rocque's Croix de Feu and, more recently, Jean-Marie Le Pen's Front National (FN) proudly boast being "neither right nor left." Hippolyte Taine's *Les origines de la France contemporaine* (1876–1899) provided the inspiration for a generation of ultra-royalist historians. Yet, as Michael Biddiss notes, Taine was temperamentally something of a Whig, and the only nineteenth-century ideology for which he had the slightest sympathy was Orleanism. Rémond generally takes a beating in many of these essays. He famously declared Gaullism to be in the Bonapartist tradition. As Jonathan Watson observes, however, this is true only if one takes Gaullism to be *le grand Charles* writ large. Watson prefers to focus on the role of the post-1958 Gaullist Party in the forging of a distinctive ideology, one closer, again, to Orleanism than to Bonapartism. In this volume, only Legitimism emerges in a recognizably Rémondian form with Geoffrey Cubitt's discussion of the religious mysticism that infused so many of its ideologues. Even this portrait might have been nuanced, had Cubitt paid less attention to the writings of François-René de Chateaubriand and reflected on the recent work of Steven Kale (*Legitimism and the Reconstruction of French Society, 1852–1883* [1992]), which argues that the later Legitimism resembled republicanism more than Bonapartism or Orleanism.

This kind of revisionism can be taken only so far. Broers, for example, bluntly asserts that "if the First Empire is of the right, then so must be Jules Ferry, [Georges] Clemenceau and [René] Waldeck-Rousseau" (p. 25). Perhaps not. All three men, after all, were principled defenders of a parliamentary and democratic regime, not an enlightened absolutism.

Fascism is a perennially thorny problem for French historians, since many are unconvinced that fascism really belongs on the right. But few have any problems assigning the fascist label to Jacques Doriot's Parti Populaire Français (PPF) because the founder, and presumably many of his followers, were former Communists. Kevin Passmore's detailed study of the PPF in the Rhône, however, establishes that most of its adherents came from the right; only a handful had previously been Communists. Workers were well represented in the party—although only slightly more so than in the conventionally conservative Republican Federation—but most of them had traditionally voted for parties of the right. In a vigorous essay, Jim Wolfreys argues, contra much received wisdom, that the FN is as fascist as the PPF ever was and far more successful and durable in the bargain. Charles Hauss counters that if the FN now seems to be a permanent force in French politics, it is also permanently marginal. This is devoutly to be hoped for, although, in

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light of the history of earlier fascisms, one is tempted to take less comfort than does Hauss in the fact that the FN seems to be playing the electoral game.

Martin Alexander brings a fresh approach to the story of the dissident officers of the OAS (Organisation Armée Secrète) years. The roots of the postwar indiscipline go back to the early days of the Third Republic. The army may have avoided direct political action, but its leaders early developed the habit of blaming all problems, even those demonstrably of their own making, on the civilian leadership. Even a general as impeccably republican as Maurice Gamelin failed to instill the habit of unquestioning obedience to civilian authority into his subordinates. The point is amply illustrated by David Parry's essay on the Cagoule, by far the clearest summary so far of this murky episode. Kay Chadwick's study of conservative Catholics in the 1930s and 1940s traces the course they steered between the "sans-dieux du communisme" and the "faux-dieux du national-socialisme." For most of them, the latter were only slightly less menacing than the former, but for a vocal minority, Nazism amounted to "un recommencement de l'oeuvre de Dieu." Michael Heffernan contends that, the *pied noir* collective memory notwithstanding, the link between the French right and imperialism is a myth. He is quite right, of course, although this is not likely to be news to anyone familiar with the history of Ferry. Miranda Pollard insists that a fundamental antifeminism was central to the discourse of the French right. Unfortunately, it is not obvious, either from her evidence or from her argument, that this antifeminism is significantly less deeply rooted in the rest of the political spectrum. Richard Griffiths asserts that French royalism became more pragmatic in the wake of the Dreyfus Affair; as evidence he points to royalism's more serious efforts to recruit supporters among the working class. Evidence of this pragmatism, to say nothing of significant royalist inroads among workers, is exceedingly thin.

As conference proceedings go, this one is better than most and ought to stimulate some debate among the many scholars of the French right.

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MONA OZOUF. *Women's Words: Essay on French Singularity*. Translated by JANE MARIE TODD. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1998. Pp. xxii, 300. $29.95.

This is a noteworthy, controversial book. Mona Ozouf is a director of research at the Centre National de Recherche Scientifique, a critic for *Le nouvel observateur*, and the author of an impressive list of histories. Most of her work has treated education (*L'école, l'église, et la république, 1871–1914* [1982]) and the French Revolution (*La fête révolutionnaire* [1976]). Her essayist's style is most accessible in *L'école de la France: Essais sur la Révolution, l'utopie et l'enseignement* (1984).

Although Ozouf has examined issues of gender in her earlier work, this book marks her first major effort in women's history. Three themes dominate her book. The first is the direct theme of the title: Ozouf presents ten biographical sketches of French women who lived between the end of the seventeenth and the twentieth centuries. She states that "The woman's portrait is a male genre. It rarely boasts a female signature" (p. ix). She seeks to rectify this by looking at literate women whose own words will produce a truer portrait than did the Goncourts, Jules Michelet, or Charles-Augustin Sainte-Beuve (or this reviewer). Separate chapters are given to a variety of women writers: Madame du Deffand, Madame de Charrière, Madame Roland, Madame de Staël, Madame de Rémusat, George Sand, Hubertine Auclert, Colette, Simone Weil, and Simone de Beauvoir. Each woman is presented on a first-name basis with a summary trait, in the style of didactic moralism. Thus, we meet "Manon, or Valor" (Roland) and "Simone, or Greed" (de Beauvoir). The portraits are interesting and informative, and they are often vivid—from Isabelle de Charrière in "the torpor of a stupid marriage" to Madame de Rémusat "who of all led the most conformist life but did not need any advice on how to be happy" and Simone de Beauvoir who was "not exactly lovable" (pp. 205 and 227). Although Ozouf may overestimate the difference between men and women as biographers, it is true that her brush has added new lines to my portrait of Auclert. We have both painted "Hubertine, or Stubbornness," but she has added some shading to traits such as Auclert's timidity.

The second theme of the book is a leitmotif within those essays, emphasized in the introduction and a concluding essay. This side of the book is more controversial than brushing aside male biographers. Ozouf uses the term "French singularity" (and Michelle Perrot's "the French path") to distinguish French feminism (both historic and contemporary) from "Anglo-Saxon" feminism. French feminism has "a tranquility, a moderation, even a timidity about it" which American feminists "loudly deplore" (p. xii). Ozouf responds with her own sharp words. The French, she says, "lack the militant thrust that transforms female unhappiness into a badge of honor. They do not oppose men, collectively guilty, to women, their collective victims" (p. xiii). She is particularly aghast at the women's words employed by some American feminists, such as those who speak of "a global war against women" (p. xii), and finds that she "cannot bring myself to use the ugly expression 'white males,' the term employed by American women" (p. 251, n. 39).

The third theme of the book is directly linked to the first two, and her passion suggests that it may have been the origin of them both. Ozouf defends the French Revolution against one of the prevalent interpretations in American scholarship today. She insists that during the Revolution (always capitalized), "freedom was theoretically secured for men *and* women" and she disputes "the studies that proliferated during the bicentennial [which] developed the idea that the

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Revolution . . . in fact signaled the historic defeat of the female sex" (p. xiv). Ozouf places herself among those "who continue to make the Revolution a period of liberation for individuals—women included" (p. 242) and is emphatic in her conclusion: "It is therefore wrong to maintain, as women historians in the United States do today, that the Revolution endeavored to worsen women's subordination, that it deceitfully argued for the universal rights of man while locating them in the bodies of white men" (p. 251). Much of this criticism is explicitly aimed at Joan Scott and Carole Pateman. The contrast with Scott's work (see *Only Paradoxes to Offer: French Feminists and the Rights of Man* [1996], which is also built on multiple biographies) is so vivid that the Society for French Historical Studies has already devoted a conference session to the two views.

STEVEN C. HAUSE
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STEPHEN L. HARP. *Learning to Be Loyal: Primary Schooling as Nation Building in Alsace and Lorraine, 1850–1940*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. 1998. Pp. xviii, 292. $36.00.

Alsace-Lorraine was long a battleground of rival French and German nationalisms, changing hands in 1871, 1918, 1940, and 1945, so that a schoolteacher like Philippe Husser, born on French soil in 1862 and dying on French soil in 1951, changed nationality five times. Those who know only one thing about the issues, explains Stephen L. Harp, inevitably cite the tear-jerking short story of Alphonse Daudet, "La dernière classe," in which, having finished his last lesson after the defeat of 1870, the French teacher writes "vive la France" on the board and dismisses the class—the implication being that he will be replaced the next morning by a German teacher. This story constructs a myth built on the subtext of good French/bad Germans and of Alsatians dragooned against their will into the German Reich.

Harp sets out to explore the reality behind the myth. He argues that his book contributes to at least four categories of European history: nation-building, the history of education, the history of France, and the history of imperial Germany. He highlights a number of points that contribute to a deeper understanding of the role of frontier territories like Alsace-Lorraine in the formation of national consciousness. For the French, the political loyalty of the Alsatians mattered more than the fact that only a minority of them spoke French. Napoleon Bonaparte, for whom French was a second language mastered only imperfectly, famously said that he did not care what they spoke so long as they fought as Frenchmen. It was not until well into the Second Empire, as Franco-German tensions mounted, that the French authorities began a concerted program of assimilation in Alsace-Lorraine. When the province became part of a united Germany, the Germans did not, contrary to popular belief, impose a ruthless Germanization. They respected the existence of French-speaking areas and allowed French-speaking teachers who did not want to leave to continue in their posts. Where they did bring in German-speaking teachers, they recruited them overwhelmingly on a local basis from Alsace-Lorraine. Attacks on pro-French clergy during the *Kulturkampf* were suspended to placate local opinion. The decisive break came not in 1871 but after 1918. The returning French, despite their promises to observe local customs, instituted a purge of German teachers and administrators, employed French teachers from the interior of France rather than local products, and embarked on a concerted campaign to eliminate the German language and culture. What they did preserve, paradoxically, were the Catholic congregations that staffed so many schools in Alsace-Lorraine, even though they had been eliminated in France under the Third Republic, because they were seen to have sustained pro-French sentiment under the Reich.

This is an extremely scholarly work, based on a wide range of archival and printed primary sources. It is a "top-down" history, giving the viewpoint of the French and German administrations. What is missing perhaps is a fifth dimension, the history of Alsatians and Lorrainers from a provincial perspective. For what the Alsatians wanted, of course, was to be neither French nor German but Alsatians. Husser, whose journal has been published as *Un Instituteur alsatien: Entre France et Allemagne* (1989), and which Harp cites at the beginning of his work, has much to say about divided loyalties and Alsatian priorities and might have triggered a wider consideration of this point. My only other comment is that Harp's conclusion kindly lets the French off the hook. He argues that the Germans were not intrinsically more tolerant than the French, rather that the French got Alsace-Lorraine back after 1918, "a period of greater preoccupation with questions of national identity than the Belle Epoque had been" (p. 201). Whether questions of national identity were not equally pressing before 1918 can, of course, be debated, but what Harp fails to criticize enough is the naked cultural imperialism of the French after 1918, which can be explained purely and simply in terms of their equation of unity with uniformity and their refusal to brook any exceptions in the "One and Indivisible Republic."

ROBERT GILDEA
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JULIAN P. W. ARCHER. *The First International in France, 1864–1872: Its Origins, Theories, and Impact*. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America. 1997. Pp. xxii, 347. $59.00.

Is it merely coincidental that with the disrepute into which it fell during its last years and then the collapse of the Soviet Union, publications concerned with the

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history of socialism, particularly the nineteenth-century movement, have dwindled to a trickle? In any event, Julian P. W. Archer's fine study of the First International in France is welcome. Although there are histories of the International Workingmen's Association (IWMA) and its development in Britain, Germany, and Spain, this is not true of the French section, a curious omission in view of the part played by French workers as cofounders (together with their British counterparts) and as major contributors to its membership.

Archer has relied on a wealth of archival and printed sources to explore virtually every aspect of the eight-year (1864–1872) history of the French section: brief biographies of important leaders, accounts of meetings, debates in congresses. Conveniently placed summaries allow the reader to assimilate the wealth of detail. Especially informative is the attention given to provincial branches—in contrast to the better-known and, admittedly, predominant Paris branch of the International in France.

The conventional view of the French section as dominated by Proudhonist thought during much of the 1860s and giving way to an endorsement of collectivism by the end of the decade is not so much rejected as refined. For the collectivism endorsed by the IWMA's Basel Congress in 1869, the first time that representatives of labor did so, was not the version associated with Karl Marx but rather the call for an end to the private ownership of land (together with mines and railroads). But because the land was understood to be managed by "societies of agricultural workers," presumably cooperatives, and not state agencies, collectivization is seen as an extension, and not the elimination, of the cooperative model.

Again, in contrast to the popular view of the International (certainly the view of the French police) as directed by the Marxist-controlled London Council, Archer shows that in France (and, for that matter, in Britain), Marx's role was minimal. Even the noted Inaugural Address of 1864, so significant in the history of Marxist and socialist thought, was of negligible import, omitted in the French translation of IWMA rules. Indeed, 312 pages of Archer's text contain only twenty-seven references to Marx (including four in the notes), and most of these relate to the post-1870 period. Even the famous vote on collectivization, which meant the decisive defeat of French Proudhonism within the Association, amounted to a confrontation taken more seriously by future historians than attending delegates in view both of the low profile deliberately kept by Marx and the acceptance of the concept of collectivization by Mikhail Bakunin.

Space permits mention of only two additional theses advanced by Archer. One is that the conventional view of the Paris Commune as only "half-heartedly" socialist requires clarification. This is true, Archer contends, only if socialism is thought of in Marxist terms. As conceived by the Communards associated with the International who promoted it, socialism meant worker-directed workshops unburdened by profit-taking *patrons*. The other is Marx's courtship of Blanquists in order to defeat Bakuninists in the early 1870s, although both competed with the Marxist view of placing stress on broadly based political parties and discrediting older conspiratorial strategies. It is here that the importance of the First International resides: the Proudhonism displayed by the French, which repudiated any attempt to subjugate the individual to the group, which refused to support strikes launched to improve wages and conditions, and which ignored demands for the eight-hour day, gave way to a new orientation: the claim by labor to the winning of political power.

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JOHN BARZMAN. *Dockers, métallos, ménagères: Mouvements sociaux et cultures militantes au Havre, 1912–1923*. Foreword by JEAN-JACQUES BECKER. (Publications de l'Université de Rouen, number 230 et du Havre, number 4.) Rouen: Presses Universitaires de Rouen et du Havre. 1997. Pp. 423. 170 fr.

John Barzman's fine book follows the evolution of the workers' movement in the industrial port city of Le Havre in the years surrounding the Great War. Barzman began with an interest in the constitution of the Communist Party in France and a desire to test the classic thesis of Annie Kriegel, who placed the critical point in the postwar turmoil of 1919–1920. In the end, Barzman finds Kriegel's focus too narrow. He sees the genesis of French communism in a much longer historical moment.

This moment consists of a cycle of worker activism that began in 1912, after the great labor battles of the preceding years. It continued through the early years of the war, the revival of labor opposition, and the tumult of the postwar era. It culminated in a general strike in the summer of 1922 and then faded bitterly into the mid-1920s.At the cycle's beginning, moderate sentiments governed a workers' movement split philosophically among several varieties of syndicalists, anarchists, and socialists, yet remarkably unified in spirit. This was no longer the case by 1922, when radicals, especially members of the new Communist Party, dominated a deeply fractured movement.

Barzman believes that the turning point in this development was the workers' experience of war. The carnage, the deprivation, and finally the broken promises pushed working people into angry confrontations with their employers and other forces of order. The *Union sacrée* that had initially brought workers into the national consensus frayed as the war dragged on and life became tougher on the home front. Resentments spilled over when victory brought no spoils for working people. In Le Havre, disillusionment led to an ongoing series of probing strikes in 1919 and 1920. These were meant to crest with a general strike in May 1922. When

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that failed to come off, the workers fell in to sullen inactivity.

Frustrations soon exploded once again. In June 1923, metalworkers (*métallos*) walked out over their employers' plans to cut wages. The *patrons*, looking to make a point, refused to negotiate. The battle that ensued brought the havrais working class together behind the *métallos*. Dockers, sailors, construction and textile workers, and others contributed to the strike fund and the soup kitchens set up for the *métallos*. Matters reached a climax in late August, when a general strike lasting two weeks brought out between twenty and forty thousand workers in Le Havre. The *métallos* went back in early October, without having obtained any concessions.

Barzman sees the general strike of 1923 as the apogee of the cycle of labor activism in Le Havre and maintains that it had an enormous impact on the workers' movement, despite its failure to gain its formal ends. For example, it taught the Communist Party to involve itself more directly in strike activity and gave the havrais proletariat a model of participatory democracy. It also inspired future action. Indeed, Barzman writes without irony that popular memory soon came to see this great "match nul" as a victory. Thus the hard lessons of 1923 prepared the triumphs of 1936.

Barzman's study really operates at two levels. The first describes the ebb and flow of the labor movement. But his more important aim is to produce a Thompsonian history of a working class creating itself through struggle. Whether readers credit his success will depend on their politics. The book is exhaustive in its treatment of labor organization and conflict. It promises, moreover, to expand our understanding of class development by exploring working-class culture outside the workplace. In practice, however, Barzman seldom turns away from labor disputes and the ceaseless in-fighting among militant friends of the proletariat.While Barzman's coverage of strikes and factional disputes is thorough and informative, it does not clinch the argument about class formation. No doubt, in the summer of 1923 other workers came out in impressive numbers to support the *métallos*. But it appears a very conditional solidarity, in view of a mass of evidence that cuts the other way. Barzman himself notes the electoral irrelevance of working-class parties in Le Havre, the low level of syndical membership, the sparsely attended mass meetings. Strike activity was plentiful. But it was sporadic and apparently centered, at least for the rank and file, on bread-and-butter issues. It would seem that if a working-class "made" itself in Le Havre, it did so largely outside syndical and revolutionary politics. Under these circumstances, to equate *esprit de classe* with militancy is to exclude a majority of working-class lives.

Barzman's history of the working class has a strong political, almost manichean, flavor. Here, working for the war effort is *passivité*, opposing it *vitalité*. Meanwhile, labor's antagonists—the bourgeoisie, the *patronat*, the government—are drawn as stock figures, slaves of their "class" interests: profit, domination, order. Some of this is inevitable in a story focusing on workers, and it is hard to deny that employers and the state often behaved deplorably. Whatever detracts from the complexity of these relations, however, also detracts from our understanding.

Notwithstanding these observations, this remains a thoughtful, extensively researched, and amiably written book. It makes a significant contribution to our knowledge of workers and the labor movement in France.

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Josué Fonseca Montes. *El Clero en Cantabria en la edad moderna: Un estudio sobre la implantación de la contrarreforma en el norte de España*. Santander: Universidad de Cantabria. 1996. Pp. 260.

In this book, Josué Fonseca Montes provides a basic but rather limited examination of the Counter Reformation in a largely unstudied and peripheral region of Spain. After examining the state of the clergy in Cantabria, he concludes that the region's difficult geography and general poverty led to the failure of the Counter Reformation in the region. Unfortunately, the restricted scope of his research makes it impossible to argue persuasively such a broad conclusion.

Fonseca begins by describing the challenges that Counter Reformation clergy faced in Cantabria. The geography was daunting. High mountains and sparse populations made communication difficult. The few episcopal visitors who ventured up into the mountain parishes were struck by the poverty of both the people and the church fabric. They found the buildings and ornaments in serious need of repair, and over the course of the seventeenth century, the precarious economic state of the mountain parishes meant little improvement in that regard. In particular, the region's poverty left few resources available for schools. Thus, unlike in wealthier regions, the church could not rely on education, either of the clergy or the laity, as its principal means of reform.

Fonseca's analysis of the clergy begins with the archbishopric of Burgos, under whose jurisdiction most of Cantabria fell. From an examination of synodal decrees and mandates from pastoral visitations, he makes an interesting attempt to quantify episcopal priorities. According to Fonseca's charts, most bishops enthusiastically endorsed the Counter Reformation priorities of improved pastoral care, increased education, and better clerical record keeping. The most extensive section of the book describes the state of the parish clergy. Not surprisingly, he finds that the majority of parish clergy were poor, forced to rely on other occupations to support themselves, and poorly educated. Even parish priests with the best of intentions did not have the means to alter significantly the spiritual lives of their parishioners. The book con-

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cludes with an abbreviated chapter on the regular clergy in Cantabria. While Fonseca offers a brief survey of monastic institutions, he provides only a cursory look at monastic life and never discusses the regular clergy, who often acted as priests for parishes under monastic jurisdiction, as active purveyors of the Counter Reformation.

This book has serious limitations. First, Fonseca never clearly defines the terms such as "baroque Catholicism" and "Counter Reformation" that are critical to his analysis. Moreover, Fonseca discusses the Cantabrian clergy as if they lived in a vacuum. There is little discussion of their interactions with parishioners or with each other. Although he argues that the parish clergy acted as the key exponents of Tridentine ideals, he spends only three pages discussing the administration of the sacraments and little more on related issues of pastoral care like teaching and sermons. Nor does he ever address the often violent jurisdictional disputes that complicated the implementation of reform.

Fonseca's failure to utilize some critical and easily available documentation is often frustrating. For instance, in his section on the material state of the secular clergy, he makes reference to the usefulness of clerics' postmortem inventories; however, he did not examine any of those inventories himself (p. 130). Later, he refers to a wealth of monastic documentation in the Archivo Histórico Nacional that is "waiting to be exploited by another researcher" (p. 197). Although episcopal visitations are vivid and exciting sources on many subjects, our understanding of the role of the clergy in the propagation of the Counter Reformation in Cantabria would have been greatly enhanced by an examination of these other sources. As a consequence, while Fonseca argues convincingly that the Cantabrian parish clergy were educationally unprepared and faced imposing obstacles to reform, based on his limited research he cannot effectively argue the broader point about the failure of the Counter Reformation in northern Spain.

Although Fonseca's work suffers from some serious lacunas, it is yet another in an expanding group of regional studies that are increasing our understanding of the social, economic, and religious diversity of early modern Spain. His work on the Cantabrian clergy confirms the findings of other historians who have argued that the Catholic Reformation faced considerable and often insurmountable obstacles on the periphery of Spain. As Fonseca demonstrates, in stark contrast to the successful promulgation of reform in central Castile, for many early modern Spaniards the Catholic Reformation was an idea that never made it to the edges of the peninsula.

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JAMES SIMPSON. *Spanish Agriculture: The Long Siesta, 1765–1965.* (Cambridge Studies in Modern Economic History, number 3.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1996. Pp. xx, 316. $59.95.

Historians have long recognized the crucial role of agriculture in economic development, particularly as it relates to industrialization. The book at hand is a welcome addition to the limited English-language bibliography on Spanish agricultural history, and it provides new perspectives on Spanish economic development. James Simpson has authored numerous articles on the subject. His book is a systematic examination of two centuries of Spain's agricultural economy and general economic development.

Simpson's first two chapters introduce new estimates of Spain's long-term agricultural output and productivity, with particular attention paid to the country's geographical diversity. Chapters three and four show how the traditional agricultural system successfully coped with the demands of population growth until the late nineteenth century. Chapters five through ten examine technological changes (such as chemical fertilizers and mechanization) and markets and institutions from 1880 to 1936; and the final two chapters deal with the post-Civil War modernization of Spanish agriculture. Here (and elsewhere in the book) Simpson frequently extends his analysis into the 1970s and early 1980s.

The phrase "long siesta" in the title is catchy but misleading, because the period under consideration was by no means a lengthy nap during which nothing of importance happened. Although tradition and continuity have always been strong elements in Spanish agriculture, during the so-called "long siesta" numerous changes transformed the agricultural sector, as Simpson himself ably demonstrates. Nevertheless, agricultural development in Spain lagged behind that of other European countries during the period of study. In part, this was because Spanish geographical conditions, in the European context, were not especially favorable for agriculture. But Simpson finds man-made factors such as governmental policies also responsible for the relative Spanish backwardness. Although demographic pressures and institutional reforms stimulated changes in Spanish agriculture during the nineteenth century, productivity barely kept pace with population growth until the twentieth century. Then there was accelerated change, but most early twentieth-century gains were lost during the 1930s and 1940s. When the Spanish economy opened up in the mid-1950s, the process of modernization resumed with unprecedented rapidity, leading to substantial structural changes and remarkable leaps in agricultural productivity.

This is not a book about unenlightened Spanish farmers who failed to respond to market opportunities and changing technology. The way that farmers reacted to these new opportunities depended on the market for the different crops and upon production costs. Since traditional farming often proved more profitable than modern production methods, Spanish

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producers were reluctant to change. But Spanish farmers were receptive to alternative methods when there were greater profits to be made. For example, many farmers who had adopted modern methods reverted to traditional techniques during the 1930s and 1940s when chemical fertilizers and machinery became scarce and prohibitively expensive. Once conditions again warranted modernizing, they switched back. The most far-reaching changes in Spanish agricultural productivity began in the mid-1950s, when the rural exodus to the cities and to northern Europe brought a labor shortage that stimulated mechanization and other improved techniques.

Readers will be grateful for the many excellent maps that establish the geographical settings, and graphically display regional differences in production and methods. Dozens of tables and maps provide statistics such as comparative yields, production costs, and consumption levels. An appendix analyzes agricultural output and consumption in nineteenth-century Spain; and an extensive bibliography shows that Simpson has based his work on a commendably wide variety of primary and secondary sources.

Works on Spanish history often suffer from geographical tunnel vision, treating Spain as though it existed in a totally separate universe. But Simpson places Spain firmly in the European context, giving the reader important comparative information. This book can be read profitably not only by specialists in Spanish history but by all who are interested in agricultural history in the context of general economic development. Although *not* "the first major study in English of Spanish agrarian history," as the jacket blurb would have it, Simpson's work is a significant contribution that deserves to appear in bibliographies of modern Spanish agricultural history along with older works by Gonzalo Anes, Richard Herr, Edward Malefakis, Jordi Nadal, Gabriel Tortella, and Bartolomé Yun Casalilla, among others.

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ANNE E. MCCANTS. *Civic Charity in a Golden Age: Orphan Care in Early Modern Amsterdam*. Champaign: University of Illinois Press. 1997. Pp. viii, 281. $36.95.

This is an important study, although a qualification needs to be made about its title: the book includes much information about the experience of orphans in general in Amsterdam, but it is primarily concerned with the *burgerweeshuis*, which was an institution reserved for orphans of citizens only. Indeed, one of this work's merits is to demonstrate just how privileged the situation of such orphans was in comparison to those in the *aalmoezeniersweeshuis*, the orphanage for noncitizens. Citizenship meant full membership of the urban community and was inherited or could be bought for a sum that was always substantial and became more so in the course of the seventeenth century. Anne E. McCants is trying to establish for this particular society the motives behind both charity in general and its specific forms, and she argues that the foundation of the *burgerweeshuis* was a move by the governing elite to meet the needs of the middling classes, who after all paid the bulk of the taxes but were excluded from all participation in the government of their town. In the early modern period, the death of both parents was a real possibility and constituted a significant threat to the social status of children of the middling classes. McCants shows that the orphanage offered a standard of living and education and training consonant with middle-class status. The quality and variety of the food provided was good, certainly well above the standard fare of the poor, and the boys at least were prepared for solidly lower middle-class occupations, such as apprenticeships in the building trades or as ships' carpenters, rather than in occupations of significantly lower status, such as weaving. So the orphanage ensured that the children of citizens did not have to face too severe a social demotion if they had the misfortune to lose their parents; while not necessarily attaining the precise social position their parents had occupied, they remained firmly in the middling classes into which they had been born.

Seeing the *burgerweeshuis* as part of a strategy by the oligarchy to appease the middling classes is intriguing but not entirely convincing. While it was certainly run by men from the social elite of Amsterdam, most of the "regents" of the orphanage were not regents proper (i.e. members of the ruling oligarchy) either at the time or later, and the author is perhaps stretching her evidence a little when she sees the office as a sort of proving ground for would-be members of the oligarchy. The wealth of the orphanage, moreover, came mostly from a brief period just after the Protestant takeover in 1578, when it received a substantial endowment from the confiscated property of the old church. It was, to a large extent, the careful management and investment of the income from these holdings, as McCants shows, which produced the substantial capital holdings of the orphanage by the later seventeenth century. The ruling elite may have been in favor of the institution in principle, but, after the initial capital endowment, their contribution to its costs was rather small. The proportion of the running costs borne by private charity was also limited. If this was an insurance system for the middling classes, then the premiums were remarkably low.

McCants deploys an impressive range of statistical techniques to make the most of the available source material, though the conclusions she draws are not always quite as convincing as her calculations. In the main, however, her approach enables her to give convincing statistical support to her arguments: for example, that the quality of food in the orphanage reflected the regents' beliefs about a proper standard of living for those in their charge and was not particularly sensitive to price fluctuations. This study is in many ways an exemplary exercise in social history. The

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empirical material is placed in the context of relevant social and economic theory—some of it more relevant, perhaps, to the twentieth-century United States than early modern Europe—and there are illuminating references to studies on charity and the care of orphans in other parts of Europe. It is certainly a very welcome contribution to our understanding of early modern Dutch society, but it also has a great deal to offer to social historians of the period in general—and even beyond.

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A. F. UPTON. *Charles XI and Swedish Absolutism.* (Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998. Pp. xxiv, 281. $59.95.

A major factor in shaping the historiography of an event or phenomenon is, apparently, its duration. Thus, in the histories of Western imperialism and colonialism or of state power and liberties the seminal but short-lived contributions of Portugal and Sweden receive but scant attention. One of the reasons for this relative neglect is, no doubt, ignorance of their languages, which interferes with ready access to a voluminous body of archival records and a vast corpus of historical literature. The appearance of monographs or syntheses written in the major Western languages is, therefore, always welcome. Thus, in A. F. Upton's book, we get a close look at the crafting of the policies that King Charles XI of Sweden (1655–1697) pursued in establishing centralized absolutism so as to preserve his country's primacy in the Baltic area, a primacy achieved by the successful wars and conquests of his predecessors.

Upton roots his account firmly in Swedish published sources and monographs (whose list fills ten pages in small print), which he has supplemented with his own forays into the archives of major governmental institutions and leading personalities. Upton keeps a narrow focus on the one problem he has identified as the crucial feature of Charles XI's reign: securing the king's absolute power over the claims both of Sweden's aristocratic oligarchy and of the estates to participate in—if not determine—the policy-making process. As the determining factor in the king's success in pursuing his absolutist goal, Upton repeatedly stresses the Lutheran tradition of unquestioned obedience to authority, a tradition that permeated all aspects of Swedish life and created a mind set that cut at the roots any velleities of opposition. Naturally, the evidence is to be found exclusively in public pronouncements and sermonizing; to what extent their admonitions were internalized by the population may be questioned, but there is no doubt of their effectiveness in legitimizing the king's will. Charles XI's personal piety and his conviction that he was doing God's purpose lent a stubborn perseverance to his actions and contributed to his overcoming all resistance. Upton does not paint a portrait in depth of the monarch (he does not even give full dates of his birth and death), something the surviving documentation may not permit, but he sketches a convincing picture of a man of mediocre talents and a limited horizon, whose paramount virtue was single-mindedness of purpose and self-confidence in the righteousness of his ways.

In chronicling Charles XI's pursuit of his absolutist goal, Upton notes several factors that eventually secured the success of his efforts. The aristocratic oligarchy (whose power base was in the council) was dislodged from its preeminence with the help of the middle and lower echelons of the nobility and the ambitious royal functionaries of commoner origin. At the same time the oligarchy's economic security was undermined by the *reduktion* (i.e. the forcible reversion to the state of domains granted by previous kings). The nobility's divisions and society's hatred of the oligarchical families, rather than the support of burghers and peasants, were the main factors in the success of the king's policies. True, the strategic role of the Lutheran Church hierarchy is not forgotten by Upton, who correctly ties it to their theological assumptions and pragmatism.

The army (and navy) was given secure foundation by allocating the revenues and manpower of specified peasant holdings and districts. In so doing, Charles XI created the first truly national army and navy in Europe, instead of relying on mercenaries or occasional impressment. Although Upton does not deal at any length with the social and economic aspects of the king's policies, he does describe briefly the successful efforts at balancing the budget and eliminating the royal debt, as well as the promotion of manufacturing and mining through a set of cameralist regulatory measures.

The book's overall picture and conclusions are not exactly novel, but the author has put us in his debt by providing a detailed, source-based account of the specific steps that resulted in Sweden's emergence as the foremost model of a "progressive" absolutist monarchy. There is no doubt that Upton is quite correct in highlighting the personal input of Charles XI. This is not surprising, of course, since absolutism implies the determining role of a single individual, be it a monarch (like the Great Elector of Brandenburg) or an all-powerful minister (like Cardinal Richelieu). However, Upton does not seriously examine the solidity of Charles XI's achievement in fact, a question that arises immediately since the achievement was rapidly undone by the next monarch, his son Charles XII.

It is a matter of no little regret that Upton has limited himself exclusively to Sweden. It would have been both interesting and instructive to view Charles XI's reign in a comparative perspective. It might have served to bring out the dynamic interplay of social, political, and cultural forces in yielding (dis)similar results. Thus, in the light of recent French historiography, we might understand better how, in many respects, Sweden succeeded—as France did not—in

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bringing about the emergence of a "modern bureaucracy." For a historian of modern Russia like myself it would be particularly instructive to have the Swedish precedents compared with the transformations wrought (or initiated) by Peter the Great in the political and social fabric of Muscovy.

Upton writes clearly and well. The more is the pity that the publishers did not provide a more user-friendly page layout, a proper proofreading of French quotations, and a more accessible price.

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ABRAHAM FRIESEN. *Erasmus, the Anabaptists, and the Great Commission*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans. 1998. Pp. xi, 196. $18.00.

The argument of Abraham Friesen's extended essay may be summarized in two propositions. First, Desiderius Erasmus, in his *Paraphrase* of the Gospel of Matthew (1522), presented a distinctive exegesis of the "great commission" in which Jesus sent his apostles forth to teach and baptize all nations (Matthew 28: 18–20) by linking this passage with the practice of baptism as described in the Acts of the Apostles: people must be instructed in the basic tenets of the faith before baptism, and must live up to what they have been taught after baptism. Second, both leaders and ordinary believers among the Zurich Anabaptists and other Swiss Brethren can be shown to have used the passages linked by Erasmus in his Matthew *Paraphrase* (sometimes citing Erasmus) in order to validate their belief that baptism is only for those who are already believers, not for infants. The same argument (with the same proof texts) is found also in Menno Simons, though not in such other opponents of infant baptism as Andreas Carlstadt, Thomas Muentzer, and Melchior Hoffman. (Although scholars working in the history of the Anabaptist movement, as I do not, now accept the idea of multiple origins, Friesen seems to defend the older idea of a single canonical tradition running from Zurich to the Mennonites—as when he describes Carlstadt and the others as "those who came to the movement from outside" [p. 68]). His main contention is that this continuity in New Testament exegesis supplies the link between Erasmus and the Anabaptist tradition that has often been asserted but not convincingly documented.

But one may question what Friesen has documented. He cites in translation a passage from "the third (1522) edition" of Erasmus's New Testament, in which Erasmus proposes that if children who have reached the age of puberty "can give a good account" of what their baptismal sponsors promised for them as infants, they might "renew their promises in public assemblies." To suggest the subversive implications of this proposal, the author cites (again in translation) the 1526 censure of Erasmus's writings by the Sorbonne theologians, who wrote of this passage that "to 'rebaptize' children would be to open 'the door to the destruction of the Christian religion' " (pp. 34–35). But the preface in question was to the 1522 *Paraphrase* of Matthew, not the 1522 New Testament; what children are to be asked is not whether they can "give a good account of" but whether they "agree with" (*interrogentur ratumne habeant*) what was promised on their behalf; and what the Sorbonne theologians fear may open the door to the destruction of the Christian religion (as quoted by Erasmus in his point-by-point reply of 1532) is not the "rebaptizing" of children but Erasmus's suggestion that youths who refuse to "agree with" what was once promised on their behalf should suffer no penalty beyond exclusion from the sacraments of the church. Elsewhere (pp. 45–46), Friesen comments on the significance of the fact that Erasmus chose to publish his *Paraphrase of Acts* (1523) right after his *Paraphrase of Matthew* (1522), thus linking the two New Testament books just as Huldrych Zwingli did at Zurich by preaching a series of sermons on Matthew, then a series of sermons on Acts. In fact, the *Paraphrase* of Matthew was followed by similar works on the Gospels of John, Luke, and Mark (all in 1523), with Acts coming only in 1524. In still another place (p. 83), Philip Melanchthon's report of his conversations with the so-called Zwickau prophets, whose rejection of infant baptism made him ponder, is dated from January 1525, not January 1522, when Melanchthon sought to keep order in Wittenberg while Martin Luther was in hiding at Wartburg. In sum, the interesting argument this book has to make is cast in doubt by the slipshod scholarship that surrounds it.

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MARILYN J. HARRAN. *Martin Luther: Learning for Life*. (Concordia Scholarship Today.) St. Louis, Mo.: Concordia. 1997. Pp. 284. $16.99.

Martin Luther's lifelong commitment to teaching makes an appealing theme for a popular biography of the reformer. Essentially an expansion of the introduction and chapter that Marilyn J. Harran contributed to *Luther and Learning* (1985), this book is aimed at the general reader concerned about the need to refocus education in our own time. To this enterprise Luther's ideas for educational restructuring are, Harran insists, "strangely" applicable (p. 9). Written in accessible language, her book describes the story of Luther's life (mainly up to 1530) in a simple and attractive way.

Why be interested today in "Luther the learner and Luther the teacher" (p. 11)? Because, the author strongly believes, an encounter with the reformer's thoughts and actions on education will encourage us to ponder our own goals. Although he was firm on the limited possibilities of schooling (only God can transform hearts and minds), Luther "perceived . . . clearly the value of education to individual, church, and society" (p. 16). Advocating what Harran considers the correct mix of religion and secular learning, he firmly

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anchored education at all levels to conversion and vocation: that is, "to service in love of God and neighbor" (p. 20). By restoring Scripture to its central place, Luther, in his own day, put the heart back into the educational enterprise. Harran suggests, by means of frequent comparisons to the rampant individualism and lack of community-mindedness of our own time, that we might do worse than take the same course. "All of Luther's efforts at education . . . were founded upon a vision of the Christian community as composed of those equal by faith before God" (p. 233). An ideal image, this, both then and now.

Harran's biography rests on standard authorities, which are cited and quoted throughout, plus a good sampling of the specialized literature, some attention being given to scholarly disagreements (most of them smoothed out in her presentation). She summarizes Luther's major writings on education, taking that subject in its broadest sense. This is the book's most useful feature. Historians will find it somewhat lacking in critical acumen. Harran accepts the humanist-reformist argument for the obvious inferiority of scholastic studies. She is "alarmed" that, at the end of the 1530s, "there were still many who were at the very earliest stages of understanding Evangelical doctrines and practices" (p. 227). Harran seems to take Luther's objectives as her own. This posture, "in line with an orthodox Lutheran understanding" (p. 9), is likely to restrict somewhat the appeal of her book to the wider audience she evidently seeks.

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THOMAS SCHOONOVER. *Germany in Central America: Competitive Imperialism, 1821–1929*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. 1998. Pp. xiii, 317. $39.95.

Historians have long understood that Germany often played as significant a role as Great Britain or the United States in Latin America, but there are few works, especially in English, dealing with the history of Germany's relations with the region. Scholarly treatments of Germany have tended to focus on the period bracketed by two world wars and the issues of Allied sanctions during World War I, Germany's rebuilding of its Latin American ties, and Nazi diplomatic and economic policies. Thomas Schoonover's history of German imperialism in Central America adds to our still limited knowledge and understanding of the Great Powers' relations with Latin America. While providing an overview of Germany's evolving relationship with the Central American countries, Schoonover argues that the German thrust into Central America and other peripheral areas was motivated by the same idea that drove British and American imperialism: the belief that expanding into world markets would reduce the domestic social and economic conflicts that wracked these industrial giants.

In his treatment of the period before German unification, Schoonover illuminates Prussian efforts to build economic ties with the region through colonization and trade, as well as its growing concern with the strategic implications of isthmian transit routes. By the end of the nineteenth century, Germany had developed important trade and investment positions with the nations of Central America. The German government also made headway with its diplomatic strategy of offering itself as an alternative to the overpowering presence of the United States. Yet despite these successes, Berlin was unable to achieve perhaps its most important goal: gaining some influence over the proposed isthmian canal. A stake in the canal was viewed as critical to successful development of German interests on the west coast of the Western Hemisphere and in Asia. Eventually, German efforts to lead a European revival of the failed De Lesseps project and other attempts to deflect the relentless U.S. drive to build and control a canal came to nothing. Nor was Germany any more successful in trying to secure naval facilities near the Panama Canal.

In the final segment of the book, Schoonover recounts the Allied assault on German economic interests in Central America, Berlin's plans for rebuilding its position there, and the actual recovery of German economic interests to their prewar levels by the mid-1920s.

Schoonover is able to offer details on a wide range of German activities in Central America thanks to the extraordinary array of archival sources which he consulted. They range from the Dieseldorff papers at Tulane University to German federal and state archives as well as document collections in Guatemala, Costa Rica, France, and England.

Yet despite its considerable accomplishments this book is not without its flaws. The author fails to address some important questions that his topic suggests. In the broadest context, while the book makes clear the importance of an isthmian canal to Germany's global ambitions, the relative economic significance of Central America to Germany is not clearly established. The book provides worthwhile data on the size of German investment and trade in the area, but how did these numbers stack up against similar German interests elsewhere in Latin America and the world? That type of comparison might well explain some of the limitations of official German involvement in the region. At another level, although the book's statistical evidence demonstrates that Guatemala was the showcase of German success in the region, regularly accounting for two-thirds or more of German investment, it is never clearly explained why that was the case. Finally, the text contains too many truncated accounts of private and public German initiatives in Central America. There are, for example, a number of cases that offer tantalizing clues about competition and conflict between U.S. and German interests, such as the ongoing competitive struggle between the United Fruit Company and the German shipping firm, Hamburg-Amerika-Paketfahrt-Aktiengesellschaft (HAPAG). But, far too often, Schoonover does not

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clearly relate the outcome of such initiatives and struggles. These instances make it difficult to appreciate the full significance of events that appear to have had a substantial impact on the fate of German interests.

Schoonover's work clearly contributes to a better understanding of German activities in one region of the Western Hemisphere with a wealth of detail drawn from a prodigious international research effort. Yet the reader is left wishing that the author had more carefully analyzed this wealth of data to provide an insightful analysis of the reasons for the successes and the failures of German initiatives in Central America.

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RICHARD BODEK. *Proletarian Performance in Weimar Berlin: Agitprop, Chorus, and Brecht*. (Studies in German Literature, Linguistics and Culture.) Columbia, S.C.: Camden House. 1997. Pp. 184.

What explains the emergence of cultural modernism in Weimar Germany? Richard Bodek challenges conventional approaches that focus on high culture by arguing that "the proper framework within which Weimar Modernism should be explored is not the cafés of fashionable Berlin West, but rather the tenements and working-class pubs of Berlin East" (p. 3). He traces Hanns Eisler's musical modernism and Bertolt Brecht's epic theater not to avant-garde art movements but to commissions from workers' choral societies and collaboration with agitprop troupes. Through amateur choirs and political theater, ordinary workers can be seen influencing and even originating modernist artistic forms. Bodek further challenges conventional interpretations by arguing that workers' cultural organizations were not simply controlled from above by political parties. Choral societies, despite their ties to the Social Democratic Party (SPD), rejected the dichotomy of reform versus revolution when they sought out radical Communist composers like Eisler. Agitprop troupes, though inspired by Soviet models and coordinated by the Communist Party (KPD), were rooted in workers' street culture and defied party directives that contradicted their understanding of revolution. Viewed from below, cultural modernism takes on a more social and political, less formalistic meaning.

This book is best read as a series of loosely interrelated studies. Bodek tries to anchor the analysis of music and theater in a case study of one Berlin neighborhood (Wedding), but it is too cursory to be more than suggestive and is more relevant to the KPD's agitprop troupes than to the SPD's choral societies. Important sources related to Wedding, such as some workers' autobiographies, are missed. Background social and cultural analysis instead draws impressionistically on other, different Berlin neighborhoods (notably Kreuzberg). The social context—Wedding or Berlin more generally—is never quite clear. Moreover, the chapter on choral societies treats workers' culture more conventionally. It discusses choral societies in terms of their historical and organizational development and analyzes political, artistic, and practical problems of musical performance through major national and regional choral society festivals rather than through local choral groups in either Wedding or other working-class Berlin neighborhoods. Shifting contexts and approaches make comparison of the choral societies to the agitprop troupes difficult. Only the vague, largely undefined concept of performance links the studies together.

Most of the book deals with the agitprop troupes. Separate chapters discuss their relation to the working-class world, place in the KPD, and influence on high culture. Bodek's most original contribution is his analysis of the troupes' interaction with Berlin's working-class street culture. Although created to promote the KPD's politics in skits performed in tenement and factory courtyards, they developed their theatrical forms and political content more to appeal to their working-class audience than to conform to party guidelines. More problematic is Bodek's treatment of the KPD. There is no systematic overview of the troupes' antecedents prior to 1926–1927, their development from 1926 to 1932, or their relation to the KPD's changing politics, organization, and cultural policies. Readers with extensive knowledge of the KPD can fill in the blanks, but comprehensive analysis is needed to prove the argument and would qualify the conclusions. In particular, Bodek fails to show that the agitprop troupes deviated from the party line; indeed, the agitprop programs he uses as illustrations of proletarian theater fully conform to central party directives. Evidence of the troupes' distinctive contribution might have been found in the controversy between proponents of a new proletarian-revolutionary art and those who favored a socialist realism derived from progressive aspects of the bourgeois cultural heritage or in the grass-roots resistance to attempts to moderate the KPD's ultra-left line during the political crises of 1932. These two subjects also could have bridged the separate analyses of music and theater, since choral societies confronted comparable controversies in the SPD. Finally, the impact of agitprop troupes on Brecht's drama can not be shown adequately in a brief survey of one play (*Die Mutter*). Although Brecht drew on agitprop forms and Communist content, he engaged in a critical, sometimes conflictual dialogue with both the KPD and workers.

In sum, this book provides a promising outline for future research. Bodek successfully links workers' culture to high art. He addresses a neglected source of Weimar modernism; advances strong, often controversial theses; and gathers suggestive evidence to support them. However, the parts do not yet fit together conceptually and methodologically; the interaction of workers, parties, and artists needs more nuanced elaboration; and the case studies require thorough

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documentation. The book could also have benefited from better editing.

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WERNER BERGMANN and RAINER ERB. *Anti-Semitism in Germany: The Post-Nazi Epoch since 1945.* Translated by BELINDA COOPER and ALLISON BROWN. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction. 1997. Pp. ix, 385. $39.95.

Since the Holocaust, the history of anti-Semitism has become a major area of specialization in German and Jewish history, with transcending significance for modern civilization and values. Idealist-intentionalist specialists have examined anti-Semitism—a dark undercurrent throughout Western civilization, at least as far back as the beginning of the Christian era—as a "warrant for genocide" in the twentieth century, evident in the anti-Jewish stereotypes inherited and reformulated by the Nazis. Psychologists have drawn relevant portraits of anti-Semites. Students of modernization have examined anti-Semitism in the German Imperial and Weimar Republican eras as an integrative ideology that identified "the Jew" as the cause and beneficiary of socioeconomic dislocation: the classic "outsider" and negation of an otherwise homogenous and rooted national community.

Meanwhile, paralleling this search for explanations of the Holocaust, surveys were conducted under the auspices of the Western occupation powers in the immediate postwar era to determine the extent to which anti-Semitism, among other expressions of National Socialism, had survived the Nazi defeat (roughly thirty to forty percent in 1946) despite being outlawed. German surveys in 1949 and 1952 confirmed these figures, so that a review of major postwar surveys identified one-third of the population as openly anti-Semitic, almost one-third as somewhat anti-Semitic to ambivalent, and one-third as not anti-Semitic. Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb offer a comprehensive and an in-depth account of anti-Semitism in Germany since 1945, including an especially noteworthy chapter on reunified Germany to about 1996.

Bergmann and Erb conducted their survey of anti-Semitism in Germany in 1987, using the most sophisticated survey techniques. Exploratory interviews were conducted to test interviewees regarding traditional anti-Jewish stereotypes. Questions were refined to reflect historical and theoretical concepts, dimensions of anti-Semitism, and everyday attitudes toward Jews. Questions and data were subjected to analysis and compared to other surveys (German and American) relative to related attitudes of the interviewees (e.g. racism, right-wing extremism, nationalism, xenophobia); concrete historical contexts, major incidents, and controversies (Auschwitz and the Eichmann trial, extension of the statute of limitations for Nazi war crimes, restitution, reparations, the viewing of the American "Holocaust" TV film); and political affiliations and other criteria. The authors participated in the famous survey conducted by the EMNID Institute for *Der Spiegel* in 1991. All major surveys, including those which included eastern Germans after unification, inform this general analysis, which is reinforced by many graphs, statistical tables, an appendix detailing analytical techniques, the questions asked, and a breakdown of percentages by age group, gender, educational level, profession, region, political, and other identifications.

This authoritative study adds a number of significant new dimensions to the field. Bergmann and Erb clearly develop their analysis beyond the search for explanations of the Holocaust, being interested, instead, in the views of postwar Germans toward Jews in Germany, Israel, and internationally. In their 1987 survey, they differentiate among anti-Semitic stereotypes (twenty-two percent), emotional rejection (nineteen percent) and willingness to discriminate (thirteen percent); and among degrees of anti-Semitism: potential (thirty-three percent), strong (twelve percent) and vehement (seven percent). They devote an entire chapter to what they call "latent" anti-Semitism, not in a psychological sense but understood in social terms, the result of being officially and morally discredited, declared illegal and therefore not being publicly discussed, expressed only privately—as in surveys—and therefore difficult to measure. Another major contribution is their positing of a new reality and agenda shaped by what they call "secondary" anti-Semitism, the result of post-Holocaust issues of guilt, restitution, and reparations (which most Germans reject) as well as the reality of Israel (the reminder of demands on Germans and guilt, which thus fares worse in the opinion of Germans than German Jews). Rather than still being traditional anti-Semites, those Germans who express various shades of anti-Semitism would, above all, prefer an end to the "annoying" debate about the past, the guilt associated with it, and reparations.

What do we learn concretely from this book which is a must for all students of modern Germany, Jewish history, and, especially, specialists in anti-Semitism? The authors clearly demonstrate that from the postwar period, definitely since the early 1950s to the mid-1990s, anti-Semitism has declined (along with a rejection of Nazism) to a point at which it is not a significant factor in German politics and is comparable to anti-Semitism in other Western democracies. Anti-Semitism no longer offers a comprehensive worldview. Reduced to a realm of private expression, anti-Semitic attitudes (twelve percent) are largely responses to "secondary" factors such as the discussion of the Nazi past, national guilt, and reparations. Jews are liked more than any other minority (Gypsies, Turks, Arabs, Palestinians, migrant workers, asylum seekers; least wanted as neighbors are the very right-wing extremists who are most anti-Semitic). German Jews are not seen as a threatening minority; sixty-five percent believe German Jews to be Germans first; in 1986 only eleven

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percent objected to German-Jewish intermarriage; ninety percent want anti-Semitic offenders punished.

Alarming is the greater hostility toward foreigners in general, which far exceeds hostility expressed toward Jews. Disturbing, too, is the low regard for Zionism (forty-three percent), identified with aggressive Israeli actions by a variety of Germans for various reasons, and not dissimilar to opinions expressed in other countries. A major surprise is the fact that eastern Germans—schooled in the antifascism that exonerated them of any Nazi misdeeds and in anti-Zionism, which might serve as a cover for a latent (not publicly acknowledged) anti-Semitism, and associated with anti-foreigner violence in the years following unification—consistently reveal lower levels of anti-Semitism than western Germans (four to six percent compared to twelve to sixteen percent).

The "latency" factor will have to be examined in the future, as will German attitudes toward Israel and Zionism. It will be interesting to see whether Jewish claims relative to Holocaust-era slave labor, stolen art, bank accounts, and insurance policies will reverse some of the positive trends by evoking past anti-Semitic images ("relentless," "influential," and "greedy"), as some pundits have noted or simply reinforce the "secondary" factor that, however, also harbors the traditional stereotypes. Will the tremendous growth of the Jewish community in Germany, especially in Berlin at this time, revive anti-Semitism? This book, though a bit cumbersome for the generally educated reader due to its varied data of so many surveys, overlapping survey questions, and different types of measurement, provides a solid foundation for an informed assessment of anti-Semitism in Germany today.

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TREVOR DEAN and K. J. P. LOWE, editors. *Marriage in Italy, 1300–1650.* New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998. Pp. xi, 304. $59.95.

This collection of essays examines the social and cultural assumptions about marriage in early modern Italy, the patterns of marriage, and their consequences for individuals, families, and the larger society. As in all collections of essays, the results are mixed, although editors Trevor Dean and K. J. P. Lowe do fulfill their promise to offer new material and arguments that point in new directions for research.

Because wedding ceremonies and festivities were important social events, they are a useful vantage point from which to launch the book and examine the practices of different social classes. Patricia Allerston observes that the sumptuous weddings staged by the Venetian elites found their scaled-down counterparts among artisans and shopkeepers, with important repercussions for the Venetian economy. While the demand for fine food, clothing, entertainment, and furniture necessary for elite weddings helped to make Venice a center for the manufacture of luxury goods in the sixteenth century, it also sparked a secondary market for used goods that trickled their way down into the weddings and homes of those less well-off, from impecunious noblemen to seamstresses and boatmen. The material possessions acquired by Venetians when they entered the state of marriage increasingly filled their homes and reflected and reinforced notions of domesticity that had been lacking in the city's earlier seafaring past.

Paintings of weddings provide Kate Lowe with a focus for analyzing the significance of a particular event for different protagonists. Her examples are several paintings showing the vesting and consecration of nuns, each commissioned by a different type of social actor: individual nuns, their families, and female religious communities. The result is a very fine piece of social history that illuminates the layers of meaning that could be attached to a seemingly simple ceremony.

More problematic, as a work of art history, is the essay by Jacqueline Musacchio on the rape of the Sabine women in Renaissance marriage panels. Noting that this theme became popular after the mid-fifteenth century, she seeks a social explanation for it in the demographic history of Renaissance Italy. The argument advanced is that the pro-natalist message of the Sabine myth resonated with a population that had been ravaged by plague and that was eager to replenish its numbers. Musacchio also claims that the theme suited a period when young married women experienced many childbirth-related deaths. The trouble with these explanations is that the demographic catastrophe that struck Italy began in the 1340s, a full century before the theme of the Sabine women became widespread in the wedding chests of Renaissance brides. Indeed, by the mid-fifteenth century, the population was in an upswing. As for childbirth-related mortality among young women, there is no evidence that the rates were different from those of the preceding centuries. Musacchio would have been well served had she taken to heart Dean's statement, in the essay that follows hers, that "the period of post plague crisis can hardly be stretched as far as to catch new laws [and, one might add, new social conditions] of the second half of the fifteenth century" (p. 97).

Dean's nuanced essay on marriage laws and marriage disputes introduces an excellent section on intervention by church and state. Like others before him, he observes that secular courts increasingly asserted themselves in the arena of marriage, but he eschews facile explanations and argues that some of what he observes is a shift from the courts' support of husbands' claims to their support of fathers' claims. He also adds that they had other concerns as well, among them establishing the prerogatives of cities over the countryside, those of citizens over those who were not, and those of the courts when there were no other claimants. In short, the history of the role of courts in

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marriage law and legal practice does not lend itself to monocausal explanations. This conclusion is bolstered by Stanley Chojnacki's fine essay, which argues that the state's growing intervention was the culmination of a centuries-long process in which marriage "was the terrain on which the government asserted its authority to regulate the delicate interactions of noble families, generations and genders" (p. 151).

An interesting historical problem of a different sort is raised by David d'Avray; namely, what to do about a historical problem that most historians do not recognize as such but over which they disagree. The author disarms the reader by admitting this conundrum candidly, but such an admission should not fool the reader into thinking this is a work to ignore. This persuasive little essay makes an important claim and, more significantly, marshals the evidence to support it. The claim is that before the sixteenth century there was no general church law requiring a religious ceremony for marriage. This left a lot of room for variations in regional practices and opened the door to Reformation debates about orthodox and ecclesiastical religion, the role of the laity and the role of the priesthood.

The question of intermarriage is dealt with in several essays, of which the most interesting are those by Piet Van Boxel and Samuel Cohn, Jr. The former focuses on the church's efforts to convert Jews in sixteenth-century Rome by providing poor Jewish girls with dowries if they were willing to be baptized. The latter examines marriage patterns in several districts of the Florentine state and challenges us to jettison our preconceived notions of the closed character of mountain communities, whose inhabitants found wives and families in far away places as they traveled the transhumance routes with their sheep.

The last section, on the consequences and endings of marriage, is the weakest. Linda Guzzetti's essay on women who sought legal remedies in the courts after leaving their husbands stresses, quite rightly, that even in a constrained social setting women had a degree of agency which should not be ignored. The other essays, however, do not add much to the collection.

To conclude, there is much in this book to recommend it to readers interested in this important topic of social and cultural history. The book opens up new territory in a field that has vast stretches left to explore.

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LOUIS HAAS. *The Renaissance Man and His Children: Childbirth and Early Childhood in Florence 1300–1600.* New York: St. Martin's. 1998. Pp. viii, 319.

This book purports to do for Florence what other scholars have recently attempted for other early modern polities: to show that, Italian epigones of Lawrence Stone to the contrary, Florentines did after all love their children. Beginning with one sentimental letter to Petrarch and ending with another from him, and enriched by particular attention to Benvenuto Cellini's autobiography, Louis Haas tells us what Florentine fathers in their *ricordanze* said sweetly about their children at birth, baptism, and death. There are few surprises. Like most historians, Florentinists try to understand not the presence or absence of but the variation in the quality of affect in different ages, and so they will hardly be drawn either to Haas's endearing view that wet-nursing, for example, was yesterday's day care (pp. 7, 9) or to his claim that parents were crushed by their children's death "just as we are today" (p. 170). The result of such syrupy psychopap is a book that does not enrich the history of childhood.

First, this is an author who does not know Florence yet did not even have his manuscript read by a Florentinist. Referring to the Minerbotti, Moralli, and Sasette families (pp. 60, 124, 67), to "the painter[s] Piero della Francesco" (p. 160), "Uccelo" (p. 45), "Simone Martine" (p. 159), and of course "da Vinci" (p. 6), not to mention Luca Panzano *and* Luca da Panzano (*passim*), Michele Savonarola and Michele de Savonarola (pp. 157, 161f), Haas has the Florentine baptistry east not west of the cathedral (p. 67) and the city's New Year beginning on March 26 instead of March 25 (p. 32f). Alongside errors of this quality, his mere misspelling of words like "monte della doti" (p. 157), "consorzeria" (p. 39f), San Domino (p. 159), and many others scarcely attracts attention.

The author's analytical abilities are no less wanting than his general knowledge. This book is crammed with non sequiturs, and Haas repeatedly misrepresents the views of the authors he cites. While avoiding the least use of quantification himself, he accuses the leading authority in these matters of flaws that he does not detail (pp. 90, 113, 130). The author allows the question of age to play little significant role in his lucubrations, using neither the Catasto nor the Tratte archives to this or any other discernible end. Haas begins by saying that his is a book about fathers, not mothers, but he then must confront the reality that, on the rare occasions that young children were not at wetnurse, they spent most of their time with their mothers. He is apparently unaware of the conflict this raises for the stated purpose of his work. In fact, it is not clear that this book is any less about mothers than it is about "Renaissance Man."

Haas's unawareness is most painfully evident at the beginning and at the end of his work, in the letters to and from Petrarch that, according to the author, "encapsulate much of what [he has] been trying to illustrate" (p. 180). In the first letter, Giovanni Boccaccio writes Petrarch that when he looks at and holds Petrarch's grandchild, Eletta, he sees his own dead favorite (*eletta*) daughter (not, with Haas, named "Eletta"). In the latter, Petrarch tells a beriefed friend that his, Petrarch's, own loss of a grandson, who had looked exactly like the poet and indeed had his name, was all but identical to the friend's loss of his son. This verbage of course conforms to humanistic models, and the writers obviously use these images of children to

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bond one to another, but no Florentinist would dismiss the sentiments of the writers for all that. A better scholar than Haas, however, would have recognized immediately that the true significance and charm of these letters lies in the fact that they are about the process of "remaking" the dead—one indubitable and quantifiable form of affect. Such remaking is one of many social and cultural institutions, largely moribund today, that in someone else's hands would be tools for determining how one age differed from another in its affect for children. Instead we have a book at this level: "[Leon Battista] Alberti," says the author, "made a simple statement of fact here: children *are* a mixed blessing" (my italics).

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CHARLES M. ROSENBERG. *The Este Monuments and Urban Development in Renaissance Ferrara*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998. Pp. xvi, 329. $75.00.

The long period of Este rule in Ferrara was distinguished by a flourishing cultural life that reached its peak during the second half of the fifteenth and the early sixteenth centuries. Writers such as Ariosto and Tasso and painters like Cosimo Tura and Ercole de'Roberti are but several of the individuals who brought renown to this most cultivated of Renaissance seignories.

Charles M. Rosenberg investigates the ways in which the Este family's members availed themselves of art and architecture in the trumpeting forth of their ambitions, both practical and ideological. (Stephen Greenblatt's phrase, "self-fashioning," is invoked frequently.) Focusing on the four Este dukes whose reigns span the quattrocento, Rosenberg meticulously chronicles the physical development of Ferrara over which these dukes presided. The successive political programs that underlie the urban evolution are distilled in a single public sculptural monument for each of the reigns: those erected to celebrate Alberto V (1393), Niccolò III (1451), Borso (completed ca. 1453), and Ercole d'Este (1498f., never installed).

The sculptures, here for the first time the object of close examination as a grouping, will henceforth constitute an essential aspect of any study of the triumphal art of the Renaissance. And Rosenberg's review of urban development will, too, greatly influence subsequent research. The metamorphosis of Ferrara, under Ercole in particular, takes on a consequence commensurate with that of contemporary Florence. Indeed, Ercole may well be likened to Lorenzo de' Medici in his pursuit of town planning. In this sense, Rosenberg joins a growing list of recent scholars—Evelyn Welch on Milan, for example—who, collectively, have forged a more balanced understanding of the Renaissance, one less centered on Florence.

A synergistic interplay between the triumphal monuments and their settings is revealed by Rosenberg. The poses, gestures, attributes, and costumes of the sculpted effigies of the princes, in other words, assume meaning in significant measure through a range of charged, symbolic connections with the contiguous public and sacred structures and spaces.

The sculptures stand as a kind of visualization of the evolution of the dynasty toward imperial pretension. The expression of ideas relating to justice, legitimacy, classical counterparts, and good rule encapsulated by the monuments shifts toward magnificence. Thus the relatively humble image of a cowled Alberto within a niche on the facade of the cathedral of San Giorgio gives way to the towering, free-standing equestrian monument planned for Ercole at the center of the Piazza Nuova in the grand neighborhood the duke had himself brought into being, the famous Addition.

This is a book of glowing scholarship, drawing upon a vast literature and original archival research; a wonderful capstone, in short, to Rosenberg's already considerable contribution to the study of Ferrara. The footnotes, luxuriant with far-flung references and marked by extended development of ideas and sustaining facts, in several instances running to more than a page in length, should prove heartening to those who have recently defended this much-maligned art. (Attention, Anthony Grafton!)

One small lapse must nonetheless be indicated. Carroll William Westfall's work on Alberti and town planning is not cited.

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MICHAEL TAVUZZI. *Prierias: The Life and Works of Silvestro Mazzolini da Prierio, 1456–1527*. (Duke Monographs in Medieval and Renaissance Studies, number 16.) Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1997. Pp. viii, 189. $39.95.

The subject of this fine biography is a figure who has been shadowy and elusive until now. Indeed, in spite of his polemical activities in Rome at the outset of the Lutheran controversy, most of the standard textbooks on the Reformation scarcely mention Silvestro Mazzolini da Prierio. Michael Tavuzzi has altered this odd circumstance permanently. Working almost exclusively from archival evidence and from the evidence of Silvestro's own considerable writings, Tavuzzi has reconstructed the man, his actions, his thoughts, and even his personality. This is the more astonishing given the complete absence of letters, diaries, memoranda, or other personal materials either by or about Silvestro. What we have here is an amazingly convincing piece of historical detective work, because Tavuzzi, having discovered that the seminal nineteenth-century monograph on Silvestro was faulty (and the errors then repeated), had to use his skeletal evidence to prove almost every salient fact about the man, from the date of his birth to the manner and date of his death. The treatment is masterful, the arguments cogent and

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completely convincing; the man who emerges is not merely bones but flesh and blood.

The book is divided into four chapters: Friar Preacher, 1456–1487; Regent Master, 1487–1502; Prior and Vicar General, 1503–1515; and Master of the Sacred Palace, 1515–1527. We follow Silvestro from the time of his entrance into the Order of Preachers at the convent of San Domenico in Savona, part of the order's reformed Observant Congregation of Lombardy, through his early novitiate and profession, his initial studies at the convent of San Domenico in Bologna and his first apostolic work, his graduate studies in Bologna and his steady ascent up the rigorous academic ladder of the Order of Preachers, to his final call to Rome in 1515 and his appointment as Master of the Sacred Palace.

This work is far more than a biography, however. In following the career and work of his subject, Tavuzzi presents the history of the Dominican Order in Italy and its condition on the eve of the Reformation. He delineates the differences and the rivalries between the observant and conventual Friars Preacher—sometimes, as during the attempts to "reform" the conventual convent of Sant'Eusorgio in Milan from 1510 to 1512, decidedly acerbic rivalries. He outlines at some length the extensive education of those friars whose intellectual capacities warranted higher education from the novitiate through the doctorate and shows that the observant friars were both far more restrictive and far more rigorous than the conventuals. Indeed, Tavuzzi illuminates every stage in Silvestro's career as preacher, teacher, administrator, reformer, inquisitor, and Master of the Sacred Palace with succint discussions of the historical backgrounds of each task or office, of Silvestro's predecessors, contemporaries, and successors, of crises, controversies, and successes. Each chapter also follows Silvestro's prodigious literary activity, and provides clear and lucid descriptions of each work.

The final chapter places the protagonist at the center of church activities during parts or all of the three pontificates of Leo X, Adrian VI, and Clement VII, a crucial period for Catholicism. As Master of the Sacred Palace, Silvestro had myriad responsibilities: book censor, overseer of preachers for papal functions, professor of theology at the Sapienza, director of the Roman tribunal of the Inquisition. During this period, the culminating years of Silvestro's career, he was involved in several celebrated controversies: the matter of Johann Reuchlin; a fight with the Master General of the Dominicans, Cardinal Tommaso de Vio; the "affair" of Pietro Pomponazzi, professor of natural philosophy at the University of Bologna; and, of course, the troublesome question of the Augustinian monk, Martin Luther. The Reuchlin battle had been in the works since 1511 over his defense of books in Hebrew. Silvestro supported Reuchlin's Dominican antagonists, and they finally defeated the famous hebraist in 1520. The polemic with Silvestro's own Master General Tommaso de Vio over some of the cardinal's interpretations of St. Thomas Aquinas had no definitive conclusion and was indeed never directly joined; it seems to show, however, that Silvestro was finally impatient with the man whom he must have considered a young whippersnapper. The attack of Silvestro and others on Pomponazzi's philosophy was defused in 1518 by the intervention of Pietro Bembo on Pomponazzi's behalf. (Bembo's apparent influence here is interesting, because he was still twenty years from his elevation to the purple.)

Silvestro's literary battle with Luther lasted some fourteen months, from May or June of 1518 to August of 1519. Tavuzzi provides a thorough and clear account of the argument. Silvestro thereafter distanced himself from the controversy to concentrate on his work on witches and witchcraft, which he seems to have deemed a greater danger. During his last years, Silvestro almost disappeared from the public life of Rome, so much so that we really know nothing of his death or place of burial, most likely in the midst of the sack of 1527.

Tavuzzi has offered to us a truly splendid piece of history. His prose is succinct and lucid, his scholarship impeccable, his arguments unassailable. This book will be a masterpiece for generations to come.

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KENNETH GOUWENS. *Remembering the Renaissance: Humanist Narratives of the Sack of Rome*. (Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, number 85.) New York: E. J. Brill. 1998. Pp. xix, 232.

The sack of Rome in 1527 by the troops of Emperor Charles V has been treated in historical literature not only as a traumatic event but as a watershed. In this book, Kenneth Gouwens examines the writings of four curial humanists and argues that they were among the conspicuous creators of the idea that a golden age preceded the sack. More importantly, their construct influenced writers even to our time who perpetuated the image of High Renaissance Rome and its glorious culture as an epoch in history that came to a definitive close when the Northern hordes invaded the eternal city.

The four humanists whose ideas Gouwens analyzes are Pietro Alcionio, Pietro Corsi, Jacopo Sadoleto, and Pierio Valeriano. The best-known among them is Sadoleto, secretary to Pope Clement VII, who became bishop of Carpentras in France and later a member of the circle of reformers at the court of Pope Paul III. Gouwens shows that Sadoleto, alone of the four able to leave Rome shortly before the sack, was nevertheless moved by it to change his view of the papal city as well as redefine the meaning of his own life. He responded to the sack by "encapsulating . . . [Rome] as a coherent unit that had ended in 1527" (p. 140) and establishing the self-image of the studious, forward-

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looking bishop who would spend the remainder of his life in the service of God.

The other three humanists responded in different ways. Having lived through the horrors of 1527, they grappled with the memories of destruction and their meaning. Alcionio broke with his patron, Clement VII, when the latter was no longer able to offer either protection or financial rewards. In several orations he, like Sadoleto, remembered Roman cultural greatness as irrevocably passed. But he also abandoned hope that the papacy would spearhead a new golden age for Rome and sought his luck with a new patron.

Corsi, whom Gouwens calls "a rank-and-file Roman humanist" (p. 77), wrote poems expressing his hopelessness and sense of loss. Rome had fallen from her highpoint under the pontificate of Julius II; its greatness had passed into history. Valeriano, in his dialogues, gave "conceptual closure" (p.144) to the High Renaissance in Rome. More hopeful than Corsi, he thought that continuity and recovery would prove stronger than disaster. But he, too, saw the golden age of Rome as being in the past.

Gouwens's book adds subtlety and remarkable scholarly acumen to recent works on the sack of Rome. His reading of what the four humanists wrote is careful and imaginative, and he is extremely sensitive to details of meaning. If one had to add a cavil, one could mention his at times too literal and graceless translations from the admittedly involuted humanistic Latin or his tiresome tendency to use modish terms drawn from literary theory. I, for one, think that he occasionally overinterprets his evidence—but that is a question for further debate. I want to close by stressing that these are small matters in a well-written and learned work that makes an important contribution to Italian Renaissance studies.

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NANCY G. SIRAISI. *The Clock and the Mirror: Girolamo Cardano and Renaissance Medicine*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1997. Pp. xiv, 361. $49.50.

Nancy G. Siraisi locates this latest book historiographically as a complement to what has gone before: Padua, Taddeo Alderotti and the *Canon* of Avicenna. From such studies of groups and texts it was time to move on to themes of "self-conscious and self-proclaimed renewal" in the context of cultural, intellectual, and social changes during the Renaissance. But as Siraisi engagingly confesses, she was caught by Girolamo Cardano.

No one need worry. Cardano is very catching. Wildly prolific in his output, fluent as a river on himself, eccentric to a degree on all important matters like religion and philosophy, Cardano steps over the boundaries of most Renaissance categories. He wrote a horoscope for Christ, sampled the suspect religion of Scotland, endured the execution of his son, and was imprisoned by the Inquisition. His stress on the "subtlety" of natural things could be construed as a direct attack on the rationality of Aristotelian natural philosophy. He is a Renaissance man, even when his very individuality makes him typical of nothing. But it is, of course, in following these personal activities across boundaries that Siraisi can achieve a great deal of her first undertaking.

She divides up the text with the enthusiasm of a scholastic, if with more elegance. There are five parts of two chapters each. We enter Cardano's medical world with his own image, the clock (to keep track of time in the busy life of the teacher and author) and the mirror (to reflect the changing condition of his body, a constant source of interest for Cardano). Here are the features of Renaissance medicine, from the new anatomy of Andreas Vesalius to the medical marketplace and the oligarchy of the big medical corporations. Cardano embraced the first, fought valiantly in the second, and was ultimately adopted by the third. He had enemies, friends, and (best of all) a patron. He had patients, and it is characteristic of Renaissance sources that we can see how he acquired them. In contrast, for all the vast bulk of his medieval commentary on the *Canon*, Gentile da Foligno (who died in the plague) says next to nothing about such things.

Renaissance medicine, of course, shared many features with its with medieval counterpart, and Siraisi shows how sixteenth-century doctors, like their forebears, discussed experience and reason. Rather than a scholastic debate on theory and practice, this was a device by the physicians of both periods to present themselves both as rational and learned, yet at the same time effective in practice. Their preferred form of practice was to control the regimen of the rich and healthy; but in cases of joint consultations, we can perceive the deontological issues of the medical marketplace.

In part three, Siraisi deals with things more proper to the Renaissance, beginning with the new anatomy. However impressive was Vesalius's *Fabrica* (1543), the immediate use of its fine and internal anatomy was in fact small to the practicing doctor or surgeon. Even Cardano, a great admirer of Vesalius, saw the use of the book primarily in bestowing a professional and rhetorical advantage to its reader in competitive situations. The rhetoric helped to make it fashionable for the well-to-do to ask for post-mortems of deceased members of the family, in the belief that the health of future generations could thus be protected. Vesalius's criticisms of Galen's anatomy were another feature of Renaissance medicine, and Cardano was ready to extend criticism to other parts of Galen's medicine. It seems to be true of most periods in Western medicine that Hippocrates, the elective father of medicine, was seen to write with a wisdom that was so deep and oracular that it constantly needed new interpretations. Commentators from Galen to the Enlightenment made Hippocrates a Galenist or a mechanist, and Galen's commentary, precisely because he was a rationalist in the Platonic and Aristotelian fashion, began

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to seem rather localized to scholars of the Renaissance like Cardano.

However appropriate to their time, Cardano's criticism of Galen and approval of Hippocrates sold less well than his work on "subtlety." This is real Renaissance territory, and Siraisi explores well (chapters seven and eight) Cardano's attitudes to sympathy, "whole substance" diseases and remedies, magic, neoplatonism, dreams, and miracles.

The book's final section is concerned with what might elsewhere be called discourses: the doctor's account of the patient and his or her illness; the patient's *historia* to the doctor and case "histories"; in Cardano's case the doctor's account of himself; narratives of particulars and their relationship to universals; and, finally, the doctor as patient.

An epilogue matches the preface and gives the book a precise symmetry. Admirers of scholarship will note that a third of the book is given over to notes, the apparatus by which Cardano is linked to all those themes and kinds of history that preceded him in Siraisi's affections. This book is more than an introduction to them.

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Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi. *Fascist Spectacle: The Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini's Italy*. (Studies in the History of Society and Culture, number 28.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1997. Pp. xi, 303. $40.00.

Mabel Berezin. *Making the Fascist Self: The Political Culture of Interwar Italy*. (The Wilder House Series in Politics, History, and Culture.) Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1997. Pp. xv, 267. Cloth $45.00, paper $18.95.

These two books, if not exactly twins, are certainly very close siblings. Both Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi and Mabel Berezin work in the field of cultural studies, the frontier where history and sociology meet. Both examine the use of ritual in fascist Italy to explore the identity, values, and goals of Benito Mussolini's regime. Furthermore, both find a leitmotif in fascism's effort to condition the individual citizen by confounding the public and private spheres of life. This process involved, in Berezin's words, "merging the public and private self" (p. 7), or, as Falasca-Zamponi puts it more plainly, "The private was, in sum, politicized under fascism" (p. 147). Neither author shies away from attaching the once-outmoded word totalitarian to the fascist experiment.

There is in each book a proper appreciation of those Italian cultural traits that allowed Mussolini's rhetoric and ritual to achieve resonance. This is to distinguish what William Sewell has termed the schema, society's "fundamental tools of thought," from the resources or means at fascism's disposal to convey its message. For example, Mussolini's histrionics did not seem out of place in what the London *Times* once famously called "the nation of carnivals," the land of operatic and melodramatic excess. The symbols of the Roman Catholic Church were appropriated and mimicked in fascist ceremonies, contributing to the rise of the phenomenon of the sacralization of politics, in the phrase coined by Emilio Gentile (*Il culto del Littorio: La sacralizzazione della politica nell'Italia fascista* [1993]). The habitual Italian respect for the family, above all for the mother figure, was another cultural element manipulated by fascist image makers. All these schemata were harnessed to maintain the fascist hold on power and to preach its ideological, hypernationalist message.

Berezin lays great emphasis on the repetitiousness of fascist propaganda and ritual, which was calculated to evoke an instinctual, emotive response. "Spectacles in the public piazza ... created a community of feeling" (p. 38), a spiritual counterpart to the corporate state. The negation of the personal self revealed fascism's true antagonist to be classical liberalism rather than collectivist Marxism. The frame of reference and general propositions are established in Berezin's first two chapters, after which she devotes the rest of her book to three illustrative case studies. The first traces the changing nature of the annual commemoration, on October 29, of the march on Rome. Over time, this occasion witnessed less celebration of a former fascist domestic success and more anticipation of a future fascist foreign war, as *adunate* or giant rallies in favour of Mussolini's imperial policy in the 1930s became the preferred form of demonstration. The second in-depth investigation focuses on the various fascist ceremonies held in Verona during the *ventennio*. Berezin chose Verona in order to test Clifford Geertz's "myth of the exemplary center," and, with the aid of some fifteen statistical charts, she surmises that the fascist "colonization of time" was not confined to Rome: "the ritual colonization of time in a peripheral city such as Verona provides yet another window on the process of fascist identity creation" (p. 149). Finally, Berezin quotes liberally from the records of committed rank-and-file fascists who died as "heroes" fighting on the Greek-Albanian front. Some of this literature consists of fascist obituaries, the remainder of letters from the soldiers themselves. Each source reflects the mix of martial, religious, and family values that fascism preached. In these instances, apparently, fascist ritual succeeded in creating the authentic fascist "self."

Falasca-Zamponi enters the same field of inquiry through the medium of aesthetics. Her thesis is that the aesthetic content to be discerned in fascist politics derived from the art-for-art's-sake school of the late nineteenth century. As first interpreted by Walter Benjamin, this movement "defined art as an enclosed space completely separated from the rest of the value spheres"; concomitantly, "aesthetic politics was engaged in the creation of a work of art and thus claimed absolute autonomy" (p. 9). Expressed more simply, art

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for art's sake accepted no rules or limits, and aesthetic politics similarly recognized no limits, particularly any restraint imposed by ethical considerations. Moreover, neither art nor politics of this genre appealed to the senses; rather, the object was to "anaesthetise" them. Fascism "strove to neutralize the senses, to knock them out" (p. 12), a postulate that incidentally challenges Berezin's insistence on the emotional impact of fascist ritual on audiences. Of course, Falasca-Zamponi's version of aesthetics is a narrow one, and she is forced to admit that if the province of true art is to arouse the senses by depicting reality, then the desensitizing artifices of both art for art's sake and fascism are aesthetic aberrations. Nevertheless, within the context of her own definition of aesthetics, her argument holds up well.

As the consummate artist-politico, Mussolini figures much more prominently here than in Berezin's work. His opportunity arose, suggests Falasca-Zamponi, because, early in the twentieth century, "a change occurred in the normative expectations of ideal social behavior for the individual." Where once the man of solid "character" was admired, the "personality" who could operate (or rule) with style was now the cynosure (p. 45). In this new climate, Mussolini was able to fabricate his self-image as superman; he shared with avant-garde artists a "belief in *homo autotelus*, who creates ex nihilo and self-referentially" (p. 11). The canvas on which the Duce painted was the masses whom, like Adolf Hitler, he despised but needed. Falasca-Zamponi quotes Mussolini's own description of the masses as "female," supine, and receptive to masculine domination. Indeed, "masculine" values were ubiquitous in fascist Italy, expressed in the notorious battles for births and grain (both potent cultural symbols in pre-fascist Italy). On a more pedestrian level, the identity of the new fascist man was to be forged by "the tight observance of aesthetic rules—rules that were conceived as both signifiers and the signified of fascist qualities" (p. 184). The author therefore cites the numerous fiats laid down by Achille Starace, the Fascist Party secretary from 1931 to 1939, to eradicate bourgeois attitudes: the replacement of a handshake by the fascist salute, the condemnation of the formal *lei*, and the insistence on the fascist calendar dating from the march on Rome, among others.

It should be noted that both the titles under review are, at least in one respect, limited in scope. Their project is to establish fascism's self-identity from its ritual practices; it is expressly not to assess how far that ritual succeeded in actually producing *uomo fascistus*. In fact, each author makes clear that the fascist venture into socio-psychological engineering was, in general terms, an abject failure. But having made the point that fascism found so much of traditional Italian culture and ceremony to be malleable and adaptable to its own purposes, Berezin and Falasca-Zamponi open up the question of why, in the end, fascist culture did not put down deeper and wider roots. By and large, however, this issue is skirted, and the reader's curiosity, once whetted, remains unsatisfied. The mere assertion that prefascist culture outlived Mussolini's regime leaves one wondering to what extent fascism's own utilization of traditional symbols contributed to that outcome. There is one valuable inference to be drawn from these extensive and rewarding accounts of fascist ritual, however. Clearly, so much Mussolinian effort was given over to public displays and spectacle that, in the centralized administration of fascist Italy, little time or energy remained for the serious business of government. In other words, these two works help to explain the almost total neglect of military planning that finally brought down the fascist regime. Together, they reinforce the old clichés about a sawdust caesar presiding over a regime of gestures; Falasca-Zamponi even calls one of her chapters "The Politics of Symbols."

Although both studies betray some of the characteristics of sociological writing most dreaded by humanistic historians—principally a certain prolixity and repetitiousness—they are instantly accessible. Specialist jargon is not unduly obtrusive and, when used, is accompanied by adequate explication. Berezin in particular employs some felicitous turns of phrase, and her book is made the more readable by her publisher's praiseworthy dedication to the old-fashioned footnote. Falasca-Zamponi's volume originated in her doctoral dissertation, some traces of which are still evident—notably the packing of information into unwieldy endnotes. In the final analysis, though, both books are admirable monographs based on a wide range of readings intelligently deployed. Historians will appreciate the factual content and will find the sociological insights stimulating.

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NICHOLAS DOUMANIS. *Myth and Memory in the Mediterranean: Remembering Fascism's Empire*. New York: St. Martin's. 1997. Pp. viii, 243. $65.00.

The Dodecanese islands, off the coast of Greece, were occupied by Italy from 1912 to 1943. They are one of the least known of the colonial possessions and, according to this account, a place where Italian colonialism is remembered in positive terms. This indeed seems to be an anomaly, because usually foreign domination is depicted in negative expressions. Nicholas Doumanis's book represents a welcome departure and is the result of an objective assessment by former colonial subjects and scholars. That the Dodecanesians remember Italian rule with a distinct sense of nostalgia and that most of their recollections are positive is possible because of the Italians' human qualities and because the colonial rulers considered the inhabitants of the islands as belonging to the same race as themselves. Italians had not forgotten that their ancient heritage derives not only from Rome but also from "Magna Gracia," greater Greece, colonies in the southern region of the Italian peninsula.

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This book is a social history, based mostly on interviews with ordinary people; it is not an analysis of colonial administration, but an assessment of everyday life under foreign rule and political oppression. "The islanders continued to feel bitter about certain abuses committed by the occupiers . . . affectionately referred to ordinary Italians as people who were very much like themselves" (p. 2). Local people described the Italian occupation as a period of progress and development; Italians were described as civilized people. This study demonstrates that cultural and social factors influence the relations between the dominant and the dominated. In spite of the fact that oral sources are not always objective, social memory is not always correct, and facts are not remembered accurately and must be verified with other sources, these things are indispensable to reconstructing the colonial past.

The Dodecanese people were not subjected to the destruction of conquest and the brutal subjugation of Libya and Ethiopia. Perhaps if the Italian record in the latter two colonies were studied in social terms and extensive interviews conducted, we might view Italian colonization in Africa in a new light. In this respect, much remains to be done, and future historians may follow the Doumanis book as a role model to discover the intricacies of the relations between occupier and occupied.

Among the negative aspects of the Italian occupation was Dodecanesian dislike of the "Fascists," a phenomenon seen also in Africa, where Ethiopians distinguished between the average Italian who had come to East Africa to work and the fanatical fascist who imposed the racial code and used brutal means against the colonized. Likewise, the Italians in Ethiopia and the Dodecanese freely intermarried with local women, who appreciated their Italian suitors as "romantic fools" who knew how to please a woman.

In contrast, the islanders considered the brief German occupation, which started in 1943, as being harsh but fair, dispassionate, arbitrary, and impartial. The German soldier seemed like a robot, devoid of human frailties, highly disciplined, courageous, with the propensity to kill anyone when given the order (p. 193). The Germans were also resented because they took food from the people. The British, likewise, during the period of temporary administration (1945–1947) were not very popular (p. 194). Anti-British sentiment derived from the fact that the British presence was considered by the islanders as another occupation by new enemies, the British being perceived as lacking human qualities (p. 195). Thus the fearsome German character made the occupation of the Dodecanese islands a terrifying experience, while the coldness of the British was seen as the reason for despising them. By contrast, the Italian period was distinguished by Italian propensity to promote *familiarità* (intimacy), which the islanders appreciated.

Doumanis's book is unique because he approaches the study of colonialism from a social point of view and reveals many aspects that historians fail to notice when using the traditional mode of writing history. Going to the people and soliciting their input, in spite of potential serious drawbacks of accuracy, will open new vistas and make the study of history more "humane."

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NICHOLAS J. MILLER. *Between Nation and State: Serbian Politics in Croatia Before the First World War.* (Pitt Series in Russian and East European Studies.) Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1997. Pp. xiv, 223. $45.00.

This excellent book by Nicholas J. Miller can be viewed as a case study of politics in action in a specific area of the soon-to-be-former Habsburg Empire. The place is Croatia between 1903 and 1914, the political actors chosen for the study are Serbs, a community constituting probably less than twenty percent of Croatia's population at the turn of the century. Miller focuses on two Serbian political parties: the Serbian Radical Party, led by Jaša Tomić, and the Serbian Independent Party, headed by Svetozar Pribićević. The two parties operated in an extremely volatile atmosphere. They shaped their politics in response to Croatian political parties and developments in Croatia that were often, to the regret of both Serbs and Croats, under the control of Budapest or Vienna. As a consequence, the Serbs needed regularly to modify their positions and tactics.

Because the segment of political time under study here is so full of events, players, and pressures, the reader can soon become overwhelmed. This is, after all, the time when the Obrenović king of Serbia was murdered and replaced by a Karageorgević (1903); when the Kingdom of Serbia and Vienna became embroiled in a trade competition (sometimes called the Pig War); when Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Hercegovina (1908), while at home its secret police and courts pursued Croats and Serbs for possible treason (Zagreb and Vienna treason trials, 1909); and when the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) introduced a new dimension to the Southern Slav question. The reader should pay heed to the details, for patience will be rewarded. Careful reading can help to illuminate the Croatian Serb politicians' concern for developments among Habsburg Serbs outside Croatia—in Dalmatia, in Hungary, in Bosnia-Hercegovina—and also among those in the Kingdom of Serbia, as well as in the Ottoman lands. The same careful attention will help to explain the confusion of governmental authorities: the Croatian *ban*, a Hungarian appointee; the Croatian *Sabor*, an elective assembly with no control over the *ban*; the Hungarian government, which tried to govern Croatia colonially; and ultimately Vienna, whose foreign office was pursuing an imperial Balkan (i.e. anti-Serbian, perhaps anti-southern Slav) policy. A Serbian party's self-interest required deft political maneuvering. The story, in other words, is one of politics, more politics, and of political personalities.

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Another way to look at this book is as a study of the chief philosophical division that separated two Serbian political camps in Croatia in the decade before World War I. The party headed by Tomić focused on the concept of an ethnic nation, relying on privilege and the corporative idea as the foundation for political life. The other party, Pribićević's Independents, who had been influenced by Tomáš Masaryk and the *Omladina*, favored a constitutional state and evoked a civic model for Serb activity in Croatia. In the period under examination, the latter group helped to foster the politics of the Croato-Serb coalition, which promoted the notion of a civic society where Serbs and Croats—everyone—would have rights guaranteed by a constitutional state, Croatia. For Miller, the existence of two such political camps denotes a particular developmental phase, that of a maturing society perched on the divide "between nation and state," between a cultural and a political concept of community.

The Independents' program collapsed in 1913 when, for political reasons, its adherents chose to collaborate with the Hungarian government. Aside from the Communist period in Yugoslav history, the only other time when ethnic national politics was rejected as a basis for political action was the pre-World War I era, when the Serb Independent Party promoted its civic alternative. Hence, from the vantage point of Communist Yugoslavia's break-up and the war that followed in the 1990s, the failure of the Independents' civic program holds a larger meaning for the author. The idea of an ethnic nation had prevailed: the notion of civic nationhood had failed to take root. Moreover, since the summer of 1995, most of Croatia's Serbs have been expelled from that state, and Croatia has become virtually homogeneous ethnically.

For this work, in addition to archival sources, Miller makes extensive use of the contemporary writings, correspondence, and memoirs of key political figures. He uses his sources well, and in a brief concluding chapter he discusses several issues that his book challenges historiographically (e.g. the true political character of Pribićević). For the two introductory chapters, Miller mines the secondary literature effectively, presenting mature, thoughtful syntheses of previous scholarship in the field. Reading his summaries of the early history of Croatia and the histories of the politics and parties of the post-1867 period is almost a pleasure. His exposition in clear and concise; his style is engaging and sometimes colorful.

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ANDREW BARUCH WACHTEL. *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia*. (Cultural Memory in the Present.) Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1998. Pp. 302. Cloth $55.00, paper $18.95.

Remarkably, given the centrality of Yugoslavism to the existence of the two twentieth-century Yugoslav states (1918–1941, 1945–1991), Andrew Baruch Wachtel's book is the first general scholarly study of the Yugoslav idea. It is also the first work of any sort to consider the collapse of that state in 1991 through the prism of culture. For those reasons, and given the quality of its analysis, this book is indispensable. Wachtel offers a strong thesis: "the collapse of multinational Yugoslavia . . . [was] not the result of the breakdown of the political or economic fabric of the Yugoslav state; rather, these breakdowns . . . sprang from the gradual destruction of the concept of a Yugoslav nation" (p. 4). Wachtel thus places his interpretation in competition with those of other writers, most directly Susan Woodward, whose *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (1995) focuses entirely on socioeconomic and political conditions in Yugoslavia.

"Yugoslavism" was an intellectual construction whose popularity waxed and waned after the 1830s, when it was first conceived during the Illyrian Movement, a Croatian nationalist revival movement. Wachtel traces the cycles of the idea's popularity, linking it effectively (as only a student of literatures can) with the cultural transitions from romanticism to realism to modernism (before World War I), various modernist and antimodernist cultural movements (during the interwar period), and the postwar progress from socialist realism through a new modernism and finally postmodernism. He convincingly describes the various types of cultural construction that "Yugoslavism" could demand: from turn-of-the-century folkloric revivals, to interwar tension between folklorism and European modernism, to tensions dividing those advocates who favored the creation of an entirely new Yugoslav culture and those whose Yugoslavism was founded on the principle of cooperation among related but unique nations. Wachtel argues effectively that the notion of a Yugoslav identity, although invented, gained strength in Yugoslavia with each passing decade. When that identity's appeal began to fade in the 1960s, the Communist regime's unwillingess and/or inability to combat that decline virtually assured that other structural problems in Yugoslavia would take hold and be interpreted through the prism of national competition.

Wachtel's narrative is built around a succession of skillfully executed case studies. Among the examples that Wachtel examines, one that recurs provocatively through the book is Petar Petrović Njegoš, who, in spite of being a Serbian nationalist poet (the author of *The Mountain Wreath*), could be found idealized as an exemplar of Yugoslavism by both the Karageorgević and Tito regimes. The presence of Njegoš at every turn in the evolution and transformation of Yugoslavism is ironic and indicative: Yugoslavism is a construction, and its popularity, or lack thereof, depends on the adroit manipulation of symbols by a cultural elite. Wachtel's commentary on the works of Ivan Meštrović, Ivo Andrić, Miroslav Krleža, Meša Selimović, and a host of writers from the 1980s are all illuminating and graceful, and he rarely stretches his evidence.

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Some readers may have difficulty accepting the strength of Wachtel's initial proposal that the collapse of Yugoslavia can only be understood in cultural terms. He modifies his assertion in his conclusion, suggesting that a cultural explanation is important but must be combined with a consideration of political and economic developments. The body of Wachtel's study is less categorical than his introduction, as he deftly blends in the political factors that called Yugoslavism into question. Wachtel's study serves three distinct communities: students of Yugoslav history and the collapse of the state will of course gain immeasurably from it. Students of national movements will find it a provocative case study (to that end, Wachtel refers often to Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* [1983]). Finally, one of the advantages of this book for non-specialists is that Wachtel concentrates on figures who are eminently accessible: the works of Njegoš, Andrić, Krleža, Selimović, and Milorad Pavić are all available in translation, and Meštrović is a sculptor who requires no translation. Thus the book, which is written in a comfortable style, lends itself to classroom use, where the translated works of Wachtel's subjects could be read in tandem with it. In a recent review of another book, Ivo Banac noted the need for historians of Yugoslavia to dedicate themselves to textual and archival studies of the region. Books like Wachtel's are an excellent start on that project.

NICHOLAS MILLER
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ELISE KIMMERLING WIRTSCHAFTER. *Social Identity in Imperial Russia*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. 1997. Pp. xi, 260. $35.00.

In the worldview of Confucian China, the "rectification of names" was a recurring theme: the correspondence between name or title and responsibility. Let the emperor be an emperor, the soldier a soldier, the father a father—so argued the Confucians—and the rest of the universe would unfold in harmonious fashion.

Operating from quite different premises, many Russian reformers from Peter I (1689–1725) onward dreamed of achieving harmony by organizing society into tidy categories that would delineate the role and responsibilities of each individual. Nobles, merchants, artisans, and peasants would each be defined by specific obligations and (for some) privileges. Status and identity would be acquired by birth and passed on to future generations.

Russia's social estates (*sosloviia*), however, never achieved the stability or corporate identity of their counterparts in other lands. Neither did autocratic reformers manage to create the "well-ordered police state" of which Marc Raeff has written. Instead, the boundaries between social and economic groups and strata remained imprecise and permeable. This was a country of (a few) serf millionaires and of penniless Prince Myshkins—a country of social flux and uncertainty. In Elise Kimmerling Wirtschafter's words, the "formal privileges and obligations . . . imposed by the monarchy on its subjects [were] limited by the government's institutional weakness, which prevented effective implementation" (p. 170).

The vocabulary of social class offers an alternative set of categories for understanding Russian society. Wirtschafter suggests that these, too, offer an unreliable picture of Russian identities. She disputes those historians who have written of a "missing bourgeoisie," arguing instead that Russian merchants and entrepreneurs displayed dynamism, responsiveness to economic opportunity, and political sophistication. Until the end of the nineteenth century, however, this emerging elite was not clearly distinguished from other social categories; its membership was unstable, and unfavorable conditions "reinforced the lack of clear socioeconomic differentiation" (p. 79). As for workers, "the impulse to organize remained temporary, fragmented, and localized; consequently, the possibility of sustained social and political cohesion proved ephemeral" (p. 157).

Although Wirtschafter cites a certain number of archival documents, her book is not a research monograph based on primary sources. Rather, it is an extensive commentary that reviews, criticizes, and attempts to synthesize the work of many other authors. The book's three substantive chapters deal with elites (landed nobility, military and civil servitors, and clergy), working people (peasants, townspeople, workers), and the ill-defined groups in between: merchants, professionals, *intelligentsia* (in this term's distinctive Russian usage), and "people of various ranks" (*raznochintsy*). The briefer introductory and concluding chapters relate the discussion of identities to the broader evolution and ultimate disintegration of imperial Russia.

In Wirtschafter's view, Russia's "fluctuating definitions and porous institutions" may have been a source of social integration. Individuals could "violate official boundaries and change legal identities in order to survive, define a social position, and perhaps even prosper," thereby promoting the "social and institutional effectiveness of the old regime" (p. 169). The older social categories and institutions, however, declined after 1861, losing their power to "mediate class conflict. The result was greater social particularism and weaker organizational ties in increasingly chaotic political and economic conditions" (p. 173), followed rather quickly by the collapse of the tsarist regime in 1917.

Wirtschafter thus defines social identities mainly in administrative/economic terms, giving relatively little attention to alternative definitions. Territorial identity is discussed briefly in relation to the nobility, and ethnic and confessional identities receive only passing mention.

Although much of her discussion rests on an implicit comparison between imperial Russian society and foreign models, the author says almost nothing about

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the very different traditions and practices of countries that provided examples (or counter-examples) for Russia's leaders—for example, the social estates and *parlements* of France before 1789—or about the roots from which those other countries' institutions and social identities had grown. She also understates the arbitrary and destructive side of Russia's social boundaries, such as the obstacles that serf entrepreneurs encountered or the difficulties of peasant-workers' bifurcated existence.

This is a topic fraught with ambiguity and paradox, and Wirtschafter has not, in my judgment, made it less so. Although she does provide some thoughtful observations and provocative suggestions, important issues are left unresolved: notably the idea of gender and family as keys to understanding Russia's social identities (pp. 9–19, 29) and the importance of "outsiders" and otherness (pp. 164–168). Wirtschafter's wordy and uninviting prose, moreover, will be an obstacle to all but the most patient readers. She offers much food for thought, but few tasty tidbits and little seasoning.

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Susan Heuman. *Kistiakovsky: The Struggle for National and Constitutional Rights in the Last Years of Tsarism*. (Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press for the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. 1998. Pp. xiv, 218.

As long as the Soviet system lasted, Western analysts of early twentieth-century thinkers in the Russian realm tended to concentrate on persons whose ideas directly affected the evolution of that system. As the significance of the Marxist-Leninist system recedes to the level of a single historical episode, one can expect more attention to other thinkers who emphasized subjects of perennial significance in Russian history. Susan Heuman's book is an early example of this trend.

Bogdan Kistiakovsky did not play a major role in prerevolutionary history, but his publications (extensive, considering his premature death from natural causes in 1920 at age fifty-two) had an unusual focus. After a youthful attraction to Marxism, Kistiakovsky became a devoted Kantian. Kistiakovsky's distinction is that he combined Immanuel Kant's principles of individual freedom and human dignity with a deep knowledge of Western and Russian law. His father, a professor at Kiev University, was an expert in Ukrainian customary law. Bogdan's own education was somewhat irregular because of tsarist police sanctions, but he studied law as well as philosophy at the Baltic university at Dorpat (now Tärtü). Eventually he took his doctoral degree in Germany (Berlin University, 1899) with a dissertation entitled *Society and the Individuals*. Subsequently he visited Germany almost annually, maintaining close associations with legal specialist Georg Jellinek and sociologists Georg Simmel and Max Weber. With considerable difficulty, Kistiakovsky obtained a position teaching the philosophy of law in a Russian secondary school, and at the relatively advanced age of forty-one he became an instructor (*privat-dotsent*) at Moscow University. Throughout, his articles in Russian-language periodicals emphasized the rule of law (*Rechtsstaat*) as the cornerstone for reforming the Russian imperial system. This emphasis differentiated him sharply from Marxists like G. V. Plekhanov, who proclaimed "revolutionary victory" as the highest law and also from populists who rejected introducing Western principles to the "unique" Russian society.

The second aspect of Kistiakovsky's unusual focus was his attachment to Ukrainian culture. At age thirteen, he joined the *Hromada* (community) movement distributing illegal publications in the Ukrainian language. His intellectual guide for many years was Mykhailo Drahomanov, whose writings had rejected the centralized autocracy in favor of a federal constitution providing scope for Ukrainian cultural growth. As a territorial unit of the federation, Ukraine, acting through peasant cooperative associations, could secure the allegiance of the masses.

Since Drahomanov rejected complete political separation from Russia, Kistiakovsky's involvement with liberal Russian organizations, culminating in adherence to the Constitutional Democratic (*Kadet*) Party, was an appropriate vehicle for his constitutional and legal reform activity. For Ukrainian nationalists demanding political independence, however, Kistiakovsky's cultural approach marked him as just a "Ukrainophile." After 1905, Kistiakovsky's positions were increasingly rejected by liberals like P. B. Struve who had been deeply humiliated by Japan's victory: "the Russian people have learned to understand that the State is a collective personality and stands above any individual will" (p. 131). Consequently, Struve argued that "Russian progressive social opinion" must struggle against regionalism, notably Ukrainophile tendencies, in favor of an all-Russian culture. Although at one time Kistiakovsky had believed that Ukrainian autonomy was compatible with alliance with a "worldwide" culture like the Russian, he became increasingly alienated by "chauvinists" like Struve. Like many moderate nationalists in later generations, Kistiakovsky became convinced that only maximum constitutional autonomy, including proportional representation for all non-Russians, could safeguard national cultures and freedom from centralizing bureaucracy.

Heuman has performed a notable service in lucidly presenting Kistiakovsky's interesting combination of moderate nationalism and concern for universal principles of freedom. More on his formative influences, such as his financial support and his wife's political involvement, would be helpful. Most striking is Heuman's failure (p. 36) to explain Kistiakovsky's presence in wartime Germany at the onset of the February 1917 Revolution. During 1918, the impact on Kistiakovsky of his brother Igor's role as Hetman Skoropadsky's

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minister of interior also calls for elaboration. But perhaps such personal data, often rare for Russian public figures, will be forthcoming as archival research becomes more feasible.

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ORLANDO FIGES. *A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891–1924*. Paperback edition. New York: Penguin. 1998. Pp. xx, 923. $19.95.

This lengthy account of modern Russian history from the 1891 famine to V. I. Lenin's death in 1924 has already created quite a stir. Recipient of several literary awards, the book provoked an acerbic exchange in 1997 between a senior American specialist on Russia, Richard Pipes, and the author, a younger British historian. Orlando Figes vehemently rebutted Pipes's review, which alleged that certain passages amounted to unattributed borrowings from Pipes's earlier work in Russian history. Fortunately, subsequent reviews and discussion of Figes's volume have focused on his various interpretations, some of which, by emphasizing social history, support the revisionist school of revolutionary historiography and some of which, by emphasizing the ruthlessness and despotism of Lenin and the Bolsheviks, appeal to conservative, Cold War historians of the early Soviet period.

A difficulty for reviewers and readers alike is that this book fits none of the customary historiographic categories. Although the author draws on useful archival material and excerpts a number of fascinating primary sources, the book is not a monograph. It covers so many topics that it cannot delve deeply into any of them. Moreover, despite Figes's knack for providing fresh detail and lively illustrative material (including some unusual and fascinating photographs) on a wide range of subjects, no significant new findings or pathbreaking interpretations are broached. At the same time the volume is neither a popular history for general readers nor suitable as a textbook for undergraduate students. Its many pages, its inordinate detail, and its assumption that the reader possesses some basic knowledge about Russia and its history rule out either audience. Finally, Figes's study, happily, is not an ideological jeremiad. He propounds no simplistic explanations for the Russian Revolution or the rise of Soviet authoritarianism. Almost all his conclusions respect the complexities of the cataclysmic events under analysis and are eminently sensible and centrist.

What, then, is the nature of the book? First, it represents a magisterial synthesis of Russian domestic history through three decades of rapid change, war, revolution, and civil war. Scholars, teachers, and serious students alike can turn with confidence to Figes's account for a clear, well-written, and thorough treatment of most significant events in Russia's internal development in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Second, the author's sketches and assessments of the leading personalities, whether tsarist, revolutionary, or Soviet, are crisp, fair, and informative. Lastly, Figes has admirably succeeded in enlivening an overly long book by frequent quotations from pertinent, intriguing, and often unknown or seldom-used primary sources, including diaries, letters, memoirs, and eyewitness accounts. Clearly sympathetic to the reactions and evaluations of Maxim Gorky concerning the unfolding of the revolution, the author relies a bit too much on that radical writer's articles and observations, but this Gorkyan slant is frequently apropos.

Despite the size of the study, damaging lacunas exist. Russia's international relations, whether diplomatic, economic, cultural, or revolutionary, are almost entirely ignored. Figes writes as if Russia existed in a vacuum: for example, the enormous pressure on Sergei Witte and other modernizers created by the need to compete within a cutthroat European state system and in a global imperialist economy is never mentioned. As a result, Russia's ties with France, the alliance system that emerged, and Allied military pressures before and during the war are slighted. Again, despite lengthy treatment of the Civil War, Figes pays scant attention to German and Allied intervention, each of which had major domestic and international import. Moreover, the degree to which the Bolsheviks' decisions were shaped by their misguided faith in world revolution, the impact on Western opinion of the bogeyman of the Third International, and the foreign policy aspects of Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) are totally absent.

Moreover, despite the author's prefatory promise to focus on the people of Russia, the resulting book is overwhelmingly political history. On the economic side, agriculture is given due and extraordinarily useful treatment, although I disagree with Figes's conclusion that Pyotr Stolypin's reforms had almost no effect. But the remarkable industrialization of Russia from the 1880s to 1914 receives inadequate coverage. Passing mention is made of urban conditions and workers' circumstances, but the scope and intensity of the social upheaval created by sudden industrial growth are seriously underplayed. Concomitantly, although Figes helpfully traces the life stories of two peasant-worker-revolutionaries, he fails to convey to the reader the transformation of family life, values, education, public health, and social structures (e.g. the growth of the cooperative movement) that took place after 1891. Not because of its political incorrectness, but because of the extensive and wrenching nature of the changes involved, Figes's sketchy treatment of the rapidly evolving role of women in Russian society is regrettable. Finally, the years Figes covers saw a burst of creativity in Russian science and culture that significantly enriched European and world civilization, yet the author devotes only a couple of pages near the end of the volume to these developments.

Figes is certainly to be commended for incisive and

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revealing accounts of many major episodes. For example, he assesses Nicholas II and the tsardom skillfully, concluding that revolution, although not inevitable, was made probable by the determined resistance of the tsar and the aristocratic elite to reform. Persuasively, the author also argues that the failure to integrate the peasantry into society made them the key to the revolution, while their egalitarian beliefs and moral subjectivity ensured that violence and civil war would accompany any social upheaval. Figes is both penetrating and sensible on War Communism, the reasons for the Whites' failure in the Civil War, and the distinction between Leninism and Stalinism.

One is bound to sympathize with his overall interpretation that a history of oppression and the poverty, pettiness, and brutality of peasant culture made it almost impossible for the Russian people to construct a new society of justice and self-rule on the ruins of tsarism. As a result, they were tragically destined to suffer further under a new form of autocracy. On the other hand, the logic of Figes's conclusion seems a bit muddled. He argues that the Russian people were not victims of alien Bolshevism but rather "protagonists" in the revolution's deplorable outcomes of violence and despotism: "To be sure, this was a people's tragedy but it was a tragedy which they helped to make" (p. 808). Yet surely the Russians did not choose cultural backwardness and a legacy of "serfdom and autocratic rule that had kept the common people powerless and passive." In my view, the Russian people who sought a new and better life in 1917 were indeed tragic victims of their past—and indeed failures at creating what they truly wanted—but they were not the architects of their own destruction.

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DILIARA KHANIFOVNA IBRAGIMOVA. *NEP i Perestroika: Massovoe soznanie sel'skogo naseleniia v usloviiakh perekhoda k rynku*. [NEP and Perestroika: Mass Consciousness of the Rural Population During the Transition to the Market]. Moscow: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli. 1997. Pp. 217.

Diliara Khanifovna Ibragimova has written a comparative study of two similar periods in Russian history separated by sixty years. The first period was the transition from the rigidly centralized system of War Communism (1918–1921) to the mixed market system of the New Economic Policy (NEP) (March 1921 to 1928). The second was Mikhail Gorbachev's *perestroika*, begun in 1985. Both events represented significant changes in the way the Soviet rural economy was operated. Ibragimova's book provides a cliometric (econometric) analysis of the opinions of elites and of peasants concerning agriculture in both periods. For the NEP period, she has collected databases of opinions expressed by Communist Party elites (including V. I. Lenin) at the Eleventh Party Congress in early 1922 and of letters sent to the *Peasant News* and to the journal *Peasant* between November 1923 and June 1924. Ibragimova compares these two data sets with similar data sets from the *perestroika* period of the second half of the 1980s. Specifically, one data set is provided by a questionnaire completed by rural delegates to the Twenty-Eighth Party Congress (1990) and by delegates to the first meeting of the Peasant Union (1991). The second data set is constructed from letters sent by rural dwellers to the editors of the newspaper *Rural Life* between December 1989 and August 1990.

By analyzing these four data sets, Ibragimova is able to compare elite and rural-resident attitudes during NEP and *perestroika*. Through the use of factor analysis, she shows that peasant concerns were quite different in these two periods. The results are complicated and difficult to summarize briefly.

Ibragimova's book is representative of the growing cliometric scholarship of new Russian historians working largely under the direction of Leonid Borodkin of Moscow State University. The long tradition of cliometric and econometric work in Russia, begun by Ivan Kovalchenko, should be noted. These new works by young Russian historians show the richness of the databases with which they are able to work and their accomplished applications of empirical methods to the study of Russian history.

PAUL GREGORY
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ELIZABETH A. WOOD. *The Baba and the Comrade: Gender and Politics in Revolutionary Russia*. (Indiana-Michigan Series in Russian and East European Studies.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1997. Pp. 318. $35.00.

BARBARA EVANS CLEMENTS. *Bolshevik Women*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Pp. xiv, 338. Cloth $64.95, paper $24.95.

These two fine books add to the small but growing collection of studies of gender (not just women) in twentieth-century Russia and the USSR. Barbara Evans Clements explores the first two generations of women Bolsheviks, who comprised in the 1920s roughly ten percent of the Communist Party. Elizabeth A. Wood explores the politics of gender in the first decade of Soviet power, looking primarily but not exclusively through the lens of the special party organization created to mobilize women, the women's sections or *zhenotdel*. Both authors address some of the key paradoxes associated with the Bolshevik project to emancipate women. The first of these is reflected in the title of Wood's book, the tension between the "baba" (woman, usually married), the woman in nature, and the "comrade," the woman whose primary identity is with class, not gender.

Feminism, or placing gender above class, was anathema in the Bolshevik canon, and those who tried to combine the two, both women activists and activists on behalf of women, struggled to reconcile the unrecon-

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cilable. Related to this was the paradoxical role of the women's sections, a dilemma faced by other Soviet institutions as well, such as trade unions. Was the *zhenotdel* supposed to defend the regime to women (as "transmission belt" of party ideology) or to defend women before the regime? These two institutional paradoxes are complicated by the paradox of Russian gender systems: the attitude of many in the party (and outside) was that the only good comrade was a male one; unless women could become men, they would always be second class, and, of course, it was biologically impossible for them to become men. Thus the final paradox: when the party addressed the "woman question," women were seen most often as instruments, not individuals: their role was to make socialism work by casting off their backward domestic ideologies, by engaging full-time in production, and, as Joseph Stalin said, to provide proper socialist upbringing for the real comrades of the future, young men.

The "Bolshevik women" in Clements's superb study consist of a sample of 545 women Bolsheviks for whom sources allow the codification of basic demographic and biographical material. This mass of data is supplemented brilliantly by judicious use of personal narratives of some of the leading, exemplary women Bolsheviks, women as distinct from one another as the "Bolshevik Feminist" Alexandra Kollontai, subject of several biographies including Clements's own, and Rozaliia Zemliachka, a fierce Communist who seemed to relish the civil war side of the Soviet experience. At all moments, Clements fits the individual stories into the broader patterns and problems established by the data set of collective biographies.

Added to the rigor of this approach is Clements's comparative method and use of social theory. Her aim is to situate the experience of Bolshevik women, and women in the USSR, in a pan-European context, and the arguments among the Bolsheviks about feminism and socialism are always linked to similar debates that were occurring elsewhere at the same time. When Clements describes the gender segregation of the labor force after 1921, with women dominating in office and service jobs, she points out that a similar trend was taking place elsewhere in Europe in the 1920s. Clements intriguingly employs recent social movement theory, derived from studies of late twentieth-century activism, to pose questions about the motivations of the women Bolsheviks, arguing that Bolshevism was the result as much of a sociological and psychological process as it was intellectual and political.

Adopting a chronological approach, Clements traces the collective history of two distinct generations of women Bolsheviks: those who joined the party before 1917, and those who joined in the course of the Russian Revolution and Civil War. In discussing the reasons why women joined the party, she argues that the party's appeal arose through small group interactions, through which these women developed a community and shared sense of purpose. In their years in the underground, Bolshevik women were distinguished by their hardness, their moral integrity, and their belief that they could overcome patriarchy through reason alone. The first generation of party women tended to come from more middling social strata, unlike their more working-class male contemporaries. The civil war generation of women, however, were younger and more working-class than the "old Bolshevik women" of the prerevolutionary cohort. Both generations shared a marginalization in the movement as women accepted auxiliary roles as local, never central, organizers and as nurses and couriers, not soldiers. Their revolutionary experience taught them to eschew "politics" (infighting) in favor of grassroots organizing, and their place outside the inner circle became a permanent one. Important, too, is the change in the political culture of the Bolshevik movement between the underground years and the Civil War. The underground party was relatively egalitarian; the Civil War introduced a new masculinism and authoritarianism that would continue to characterize the party throughout its history.

Clearly written, expertly researched, and very sensitive to sources and their potential problems, this book offers many new insights for specialists and general readers alike. It would make an outstanding choice as the representative work on the Russian revolutionary period for a general European history course or general history of women and gender, as well as a provocative and readable supplement for Russian history surveys.

Wood explores the issue of gender from two perspectives: institutions, primarily the women's section of the Communist Party and the rhetoric employed in the central, *zhenotdel*, and trade union press concerning issues of women workers, family life, and the status of women under socialism. Richly documented, Wood's study begins with a broad history of the "woman question" in Russia and the revolutionary movement and then concentrates on the period of the Russian Civil War and the early years of NEP. Although she traces the institutional history of the women's sections to their demise in 1930, the bulk of her analysis is devoted to the period between 1918 and 1923. Whereas Clements sees a qualitative shift in the receptivity of the party away from women's equality occurring in the Civil War, Wood portrays this period as still one of optimism, citing the extensive array of legislation concerning women and the hopeful first steps of the *zhenotdel*. The period of NEP, sometimes portrayed as a "return to normality" or a breathing space, was anything but that for the women organizers of the party. In Wood's account, both institutionally and in party rhetoric, women were quickly marginalized and victimized by the official emphasis on production over social welfare after 1921. In her assessment, the *zhenotdel* was essentially marginalized by the end of 1923, and merely limped along until its final liquidation in 1930.

This is a rich and densely argued study that embeds the story of the *zhenotdel* in the context of the political struggles and institutional structures of this formative

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period of the Russian Revolution. Wood demonstrates clearly the dilemma of whether women party activists should serve the party or their constituents. As long as the *zhenotdel* remained loyal to the party—and how could it not be?—it had to subordinate the interests of women to the interests of what the party decreed was policy.

Even during the Civil Car, the *zhenotdel* struggled against criticism that it was more feminist than class-oriented, and it fought to retain the financial support that would allow it to continue to organize women workers. NEP brought new challenges but the same scarcity of finances and cadres: women bore the brunt of unemployment created by the regime's new rationalizing measures, and the *zhenotdel* fought to preserve the principles of social welfare that had been articulated in the immediate postrevolutionary years. Throughout this period, the *zhenotdel* faced opposition from the trade unions, who wanted no intermediary to help them organize their own workers. Yet *zhenotdel* activists correctly perceived that organizing women workers occupied a low priority on the trade union agenda. They were also hobbled by continuing debates over the nature of women, the family, and private life, and about the relationship between frail women and socialist morality. Condemned to marginality by the taint of feminism and the low status of women, the *zhenotdel* appears to have lost its appetite for autonomous activism after 1924, and thereafter became the "dutiful daughters" of the Communist Party. A brief overview of *zhenotdel* activities from 1924 until its official dissolution in 1930, however, seems like a postscript in comparison with the richly textured analysis of the earlier period.

Together, these books make important contributions to a new understanding of the deeply embedded gender systems of Russian and Soviet society and politics and provide a rich array of arguments and evidence on which to build further studies.

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MICHAEL J. HUGHES. *Inside the Enigma: British Officials in Russia, 1900–1939*. Rio Grande, Ohio: Hambledon Press. 1997. Pp. xi, 336. $55.00.

In his preface, Michael J. Hughes alerts us that his monograph is not about Anglo-Russian diplomatic interactions from 1900 to 1939. It is rather, he claims, "a chronicle of Russian history," domestic political and economic history; "as seen through the eyes of British representatives based in that country over forty years" (p. ix).

Hughes's source materials include a wealth of unpublished Cabinet and Foreign Office materials in the Public Record Office as well as a number of collections of private papers. He also consulted most of the relevant published literature, although he might have profited by examining Gordon W. Morrell's exploration of the Metro-Vickers crisis (*Britain Confronts the Stalin Revolution: Anglo-Soviet Relations and the Metro-Vickers Crisis* [1995]) and Timothy O'Connor's work on Soviet Foreign Commissar Georgii Chicherin (*Diplomacy and Revolution: G. V. Chicherin and Soviet Foreign Affairs, 1918–1930* [1988]).

Hughes is most original and persuasive when dealing with the years from 1914 to 1929, to which he devotes something like sixty percent of his text. The other twenty-five years get substantially less attention, and the book seems especially thin when it reaches the 1930s, to which the author devotes just forty-five pages.

Even the chapters on the 1920s, however, omit a lot. Delegates to seven Communist Party congresses freely debated issues and personalities over the course of that decade, for example, and voted yea or nay without any apparent fear of lethal reprisals. The British Embassy surely paid some attention to such rich sources of political intelligence, but Hughes tells us nothing about how officials evaluated those congresses. He merely informs us that the embassy staff "found it difficult to follow the titanic struggle for power" during the 1920s (p. 203).

For any such research as Hughes has undertaken to be truly useful to the profession, it would have to meet one of two criteria. Either the official reports out of Russia would have to have been unusually perceptive and insightful, reflecting observations not readily available elsewhere; or, whatever the quality of the reports, the Foreign Office would have had to have credited them, and the government would have had to been listening to and acting on the Foreign Office's advice.

Hughes himself helps persuade his reader that none of these assumptions are true. Most officials dispatched to Russia did not want to go there, never learned the language, and got themselves a better posting as soon as they could. Before the revolution, they socialized mostly with well-to-do young Russians who "knew little of what was going on in the political world" and whose ideas "reflected the perspectives and prejudices of an urban elite largely divorced from the rest of Russian society" (pp. 30–31). After 1917, British officials had only minimal contact with local people, providing them almost "no real opportunity to sense the mood of the country or the state of popular morale" (p. 195). And once Joseph Stalin was undisputed master of the country, of course, almost no Russian outside the Foreign Commissariat would have anything whatsoever to do with any foreign imperialists.

So British officials, largely confined to their damp and dreary embassy building, had very little to report and, as Hughes tells us, the Foreign Office often relied on other information sources anyway. In any event, finally, the government often ignored Foreign Office recommendations altogether when making policy choices on how to respond to the challenge from Moscow.

All of which prompts one to ask why this book

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needed to be written. Hughes's research is impeccable, and his narrative includes some fascinating nuggets of information here and there, but, basically, he is telling us of badly informed people who sent minimal information on to higher-ups who paid little attention to it anyway, and who themselves were ignored by the men who made the most crucial decisions on how to deal with the Russians.

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ROBERT SERVICE. *A History of Twentieth-Century Russia*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1997. Pp. xxxiii, 653. $29.95.

Robert Service's synthesis of Western and Russian historical writings provides a balanced assessment of the political leadership's interaction with Russian society from the last tsar to Boris Yeltsin. The book focuses on the commitment of V. I. Lenin and his successors to "the Soviet compound," defined as "the one-party state, the one-ideology state . . . legalized arbitrary rule and . . . terror as acceptable methods of governance . . . administrative ultra-centralism, [and] . . . philosophical amoralism" (p. 154). This commitment precluded the emergence of a different variant of Soviet socialism. Thus the system generated its own destruction when an unwitting Mikhail Gorbachev sought to recast its foundation.

The book is at its best in its coverage of the postwar era. Treatment of those forty years is comprehensive and extensive, taking up almost half of the tome. By contrast, the chapters on the prerevolutionary period and 1917 are more schematic. Although World War I is seen as a defining point, without which the revolution would have been impossible, there is little sense of the geopolitics or of the recent literature on the subject (Dietrich Geyer's work on domestic and foreign policy comes to mind). Service's treatment of the empire is inconsistent: the non-Russians are given a prominent position in the Soviet Union's "implosion" but hardly feature in the analysis of the Romanov dynasty's collapse and of the pre-Stalin years. The chapters on the revolutions of 1917 and the decade after reflect some of the more spectacular revelations from the Soviet archives, specifically about Lenin's role in the Romanovs' execution, the introduction of mass terror for the sake of intimidation, the promotion of revolution in Central Europe, and the execution of Orthodox bishops and priests.

Archival disclosures and recent historical analysis are used most effectively to show how the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the compromise it embodied with the peasantry—the revival of the market economy and religionstemmed from the leadership's acknowledged sense of weakness. The fear of a peasant rebellion à la stenka Razin inspired Lenin to battle his party. From 1920 to its demise in 1928–1929 the odds were stacked against NEP, because of the general opposition to it at all levels in the party, from the Politburo down, and the consensus that it would be temporary. Lenin emerges as a wily politician who sends secondary leaders to do battle on NEP's behalf. One of its most formidable opponents was Leon Trotsky. Lenin secretly sent Joseph Stalin and others to assail Trotsky at the Eleventh Party Congress in 1922 and helped Stalin become General Secretary. Unfortunately, the latter account, which differs from Moshe Lewin's and Isaac Deutscher's versions, is based solely on Anastas Mikoyan's memoirs. Although the chapters on the 1920s are engaging, they could have been enriched by the perspectives of social and cultural histories. It is perplexing to find no allusion to the many recent "classics," such as those by Ronald Suny, Diane Koenker, Lewis Siegelbaum, Hiroaki Kuromiya, and Mark Von Hagen, to name a few.

Service is most compelling in raising fields of inquiry as historians reassess the twentieth century in Russia. Many in and outside the Communist Party found the pronouncements and campaigns of the Soviet state appealing. Here and elsewhere, Service points the way for a broader context in which to place Russia as he depicts, for example, the thrill of common workers as they enrolled in day, evening, and trade schools—a sentiment they shared with other workers in industrializing societies. There are intimations of the socialist movement's rich legacy to Russia's political culture in popular support for the Communist educational and social welfare programs. Throughout the Soviet era, popular support was manipulated cynically by the leadership, which developed a system of rewards and mobility to generate working-class and peasant loyalty as a means to ward off potential or real civil unrest. Popular expectations and interpretations of the "bright socialist future" are another field of research as historians seek to establish continuities between tsarist and Soviet culture and society. From Service's portrayal of Gorbachev as a "Child of the Twentieth Congress," it is clear that more research must be done on generational dynamics—education, cultural milieu, expectations, group identity—in order to understand how the system produced such a generation. Similarly, much work remains to be done on the problem of deconcentration of power and local autonomy within the highly centralized state. This phenomenon, which may be unique to Russia, suggests the need for sub-regional studies. The weakness of nationhood, evident from the Civil War era and through the 1990s, as Service points out, was a legacy of the tsarist past; it took different forms at various points but has continued to play an important role in the country's political life to the present.

Assessing Gorbachev's base of support, Service discusses the intelligentsia's access to Western literature and radio. This raises the subject of the Western media's impact on the expectations of Soviet citizens and the pressure exerted on Soviet politics. How did the Soviet state fall behind the West in this important area when, to recall Peter Kenez's and Richard Stites's works, the Communist leadership showed a keen un-

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derstanding of the media in the infancy of Soviet power? By the 1970s and 1980s, sectors of the educated public at least in Moscow and Leningrad became enamored of the values and lifestyle that they imagined and culled from Western literature and cinema. Like Westerners, Soviets were participants in a popular culture that sought entertainment (including viewing politics as a spectator sport), pleasure, and creature comforts. Arguably, to some extent, the Gorbachev years began a process by which the Russians reintegrated themselves from the bottom up and top down into the mainstream of Western culture and reclaimed and reinterpreted their own past. The process of reexamining the entire period in light of the opening of the archives has only just begun and will take years before discrete problems are fully researched and provide the foundation for new general histories. In the meantime, Service's comprehensive and well-written book serves as a solid reference tool for the general public and historians alike.

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MIDDLE EAST AND NORTHERN AFRICA

KHALED FAHMY. *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army and the Making of Modern Egypt*. (Cambridge Middle East Studies, number 8.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Pp. xviii, 334. $59.95.

Twenty years ago, scholars based in Cairo, Aix-en-Provence, and Los Angeles launched a coordinated assault on the conventional wisdom regarding early nineteenth-century Egypt. The campaign succeeded in revising virtually every aspect of the history of the Muhammad ʿAli period: Egypt's economy proved to be dynamic rather than stagnant; private agricultural holdings took shape long before the famous 1858 land law; government efforts to promote mechanized industry and commercial monopolies fared a good deal better than contemporaneous European observers hoped; senior religious notables turned out to be just as likely to mobilize popular opposition as they were to rally support for the authorities; artisans rather than peasants stood at the heart of the rebellions that swept the provinces; and Muhammad ʿAli Pasha himself comes out a level-headed reformer, not a rapacious tyrant. Postrevisionist scholarship can go in one of three directions: it might uncover additional topics and subject them to similar revision; it might propose some way to reconcile or synthesize conventional and revisionist accounts; or it might mount a last-ditch defense of the earlier interpretation using new evidence, a project John Lewis Gaddis aptly calls "orthodoxy plus archives."

Sadly, the bulk of Khaled Fahmy's long-awaited study looks a lot like orthodoxy plus archives. Muhammad ʿAli is reinstated as the prime mover of Egypt's domestic and foreign affairs (pp. 9, 73, 131, 172–73, 242); innovative institutions, particularly factories and government ministries, operated much less efficiently than their designers intended (pp. 186–91); and peasants were oppressed in a variety of horrible ways, just as European consuls reported at the time (p. 254). In the area of criminal retribution, "Mehmed Ali and his authorities were not real innovators. The *shari'a*, as is well known, uses the body of the culprit in a similar way to bring about some kind of connection between the crime committed and its appropriate punishment. Theft, for example, is punished by amputating the hand" (p. 128). One could hardly come up with a better example of problematic conventional wisdom, whether of early nineteenth-century Egypt or of Muslims in general.

More disturbingly, Fahmy's restatement of the old view of the Muhammad ʿAli period is camouflaged in postmodernist trappings, making it appear to be on the cutting edge. The discussion of pervasive organizational inefficiency culminates as follows: "What this chapter attempted to do is to unveil this charade of power to see it for what it really was: offering an impressive façade, it is true, but a facade nevertheless. And one that is full of cracks at that. To rely solely on [official] sources, therefore, is to overstate the consistency of these new forms of power" (p. 194). Fahmy then offers an "example [that] might help illustrate the problems of relying only on the blueprints and the letters of the Pasha in writing the history of Egypt in his reign." The example is a military report that includes in its title "a mistake, an omission, a word that is crossed out, that betrays the very logic of the text and through which a deeper reality comes across challenging the very image that the bureaucracy had striven to maintain of itself" (pp. 195–96). "What is interesting in this case," he goes on, "is that it shows that in spite of the explicit regulations of the Pasha that the registers of the bureaucracy be kept clean, with no scribbling or scrawling, the chief scribe of the army saw clearly that he was facing a situation that dictated his violation of this order" (pp. 196–97). "The tension inherent in the text is not only based," Fahmy concludes, "on the discrepancy that separates it from the reality it tries to regulate; that text is itself a reflection of this reality, in spite of its presence to the contrary, in spite of its presumed primordial, detached nature. Even before seeing how the soldiers might have reacted to the power of the modern state, the texts which annunciate that power, the laws, blueprints and government regulations, are themselves *already* compromised and 'contaminated' by the reality they set out to organize, regulate and 'inscribe'" (p. 198).

Not everything in the book is written this way. But if such sections were excised, not much would be left: summaries of a handful of important civil and military codes (pp. 100–101, 105–107, 134–55), overviews of the army's efforts to combat disease (pp. 214–26) and of the ways that conscripts tried to escape military service (pp. 97–103, 256–63), and cogent descriptions of key battles and of the rivalry between Muhammad ʿAli and Muhammad Khusraw Pasha (pp. 61–67,

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160–67, 285–91). One wishes these insightful vignettes had been put to more productive use, particularly since the author's heart is clearly in the right place, buried deep in the Egyptian archives trying to infer how state policy shaped the lives of ordinary people.

FRED H. LAWSON
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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

NANCY ROSE HUNT, TESSIE P. LIU, and JEAN QUATAERT, editors. *Gendered Colonialisms in African History*. Malden, Mass : Blackwell. 1997. Pp. x, 138.

Clitoridectomy in Kenya, a native commissioner in Southwest Africa, white women in the police in South Africa, love magic in Madagascar, and advertisers' ideal female consumer in southern Africa come together in this volume of essays by four historians and one anthropologist. Originally published as a special issue of the journal *Gender and History*, the book version is launched by Blackwell as the first in a series aimed at making new work on gender history available to a non-specialist audience.

Nancy Rose Hunt's introduction surveys trends in historical work on women and gender in Africa since the 1970s. A first wave focused on African women's economic activities and social agency, while a second wave explored the construction of gender relations and meanings, including notions of masculinity, sexuality, and the body. Hunt suggests that these essays are part of a third wave that is incorporating the lexicon of cultural history in African historical studies of gender, posing questions about the production of Africanist knowledge and epistemologies that invite methodological innovation with regard to sources that historians and anthropologists have conventionally used.

Adolescent girls circumcizing themselves are on center stage in Lynn Thomas's discussion of a particular historical moment in 1956 in Meru, Kenya, when the local council of male elders prohibited clitoridectomy. The suggestion to ban clitoridectomy had been made by a district commissioner as a way for the Meru, unlike the Kikuyu, to cooperate with the colonial government. Adolescent girls defied the ban by attempting to excise each other. Thomas explains young women's defense of clitoridectomy as an attempt to maintain practices that regulated both relations among different generations of women and between women and men. The setting was one of tense political relations when the council of elders sought to improve its political interests with the interventionist colonial administration but did not, in the end, command sufficient local authority to alter gendered social relations. In effect, Thomas suggests that relations of gender and generation helped to shape the nature of the late colonial state in Kenya.

A native commissioner who kicked an Ovambo woman worker is the lead figure in Patricia Hayes's essay about the work of "Cocky" Hahn in the northern region of Southwest Africa from the time of the South African administration in 1915 until after World War II. Hahn, who wrote many ethnographic texts and administrative reports on indirect rule in Ovamboland, was well known for his readiness to resort to force. Hayes's concern is with the simultaneity of the exercise of power through violence and through expert knowledge, which she explores in one episode of Hahn's career when the ambivalence of his project was revealed and then smoothed over. A junior officer's legal allegations contained evidence of Hahn's violence against Ovambo people of both sexes. Hayes focuses on an incident mentioned in passing in the official enquiry that described him kicking an Ovambo woman he found polishing the veranda floor of the official residence, coming up on her from behind and kicking her "in her private parts" (p. 57). Hayes interrogates the sociocultural system that produced an individual like Hahn, his administration, and the "expert" knowledge he left behind. Such an investigation provides important information about colonial constructions of gender and race, and, above all, Hayes argues, it invites demonstration of the link between representation and physical violence, detaching such observations from purely representational paradigms so as to include their corporeal dimension.

Middle-class white women in South Africa wanting to join police institutions conducted an active campaign for enlistment in the early twentieth century, at a time, as Keith Shear demonstrates, when it was possible to envision alternative versions of the colonial state and the structure of police institutions. The South African government had not yet ossified into the rigid structures that later became associated with the apartheid state. The women's police movement highlighted preventive measures, especially against prostitution, as a way of uplifting lower-class white women. For a short period beginning in 1915, white women in Cape Town undertook volunteer police work, whereas a similar effort failed in Johannesburg. Shear explains how women's campaign for preventive police practices was enmeshed in segregationist discourse about controlling Africans that ultimately influenced the official rejection of their demand for police work. This debate was not about the gender of the police but the direction of state policy. During subsequent years, that segregationist policy was so much taken for granted that when white women in 1972 were admitted into the police force, it had nothing to do with alternative visions of policing but was due to shortages of white male officers.

Imerina women abandoning their homes at night, stripping themselves naked, and riding men like horses exemplify the reversal in gender practice of love magic that has taken place over the past century in Madagascar, a transformation anthropologist David Graeber attempts to explain. He suggests that people work out their ideas about the nature of power in stories about love magic and that such stories constitute arguments over the rights and wrongs of power.

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At issue is political morality, the construction of "negative authority" (p. 95) as traditional Malagasy, and the avoidance of relations of command that followed French colonization. If Imerina men once were the chief practitioners of love medicine, today women hold this role. There is no real paradox. Men in positions of authority avoid giving orders in public. Because of their central position within households, women use imperative language much more frequently than men; they acquire a reputation as manipulators that reinforces the impression that they rule men and even enslave them by magical powers. The political reality that is constituted by domestic and national politics is not distinguishable from its representations, Graeber concludes, for politics comprises arguments over representations as well as their interpretations, and Imerina women today play this game as much as men do.

Did African husbands in the late 1950s "fork up and smile," allotting consumption to their wives as an African advertising agent suggests in Timothy Burke's essay on marketing and consumption in post-World War II southern Africa? Burke's concerns are with the gendering of consumption by transnational firms such as Lever Brothers and Colgate-Palmolive as well as with the contradictions between advertisers' claims and the social realities of the African women whom advertisers imagined as typical consumers. An effective market for African female consumption barely existed away from the urban areas, and urban African women's new access to income largely from informal sector work often challenged deep-seated norms about men's household control. Burke suggests that transnational marketing practices both created and erased social differences, establishing or dissolving local distinctions.

As a whole, this collection is skewed by its southern African focus and by four of its five essays dealing with former settler colonies. The book would have benefitted from the inclusion of essays on West African societies with less intrusive colonial regimes. Broadly speaking, these individually diverse essays share concerns with the gendered dimension of knowledge production in colonial Africa; they examine representations of various kinds, attempting to link discursive figurations to the realities that produced them and with which they interacted. But they do not do so with equal success. It is unclear to what extent adolescent Meru girls indeed circumcized themselves. Did Cocky Hahn see a "Hottentot Venus" in the figure of the Ovambo woman whom he kicked? Detailed advertisement language that varies between commodities and identifiable consumers is largely absent from Burke's generalizing essay, which slides almost too easily between South Africa and Zimbabwe. But minor misgivings over details and specifications are less at issue here than the critical edge and constructive potential of these new works, which are likely to influence future research aimed at disentangling the complicated local and metropolitan interactions that gendered so many facets of colonial experiences in Africa and elsewhere.

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SUSAN GEIGER. *TANU Women: Gender and Culture in the Making of Tanganyikan Nationalism, 1955–1965.* (Social History of Africa.) Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann; or E.A.E.P., Nairobi, Kenya; Mkuki Na Nyota, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. 1998. Pp. xix, 217. Cloth $60.00, paper $23.95.

On the way to writing a biography of Bibi Titi Mohamed, a well-known Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) woman political activist, Susan Geiger wrote a larger book that chronicles the role of women in the development of Tanzanian nationalism during 1955–1965, arguably the most important decade of its development. In fact, the life of Mohamed and the lives of the other women TANU activists that Geiger chronicles are the canvass on which she paints women as a major force in "constructing, embodying, and performing Tanzanian nationalism" (p. 14).

In some respects, the book is autobiographical as well as biographical. In a short, informative, and very postmodern preface, Geiger integrates her experience of doing research with a report on the research itself. Perhaps it is a clear understanding of her "defining" power as researcher that is, at least partly, responsible for the extent to which Geiger allows each of her biographical subjects to speak in her own words.

Tanzanian women's delineation of their roles in nationalist struggle and of their philosophies of nationalism are central themes of the book. There are also three main theoretical issues that Geiger explores. The first is the central roles of women in the anticolonial struggle in Tanzania and particularly their roles as architects of and activists in its nationalist movement. The second provides a corrective to the story of Tanzanian nationalism that challenges the general rendering of African nationalism as a project primarily of elite men who imported Western ideologies. In this second emphasis, Geiger is critical of several scholars of Africa (e.g. Basil Davidson, John Iliffe, Crawford Young) for marginalizing women in nationalist histories and in analyses of the development of nationalism. A third main theoretical thread of the book is its critique of the work of several scholars of nationalism (e.g. Benedict Anderson, Paul Brass, E. J. Hobsbawm). Geiger castigates them for promulgating "universal truths" about nationalism that are "too narrow, masculine, Eurocentric and elite-centered" to encompass the evolution of Tanzanian nationalism (p. 13). Her point here is reminiscent of the effect that evidence from women's lives in places outside Europe and North America had on theories of feminism as promulgated in the West. That is, feminist theory has been profoundly altered by such data to the point where many feminist theorists now speak of feminisms rather than one, universalizing feminism. Geiger's book sug-

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gests to us that "universal truths" about nationalism are heading toward the same fate.

Though Mohamed and Julius Nyerere (the first president of an independent Tanzania) were the best known of all TANU leaders throughout the country, Geiger comments "Yet she [Mohamed] receives only passing mention in most historical accounts . . . even less are her women supporters mentioned" (p. 9). In Geiger's view, women were excised from the histories of Tanzanian (read African as well) nationalism for many reasons. Among them she lists the gender and racial biases of Western narrators; reliance on a written record that often fails to record the thoughts, strategy, and leadership of non or minimally Western-educated women; and the lack of distribution, outside a particular locale, of oral or African-language accounts of women's activity. For instance, Geiger informs us that the few accounts of Tanzanian nationalism written by Tanzanians, especially those in Swahili, are less likely to omit women.

The centerpiece biography of the book is that of Mohamed. In metaphorically describing Mohamed as an "anti-colonial foot soldier," Geiger telescopes certain characteristics of many women active in nationalist struggles in Africa. Most had minimal Western education or none at all, as many of them were Muslim or practitioners of various ethnic-based religions as were Christian, they responded collectively with gender as their organizing bond (tending to cross ethnic, religious, and class lines more often and more easily than men), and they often provided vast material and human resources to nationalist movements.

However much women were central to the construction of Tanzanian (again, read African) nationalism, the attainment of one of its chief goals, independence, frequently occasioned the marginalization of women from the new centers of power. In a sometimes collective amnesia, men failed to regard women as citizen equals in the new order. Although Nyerere strongly supported women's equality, for instance, few women were highly placed in his government. This pattern, in fact, replicated itself over much of the continent. In some places, women were asked to "return" to their roles as mothers and helpmates to men as part of a newly invented "tradition."

Women's central roles in the anticolonial and nationalist struggles are powerful evidence with which to confront recalcitrant governments not in the forefront of implementing women's equality. Geiger ultimately sees Mohamed's life as emblematic of "the continuing gender constraints facing Tanzanian women" (p. 19). With this book, Geiger provides that powerful evidence to challenge such restraints.

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PAMELA SCULLY. *Liberating the Family? Gender and British Slave Emancipation in the Rural Western Cape, South Africa, 1823–1853*. (Social History of Africa.) Portsmouth: Heinemann. David Philip, Cape Town, South Africa. 1997. Pp. xiii, 210. Cloth $60.00, paper $23.95.

Pamela Scully's study of changing gender relations in the rural Western Cape of South Africa during the period of the British slave emancipation (1823–1853) is a sophisticated and creative study that brings gender into the analysis of slave emancipation in Africa by examining how male and female slaves, British missionaries, former slaveholders, and colonial officers used various notions about proper male and female roles to cope with, direct, and/or make sense of the changes brought about by slave emancipation.

Scully begins her analysis by documenting both the ideology and reality of family life within the slave regime at the Cape. She notes, for example, that the specific ideas about the "proper" sexual division of labor governed slaveholder and enslaved alike. Men, whether enslaved or free, were suppose to and did work outside the home; women, slave and free, worked primarily within the home (although regional differences did exist). Scully also convincingly argues that within this shared ideology and reality of gendered labor roles, slaveholders maintained considerable control over the ability of the enslaved to realize fully this received ideology by refusing to recognize slave marriages. This refusal weakened the ability of enslaved men—despite their best efforts—to act as fathers. It also reinforced the predominant matrifocal character of the enslaved family.

Scully then documents British antislavery efforts to abolish slavery at the Cape. These efforts focused on what the abolitionists saw as the impact of slavery on the family: the breakdown of "proper" parental roles, the sexualization of enslaved women, and the abuse of children. Scully identifies British colonial officers at the Cape as yet another factor in the history of slavery and emancipation at the Cape. According to Scully, these officers attempted to mediate between the slaveholders and the British antislavery forces by enforcing the antislavery legislation while also working with the former slave owners to retain access to labor by passing legislation that allowed the latter to apprentice the children of their former slaves. Using a most effective "counter-reading" of colonial and missionary documents, Scully skillfully reveals enslaved voices as well. She documents, for example, how African men and women, once free, both imbibed the standard ideology about gender and family and attempted to live according to this standard in spite of the obstacles presented by their economic circumstances. Yet she also indicates that these formerly enslaved men and women altered aspects of these standards for their own purposes. Freed women, for example, abandoned domestic work on settler-owned farms, thus freeing themselves from sexual abuse, but combined the notion that they should still be engaged primarily in domestic work with the need to participate in waged labor by working within their own households selling

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garden produce, doing other people's laundry out of their own homes, and marketing clothes. Freed men as well sought to realize fully their roles as fathers and husbands by seeking recognition of their marriages and their paternal rights over their children. Yet the realities that governed the lives of formerly enslaved women and men continued to compromise their ability to fulfill their accepted maternal and patriarchal roles. Men, for example, who were unable to marry, refused to live at the mission stations, failed to maintain steady employment, or were forced to seek work far from their families were still viewed by themselves and by others in the society as incomplete men. Women who were unable to support their children, engaged in infanticide, or were raped were continually vilified as unfit mothers and/or sexually promiscuous. This, in turn, prevented enslaved women from using Cape laws to protect themselves from sexual violence. Scully argues then that it was the ideologies of gender, family, and sex that governed human relations at the Cape during the era of British slave emancipation and that it was through this ideology that missionaries, former slave owners and the colonial state were able to maintain their ideological, economic and political position of power vis-à-vis the population of freed men and women despite the ending of slavery.

This is a most important study. Not only does Scully deftly blend the perspectives of enslaved men and women, slave owners, missionaries, and colonial officials into a coherent and convincing narrative, but her analysis reveals as no other study has the dynamics of gender as it operated in Africa during the period of emancipation. She also situates her study within the context of other slave systems, most particularly the Caribbean system. This makes this study a "must-read" for all scholars interested in understanding the gendered dynamics of slavery and emancipation more generally.

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RANDOLPH VIGNE. *Liberals against Apartheid: A History of the Liberal Party of South Africa, 1953–68.* New York: St. Martin's. 1997. Pp. xi, 268. $65.00.

In South Africa in 1999, five years after the first democratic election, it is difficult to find a white person who will admit to having voted for the National Party that began constructing the notorious apartheid state in 1948. Yet as Randolph Vigne's book amply demonstrates, the number of whites who actively opposed the state numbered in the hundreds. In chronicling the brief history of South Africa's Liberal Party, from its founding in 1953 to its voluntary dissolution in 1968, Vigne seeks to rescue from oblivion the contribution of these "good whites."

Vigne joins Joshua Lazerson, whose book, *Against the Tide: Whites in the Struggle against Apartheid* (1994), had a similar subject and time frame but a different focus. Lazerson's concern was largely white Communists, who after the banning of the Communist Party of South Africa in 1950 regrouped as the Congress of Democrats (COD). Lazerson was rather dismissive of the liberals; Vigne is equally dismissive of the COD.

Vigne begins by tracing the modern Liberal Party back to its mid-nineteenth-century roots in the old British Cape Colony. There, all "civilized men"—provided they met certain property or salary qualifications—were guaranteed "equal rights." This introductory chapter is the least effective in the book. Vigne compresses one hundred years into a mere nine pages and jumps around so much chronologically (a problem throughout the book) that readers would be better advised to refer to the works of Phyllis Lewsen and Stanley Trapido on the early history of liberalism.

Although confusing, the first chapter does identify a key theme: the conflict in the party between "old" and "new" liberals. Old liberals favored the Cape Colony concept of limiting the franchise by setting educational requirements for all voters. New liberals favored universal suffrage. The dispute dogged the party throughout its existence, although Margaret Ballinger—longtime representative of Africans in the all-white Parliament and stalwart old liberal—moved closer to the new liberals when she opposed the banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in the early 1960s.

The Liberal Party was founded in 1953, after it had become clear that the official opposition, the United Party (UP), was only nominally liberal (and old liberal at that) and increasingly ineffective. As a party, the liberals were not much more effective, though Leslie Rubin did make it into the Senate. Vigne acknowledges that the Liberal Party missed out on the pivotal historical moment in its early history: the 1955 Kliptown conference. There, the Congress of the People (which included the ANC and the COD) approved the Freedom Charter, "which set forth the desires and aspirations of the people.'" It was, Vigne notes, "'the people's finest hour.' And the Liberal Party was not there" (p. 50).

In 1957, the new liberal Patrick Duncan founded *Contact*, a newspaper of political commentary. Its contributors included the leading liberal, Peter Brown, and the novelist Alan Paton. The Liberal Party also began actively recruiting African members; by the late 1950s, there were about 8,000. By the early 1960s, after the banning of the ANC, the PAC, and the COD, the Liberal Party stood virtually alone in its opposition to apartheid.

Official persecution of the party began with the bannings of Brown and Duncan, followed by hundreds of party stalwarts. By 1963, the Liberal Party was moribund. Many liberals chose to leave South Africa. Some, the young Randolph Vigne among them, turned to armed resistance, although without the sanction of the Liberal Party. In 1968, faced with government legislation banning multiracial parties, the party disbanded.

It is difficult to read Vigne's book without thinking

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of the Black Consciousness leader Steve Biko's scathing dismissal—a dismissal acknowledged by Vigne—of "that bunch of do-gooders . . . who say that they have black souls wrapped up in white skin" (Steve Biko, *I Write What I Like* [1978], p. 34). Writing about himself in the third person, Vigne seems often to don the label "good white." To his credit, he also acknowledges the conflicts within the party and faults its members for not setting up in exile, as did the ANC and the PAC. In the end, the Liberal Party was a party dominated by white intellectuals, and it was a failure. As erstwhile ANC member and Liberal Party founder Selby Msimang observed: "the African Liberal wanted something dynamic, something which would perhaps create a stir . . . something emotional" (p. 228), things that the Liberal Party proved unable to supply.

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Film Reviews

CENTRAL STATION [*Central do Brasil*]. Produced by Martine de Clermont-Tonnerre and Arthur Cohn; directed by Walter Salles, Jr.; screenplay by Marcos Bernstein, João Emanuel Carneiro, and Walter Salles, Jr. 1998; color; 115 minutes. Brazil. In Portuguese with English subtitles. Distributor: New Yorker Films.

The Brazilian film *Central Station* is not based on historical events. Unlike such recent highly acclaimed films as *Elizabeth*, *Life Is Beautiful*, or *Shakespeare in Love*, it does not seek to recreate the dynamics of a bygone era, nor does it attempt to comment on or to imagine what such dynamics might have been like at some given moment in the past. *Central Station* is, nonetheless, an important film for students of history for three reasons. First, it marks an important moment in Brazilian film production when Brazilians are rediscovering their country's geographic diversity (although economic uncertainty accentuated by the devaluation of the *real* in early 1999 may limit this development). *Central Station* looks inward, discovering the potentials of the interior of the country. It is, to paraphrase Luigi Pirandello, a film in search of a country. Second, *Central Station* engages in a dialogue with Brazilian filmography, particularly the films of *cinema novo*, the aesthetically and politically compromised movement that emerged in the late 1950s determined to focus on Brazilian social reality and its underdevelopment. Finally, while the film does not travel through time, it does travel across space and in so doing comments on our notions of time and progress. At the center of *Central Station* is the historian's quintessential preoccupation: the search for information and the uncovering of truth, however fragmented it may be.

The film's plot centers on two main characters: Dora (Fernanda Montenegro, the *grande dame* of Brazilian theater), an elderly retired schoolteacher who purportedly transcribes and mails letters across the country for many of the illiterate citizens of Rio de Janeiro, and Josué (a young boy whom the director met begging in the airport), the son of one of Dora's clients, who finds himself abandoned when a city bus strikes down his mother near the train station where Dora works. These two characters are products of Brazilian urban malaise, which has cultivated individuals who are lost, exiled, alienated, and often unscrupulous. Josué has lost his innocence, and Dora is pathetically corrupt.

Central Station takes its name from the busy subway and train stop in the heart of Rio's working-class district. One end of the station is the gateway to the Praça da Republica (the Plaza of the Republic), one of the outer landmarks of the bustling downtown area. Another serves as a gateway to the bus terminal, which takes passengers to neighborhoods farther afield. The title thus recalls at once a central and specifically urban locale and becomes a metaphor for a crossroads in Brazilian history. The film underscores the coming together of two distant generations, one represented by Dora, a grandmother-like figure, and the other by Josué, a child of about ten. Together, they flee the urban confusion and find friendship and redemption as they search for Josué's father. In their travels, they discover themselves and a vast country full of beauty and mystery.

Walter Salles's inspiration for the film apparently came from an actual relationship that developed between a female prisoner and the sculptor Franz Krajcberg after she wrote a letter to him. This uncommon relationship became the subject of the documentary *Socorro nobre* (Noble Help) of 1995. The power of that letter intrigued Salles, who wondered what would have happened if the letter never arrived. This premise was developed into a fictionalized script for *Central Station*.

Central Station represents an important development in the filmmaker's career as well as in Brazilian filmography. Salles's first major film, *Terra extrangeira* (1996), dramatized the era in Brazilian history under the corrupt President Fernando Collar de Mello, when disillusioned Brazilians were leaving for Europe and the United States in record numbers (see *AHR* Film Reviews, April 1998). Salles, the son of a Brazilian diplomat, spent many years living outside Brazil and was eager to depict that perspective. In *Central Station*, which takes place in the present, the young director provides a more optimistic view. Brazilians are in the process of self-discovery, and it is no coincidence that this occurred precisely at a time when Brazilians were enjoying unprecedented economic and political stability. The film argues that the answers to Brazil's problems lie within, and this is symbolized by the interior dry lands, the *sertão*.

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The interior of Brazil, particularly that of the northeastern state of Bahia, has long held a mythical place in Brazilian history. In his classic *Rebellion in the Backlands* (1902), Euclides da Cunha provided a vivid and often sympathetic portrayal of life in the northeastern interior while documenting the famed millennial rebellion at Canudos. Many modernist writers of the 1920s and 1930s described the interior as the cradle of Brazilian civilization. Filmmakers associated with *cinema novo* focused on the interior and the northeast to raise consciousness about Brazil's underdevelopment and poverty. For example, Glauber Rocha, one of the major ideologues of the movement and author of the manifesto "An Aesthetic of Hunger" (1965), focused on the northeast in his film *Barravento* (The Turning Wind, 1962). Other films, such as Nelson Perreira dos Santos's *Vidas secas* (Barren Lives, 1963), accentuated the devastating poverty and isolation of life in the backlands. The agenda of *cinema novo* in the 1960s established a discourse that continued to influence Brazilian cinema in the 1970s and 1980s. One poignant example was Hector Babenco's internationally acclaimed *Pixote* (1980), which employed street children rather than professional actors to document and dramatize their brutal lives in urban Brazil.

Central Station borrows much from *cinema novo*, but Salles is less dogmatic and less brutal in his depiction of poverty. Brazil is plagued by poverty and illiteracy, to be sure. They are both part of the urban landscape and integral to the rural environment. They affect the old and have an impact on children. But Brazil is also a country of celebration and beauty. Salles employs techniques of the road movie to explore Brazil and to allow his alienated protagonists to escape into the sunset. Dora and Josué travel by bus, and their poetic sunset is the heart of the *sertão*. The various bus stops become moments for reflection as they move further and further away from the city. Although the *sertão* is every bit as poor as the city, Salles celebrates the humanity of the old-fashioned life of the interior (as seen in the way that Josué's brothers eventually accept him). The celebration of the nobility and innocence of "the unexplored" or uncorrupted territory goes back at least to Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the mid-eighteenth century, and, like Rousseau, Salles's vision is both romantic and utopian.

The film's voyage through Brazil's underdeveloped geographical space is a lesson in history. The Cuban writer Alejo Carpentier remarked on several occasions that, as a culture born from symbiosis, from cultural, political, and social intermingling, Latin America represented the spirit of the baroque. It is, as he also said, a culture that possesses a marvelous reality (*lo real marvilloso*), where the extraordinary is often routine. *Central Station* gives us a glimpse of Brazil's baroque. The tough urban lifestyle exists within the same national boundaries as the archaic, almost medieval existence of the northeast. This is a large country with many resources, but it is also a country where high levels of illiteracy still have many people paying others to write letters for them. Brazil is a place where religion—long dismissed in many urban centers—continues to play a significant role in the lives of people. The Protestantism of the truck driver, who ironically reawakens Dora's dormant sexuality, and the religious celebration in the small town, where hundreds of believers pray and give thanks to saints, are two examples. In Salles's Brazil, remnants of feudalism coexist with some of the most advanced trends of capitalism. Poverty and beauty are interconnected in ways unimaginable to many in the West.

At times, Salles's discourse borders on exoticism, a criticism not unfamiliar to those who promote Latin America's unique baroque nature. In some ways, the *sertão* serves the same function as Egypt in *The English Patient* (1996), although without the colonial discourse, or Italy in *A Room with a View* (1986), although Salles's characters are more subtle. The "other space" is constructed in an *almost* orientalist fashion that does not reflect the dynamic quality of the day-to-day life of "ordinary people" or the role of their rituals. Here, the filmmaker faces the same challenge as the historian: how to reconstruct the truth of "ordinary people."

While the film has some documentary qualities, Salles chooses to present one specific interpretation of Brazilian reality. Through the eyes of two urban travelers, we gain a perspective on the tensions in Brazilian life. Salles accentuates these tensions without being didactic. The film raises many questions and treats important conflicts and issues, including age and gender, poverty, and the urban-rural dichotomy. In addition, this important work situates itself within the debates on progress and national identity.

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Welcome to Sarajevo. Produced by Graham Broadbent, Damian Jones, and Paul Sarony; directed by Michael Winterbottom; screenplay by Frank Cottrell Boyce. 1997; color, 102 minutes. UK/USA. In English and Serbo-Croatian. Distributor: Miramax.

The Perfect Circle [*Savršeni krug*]. Produced by Sylvan Burztejn, Dana Rotberg, Peter Van Vogelpoel; directed by Ademir Kenovic; screenplay by Ademir Kenovic, Abdulah Sidran, and Pjar Zalica. 1996; color; 110 minutes. Bosnia/France. In Serbo-Croatian and French. Distributor: Les Films du Losange, Paris/Parnasse International.

The Wounds [*Rane*]. Produced by Dragan Bjelogrlić; written and directed by Srdjan Dragojević. 1998; color; 103 minutes. Yugoslavia (Serbia)/France, in association with European Film Promotion, an initiative of the European Union's Media Program. In Serbo-Croatian. Distributors: Le Studio Canal +, Paris; Cobra Film Department/Pandora Film, USA.

The Powder Keg [*Bure Baruta*]. Produced by Dejan Vražalić and Antoine de Clermont-Tonnerre; directed by Goran Paskaljević; screenplay by Dejan Dukovski,

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Goran Paskaljević, Filip David, Zoran Andrić. 1998; color; 100 minutes. Yugoslavia. In Serbo-Croatian. Distributor: Paramount Classics.

Within the past decade, a number of important films have been produced in wartime conditions in and about Bosnia, some under the most difficult circumstances imaginable. Many seek to foreground the experiences of ordinary people caught in the fray. Among them, several have emerged to succeed in international competition—all four films under review, for example, were screened at the Toronto International Film Festival in either 1997 or 1998—and have obtained limited distribution with the support of coproducers.

Welcome to Sarajevo, a feature film based on a memoir by journalist Michael Nicholson, foregrounds a journalist's conflict over whether or not to smuggle a young orphan girl out of Bosnia and bring her home with him to England. Designated by the United Nations as the "14th worst place on earth," the region is portrayed here as a fictionalized visual environment, but the filmmaker nonetheless manages to interrogate the complex history and culture of Bosnia. In so doing, this reenactment of a true-to-life incident is without question one of the most riveting and worthwhile films of its genre, suggesting that Michael Winterbottom may well be one of the few commercial directors working in English to be primarily concerned with the ethics of a moral cinema.

Underscoring the narrative is the film's focus on the ethics of journalism: how, it invites the viewer to consider, is the ongoing tragic conflict to be made repeatedly watchable for primetime news? Opening with scenes from the 1984 Olympics in Sarajevo, the film continues with restrained yet rigorous camera movement throughout. Without resorting to the seductions of cheap outrage or emotional manipulation, Winterbottom maintains a steadily vibrant imagery by prioritizing the intensity of experience of his protagonists. Just as the film attempts to understand, both visually and narratively, the framework of a civil war often portrayed as unfathomable by the Western press, so, too, must the viewer make the effort to comprehend the film's multiple points of view within a structure that shifts from mock-documentary to actual archival footage, from home movies to reconstructed war scenes. The struggle at the film's center thus becomes the viewer's effort to understand empathically—yet resist the impulse to recoil from—the apparent hopelessness of the situation in Bosnia. In this effort, the camera becomes both guide and independent witness, circulating through the corpse-littered city of Sarajevo, registering its anarchic conditions gradually, as each scene accumulates a wealth of experience, texture, and immediacy.

The first Bosnian feature film to be released after Bosnia became a sovereign and independent state in 1992, *The Perfect Circle* was selected to open the prestigious Directors' Fortnight at the Cannes International Film Festival in 1997. An unusual example of international collaboration, even among postcommunist cinematic practices in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, the film was shot in Sarajevo, then in Brač on the Croatian coast, and processed in Zagreb; the score was recorded in Amsterdam with two composers, one from Sarajevo and the other from Tel Aviv, and post-production work was finished in Paris.

Filming began in February 1996, after the Dayton Peace Accord had been signed, when, according to its acclaimed director, Ademir Kenović, who had to obtain permission from United Nations authorities to film in his native city, one could still feel the tension in the events, memories, and atmosphere of the war. Whereas its subject transcends that of war by focusing on the experiences of ordinary people, the film nonetheless evokes the impression of a documentary of everyday life in war-torn Sarajevo. In fact, the shooting of the original screenplay was to begin in spring 1992, when war broke out, causing the filmmakers to go into hiding for four months in the Holiday Inn, the only hotel that, while riddled with bullet holes, was still functioning. As a result, the script was rewritten in the midst of the worst days of the Serbian siege of Sarajevo, by Kenović in collaboration with Pjer Zalica and Abdulah Sidran, the latter a poet and screenwriter whose credits include another Cannes Festival winner, *When Father Was Away on Business* (1985), directed by another celebrated Bosnian filmmaker, Emir Kusturica.

At the heart of *Perfect Circle* is an affecting portrayal of Adis and Kerim, two young boys aged nine and seven, who, after losing their whole family (with the exception of an aunt, Aicha, who has fled to Germany), find refuge in the house of Hamza, a poet whose wife and daughter have left Sarajevo during the first year of the war. Unable to abandon the children, Hamza must locate the missing aunt. Day after day, the poet and the brothers learn to live together, even to love each other, confronting and ultimately surmounting the indescribable difficulties of life in a destroyed city. After obtaining news of Aicha, Hamza prepares for the boys' departure for Hrasnica, and from there to Germany. But Adis and Kerim, having discovered the well-being of a home with Hamza, are reluctant to leave. After his house is bombed, Hamza accompanies them to the border point of separation—a final, exceptionally difficult passage—as he must face the anguish of uncertainty about their eventual arrival.

Although Srdjan Dragojević, director of *Pretty Village, Pretty Flame* (1996), a tragicomedy about the Bosnian war, had vowed never to undertake another project dealing with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, he was compelled to make *The Wounds* by the story of two young men, victims of the moral and political turmoil of a society devastated by war, who enter the criminal underground in order to appear on the television talk show *The Street Pulse*, whose guests are Belgrade's most ruthless gangsters. Having achieved their dream, their success in the world of

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crime is truncated by the violence that arises between them, resulting in a blood feud of retribution that requires an equal number of wounds to be inflicted upon each. The "wounds" of the title clearly transcend those of a purely physical nature, as Dragojević invokes the psychological scars of war on an entire generation that has, in his view, been denied both a present and a future. Despite the inevitable representations of brutality in this film, its chronicle of the moral and ethical toll taken on the lives of its young protagonists emerges as an engaging and dynamic cinematic text of the Bosnian experience.

In a more literary register, the distinguished Serbian director Goran Paskaljević has created in *The Powder Keg* a significantly powerful film, set in Belgrade in November 1995, that offers a fictional yet nonetheless compelling account of events occurring on the night of the Dayton Peace Accord. Within the framework of a lingering threat of violence and hatred, Paskaljević, like his counterpart Kenović in *The Perfect Circle*, is concerned primarily with the experiences of ordinary people caught in the crossfire, forced to contend with brutal material realities without abandoning hope for a "normal" life. Signs of war are ubiquitous, as chaos, madness, and unrelenting conflict undermine the city at every turn.

In a crumbling hospital, one protagonist, Michael, visits a childhood friend whose legs have been blown off at the front line, offering him artificial limbs he has found in Paris. Members of a Bosnian Serb refugee family live in a garage with only the most rudimentary of accommodations. Mustache, a former teacher from Sarajevo, now a bus driver who refuses to work for war profiteers and traffickers, serves as a moral center for the film's consideration of corruption and ethics in the midst of wartime chaos, while at the same time his seventeen-year-old son has become involved with the local mafia. The film's structure conveys the impression that these protagonists' lives are ultimately intermingled in an explosive destiny on this fateful, historic night, with sequences shot in variations of sepia tones that evoke the fate of Belgrade's citizens.

All four films succeed admirably in providing a historical framework as a backdrop to the nightmare conditions of the Bosnian war while simultaneously presenting vibrant characters of uncontestable humanity. These are artistically viable, challenging, yet beautifully produced films that invite the audience to move beyond conventional Western attitudes of incomprehension or helplessness with regard to the tragic events they portray.

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Collected Essays

These volumes, recently received in the *AHR* office, do not lend themselves readily to unified reviews; the contents are therefore listed.

METHODS/THEORY

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS

To the Editor:

We recently read Keith Windschuttle's book *The Killing of History: How a Discipline Is Being Murdered by Literary Critics and Social Theorists*. Wondering how the book had been received, we consulted Dominick LaCapra's review [*AHR* 103 (February 1998): 148–49]. We were appalled; if anything, LaCapra's review is evidence that Windschuttle's central argument is correct. LaCapra accused Windschuttle of being "vitriolic" and "closed mind[ed]" (p. 149). In our opinion, these adjectives are more applicable to LaCapra's review than Windschuttle's book.

Instead of critiquing Windschuttle's arguments, LaCapra merely constructed an empirical straw man, then ripped it down, attempting to defend the critics and theorists that Windschuttle deprecated. Those who have only read the review might be interested to know that, despite what LaCapra says, Windschuttle does not characterize those he criticizes as "invading aliens," "traitors," and "dupes." In fact, as LaCapra acknowledges, Windschuttle's intention was "to provide accurate synoptic accounts of the views of his adversaries" (p. 148). A less partisan reviewer would surely have conceded that Windschuttle effectively and succinctly summarized the ideas he criticized. However, according to LaCapra, Windschuttle merely sought "to construct an insufficiently differentiated 'other'" (p. 148), as if Windschuttle had lumped Foucault in with Fukuyama.

In *The Killing of History*, Windschuttle criticized a number of works of "theoretical" history, showing that their authors had twisted facts to suit theories rather than theories to suit facts. Thus, unsurprisingly, Windschuttle used the empirical method to defend the empirical method. Strangely, however, LaCapra criticized Windschuttle for "his reliance on rather loose montage or collage as an overall organizational device, for the list of his adversaries and 'test cases' would seem to make any stronger mode of articulation unavailable to him" (p. 149). LaCapra, in other words, attempted to portray induction as a stylistic device rather than a legitimate method of inquiry, deliberately confusing style with substance.

LaCapra's review also relied heavily on the use of loaded terms, beginning with his first sentence: "This book falls into a rapidly growing *genre*, what might be called *born-again* empiricism or, at times, even positivism, arising in *reaction* to recent theoretical and methodological *initiatives* and often *rallying around the flag* of objectivity [emphasis ours]" (p. 148). LaCapra might as well have called Windschuttle an ignorant, fanatical, and reactionary hypocrite who opposes new ideas because they are new. LaCapra provided no evidence for this position; instead, he substituted abusive language for argument.

Such sleazy insinuations recurred throughout LaCapra's review. His favorite trick was to compare Windschuttle's views with fundamentalist religion. He wrote that Windschuttle's arguments are suitable for "a bloody crusade" and concluded that *The Killing of History*'s purpose was purely "ritualistic": Windschuttle was merely "preaching to the converted" and "shoring up an embattled faith" (p. 149). LaCapra's attempt to characterize Windschuttle as a historical Jerry Falwell is ironic, considering the role that empiricism played in breaking the grip of religion on the mind of the West.

LaCapra employed other fallacies as well, especially toward the end of his review, where he made improper appeals to both popularity and practice. Historians, he implies, should adopt a "theoretical" perspective because other historians have already done so. In other words, hop on the bandwagon: don't be left behind with Reverend Windschuttle and his disciples.

We believe that Windschuttle has some important things to say about the way history is being written and taught. His book is far from perfect but deserves better

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than LaCapra's vituperation. Rather than debate with *The Killing of History*, LaCapra simply sneered at it, which was unfair to both Windschuttle and the historical community. Whether or not you agree with Windschuttle, his critique should be taken seriously. Disregard the review and read the book.

DARYL BASWICK
DAVID LEESON
McMaster University

DOMINICK LACAPRA REPLIES:

I wonder what adjectives Daryl Baswick and David Leeson find applicable for their own letter, which is as weakly argued as the book they try to defend. The title of Windschuttle's book alone, wherein intellectual and interdisciplinary challenges are converted into death threats, gives some idea of its "arguments." I offer a few examples from Windschuttle's preface, with respect to which the terms I employed are quite justified. First, he inveighs against aliens: "We are now witnessing a breed of literary critics, literary theorists and theoretical sociologists who have moved in and begun writing their own versions of history." Second, he turns to traitors: "Some of those who trained as historians and spent most of their working lives in the field have accepted the validity of the critics' arguments and have written works from what would once have been regarded as an alien perspective." Third, he alludes to dupes: "There are a small number of very good historians who, though still upholding the discipline's traditional methodology, have recently incorporated into their work ideas and practices that a decade ago they would not have countenanced. The representatives of this last group are embracing assumptions that have the capacity to demolish everything they stand for" (p. 2). In a sweepingly indiscriminate gesture in which very different and at times mutually critical approaches are amalgamated as invading "others," Windshuttle then tells the reader that his "principal targets" are cultural relativism, semiotics, structuralist theory, poststructuralist theory, antihumanism, genealogy and discourse theory, Hegelian and Marxist philosophy of history, postmodernist philosophy of history, radical skepticism and scientific relativism, hermeneutics, historical fiction and theory of poetics (pp. 2–3).

The preface is an apocalyptic if not projective and paranoid herald of things to come in which a putatively "lethal" threat to "genuine historians" (p. 4) is met by a preemptively lethal attack. Here is but one of Windschuttle's sweeping indictments of the current critical scene in which he offers a specular image of the despised "other"—an image in which questionable analogy is misrepresented as exactitude: "One of the most striking things about the output of the late twentieth [*sic*] literary and social theory is how closely it resembles—through its slavish devotion to seminal texts and its unrestrained flight across all subject matter—the theology of the medieval clergy. Today's theorists have substituted French theory for Christian texts but are seeking to break down the disciplines in exactly the same way" (p. 222).

"Unrestrained flight across all subject matter" could not be more apt to describe what I termed Windschuttle's own "reliance on rather loose montage or collage as an overall organizational device." Logic itself disintegrates when such a device is confused with induction. Windschuttle's book is at best a broadside or a discursive analogue of saturation bombing—not a careful, discriminating, well-articulated set of arguments. And the figures or tendencies he attacks are as varied in orientation as they are in stature. He devotes almost as much attention to Fukuyama as to Foucault, and if anything he employs a less dismissive and aggressive tone with the former (whom he does lump in with Hegel as well as Nietzsche) than with the latter. Moreover, he allocates more space to Fukuyama—over fourteen pages—than to truly important and influential literary critics and social theorists (for example, Pierre Bourdieu, Jürgen Habermas, Fredric Jameson, Paul Ricoeur, and other figures he treats summarily). He also slights historians or cultural analysts who have tried constructively, but also at times critically, to come to terms with recent tendencies—many of whom he does not even mention. (For example, no mention is made of Robert Berkhofer, Jr., Iain Chambers, Geoff Eley, Nancy Fraser, Jan Goldstein, Harry Harootunian, Geoffrey Hartman, Martin Jay, Gareth Stedman Jones, Bruno Latour, Meaghan Morris, Peter Novick, Michael Roth, Joan Scott, Gabrielle Spiegel, John Toews, and others.) One may disagree with Foucault in basic ways (as I do), but even to treat him and Fukuyama in a comparable manner is a serious lapse of judgment. One may also have (as I do) strong critical reservations about certain recent figures and tendencies that appear in lead or cameo roles in Windschuttle's book, but one may nonetheless expect of a scholar both fairness in representing the views of others and discriminating critical judgment in evaluating them. Here, Baswick and Leeson are asking the impossible: that a reviewer somehow treat Windshuttle's reductive and indiscriminate survey in the manner in which he should have treated the complex figures he bowdlerizes and lambastes.

Empirical inquiry and theory are not incompatible. Nor are induction and argument. Their cogent articulation in a sustained analysis and critique of significant intellectual currents of the twentieth century demands much more than Windschuttle's book is able to deliver. I would reiterate the basic point that Windschuttle is preaching to the converted. Baswick and Leeson have been (no doubt already were) converted and—as they assume the role of ingénue and wander the globe wondering about the book's reception—are upset by any interference in the process of propagating the faith. Anti-theoretical, doctrinal empiricism—in contrast to empirical inquiry—is itself a faith, however impoverished and self-deceived, especially when it

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allows for little or no discrimination in identifying and attacking its targeted "others." I would mention only one egregious instance of Windschuttle's ideologically tendentious and blind defense of empiricism that accompanies his attack on Anne Salmond's *Two Worlds: First Meetings between Maori and Europeans 1642–1772*. He objects to Salmond's supposed relativism in trying to present both sides of the story. Instead, Windschuttle insists on the necessity of "an historical perspective that transcends parochial Maori culture" (p. 276). This imperially transcendent metanarrative that both delivers "historical reality" (p. 276) and tells "what really happened" (p. 277) also "proves" European superiority. In reality, it amounts to blaming the victim (whatever the tribal warfare among Maori may have been at the time of "contact"). The Maori did not realize what Europeans knew: that their "portentous . . . contacts" with the Europeans were "life-threatening" for the Maori (p. 276). For Windschuttle, the Maori's putative lack of the Europeans' "historical sense" concerning the devastating nature of "contact" for them proves—*mirabile dictu*!—that the Maori were "profoundly mistaken" and (in Peter Munz's words quoted with approval) "lacking in something essential" (p. 276).

The unconverted who read Windschuttle's book expecting careful analysis and nuanced judgment—not to mention sensitivity—may well come away with the impression that the criticisms in my review were understated.

DOMINICK LACAPRA
Cornell University

TO THE EDITOR:

Jaime Rodríguez's review of my book *The Americas in the Age of Revolution, 1750–1850* (*AHR* 103 [October 1998]: 1218–19) warrants a response.

Rodríguez is incorrect when he writes that I neither provide a definition of revolution nor am consistent in my use of chaos theory and complex systems. On pages 1–4 of the book, I explain revolution (as well as a revolutionary situation), identify what I believe is the important distinction between revolution and rebellion, and point out the crucial difference between the American, Haitian, and Spanish-American revolutions on the one hand and the French, Russian, and Chinese on the other. Chaos theory and complex systems are more useful to the social scientist, I concede, but chaos theory provides the historian with a reminder that change is not always linear or immediate, and complexity offers us a way of understanding how creativity, order, and adaptation emerge from the chaos of revolution.

Rodríguez chides me for not providing a more detailed account of the differences between the American and Spanish-American revolutions. He states that the United States had "but one revolution" as contrasted with the "several insurgencies with different characteristics" in Spanish America (p. 1218). In actuality, the American Revolution appeared to have singular purpose and character, but the war was different in every theater, the relationship between the military and civilian leadership was often contentious, and revolutionary politics at every level was riven by factionalism, blood feuds, and uncertainty about the future. British-American revolutionaries got more financial support than their Spanish-American counterparts, but the Continental Army continually suffered from shortages. Certainly, the economic condition of the United States looked far more promising than that confronted by Spanish America, but the long European war from 1793 to 1815 between France and Great Britain inflicted serious damage on U.S. commerce and the economies of U.S. eastern seaboard cities.

Rodríguez is correct in pointing out that I do not make sufficient distinction between the experience of Mexico (and Central America) and that of South America, but he wrongfully accuses me of ignoring the nature of government and society in postrevolutionary Spanish America or the economic disadvantages confronted by the new governments (pp. 248–54). Further, his assertion that I am invoking a U.S. interpretation of the Spanish-American revolutions when I discuss the role of the military is mistaken. The American Revolution *avoided* the militarization of society, but Spanish America did not. The legacy of this experience had a profound impact on the relationship between the military and the state in postrevolutionary Spanish America, including Mexico, as Tulio Halperín Donghi, Jan Bazant, Frank Safford, Alain Roquié, among others, have shown. U.S. presidents often used the military in an aggressive manner to assert central authority and incorporate a continental empire. But they were not so fearful as their Spanish-American counterparts that the society might not survive prolonged conflict or that the future might be more calamitous than the past.

Rodríguez laments that I have not given proper attention to the great political revolution that went on in the Spanish world in the tumultuous years from 1808 to 1826, a story admirably recounted in his recent book, *The Independence of Spanish America* (1998). I intentionally de-emphasized the transatlantic dimensions of the American, Haitian, and Spanish-American revolutions because I wanted to bring the particularity of these struggles to center stage and to explain how those who were caught up in these struggles adapted to their chaotic patterns. I did not tell the "whole story" about any of these revolutions.

Rodríguez takes issue with my interpretation of Simon Bolívar. I chose Bolívar because he embodied all the passions and contradictions of the Spanish-American cause and, more important, because of the hardships he confronted in molding an army of *castas* to fight a war in the countryside. My interpretation of Bolívar and his place in the history of the Spanish-

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American revolutions is not simplistic or characteristic of a "North American" view of his role. Rodríguez describes him as a "destroyer" and an "autocrat" (p. 1219). A generation of U.S. leaders in the 1820s would have heartily seconded that assessment.

LESTER D. LANGLEY
University of Georgia

Jaime E. Rodríguez does not wish to reply.

THE EDITORS

TO THE EDITOR:

In Paul W. Schroeder's extremely interesting review of Konrad Canis's book *Von Bismarck zur Weltpolitik* on German foreign policy from 1890 to 1902 (*AHR* 103 [October 1998]: 1265–66), Schroeder expresses the view that German errors were less responsible for the ultimate defeat than the fact that "those who were willing to call the shots in the game of world politics, especially Britain and Russia, had their own reasons, capacities, and strategies for seeing to it that Germany would lose no matter what it did." Since Russia lost to Germany at Brest Litovsk in 1918, I wonder if France should not be close to the center. In the years covered by the book, realpolitik led Republican France to make what George F. Kennan has called "the Fateful Alliance" with czarist Russia. After the Fashoda crisis of 1898, Théophile Delcassé, as French foreign secretary starting that year on June 28, began the policy that led to the *entente* with Britain in 1904 and to weakening Italy's adherence to the Triple Alliance. German pressure forced him to resign on June 6, 1905, but his accomplishment lasted: when war came in 1914, Britain, going beyond its written obligations, declared war on Germany, and Italy did not honor its alliance with the Central Powers. It seems to me that France, and specifically Delcassé, called a lot of shots.

BERNARD SINSHEIMER
University of Maryland, European Division

PAUL SCHROEDER REPLIES:

I thank Bernard Sinsheimer for his kind comment on the review, and certainly agree with him that France, in particular Delcassé, played a very prominent role in defeating Germany's bid for world position before World War I. I would concede further that Delcassé's policy was more systematically and consciously anti-German than either British or Russian policy generally. I still think I would emphasize the roles of Great Britain and Russia, simply because they more than France were in a position to frustrate German aims in the imperialist-*Weltpolitik* contest, in the Far East, the Near and Middle East, Africa, and the high seas, and had obvious reasons for doing so. However, there is no basis for any real dispute between us here.

PAUL W. SCHROEDER
EMERITUS
University of Illinois, Urbana

TO THE EDITOR:

Readers will question the fairness of Gwendolyn Midlo Hall's review of Gilbert C. Din and John E. Harkins's book *The New Orleans Cabildo: Colonial Louisiana's First City Government, 1769–1803* (*AHR* 103 [October 1998]: 1316–17). An *AHR* reader turns to a review for a succinct summary and detached critique of the arguments found in a book. Instead, Hall dispenses with that duty in a few sentences in order to devote the review to her own special concerns. First, she disputed the authors' observation that only a minority of Spanish administrative records remained in Louisiana after 1803, but her reference to the judicial and notarial records that did remain in the province is quite beside Din and Harkins's point. Hall then misrepresents the authors as suggesting that "there were substantial numbers of runaway slaves only during the 1780s." In fact, the writers devote the better part of Chapter 7 to describing runaways before, during, and after that period, their point being that no maroon communities are recorded except for a brief time in the early 1780s, a subject on which Din has published detailed research elsewhere. Most unusual is Hall's presentation of raw data concerning numbers of testimonies about runaways that in no way controverts the authors' argument, data that have never been described and submitted to peer review. Hall ignores the bulk of the author's book (ten additional chapters), one of the few studies of municipal administration in an eighteenth-century North American community. I disagree with several of Din and Harkins's arguments about social conditions in New Orleans, but I should prefer to find their useful analysis of the cabildo's operations aired and weighed in the *AHR*, rather than this emphasis on the reviewer's own unpublished research about a subject that plays just one part in a large book.

THOMAS N. INGERSOLL
University of Montreal

GWENDOLYN MIDLO HALL REPLIES:

In the interest of civility, I have consistently declined to review bad books. My review of the Din/Harkins book is both positive and informative. Nevertheless, I did raise questions about its overreaching conclusions about social conditions in Spanish New Orleans based almost entirely on administrative documents. My review stated that it would be too much to ask that these historians consult the mountains of relevant notarial documents housed at the New Orleans Civil Court building, but asked that their existence be recognized

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and not positively denied. Furthermore, the rich Spanish Judicial Records are easily accessible. Substantial numbers of these documents have been indexed and/or translated by Laura L. Porteous and published in the *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, volumes 1–29, 1917 through 1941. All of them are available at the Louisiana Historical Center of the Louisiana State Museum in New Orleans.

It is true that Gilbert Din has published an article about the San Malo maroons, but again, using purely administrative records. By failing to use the Spanish Judicial Records containing testimony from some of these runaway slaves, he presents them as thieves and gratuitous murderers. The testimony of slaves captured during the years preceding San Malo's capture shows their autonomous activities in production and trade and the defensive nature of the murders for which San Malo and his companions were hanged without benefit of trial. These documents were used in James T. McGowan's "Creation of a Slave Society: Louisiana Plantations in the Eighteenth Century" (PhD dissertation, University of Rochester, 1976), and in this writer's chapter about runaway slaves in the cypress swamps in *Africans in Colonial Louisiana: The Development of Afro-Creole Culture in the Eighteenth Century* (1992).

Ingersoll claims that I present unpublished "data that have never been described and submitted to peer review," referring to my *Louisiana Slave Database, 1723–1820*. This database has been in progress since 1984. Some initial results were published in my *Africans in Colonial Louisiana . . .*, which won nine book prizes. The expansion of the initial database was evaluated three times by review panels of the National Endowment for the Humanities. The NEH funded the project for five years with matching funds from the ministries of culture of France and Spain, the Guggenheim Foundation, and several other funding agencies after being submitted to their review processes. It is now in press at Louisiana State University Press and will appear as a compact disc this year. My new book, tentatively entitled *Ethnicity and Race, Slavery and Freedom: A Comparison of French, Spanish, and Early American Louisiana, 1720–1820*, relies heavily on this database. It is under contract with University of North Carolina Press, where the proposal was also submitted to peer review. It deals with runaway slaves and their communities throughout Louisiana in some detail.

I have tried to be as civil as possible to Thomas Ingersoll. We both know that I fundamentally disagree with his belief that slavery was the same in all times and places. My work has always been comparative, studying changing patterns within a broad context over time, place, and circumstance. I declined to review Ingersoll's book manuscript for a very prestigious press, leaving the decision to other scholars. Ingersoll and, unfortunately, some other male specialists in slavery studies and Louisiana history seem to have a serious problem with the very concept of an independent-minded, senior woman impinging what they consider their territory and have descended to new depths in their attempts to discredit me. Perhaps some of them feel I should study women and leave the real history to the men.

GWENDOLYN MIDLO HALL
EMERITA
Rutgers University

TO THE EDITOR:

It should come as no surprise to readers of Albert S. Lindemann's two books—both histories of anti-Semitism written from the anti-Semites' point of view—that his review in the December 1998 *AHR* of Robert Chazan's *Medieval Stereotypes and Modern Antisemitism* evinces a sympathy for medieval lepers that is nowhere in evidence in his remarks about medieval Jews. No doubt, the Florentine bankers who practiced usury on a much vaster scale did so in accents less grating to the ears of medieval, and modern, anti-Semites.

The surprise here—indeed, a puzzle worthy of a medieval mystery play—is why the *AHR* chose Lindemann to do this review as opposed to, say, R.I. Moore, Mark R. Cohen, Gavin I. Langmuir, or any number of other scholars possessed of the judgment and credentials that Lindemann sorely lacks. Perhaps it is a holiday prank. Or perhaps the *AHR* is seriously deploying a new, subjective principle in choosing reviewers, i.e., it takes a bigot to review a book on bigotry. Applying the same principle, we can look forward to reviews of histories of spousal abuse by violent misogynists, reviews of histories of the ASPCA by pathological dog beaters, and reviews of histories of lynching by surviving members of the White Citizens' Councils. Just in case there is a temptation to recruit Byron de la Beckwith for the last of these assignments, I regret to have to pass along the information that he is recently deceased. No, I am not suggesting that some of Lindemann's best friends are Klansmen. Any self-respecting Kleagle would be put off by his academic pretensions.

HAROLD BRACKMAN
San Diego, California

ALBERT LINDEMANN REPLIES:

Harold Brackman's letter amply discredits itself. My first inclination was simply to ignore it as unworthy of a response, confident that most readers of the *AHR* would recognize the author as an obnoxious and fatuous crank. That I decided to answer reflects my conclusion that a reply might serve a number of useful purposes, one of which is to encourage many to read the review who might otherwise have overlooked it. I hope readers will then also take some time to look over my other work, since I gather that Brackman's real wish is to discredit it.

Since the letter is in part directed against the editors

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of the *AHR*, it seems fitting to say a few words in defense of their choice of me as reviewer. I have reviewed books for the *AHR* for around thirty years, beginning not long after I received my PhD from Harvard University and published my first book. My most immediate credentials as a reviewer in this field include two books on the history of anti-Semitism (*The Jew Accused*, 1991, and *Esau's Tears*, 1997) published by Cambridge University Press, not known, to my knowledge, any more than Harvard University for supporting bigotry. Publishers of my other books include Yale University Press, the University of California Press, and Longman. If the editors of the *AHR* are to be blamed for selecting me as a reviewer, then the editor of the AHA's *Perspectives* should also be denounced for asking me to write an article for it (October 1993, "Anti-Semitism: A Case for Teaching about the Manifestations of Prejudice"). So, too, the editors of *The Chronicle of Higher Education* (for an op-ed piece, June 1, 1994, "The Lessons of Anti-Semitism"). I have been asked as well to write reviews or articles dealing with anti-Semitism for the following scholarly journals: *Religion*, *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, *Central European History*, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *Shofar*, *The Historian*, and *The European Review*. As long as we are at it, why not blame the Jewish Studies Program at the University of Wisconsin for inviting me to be Senior Distinguished Lecturer, or the Academic Senate of the University of California, Santa Barbara, for voting me Distinguished Teacher of the Year, citing in particular my courses on anti-Semitism?

I could lengthen this list of those who might be similarly blamed for not spotting my "academic pretensions," but I hope I have provided enough information so that readers will understand that a holiday prank or perversity of judgment are not the most likely reasons that the editors of the *AHR* asked me to review Robert Chazan's book. I suppose, too, that they may have seen the many positive reviews of my books on anti-Semitism ("original and often brilliant," *History Today* [December 1998]: 52; "Any fair-minded reader has to be impressed by the way in which Lindemann tackles taboo after taboo in the litany of antisemitic historiography and, basing himself scrupulously on scholarly research, reveals a much more complex picture," *TLS*, March 4, 1998; "Lindemann's richness and subtlety are difficult to overstate," *The Nation* [April 6, 1998]: 28). Personally, the reaction I found most meaningful came in an e-mail post from a man, E.Z., now a retired professor, who escaped Germany in 1938 on the last *Kindertransport*: "I have just finished reading *Esau's Tears* and I wanted to tell you what a splendid book it is. It is meticulously researched and beautifully written—by far the best book I have ever read on this sad subject."

I understand, of course, that none of the above information will have the slightest effect on the Brackmans of the world, confined in their smug and self-righteous circles, lashing out in reckless and vicious terms at any who deviate from their vision of the truth. It is only too clear that they are not interested in scholarly exchange but in vilification and unprincipled misinformation.

I have taken the time to reply in part because I worry that such men often succeed in limiting free discussion in this field by intimidating those who might want to participate but fear being crudely maligned and insulted. I hasten to add that my own experience over the past decade from other scholars has been mostly of warm support, even when mixed with honest disagreement—occasionally interrupted, alas, by pompous and malevolent outbursts like this one.

ALBERT S. LINDEMANN
University of California, Santa Barbara

TO THE EDITOR:

I was amused to see in Brian Dippie's review of my book *Indian Nation: Native American Literature and Nineteenth-Century Nationalisms* [*AHR* 103 (December 1998): 1691–92] his lofty assertion of what "a historian would want to resolve" (presumably as opposed to a literary critic like myself) regarding the integrity of the text. I was amused not so much by the peculiar implication that historians are naïve readers, who cannot accept the ambiguous "integrity" of most nineteenth-century Native American texts, but by his unwitting self-condemnation. Perhaps these matters are on his mind at the moment because I note in my book (though he neglects to mention it in the review) that in *The Vanishing American* he completely misidentified a text by Simon Pokagon. Not only did he fail to inquire about the integrity of the text, it seems, but clearly he (a noted historian) failed to read it all!

CHERYL WALKER
Scripps College

BRIAN DIPPIE REPLIES:

I am glad Cheryl Walker was amused, and am grateful for her correction to a book that originated as a dissertation twenty-nine years ago, when I was less perfect than I am now.

BRIAN W. DIPPIE
University of Victoria

ERRATUM

In the book review of Earl P. Olmstead, *David Zeisberger: A Life among the Indians*, *AHR* 103 (December 1998): 1690, the phrase "murders in Philadelphia by the Paxton Boys" should have read "murders in Lancaster by the Paxton Boys." The reviewer, Beverly Smaby, regrets the error.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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